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THE INFLUENCE OF HISTORY UPON SEA POWER

A COMMENT ON AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY¹

BY A. WHITNEY GRISWOLD

IT IS fifty years since Alfred Mahan's exposition of the influence of sea power upon history inspired the new American navy. Mahan reached far into the past for his ideas. Today new weapons, new methods of warfare, new modes of living call for serious reappraisal of maxims propounded half a century ago from human experience of a still more distant epoch. For if sea power has influenced history, history—whether we think of it as the record of life or as life itself—has returned the compliment. Through popular beliefs over which Mahan could not prevail, through Mahan's own writings, through scientific progress and political and economic developments since his time, history has wrought its influence on the conception and uses of sea power. In what ways and how they affect the United States it is the purpose of this paper briefly to inquire.

For its present size and strength the United States owes relatively less to warfare than any other great power of modern times. This has been its singular good fortune. The preoccupations of European and Asiatic powers in their own continents, the oceans which separate both of these from America, the absence of menacing neighbors in the Western Hemisphere, the favorable climate, rich soil, ready access to the sea, and unparalleled wealth of natural resources of their own country have enabled the American people to secure in peace most of the things for which Asiatics were starving and Europeans continually fighting. Wars the United States has fought, to be sure, for independence, for union, for the expansion of its territories and the ideals of its people. In peacetime, moreover, it has employed its army and navy to insure its own security and to lend weight and substance to its foreign policies. In these respects it differs from the other great powers only in degree. But that degree has been sufficiently large to give rise to an American belief in a better life than that of the eternally warring Europeans, a life that could be led without recourse to the tools of war.

Until the World War, this belief embraced only the people of the Western Hemisphere. The War projected it to include the entire world. Passive or dynamic, it became an American conviction that war was not an inevitable concomitant of life, and that it could be eradicated by such methods as universal disarmament and the establishment of a system of world government or simple forbearance. Here we must note perhaps the most significant influence of history upon sea power in the past half-century. Mahan was the world's foremost exponent of armament, a disbeliever in arbitration and a believer in the morally purifying qualities of war.

¹ Read before the joint session of the American Historical Association and the American Military Institute, Washington, D. C., December 28, 1939.

Whereas the World War stimulated an American naval expansion of which Mahan unquestionably would have approved, it also set in motion a law of diminishing returns that militated against the uses of armaments in general and Mahan's conception of those uses in particular. Although the United States refused to join the League of Nations, it was propelled by popular demand to assume leadership of the disarmament movement, and to take an active part in the parallel movement toward international arbitration, consultation, and cooperation. Even some leading isolationists tended to oppose naval expansion as an unnecessary and an uneconomical diversion of funds from the fundamental needs of the American people. In short, practically every element in American political life except the professional naval scientists turned from Mahan's teachings to other alternatives: the League, disarmament, Pan-Americanism, isolation—all minimizing the positive value of sea power.

The results of this trend are too many and varied to be covered here. To mention only a few: the Washington and London naval treaties, the Philippine Independence Act, and last but not least the cash-and-carry neutrality law showed a very substantial qualification of the command-of-the-sea doctrine. Based on actual rather than potential relationships, the naval treaties and the non-fortification agreement confirmed the decision of the United States not to strive for command of the sea in the western Pacific. The cash-and-carry law was a dramatic revision of the freedom of the seas principle that had been a partial cause of American involvement in two wars and a focal point in Mahan's thesis. All of these steps, in the aggregate, amounted to a contraction of what might be called the American command area to the western hemisphere.

Psychological reaction to total war was not, however, the only factor in the process. Another was to be found in Mahan's own writings. These preached the gospel of sea power not only to the United States but also to the other principal industrial powers, inspiring them, too, to build great navies. Like the exporters of industrial machinery Mahan stirred up international naval competition which in turn cut down the potential command areas of every nation including his own. Doubtless these navies would have been built anyway, but Mahan's exciting pages hurried them along. As they took shape, the United States, England, Germany, France, Italy, and Japan all acquired command of the sea in certain areas and lost it in others. While the United States gained superiority over each of them in the western hemisphere, it lost it to them in the Eastern Atlantic, the Western Pacific, and other more remote and narrower seas.

Economic and political conditions which Mahan either overlooked or insufficiently appreciated further intensified the constricting process. Here again we have space for only a few examples. Mahan's economic premises, which applied accurately enough, perhaps, to England, led him into an error of emphasis when he transposed them to the United States. A small, overcrowded island, dependent upon maritime commerce for its very existence and on the maintenance of far-wandering sea communications for the safety of its empire, was bound to attach

more importance to sea power than a great, underpopulated, almost self-sufficient continental power whose vital material resources, commerce, and communications lay compactly within its own territories. It is true, as Mahan argued, that the geographical position of the United States made a naval island out of it; that it therefore could do many of the things with a navy that England had done. But because the welfare of so few Americans as compared with Englishmen was bound up with overseas traffic of any kind, the American people never wished to do those things as much as the English.

There are many indications of this fact. American foreign trade has lately eclipsed England's in volume; but only about eight percent of the total raw materials, agricultural commodities, and manufactured goods produced in the United States goes into this trade as compared with twenty-five to thirty percent of the products of the United Kingdom. England's foreign investments today exceed those of the United States by nearly six billion dollars, or four to one on a per capita comparison. During the period 1920-1931, when American foreign investment reached its peak, foreign capital issues averaged only fourteen percent of the total capital issues marketed annually in the United States. The comparable English figure was thirty-eight percent. Moreover, to the United States of the early nineteenth century, which occupied so large a space in Mahan's mind, maritime commerce and communications were more vital than to the United States of 1890 or 1940. Witness the decline of the American merchant marine, so much deplored by Mahan, the true competitors of which were the canals, railroads, highways, and airlines that carried Americans away from potential riches overseas to the actual riches of their own continent. When the American people obtained in the Philippines the very type of naval base and commercial entrepôt essential to Mahan's economy, they neglected it until it became a hostage instead of a weapon, and then voted to get rid of it because it competed with their domestic interests. The United States has been free to build the world's greatest merchant marine, to convert Manila into an American Singapore, to achieve and maintain a quantitative two-to-one naval superiority over Japan. But it has not wished to do these things. Why? Not because they were impossible, but because the material incentive to do them was lacking. Nor have all Mahan's writings or followers been able to supply the incentive.

Here is yet another instance of historical factors shaping American naval policy to their configuration rather than of sea power influencing history. It is an instance which by no means vitiates Mahan's entire teachings. For only a part of these were devoted to imperialistic overseas expansion. Most of what he wrote concerning the importance of ships, bases, and lines of communication lying within the American command area has been substantiated by the very trends that have diminished the needs and possibilities of expansion beyond that area.

Reinforcing these trends are the new weapons and modes of warfare that have come into usage since Mahan's day. We have observed that Mahan drew his lessons chiefly from an era that was past even when he wrote. This was the era of

sail, of the practically unlimited cruising radius of wind-driven battleships, of the unquestioned superiority of the ship of the line over every other existing weapon except the occasional (and highly erratic) fireship and the more powerful ship of the line of an enemy. The advent of steam-driven ironclads, however, cut down the cruising radius and sea-keeping qualities of all navies by tying them to coaling and repair bases. As these modern warships turned to oil for fuel and grew in cost and technological complexity, their cruising radius was further reduced. And as the mine, the submarine, and the airplane were perfected, the ship of the line was obliged to acknowledge three weapons, any one of which might prove as deadly as another ship of the line. The results? The command of the sea had now to be contested in three dimensions instead of one; the new weapons augmented the advantages of the defense over the offense; and the command area of every sea power expanded and contracted accordingly.

Did the new weapons also seal the doom of the battleship? Twice within a quarter-century the world's greatest sea power has been forced to withdraw its battleships from the range of enemy submarines. Nor is it likely that any belligerent nation today would risk its few and costly battleships in submarine-infested, mine-sown, and air-patrolled enemy waters. Compared to their modern counterparts, the storm-beaten ships of the line that thrilled Mahan's imagination were cheap, plentiful, easily and quickly replaced and because of their immunity to weapons of a lower class could be risked in waters that modern dreadnoughts dare not enter. What significance this very patent fact holds for the navy of the future is a question for the naval scientist. But a layman may perhaps be allowed a conjecture. In the first place, the experience of England and Germany in the World War and their experience to date in the present war proves not that command of the sea is no longer an objective, but rather that it is possible only in more restricted areas and that there are more varied means of contesting it than in the past. Secondly, whatever happens to the British navy, it will be just as fallacious to mould American naval, as it was American economic, policy too closely to the British pattern. While science has brought the British isles within range of land-based, continental air power and rendered the English channel a naval death trap, it has done no such thing to the United States. Even assuming that Britain has lost some of her insular qualities and hence can no longer rely for her security on "pure" sea power, the vast oceans that an enemy would have to cross in order to attack the United States leave sea power the first and surest defense of this country now as in the past. In the tangled maze of England's European interests it is conceivable—as the present war may prove—that a great continental land power may win a limited victory over an insular sea power. In Bismarck's metaphor, the elephant may conquer the whale. It came perilously close to doing so in 1914, when the modified Schlieffen plan failed by too slight a margin to give much reassurance to the apostles of sea power.

In 1917, likewise (as Ludendorff has intimated in his war memoirs), if the German High Command had known of the imminent collapse of Russia they

might never have given the fateful order for the unrestricted submarine warfare that brought the United States into the war and so lost it for Germany. The High Seas fleet was still in being. Germany might have sat upon the winnings of Brest Litovsk, fought defensively on the western front, and defied the British fleet to starve her out. Even as it was, the British were obliged to accompany their naval warfare with a desperate and exhausting military effort. Mahan could write of the British navy during the Napoleonic wars, "Those far distant storm-beaten ships upon which the Grand Army never looked stood between it and the dominion of the world." There were moments during the World War when he might well have written, "That poor bloody infantry that never looked upon a far distant storm-beaten ship stood between England and the collapse of her sea power." No derogation of Mahan is intended in these lines, for he recognized and stressed the importance of coordinated land and sea warfare. The World War was not the first in which Britain had sent expeditionary forces to Europe; nor could they have got there without the British navy. The facts are cited merely to emphasize the relative freedom of American as compared to British sea power to operate defensively in a pure medium. Whereas a European elephant has done, and may now do more, serious injury to the British whale, the American whale can only be vanquished by another whale.

One other related factor greatly strengthens the defensive security of the United States within its own command area, namely the shift of emphasis from combat to economic pressure as the prime function of the modern navy. In this respect history has corroborated rather than confuted Mahan. But the British blockade and the German *Handelskrieg* dominate the naval tactics of those two powers even more exclusively than Mahan might have expected. And it is precisely this type of warfare that the United States with its ocean bulwarks and well-nigh total self-sufficiency is best able to withstand. In food it is already self-sufficient for war purposes. Of the few strategic raw materials that it lacks, rubber is the most important. But a variety of ways are available to repair the deficiency. Alternate sources may be developed within the American command area. Substitutes may be perfected at home. Reclamation of used stocks and increased stores of crude and unused may provide for the demands of war. Finally, although most of its rubber comes to the United States from the Dutch East Indies and the Malay States *via* the Pacific, a fair portion comes from India and Ceylon, to which the Atlantic and Indian Oceans offer an alternate approach. It is even conceivable that rubber could be transported from Malaya and parts of the East Indies by this route. Consequently, a foreign policy that guarded against antagonizing simultaneously the nations which control both routes would seem an altogether practicable insurance of the present sources of supply. A combination of all these measures and their extension to include tin, chromite, antimony, and the few other strategic materials in which it is deficient would make the wartime self-sufficiency of the United States approximately complete. But the influence of history has placed this accomplishment within the

spheres of American industrial technology and economic and foreign policy rather than in an unqualified expansion of sea power.

What is true of the wartime resources of the United States is also true of its peacetime resources. Mahan postulated a navy, a merchant marine, and overseas colonial expansion as a virtually infallible sequence to national prosperity. So it may have been in the case of Great Britain, but not wholly for the reasons Mahan assumed. In one sense British sea power was the result rather than the cause of an industrial and financial expansion that got the jump on all competitors and came to a warlike end once they were aroused. Nor is the end result of this policy—an empire scattered precariously all over the map in a world full of pirates—one to commend the premises on which it rested. It could not come near to solving the modern economic and social problems of the American people. Mahan did not envisage the day of an intensive American economy, a static birth rate, a domestic crisis born of the paradox of over-production and underconsumption, and everywhere, all over the world, industrialization spreading competitive economies with similar troubles of their own. If sea power had proved the true source of national prosperity, why do such problems exist? If imperialism promised to solve them, why are Americans so critical of Japan, Italy, Germany and Russia?

It does not follow that history has proved Mahan correct upon the defensive and incorrect upon the offensive. The defensive to one power is the offensive to another. What does follow is that history has so influenced American sea power as to decrease its military, economic, and political value outside of the American command area while increasing it within that area. No nation is today in such full possession of its own destinies as the United States. Beyond the oceans that still protect it, its only conceivable enemies are engulfed in war. No nation has so much to lose or so little to gain by following their example. Are they fighting for trade? Some neutral that can undersell them may capture their markets when they are exhausted. For empire? The United States does not want any more and has officially disapproved of the efforts of other countries to acquire it. Are they fighting for access to the sea, for ice-free harbors, for security, for *Lebensraum*, for raw materials? The United States has them all, in abundance. But it is all the more important, therefore, that its possession of them be carefully and effectively guarded; and insofar as the teachings of Mahan instruct them in that task, the American people should be grateful to him. They may honor him by building and maintaining a navy—whether a one-ocean or a two-ocean navy—adequate to the performance of that task. But history argues that they will not profit by following his teachings to their imperialist periphery, where nations contend for an illusory command of the sea that no one of them, not even England, ever made complete.

To determine the size and type of this navy is the responsibility not of the naval scientist alone but of American statesmanship. The tremendous cost of a modern navy and the implicit risk that it entails for the entire nation render it part and parcel of the national interest. It is not just the representative of foreign

trade, but of every single geographical section, economic community, and human being counted in the national census. Its uses are therefore to be determined not by the needs of foreign trade alone, but in relation to all those other interests measured within the limits of a single equation. That the nation has accepted it as such is indicated by the recognition given by all sections of the country to the need for secure naval defense. Here, by the way, is another influence of history upon sea power, one that has reversed the disarmament trend of the previous decade. At the same time, political developments indicate that the foremost objective of the American people today is the achievement of a sound and prosperous economy and an efficient self-government within their own borders.

A navy adjusted to the defense of that objective is hardly to be built according to economic and political blueprints of 1890, much less 1800. They must be blueprints of 1940, and American blueprints, not British. The building of such a navy and the use of it to defend the opportunity of the American people to attain this objective would not only repay with interest the cost of construction and maintenance; it would generate the most constructive of all possible influences of sea power upon history.

THE ENGLISH SOLDIER IN THE CAMPAIGN OF AGINCOURT

BY WILFRED BRENTON KERR

I. *The Siege of Harfleur*

THE mobilization for the expedition of 1415 took place at Southampton, and to that port the companies made their way from various parts of England under guidance of their captains. Of the "send-off" from the population at large only one incident is recorded, a clash between soldiers and townsmen at Salisbury which cost the lives of four citizens. Such an affair was doubtless peculiar to Salisbury but leaves us to infer little flow of tender sentiment as the troops passed on their way to Southampton.²

By the second week in August 1415 there had gathered in the port some twelve or twelve and a half thousand combatants; an unknown number of servants, minstrels, chaplains, and traders; and horses and equipment appropriate for such a host.³ On the 11th all was ready and they set sail. Some of the men cast about for omens; but these contradicted one another, the burning of three ships in the roadstead being cancelled by a flock of swans off Wight, and permitted the expedition to continue with an open mind.⁴ The rank and file were in a little doubt about the destination, certain rumors and official acts having favored Guienne. But on the 13th after a smooth passage they lost the doubt at sight of the Chef de Caux, the headland at the mouth of the Seine River. Normandy was to be the scene of operations at least for the present. At five in the evening the fleet came to anchor in the Seine at a spot three miles from Harfleur. Henry held a council and forbade anyone to go on shore that day; and in the dark he sent off John Holland, the future Earl of Huntingdon, and a cavalry patrol to learn the prospects for landing and camping. They returned shortly, reporting all clear; and at six in the morning the men began to disembark in a swarm of ships, sloops, and boats. They made their way toward the wooded hills to the north where

² The subject of this article is the life and work of the English soldier in that part of the campaign of 1415 which preceded the battle of Agincourt: the siege of Harfleur and the march to the battlefield. The author hopes to treat the conflict of Agincourt itself from the same viewpoint in a succeeding issue. Here the emphasis is on the soldier's work, the social aspects of service being kept for a separate study.

³ J. H. Wylie, *The Reign of Henry the Fifth* (Cambridge, 1914-29), I, 478-79.

⁴ The number of the host is greatly in dispute. At the end of the siege of Harfleur, 1,200 men remained as a garrison and 5,900 went on to Agincourt, a total of 7,100. 5,000 hospital cases had gone home, and death had claimed a number which we may set at 1,000; but both of these figures would include non-combatants. If the combatants among these 6,000 casualties were 5,000, the original muster was 12,100. We might allow another 400 for errors in our calculations. An official speech described the casualties as the greater part of the host (*Rotuli Parliamentorum* [London, 1767-77], IV, 62). If these were 6,000, the total would be less than 13,000. It seems that 12,000 is not far from the truth.

⁵ *Henrici Quinti, Angliae Regis Gesta*, ed. by Benjamin Williams (London, 1850), p. 13; *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre, Seigneur de Saint Rémy*, ed. by F. Morand (Société de l'Histoire de France, 1876), I, 224.

they were to wait until the equipment should come on shore. Once over the first ridge from the beach they found a system of entrenchments, the difficult marsh of the Lézarde stream which flows down from above Harfleur, and stones in plenty for missiles. They wondered why the French were absent from such a defensible line; but, putting the neglect down to sloth, folly, or heedlessness, they proceeded to the hill nearest Harfleur, the men of arms finding the climbing hard. On one side of the camp site was an open wood sloping to the Seine; on the other, farm houses, paddocks, and orchards.⁵ The principal officers commandeered the buildings; the men took what was left, selecting the sky for a roof.⁶ In the next two days a few had official duties scouting about Harfleur for information, but most found time heavy on their hands and indulged in private expeditions about the country which drew from Henry V a stern warning and a set of instructions about conduct in Normandy.⁷ The interval of idleness was not long, however, for by Saturday the 17th the equipment, baggage, and horses had all been brought on shore. On that day the army moved to Harfleur in its three sections save for the stragglers who came in by themselves. Only one chronicler, not of the best but undoubtedly right in this instance, noticed the high spirits and great expectations with which even veterans go forward to a new and promising enterprise.⁸

The march of a mile or two was quickly accomplished; and presently the soldiers, descending a hill on the west of the Lézarde, caught sight of Harfleur itself. It lay low in the valley fairly close to the eastern hill, and behind the walls appeared fine houses and a conspicuous church. The English had good first impressions, thinking the town attractive if small; and, being professionally minded, they quickly took stock of the defenses in their way. To the north of the town was a lake which the French had made by damming the river. Henry ordered some men to search it with boats,⁹ and they found it at least thigh-deep and wider by a quarter than the Thames at London, a considerable obstacle to encirclement. Walls, two and a half miles in circumference, surrounded the town in the shape of a heart, and on them lay twenty-six towers and intermediate strong points. In the walls were three gates, each protected by an out-fortification called a barbican or bulwark, and about the whole lay a double ditch on both sides of the Lézarde. Of the bulwarks, the one nearest the route of approach drew the most attention. It was obviously strongest of all, and the men thought it greater

⁵ *Henrici Quinti*, pp. 14-15; Titus Livius, *Vita Henrici Quinti, Regis Angliae*, ed. by T. Hearne (Oxford, 1716), p. 8.

⁶ Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 8. The men lay in three principal groups: the van under the Duke of Clarence in the pleasant fields toward Harfleur, the main body under Henry on the hill, the rear with the Earl of Suffolk in the plain toward the Seine, and wings to right and left.

⁷ L. Mirot, "Le Procès de Maître Jean Fusoris," *Mémoires de la Société de l'Histoire de Paris*, XXVII (1900), 205, 260-61; *Henrici Quinti*, p. 15.

⁸ "*Universo leto corde*," *The Chronicle of John Strecche for the Reign of Henry V*, ed. by Frank Taylor (Manchester, 1932), p. 18. The march, according to *Henrici Quinti*, p. 16, was not done in column of route but in three columns, the van and rear acting as wings to the main body.


⁹ *Chronicles of London*, ed. by C. L. Kingsford (Oxford, 1905), p. 117.

in diameter than the stone's toss with which Englishmen amused themselves on their roadsides. The moat about it was twenty-five feet wide at the narrowest point. One bridge joined bulwark and town; another, much smaller, appeared upright on the outside of the bulwark, ready to be let down for sallies. Of less interest to the soldiers and more to the sailors was the harbor. This had the customary wall and turrets and an entrance guarded by two towers and closed by chains. On most of the wall was a layer of sharp stakes and tree trunks, ends out to discourage hostile shipping. Such was the daily spectacle of the English army for the next month.¹⁰

The first piece of business was the investment of the town. On the Saturday of his arrival Henry held a council and settled the distribution of strength about the town, the number of watch posts for day and night, and that of the parties for raiding and foraging. The greatest difficulty was the lake of the Lézarde, and by its eastern side a French regular detachment got into town on that night. Next day the French showed themselves freely on that side in their work on the fortifications and emphasized to Henry the necessity of closing it off. At night (of the 18th) he sent Clarence with a detachment and some heavy guns to march around the lake and occupy the gap. Clarence and his men found going down and over the slopes of the valley difficult in the dark but performed their march of nine or ten miles in good time, picked up a French convoy on the way, and on a fine Monday morning appeared on the hill to the east of the town, Mont Cabert. They soon established posts from the bank and ridge to the Seine, and Clarence set up headquarters in a chapel on the brow of the hill. The two sections of the army were presently connected by boats on the lake and ships in the harbor, and the encirclement of Harfleur was complete. Henry divided the line on his side of the flood into two sectors as commands for the Dukes of Gloucester and York; but both had sinecures for Henry was careful to do everything of importance himself or through Dorset, his constable, who earned the nickname "little king." He established outposts about his camp by land and on the Lézarde and placed some of the best companies in the open country at the rear of his headquarters. He did his business in a large tent and slept in the priory of Graville. In this way the organization of the lines was complete.¹¹

¹⁰ The town and fortifications are described in *Henrici Quinti*, pp. 16-19; N. H. Nicolas, *The History of the Battle of Agincourt and of the Expedition of King Henry the Fifth into France* (London, 1827), pp. 96-101; "Elmhams Liber Metricus de Henrico Quinto," *Memorials of Henry V., King of England*, ed. by C. A. Cole (Rolls series, London, 1858), pp. 106-107; Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 9; and Wylie, *op. cit.*, II, 8-16. Around the bulwark was a covering of large upright tree-trunks nearly as high as the wall and bound closely together. Openings had been left for the guns and missile-throwers, and in the interior were shelters and passages made shock-proof with blocks, earth, and rough beams (*Henrici Quinti*, p. 17). This last reference is not clear about the double ditch on the king's side of the town, but "Elmhams Liber Metricus," p. 107, leaves no doubt.

¹¹ *Henrici Quinti*, pp. 20-21; "Elmhams Liber Metricus," p. 108; Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 9; Thomas de Elmham, *Vita et Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. by T. Hearne (Oxford, 1727), p. 42. *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 226, mentions the convoy; *The Chronicle of John Hardyng*, ed. by H. Ellis (London, 1812), p. 374, says that the Earl of Salisbury was with Clarence's



1



2



3



4



5

SOLDIERS OF THE PERIOD OF AGINCOURT

1, French horse archer; 2 and 4, pikemen; 3, Burgundian archer; 5, English archer. Reconstructions based on contemporary manuscripts; from Viollet-le-Duc, *Dictionnaire Raisonné du Mobilier Français de l'Époque Carlovingienne à la Renaissance* (Paris, 1874).

Next, trying to follow Holy Writ and divine guidance, he sent the Normans a summons based on Deuteronomy 20:10 requiring them to yield to him their portion of his duchy of Normandy attached to the crown of England. They refused in scornful terms and told him to do his worst. He appealed to heaven for judgment on the rebels, kept his priests busy at masses to the same end, and, supporting prayer with works, ordered the establishment of positions for the artillery and their guards and for a special guard opposite the bulwark. He spent day and night overseeing the business himself, and the siege commenced in earnest.¹²

The first job was to place the guns and machines; the next to construct shields for the first and fortifications for all. The shields were probably the carpenters' business, but the fortification fell to the ordinary soldiers.¹³ The number and location of the artillery positions are unknown save that they were close enough to the walls and bulwarks to draw fire and incur the risk of sallies. Accordingly, guards were needed for each position. Allowing room for them as well as for the guns or engines, the soldiers dug ditches on both sides of each position, threw the earth back to the interior on piles of faggots to make a rampart, and planted stakes to hold it. They did a like service for the special guard opposite the bulwark. Clarence's men, thinking themselves in particular danger of sallies in their isolated position, took thorough precautions; they made a ditch for their camp and a back-parapet supported by tree-trunks and stakes with due openings for their artillery. Here both men of arms and archers worked, each having a fixed length to dig until the work was completed.¹⁴ The Englishman in arms in 1914-18 often remarked that his proper heraldic device was a spade rampant on a sand-bag, and his predecessor of 1415 could well have held a similar opinion.

More labor was provided by the mining. The guard opposite the bulwark burrowed toward that structure until they reached wet earth, the sign of the edge of the ditch and the waste of their efforts, which they might well have foreseen. Unable to get below the ditch, they gave it up for a bad business. Clarence's men dug three times toward the walls and got into the mound between the ditches, but each time they started under a wooden shelter which was perfectly obvious to the besieged and each time they ran into a counter-mine which brought their work to naught. The failure is ascribed by the apologist chronicler to the hill

force and is likely right; *Registres de la Jurade (Archives Municipales de Bordeaux, vol. IV [Bordeaux, 1883])*, p. 257, mentions Dorset's activity and his nickname; constable was equivalent to second in command. Elmham, *op. cit.*, p. 42, professes to give details about the sectors of York and Gloucester, saying that Henry gave Gloucester the half upstream, expecting it to be the hottest, and assigned the lower half, including the bulwark, to York. The statement is not in Livius, *op. cit.*, and its value is uncertain.

¹² *Henrici Quinti*, p. 21; "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 109; Livius, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.

¹³ The shields were of thick planks clamped with iron. Each had two parts, an upper and a lower. For firing, the upper was drawn down and back and the lower raised above the gun to fend off missiles. For loading, the lower was presumably dropped in front of the gun and the upper raised to protect the gunners. The details are not clear, but the general purpose is evident. *Henrici Quinti*, p. 21.

¹⁴ *Henrici Quinti*, pp. 21-22; "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 109.

which prevented commencement under cover, though why the work should be attempted at all in such circumstances he does not explain. At any rate mining was a definite disappointment. Work of a different nature was found in the making of ten-foot faggots for the crossing of ditches and of scaling ladders and wooden towers wall-high, with the last two of which the carpenters had probably most to do. Clarence's men prepared their faggots and put them in piles but presently, observing French activity on the walls, conceived a fear of inflammables which might burn faggots and men together in the ditch. Accordingly, they abandoned their intention and used the faggots as cover for the men at the top of the hill. Obviously they had blundered again in advertising their plans and Clarence had much to learn about the art of concealment. The duty of wood-work required the efforts of only a few men at a time; that of digging more but not many at once. Nor did outpost duty or guard on the guns require large numbers. Most of the time for most of the men life at Harfleur was a military holiday.¹³

The chief work of the siege on both sides of the town fell to the artillery. The bombards went off with terrifying roars and clouds of smoke which reminded the besieged of stories about the inferno, and they did some night-firing which enhanced the terror and reduced sleep. Official names were bestowed on these guns—London, Messenger, King's Daughter—without much appropriateness and were doubtless superseded in practice by more homely appellations. The gunners, mercenaries from Germany, probably received the attention and admiration of the troops. The more numerous tubes may have done much of the work, and the engines assisted to the best of their ability. The targets were many: the French guns on the walls and in the towers, the towers themselves, the gates, the bulwarks, the interior of the town. The bombardment was effective; it broke down a great part of the principal bulwark and wrought much destruction among the buildings almost to the center of the town, knocking steeple and bells from the church of St. Martin. The soldiers watched the collapses, saw the Normans dodging the balls, and fondly imagined that much laming was being done among the townsmen. The archers for their part sniped at the defenders, particularly the parties trying to repair the damage of the bombardment, and drove them under cover.¹⁴

Of personal encounter there was a certain amount. On his march around the flood Clarence fell in with a convoy from Rouen consisting of wagons and carts loaded with guns, powder, cross-bows, and bolts and captured the lot without trouble. Next, by one account, he and his men met a party of the garrison on horses looking for the convoy, sparred with them a little, and drove them into

¹³ *Henrici Quinti*, pp. 22-26; "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 111. Elmham, *op. cit.*, p. 44, remarks on the discomfort of wearing armor in the heat of August and is certainly right. *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 226, mentions three mines but much exaggerates their effect.

¹⁴ For the bombards, *Chronique du Religieux de Saint Denys*, ed. by M. L. Bellaguet (Paris, 1844), V, 527-28; "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 110; Elmham, *op. cit.*, p. 43. For the names of the guns, the church, and the laming, *ibid.*, pp. 363-64; Nicolas, *op. cit.*, p. 253. For the bombardment, *Henrici Quinti*, pp. 22-23; "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 110.

the town.¹⁷ When Clarence's miners met those of the French, collisions occurred until it became clear that the town could not be entered in this way. Then some English men of arms, eager for the novelty of underground combat or for promotion, went with Henry's permission into the mines and engaged their French opposites with swords, axes, and lances, awkward though the last must have proved, by the light of torches. Such fighting combined the maximum of difficulty with the minimum of possible profit, and in the upshot the French captured a few prisoners. How a man in a narrow tunnel with a dozen comrades at his call could contrive to be taken prisoner is not clear; presumably the English were amateurs engaged with expert French. When the garrison tired of this sport, they had recourse to gas and drove the English out by "smoulder and stench."¹⁸ It is clear that the French had the better of these struggles. Toward the end of August the guard which Clarence maintained over the mines rushed the outer of the two ditches, kept it, and sniped with cross-bows and slings, obliging the French on the walls to take cover and giving them a hot time if the English chronicler is to be believed.¹⁹ But the advance yielded no particular gain.

Once the English became aware of a French force in their rear. Certain French leaders planned three ambushes and dispatched scouts to draw the English out. The English soon caught sight of these and cried, "To arms"; a party dashed out in pursuit, chiefly men of Lewis Robersart's company. They rode so speedily that they overtook the scouts and captured some, including two of the leaders. They were now scattered and out of control and might have fallen victims to the trap, but the third French leader incautiously showed himself and gave away the plan. The English returned to their camp with the honors of the day and the prisoners.²⁰ No further attempt was made to interrupt the siege from the outside, the French being thoroughly occupied with the quarrels of Burgundy, king and dauphin. English patrols rode about the towns and castles of the neighborhood, found them well guarded, and attempted nothing. The garrisons of the harbor towers made sallies against the English ships fruitlessly.²¹ But the chief fighting took place between the French of the bulwark and the

¹⁷ Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 9; Elmham, *op. cit.*, p. 41. Livius speaks of strenuous fighting and many wounds but exaggerates greatly; *Henrici Quinti* is silent. *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 226, mentions the convoy, as do *Henrici Quinti*, p. 20, and "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 108, but none of these says anything about the skirmish and thereby casts some doubt on it. On the other hand, a small tussle of this sort might be reported to Gloucester by Clarence and so have been recorded by Livius but missed by Elmham and le Fèvre who stayed on the king's side of the Lézarde.

¹⁸ Elmham, *op. cit.*, p. 363. *Ibid.*, p. 45, has a story that Henry gave the custody of the mines to a knight described only as being very dear to him; this is not in Livius but may be true.

¹⁹ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 25.

²⁰ *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 230-231, which adds that Robersart was a native of Hainault who had "become English." The man had indentured for three archers only (Nicolas, *op. cit.*, appendix, p. 94) but must have had a better command by this time. The French leaders were the lord of l'Isle Adam, Baron d'Ivry, and Jacques de Brimeu; the first and last were captured.

²¹ *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 226; Livius, *op. cit.* p. 10.

English of the post opposite it. On September 15 the French sallied out, reached the post, and set fire to the works, presumably the shelters and the palisade. An imperative question arises: where were the guard during the fifteen or twenty minutes this must have taken? They were right inside resting from their labors and to a man absorbed in deep sleep. Eventually the noise or the smoke woke them up. Perceiving what had happened, some set to work at the flames and shortly extinguished them; others dashed out on the French. These stayed for a little brush and even inflicted a casualty or two. Then they retired in perfect safety to their bulwark and jeered at their opponents as sleepy and slothful, unable to watch their own posts. Next afternoon the French tried another sally, presuming on their good fortune, but this time the event was different. After the first affair, John Holland, captain of the guard, must have had an interview with Henry—apologetic on the one part, accusative on the other, and painful for both. That night he planned a counter-attack and prepared long faggots. The English were thus on their toes when the second sally came and easily repulsed it. Now they attacked the bulwark, trying combustion first. A flaming arrow soon set fire to the wood of the structure, and the French fell strenuously to work putting the fire out. This was the opportunity of the English. They threw their faggots into the moat, got across into the bulwark, seized part of it, and set up Holland's pennon. Then some spread the flames with powder while others set on the French with arms and missiles. The French abandoned the bulwark, retired unharmed to the wall, and drew up their bridge after them. Then they blocked the entrance about it with wood, stones, earth, and mud.²² The English, now in possession of the bulwark, tried their own hands at putting the fire out and worked two or three days in vain. A fortnight later smoke was still issuing from the ruins, and possession did the English little good. With this affair personal combat ceased at Harfleur, but of exchange of missiles there was plenty during the month of the siege. The French had no artillery comparable to the bombards of the English, but they had and used smaller guns, engines, and crossbows. In return some English archers sniped at the defenders who exposed themselves from time to time on the walls. But barter of this kind appears to have had little effect on the progress of the siege.²³

The operations were at quarters close enough for the soldiers to observe a good deal of the enemy. The French commander was Ralph de Gaucourt who had slipped into the town with three or four hundred lances on the night of Henry's arrival before Harfleur. In addition to the regulars he had the militia of the town of whose numbers there is no estimate. His men knew their business. They

²² *Henrici Quinti*, pp. 27-28, says that Holland's men filled the ditch in front of the bulwark with their faggots during the night of September 15-16 between the skirmishes, but this is hard to believe. The French would certainly have seen them in the morning of the 16th and would not have ventured a sally with the bulwark so easy of approach. They would have at least cleared the ditch first. Elmham, *op. cit.*, p. 364, and Nicolas, *op. cit.*, p. 254, state merely that an Englishman burnt it.

²³ *Original Letters Illustrative of English History*, ed. by H. Ellis (2nd series, London, 1827), I, 95-96; *Henrici Quinti*, pp. 17, 23; *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 226.



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No. 62.

COMBAT IN THE HUNDRED YEARS' WAR

From a contemporary manuscript reproduced in John Hewitt, Ancient Armor and Weapons in Europe (London, 1860), III, 52.

fired from the bulwark, turrets, and walls as long as these stood; and, when damage was wrought by the bombardment, they found concealed lodging places among the heaps of stones and in the holes of the broken structures and sniped with surprising accuracy at the English when they least expected it. The damage to walls and bulwark they repaired as best they could; every night they piled logs, faggots, and tubs full of earth, dung, and sand or stones into the breaches and strengthened the wall on the inside with faggots full of clay, earth, and mud. Inside the town they applied the principle of shock absorption; they filled streets and alleys with mud, earth, and dung to a great depth, into which the English stones dropped harmlessly. Against a possible assault they placed on the walls pots full of combustible powder, sulphur, and quicklime and vessels containing other powders and oils. The English admired the activity of their enemy and thought that no human being could have done more.²⁴

The technique of the two sides invites comparison. The English artillery was handled well; but the digging of three mines in plain sight, the losses in the mines, the preparation of faggots in view of the enemy, and the carelessness of Holland's post in particular and of the outposts in general in letting a dispatch bearer slip through their lines²⁵ all bespeak the imperfect craftsman. Some of the faults were those of amateurs in the art of sieges, but some sprang from the English lack of imagination which so often seems lack of wit to the irritated observer. It is distinguishable nevertheless by an ease of remedy at a suitable shock, and such a shock was administered by the French sally. Then the English showed what they could do in the capture of the bulwark, a well planned and executed bit of work. The French committed no such errors save the second sally against Holland. Their use of cover was adept, their feats in the mines admirable, their management of artillery effective, their engineering of the best, their surprise of the post well timed, and their escapes well carried out. They had proved their expertness, and to them must go the honors of the siege as the English acknowledged by their tributes to French skill.²⁶

The French had lost none of their powers of resistance and were in no trouble for supplies. The destruction of the fortifications, however, was so evident that early in September Henry was writing to Bordeaux in jubilant tones about the approaching capture. One of his clerical friends, John of Bordeaux, set the date for surrender at a week from the 3rd at the most and foresaw a triumphal march through Montivilliers, Dieppe, Rouen, and Paris, thereby indulging in a bit of Gascon tall talk.²⁷ But the reward of the English artillery could not long be postponed.²⁸ The day after the capture of the bulwark, September 17, Henry

²⁴ *Henrici Quinti*, pp. 23-24; "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 110. *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 226, also admires the defense.

²⁵ Wylie, *op. cit.*, II, 53.

²⁶ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 23.

²⁷ Two letters to the municipal authorities of Bordeaux in *Registres de la Jurade*, pp. 256-57. Wylie, *op. cit.*, II, 78-80, for John of Bordeaux.

²⁸ *The St. Alban's Chronicle, 1406-20*, ed. by V. H. Galbraith (Oxford, 1937), p. 90, says that the bombardment was the cause of the surrender and is no doubt right.

sent another summons to Gaucourt and the officials of the town with a second reference to Deuteronomy, but again he met a scornful rebuff. Incensed at the stiff-necked generation of Normans, he planned an assault and proclaimed his orders throughout the camp at night to the advertisement of trumpet calls directing soldiers and sailors alike to report to their captains for assignment of duties. That evening the men of arms were busy getting scaling ladders ready, and the artillery began an especially intense bombardment to keep the garrison sleepless and less ready to meet the attack. That any advantage of this would be outweighed by the similar effect on the English and the clear warning given to the besieged, Henry did not see. But it produced a third effect which may have been in Henry's mind. In the night a message came from Gaucourt to Clarence asking for a parley, and in response Henry sent a commission of three, headed by Dorset, to negotiate.²⁹ An agreement was reached whereby, if by one o'clock of the next Sunday afternoon no help should have arrived from either King Charles VI or the dauphin, the garrison would surrender Harfleur to Henry. Henry accepted the offer, stopped the bombardment, and next day received the oaths and the hostages. The garrison could not obtain the help, and on Sunday, September 22, they made the formal surrender. The English soldiers, gathered about the way from the main gate to Henry's tent on the hill, watched Gaucourt and the city council walk up to hand the keys to Henry and walk down again. Then the French standards came down from over the gates, and those of St. George and Henry went up. Henry appointed his uncle, Thomas Beaufort, Earl of Dorset, captain of Harfleur and sent him in with an escort. The following day he entered himself with a few of his friends to see the town and give thanks at the Church of St. Martin. Most of the army remained in camp until the king completed his plans about the inhabitants. When he had arranged for ransoms and for the eviction of those who would not become his subjects, the soldiers entered the town, bringing the guns with them.³⁰

Since fighting was so little, the casualties of action were few. Some men were hurt by the French snipers, like Thomas Hostel who was smitten by a dart in the head, lost an eye, and had one cheek-bone broken.³¹ Others were wounded or taken prisoners in the mines, but the total cannot have been large. One of the chroniclers reports a rumor that English losses in combat were five hundred in knights and squires alone; but, if this number were divided by ten, it would probably fall little short of the total of such casualties for all ranks.³² Of other

²⁹ "Rôles Normands et Français et Autres Pièces Tirées des Archives de Londres par Bréquigny en 1764, 1765 et 1766," *Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires de Normandie*; 3rd series, Vol. III (1858), no. 64, p. 6; *St. Alban's Chronicle*, p. 90.

³⁰ *Henrici Quinti*, pp. 31-32; *St. Alban's Chronicle*, pp. 91-92; *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 229; Elmham, *op. cit.*, p. 366.

³¹ *Original Letters*, I, 95-96.

³² *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 229-30, from which it appears that the two harbor towers delayed surrender for two days after the king's entry into the town. Joseph Hunter, *Agincourt, a Contribution towards an Authentic List of the Commanders of the English Host in King Henry the Fifth's Expedition to France in the Third Year of His Reign* (London,

losses, however, there were plenty. The chroniclers blame them in part on the eating of raw fruit and on the cold of the nights. But unripe fruit, as any boy can testify, need cause no more than a quarrelsome stomach; and the argument about the cold of the nights will not impress men who have slept out in northern France all year round and found August and September ideal months for the purpose. More injurious may have been the careless drinking from the lake of the Leure alleged by one chronicler. Worse than this, however, Henry's sanitary officer was not on his job, and the bodies of slaughtered cattle lay unburied about the camp. The ensuing rot and stench brought on a dysentery or "bloody flux" which carried off many more than the sword and incapacitated so many that Henry sent home after the surrender five thousand hospital cases under charge of Clarence, Arundel, and March.³³ The number of deaths is uncertain but may have reached one thousand including combatants and others. The total of casualties by this reckoning was between six and seven thousand or more than half the army.³⁴ It is this high mortality from causes other than action that surprises the modern reader. Henry's army paid dearly for its success.


II. The March to Agincourt

Harfleur garrisoned and the five thousand dispatched to England, Henry could decide what to do next with the nine hundred lances and five thousand bows left him. The most obvious course was a direct return by sea to England, but Henry proposed to march to Calais and embark there. When he made the suggestion to his council, most of the members saw little good in it, fearing lest the band of English, constantly decreasing by casualties, would be swamped by a great multitude of French, constantly increasing by reinforcements. To this practical argument Henry opposed a moral one. He relied on the justice of his cause and divine assistance; if God were on his side, the multitude of enemies was negligible. This pious consideration carried the day and all concurred in the decision to march to Calais, not convinced but not able to meet the king on such high ground. Though he had thus disposed of the danger with the faith of a Gideon, he had not explained why he wanted to march to Calais.

1850), p. 28, mentions only two lances killed in action at Harfleur, both in the younger Michael de la Pole's company; if many more had fallen in this way, the names of some would have appeared in these lists.

³³ Elmham, *op. cit.*, p. 44; *St. Alban's Chronicle*, p. 92; T. Walsingham, *Ypodigma Neustriae*, ed. by H. T. Riley (Rolls series, London, 1876), p. 461; "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 114; *Henrici Quinti*, p. 36.

³⁴ *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 226, estimates 2,000 casualties. He was in camp but is not much good at figures. Hunter, *op. cit.*, is a better guide. His lists make the fatalities much lighter: 4% of Arundel's archers, 8% of the Earl Marshal's lances, and 4% of Lord Willoughby's. The highest is 12% of a company of Kighley's, and many companies report none. Four percent would be a high estimate of the average, or 480 combatants. The valets suffered more in proportion; Lord Willoughby has 16 valets, 4 pages sick, 6 lances out of 29 (one of whom died), and no archers at all out of 60. If we give the non-combatants another 500, making 1,000 in all, we shall not be far wrong. "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 114, calls the deaths simply "plures" and seems to agree.



HENRY'S MARCH FROM HARFLEUR TO CALAIS

The motives, however, are not far to seek; he desired the prestige of the march and a better look at the duchy of Normandy which he claimed as his own.³⁵ All commentators have exhausted their vocabularies in condemning the march, and, as it could serve no useful military purpose, it must stand convicted. Nevertheless, had precautions been taken to insure crossing of the Somme near the mouth, the march would have been merely useless rather than dangerous. The absence of such precaution shows that Henry had yet much to learn about the business of war.

³⁵ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 36; Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 12; Elmham, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51. The explanation of Livius, that Henry wanted to see Normandy and to avoid the appearance of running away, was doubtless derived from Humphrey of Gloucester and has good authority.

The march decided on, the king sent his artillery and heavy baggage to England by sea. He hoped to move rapidly and to cover the distance, reported to be one hundred miles, in eight days. Here his engineers committed the opposite fault to that of his exaggerating chroniclers, much underestimating an actual mileage of one hundred and fifty. The army started from Harfleur on October 6³⁶ and met its first obstacle at Arques on the 11th. Here were an open town at the foot of a hill, a castle, and a river flowing gently down to Dieppe. The road lay over narrow bridges blocked with tree trunks and commanded by the guns of the castle. Henry tried a bluff, busied himself conspicuously about the sections and wings of the army, and drew up some or all of the men in positions facing the castle. The French replied with a few shots to warn the English off but harmed no one. After a short delay the king came to the point and asked for a passage and some food, offering in return to refrain from setting fire to the town and the houses of the suburbs. The captain of the castle, thinking to escape a siege, took the offer, removed the trunks, and permitted the army to proceed through the middle of the town.³⁷ Next day the English passed by Eu, the patrols engaging in a skirmish with a party of the garrison and taking a few prisoners. These informed their captors that a large force was ready to dispute their passage of the Somme. Accordingly, in apprehension the army approached the river in the neighborhood of Abbéville on the 13th. They had hope of crossing by a bridge, and Henry sent some cavalry with the scouts to hold it.³⁸

Presently these returned and announced that the bridges and causeways had been broken and that the French were indeed in force on the opposite bank. The army was close to Whitespot ford, by which Edward III had crossed before Crècy, but could obviously make no use of it in face of the large hostile force on the other side. Henry had the option of simply returning to Harfleur and embarking there. But this possibility he would not consider in the interest of prestige, and he resolved to march upstream to find a passage. But the French were alive to their business, and everywhere the English found the fords guarded, the bridges and causeways broken. The outlook was black until fortune came to the rescue on the 18th. The scouts rounded up some country people who told of a passage not much used or known and then unguarded.³⁹ Henry sent men

³⁶ There is a discussion of dates in Wylie, *op. cit.*, II, 88, note 3.

³⁷ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 37; "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 114.

³⁸ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 39; "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 115; Nicolas, *op. cit.*, p. 257; and *Chronique . . . de Saint Denys*, V, 545, all agree in the expectation of a crossing by a bridge and in the fact of the broken bridges. None of these mentions the ford, which evidently had no part in the calculations or experiences of the English. Hence, we may dismiss the well-known story of the Gascon prisoner in *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 232-33, and that of the stakes in the river bed in Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 12, as possibly true but certainly of no importance. Henry would have investigated the Gascon's tale and would have soon found whether it was correct, and his soldiers could have pulled out the stakes easily enough. Had one prisoner's story and the stakes been the only obstacles, the army would not have been hindered long in its passage of the Somme.

³⁹ Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 13.


on horses at once to test the statement, and, when they returned with an answer in the affirmative, the whole army hastened to the river. For a mile they traversed the marsh of a tributary, the Ingon, with much trepidation, at the mercy of an attacking force; but all went well and they found not one crossing but two, by Béthencourt and Voyennes near Nesle. The causeways of approach had been broken, but it was possible to ride over them in single file. Henry sent a force of lances and archers on foot under John Cornwall and Gilbert Umfraville to make their way over the river and establish a post on the opposite bank. Archers went first, lances next, and horses last; when they had reached the north bank, probably the whole army breathed more easily. The next job was to make the necessary repairs to the causeways. The men took doors, window-frames, and timber from neighboring houses, straw from the stacks, and branches from the trees, and with this material they patched the causeways to a width sufficient for three men to ride abreast. This work took the rest of the 18th, and the crossing occupied the next day. Then the army continued on its way and found no hindrance until on the 24th it came on the great French force barring its way at Agincourt.⁴⁰

For the march the army moved in order in its three sections, the Duke of York in charge of the van, Henry himself in the center, and Lord Camoys in the rear.⁴¹ The baggage train was of a fair length, as the arrangements for crossing the river indicate, and presumably it went between the main and the rear bodies although the chronicles are silent on this matter. The van took some liberties, spreading itself through the country for patrol work and foraging. The men of arms had horses, as had many archers also, but they accommodated themselves to the pace of the foot-archers and the baggage wagons.⁴² There were certainly no bands, and one doubts that the men marched in step, but they talked and shouted a good deal. At only one point have we a definite glimpse of the army en route, the crossing of the Somme. The baggage went by one ford, the soldiers, presumably three abreast, by the other. Henry took his stand at one side of the entrance to the second causeway and posted officers on the other side to insure a proper procession in file and no jams. The ford, being a little above a horse's belly in depth, must have produced a fairly thorough wetting. The first of the men began to cross at one in the afternoon and the last were not over until an hour before dark, or about five o'clock, the four hours or so

⁴⁰ *Henrici Quinti*, pp. 36-46; "Elmhams Liber Metricus," pp. 116-17; *Chronique de Jean le Fière*, I, 231-43; *Chronique . . . de Saint Denys*, V, 550-52; Elmham, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-54; Wylie, *op. cit.*, II, 88-94, 108-131. *Chronique . . . de Saint Denys* says that the English commandeered the services of local carpenters to rebuild the causeways. This is not a good authority on the doings of the English before the battle, however, and it does not appear that local carpenters would be required.

⁴¹ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 50.

⁴² "Chronique de Ruisseauville," *Archives Historiques et Littéraires du Nord de la France et du Midi de la Belgique* (Valenciennes, 1834), IV, 138, says that the English were very tired of riding and of marching on foot, which indicates both modes of progress. *Chronique . . . de Saint Denys*, V, 553, says that most of the English were on foot, as is to be expected.



EARLY 15TH CENTURY SUIT OF ARMOR

This partially restored suit of Italian armor is one of the few on exhibit dating from about 1400, courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

being a short enough time for the passage of six thousand men in such difficulties.⁴³ The whole distance to Agincourt, two hundred and fifty miles, was covered in eighteen days, of which sixteen and a half or less were marching time. At the rate of fifteen miles a day, this represents no mean achievement over the fifth grade roads of 15th century France.

As invaders the English could hardly expect an uninterrupted passage, though the French were at odds among themselves, and their patrols had brushes with the local garrisons as they passed along. One such, at Montivilliers on October 8, cost the English one killed and six prisoners, including a squire; another at Fécamp cost three prisoners.⁴⁴ At Arques the French of the castle favored Henry's men with a few stones before they supplied bread instead. At Eu a few Frenchmen sallied from the town with a furious rush against an English patrol. One of them, Lancelot Pierre, charged an English knight. Both couched lances and struck, and the Frenchman pierced his opponent. Then the Englishman's squire took over the combat and drove his lance through Pierre's body, making the score even. A few of the French were taken; the others regained the town, their comrades fending off the pursuing English with a shower of arrows and missiles which injured a few.⁴⁵ From Corbie a French party rode across the bridge and charged with great vehemence and a terrifying blare of trumpets according to their custom. An English patrol met them, took two lances, and killed several others, thus gaining the honors of the skirmish.⁴⁶ On occasion individual prisoners like those of Corbie deluded or perturbed the English by tales of enemy deeds or intentions, and from time to time the army saw in the distance the French detachments guarding the crossings of the Somme or drawn up in line of battle quite unnecessarily in view of the broad marshes on both sides of the river. When the van was making its way over that river and less than one hundred were on the north bank, some squadrons of French cavalry made their appearance from houses lower down. They sent out some of their swiftest scouts who observed Cornwall's well established post for some time, then retired. Pres-

⁴³ *Henrici Quinti*, pp. 43-44; *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 235. Le Fèvre puts the crossing from 8:00 a.m. to near dark, but the chaplain must have preference. Le Fèvre forgets the post first established on the north bank and sends van, main body, and rear over together on the second day. He does not mention the two fords. Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 16, remarks of an unusual silence, "*nullus auditus est Anglicorum clamor ut solebat.*" Hence, noise must have been the rule.

⁴⁴ Wylie, *op. cit.*, II, 90, 92. Three of the first set of prisoners were cordwainers, a fact which suggests the baggage train.

⁴⁵ *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 231-32; Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 13; Elmham, *op. cit.*, p. 52; *Henrici Quinti*, pp. 37-38.

⁴⁶ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 41; "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 115; Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 13; Elmham, *op. cit.*, p. 53. By a document used by Holinshed, quoted by Nicolas, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-58, note, a Cheshire squire named John Bromley played a notable part in this action, recovering the standard of Guienne which had been carried by Hugh Stafford. The chroniclers, however, are silent about Bromley when they should have been eloquent, and Wylie, *op. cit.*, II, 116, note 1, remarks that the document is not above suspicion. It is peculiar that not even *Henrici Quinti* mentions the bridge at Corbie, although the French must have come across it. No doubt they held it in such strength that the English could not attempt it.

ently the whole French body, concluding that they were too late to do anything useful, drew out of sight.⁴⁷ On October 20 three heralds arrived. Brought by York to Henry, they stated that the French would do battle with him before he could reach Calais but that their leaders, the Dukes of Orleans and Bourbon, had not yet assigned a day or a place. This method of notifying one's enemy seems at least simpler and less expensive than the long preliminary bombardments in fashion in 1915-17. On October 21 some French sallied from Peronne but changed their minds and retired before the charge of an English party without engaging in a combat. The English suspected a ruse to draw them into range of the town's guns; but, if this were so, it failed. On October 24, a party of seven Lancashire archers fell into the hands of the French. When patrols were searching the country in front of the army or on its flank, losses of this sort were inevitable and fell mainly on the archers. A few fell sick like the two men of arms whom Henry left in charge of the French captain of Boves, promising ransoms. On the whole, however, the casualties of the march were surprisingly few.⁴⁸

After passing Peronne, the soldiers saw the road cut up by many tracks and knew that the French army was not far ahead. This observation settled a question in dispute since the departure from Harfleur. In the first few days speculation was busy with the question whether there would be a battle at all. The prisoners of Eu had spoken of a large force guarding the crossing of the Somme. Nevertheless, some of the English held that the French were too much occupied with their own civil war to trouble about invaders; others insisted that French prestige and courage would forbid toleration of an English army on French soil in spite of internal difficulties.⁴⁹ The appearance of the French force on the north bank of the Somme by Abbeville closed this phase of the debate; and the English contemplated a march to the head of the river, said to be sixty miles away, where a monstrous and well equipped French army would lie in wait. The prospect daunted many, the more as day after day brought within vision only broken bridges and guarded fords. The provisions brought from Harfleur and those obtained by blackmail on the road would soon give out; the enemy would destroy or remove the food from the line of march and finally with their multitude and their machines would overwhelm the few English, tired and weak from lack of sustenance. In their dismay the men could not hide from themselves the error of generalship which was endangering the whole army; yet they could do nothing else than proceed on their way, with pressing appeals to the Virgin and

⁴⁷ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 44.

⁴⁸ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 45; "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 118; William Beaumont, *Annals of the Lords of Warrington* (Manchester, 1872), I, 245; *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 234. Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 15, and Elmham, *op. cit.*, p. 56, speak of a combat at the river Ternoise on October 24 to prevent a French party from breaking a bridge. *Henrici Quinti*, "Elmhami Liber Metricus," and *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre* do not mention fighting at this place; all speak of a clear passage of this river. Livius is wrong but may be denaturing and magnifying the tussle in which the archers were made prisoners.

⁴⁹ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 38.

St. George for their safety. By Amiens there was no other hope, and the low of spirits was reached. Food, wine, and a good night's rest at Boves did something to revive confidence. Near Corbie captives reported an enemy plan to ride down the English archers with armed men and horses, and Henry ordered his men to prepare stakes with which to meet the charge. These precautions taken, the passage of the Somme on the 19th inspired the thought that the English would evade the French army after all, and spirits rose high. But the arrival of the French heralds the next day quenched all hopes.⁵⁰


Henry must have felt the eyes of his soldiers turned on him, and he rose to the occasion. At the message of the heralds he did not in the least change color, nor did he show wrath or hesitation. "Let all be as God wills," he murmured. The heralds asked what road he would take. He made a careful reply, aiming to avoid battle if possible and yet save his prestige. He was going direct to Calais, and any attempt to block his way would bring great risk to the blockers. He would not look for the French, nor would he alter his pace because of them; but he exhorted them not to shed Christian blood and thus betrayed his anxiety. The heralds, of course, had nothing to say to these hints, and he dismissed them with fine presents, saying that they had brought good tidings. When they had gone, he addressed his troops in a kindly and spirited manner, presumably about the impending battle, and ordered possessors of surcoats to wear them, himself setting the example.⁵¹

Battle did not take place the next day, but the appearance of the road beyond Peronne, indicating a host of enemies, roused qualms again. "We who were the subordinates of the host," declared his chaplain, "(I say nothing of the leaders) fearing the imminent battle, raised our hearts and eyes to heaven, beseeching God with heart-felt prayers to have pity on us and in his great goodness to turn from us the wrath of the French."⁵² With these misgivings, on Thursday the 24th the army approached the river Ternoise, knowing that the French could not be far away. It was the Duke of York's duty to find whether the passage was clear,

⁵⁰ *Henrici Quinti*, pp. 38-45; *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 231-42. The archers were directed to prepare stakes six feet long, square or round, sharp at each end. They were to be planted obliquely in the ground to form a hedge several stakes thick to more than half the height of a man from the ground. *Chronique . . . de Saint Denys*, V, 549, 551, says that the English cursed the French traitors who had suggested the expedition. It is not unlikely that they did, but the monk is not a good authority for the march.

⁵¹ Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 14; Elmham, *op. cit.*, p. 55; *Henrici Quinti*, p. 45; "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 118; *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 237. Jean Juvenal des Ursins, "Histoire de Charles VI," *Collections des Mémoires Relatifs à l'Histoire de la France*, ed. by Michaud and Poujoulat (3rd series, Paris, 1857), I, 521, professes to give the address at length but cannot be depended upon as his narrative is poor. *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 236-37, reports the negotiations differently than Livius, given above. He says that three heralds invited Henry to discuss a time and place for the battle; that Henry received them and their letters with an appearance of great joy and sent them away with presents but no response. Later, however, he sent two men to them to say that he was marching toward England, not staying in a town or fortress, and could always be found in the open. Hence, there was no need for setting a time or a place. Livius, however, reports Gloucester who ought to know better than le Fèvre.

⁵² *Henrici Quinti*, pp. 45-46.



FRENCH MAN-AT-WAR OF THE LATE 14TH CENTURY IN FULL
WAR HIRNESS

Reconstruction by L. Vallet

but Henry had a habit of taking charge himself at critical moments. He sent out a special patrol of six nobles in their surcoats who presently reported all clear. The van crossed and mounted the far slope of the valley. Soon they had their news. A scout had reached the top and returned to York in high dismay at the numbers of the enemy he had seen. York waited for confirmation by other scouts, then reported to Henry. The king received the information with no trace of fear or wrath. He halted the middle division, put spurs to his horse, and went to see for himself. Having seen, he came back still perfectly calm and ordered the army forward. The men crossed the river in haste, climbed the slope, and soon caught sight of three French columns emerging from a valley higher up a mile away. These were precursors of the hostile array that soon appeared "in columns, sections and squadrons of a multitude compared with us." The French presently took position rather more than half a mile from the English in a large field across a small valley, like an innumerable multitude of locusts in the eyes of the clerical chronicler.⁵³

The sight confirmed previous feelings of dismay, and the moment provided a test of leadership. Henry was ready; he ordered his men to dismount, drew them up for battle, and addressed them in kindly and heartening fashion, but in words of which we have no record. Many soldiers took again to their knees and their prayers; and, says our authority, every man who had not already cleansed his conscience made his confession, the only lack being of priests.⁵⁴ Not only the rank and file entertained obvious diffidence. One of the best captains, Walter Hungerford, uttered in the king's presence the wish for ten thousand more of the better English archers who would like to be with the army. Henry was stung by the pertinence of the remark into calling Walter a fool, but he thought it imperative to maintain the bluff. "By God in heaven on whom I depend for grace and in whom is my firm hope of victory," he shouted, "even if I could I wouldn't have one more man than I have. For this that I have is God's own army which he thinks me worthy to command now. Don't you think that omnipotence with this lowly band can conquer the opposing pride of the French who glory in their multitude and strength?"⁵⁵ Although the bluff was magnificent, Henry knew it was bluff for shortly

⁵³ *Henrici Quinti*, pp. 45-46; *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 242; Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 15; Elmham, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-57. The last expands the version of Livius, giving speeches and dramatic details, but has no independent value.

⁵⁴ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 47; *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 242.

⁵⁵ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 47; "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 119. The latter does not give Hungerford's name. In Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 17, this speech of Henry's is transferred to the morning of the battle and expanded. By this version, Henry declared that he did not want one man the more. With their present army, all would ascribe a victory to God alone, none to their own strength, and a defeat would bring so much less loss to England. Whereas, if they had a large army and won, they would put it down to their own valor and offend God; and, if they lost, there would be much more loss and disgrace to England. Then he exhorted his men to be brave and fight with all their might; God and the justice of their cause would protect them and deliver these most proud adversaries into their hands. The version of *Henrici Quinti* must have priority over Gloucester's recollections as recorded by Livius.

he was dismissing his few prisoners, taking their promise to return if he should win and freeing them entirely if he should lose.⁵⁶ Walter Hungerford knew it was bluff also but said nothing, and the soldiers knew it was bluff but may have felt somewhat the better for it. The show of confidence was necessary for any frank acknowledgment by high command of the small chances for success would have started a general *saute-qui-peut*. That Henry was so fully capable of it demonstrates a considerable ability as an actor. He must have known that the march had been the greatest of his military mistakes; yet he kept command of himself and never appeared to better advantage as manager of men.

For some time the army remained in line, subject to observation by French patrols. Presently these withdrew to a field on the other side of the wood on the English left by which ran the road to Calais. Henry wheeled his line around in fear of a circling attack from behind the wood, but nothing of the sort happened. Shortly came sunset; and the French occupied the hamlet and orchards of Agincourt, blocked the road to Calais, and settled down for the night. Through the dusk came a murmur of French voices as one man called for his comrade, his servant, or friend separated in the throng. The English, still standing in line, began to call likewise. Henry feared confusion and forbade the noise under heavy penalties. Silence restored, he chose the village of Maisoncelles as a billet, and the troops found a white road which led them straight into it. There the captains and Henry took the cottages, the others the gardens and orchards and the abundant rain which soon followed. The lack of bread, the wetness, and the feeling of the night before zero discouraged conversation. "No men made less noise than the English," writes the Burgundian chronicler who was with them that night. "Only with great difficulty could one hear them whispering to each other, such low tones did they use."⁵⁷ But presently, as the men selected sleeping quarters and prepared for the morrow, the silence gave place to a general hum. Those who had not confessed kept the priests busy. The men of arms tested their weapons and armor and repaired them as best they could; the archers restrung their bows as the rain permitted.⁵⁸ They could see the French lighting fires and posting pickets everywhere in front. Cheer themselves as they could, they had no pleasant anticipations of the morrow; but the Englishman's lack of imagination probably worked to their advantage, banishing forebodings for what sleep the rain permitted. By midnight all was silence again in the army by Maisoncelles.

⁵⁶ *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 243.

⁵⁷ *Henrici Quinti*, pp. 48-49; "Elmhani Liber Metricus," p. 119; Elmham, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59; *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 243-44. Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 15, speaks of bread and drink in Maisoncelles a little better than usual for some days, but this would be for Gloucester and his circle.

⁵⁸ *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 244. Livius, *op. cit.*, says that the silence lasted from the time of the order until the arrival in Maisoncelles only, and he is no doubt right.

GRANT'S WOODEN MORTARS AND SOME INCIDENTS OF THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG

By F. STANSBURY HAYDON

FOLLOWING the battle of Big Black River Bridge, May 17, 1863, General Pemberton withdrew his Confederate forces to the Vicksburg defenses. Grant's Army of the Tennessee pursued and, with the cooperation of the Mississippi Squadron under Rear Admiral David D. Porter, laid siege to this strategically important stronghold on the Mississippi River. The investment operations that followed were marked by a number of incidents interesting as well as unique in the history of the Civil War.

Grant had not expected a prolonged siege of the city and had ordered an assault to carry the Confederate lines on May 19 which resulted only in securing more advanced and advantageous positions for the foremost of his units. A second direct infantry attack three days later, preceded by a furious bombardment from every Federal battery then in position, again resulted in failure. Grant then decided that the city could be taken only by formal investment and, in his own words, he determined to "outcamp the enemy." The Army of the Tennessee had with it no siege train. The operations during the recent campaign would have precluded the carrying of such matériel in the equipment of the army even had it been available, and when formal investment operations were begun Grant's heaviest ordnance consisted of six 32-pounder rifles and the field batteries attached to the various units of his army.¹ To correct this defect he requested Admiral Porter to furnish several heavy caliber naval guns for mounting in batteries in rear of the city.² Porter accordingly supplied four 8-inch and two 9-inch pieces which were placed in position in Grant's lines.³ Altogether including light and heavy field pieces and naval ordnance, the Union land forces had 168 guns in position by June 20, and the Chief of Artillery reported ten days later that the number had been increased to 220.⁴ These numerous guns, superior in numbers, range, and caliber to the ordnance of the defending force, soon gained for the Union army a definite fire superiority that succeeded in severely crippling and silencing many of the

¹ Genl. U. S. Grant, "The Vicksburg Campaign," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (New York, 1884), III, 517, 521; *Id.*, *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant* (New York, 1885), I, 531-32.

² Grant to Porter, May 29, 1863, *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion* (Washington, 1894-1927), ser. I, vol. XXV, pp. 49-50. This publication is hereafter cited as *O. R. N.*, and all references to it are to the same volume.

³ Porter to Grant, May 29, 1863, *O. R. N.*, p. 50; Porter to Secy. Welles, June 9, 1863, *O. R. N.*, p. 66.

⁴ Asst. Secy. of War Charles A. Dana to Secy. Stanton, June 20, 1863, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, 1881-1901), ser. I, vol. XXIV, pt. I, p. 104. This publication is hereafter cited as *O. R.*, and all references to it are to the same volume. Reports of Capts. F. E. Prime and C. B. Comstock (Chief Engineers, Army of the Tennessee), November 29, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 176.

Confederate batteries and served materially to weaken resistance to the Federal siege operations.⁵ But in all this formidable and effective array of metal not a single mortar was available for use against the Confederate defenses.⁶

The nature of the investment operations, however, rendered the use of mortars highly desirable and, in some instances in the last stages of the siege, almost a necessity. "Investment by inches" was the term once applied to the slow and steady process of pressing approaches to the beleaguered city.⁷ The Confederate defensive works generally occupied high ground, thus giving some advantage to the defenders against the pioneer troops who pushed their saps and parallels almost within touching distance of the ditches and parapets of the fortifications that ringed the land side of the city.⁸ The proximity of the opposing forces became almost unbelievable as the siege progressed. Grant states at the outset that "in no place were our lines more than 600 yards from the enemy."⁹ On May 28 the sappers of Sherman's 15th Corp had completed parallels within eighty yards of the Confederate fortifications, and by June 9 the forward saps had been pushed within fifty feet of the same position. General McPherson's units had also reached a point within one hundred yards of their objective.¹⁰ June 20 witnessed the pioneers of General Logan's Division within twelve feet of the works opposite his line, and Grant's chief engineer reported that by July 1 four Federal approaches had actually reached the Confederate ditches.¹¹ About the same time Brigadier General E. A. Carr's approach was only ten yards from the opposing works.¹² By the end of June, at no less than ten points along the lines, the heads of regiments formed for assault could be placed within five to 120 yards of the enemy's line.¹³ So close did the burrowing Union pioneers dig to the works opposing them that on one occasion a gun was double-shotted and run forward by hand until its muzzle entered a Confederate embrasure. In this position it was fired, disabling a loaded cannon and wiping out its crew.¹⁴

From a glance at this general situation, in which the opposing forces were so closely entrenched, it is obvious that in certain parts of the lines supporting

⁵ Maj. Genl. C. L. Stevenson to Maj. R. W. Memminger, July 29, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 344; Maj. Genl. John H. Forney to Memminger, July 21, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 368; Maj. Genl. M. L. Smith to Memminger, August 9, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 398.

⁶ Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, I, 540.

⁷ Cf. photograph of Genl. John A. Logan's position (3rd Division, 17th Corps) in Francis Trevelyan Miller, ed., *Photographic History of the Civil War* (New York, 1911), II, 201.

⁸ "Description of the Ground," and "Description of the Enemy's Line," reports of Prime and Comstock, November 29, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, pp. 169-70.

⁹ Grant, "The Vicksburg Campaign," *Battles and Leaders*, III, 521.

¹⁰ Dana to Stanton, May 28 and June 10, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. I, pp. 90, 95.

¹¹ Dana to Stanton, June 20, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. I, p. 104, Capt. John M. Wilson to Brig. Genl. John A. Rawlins, September 7, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 179.

¹² "Carr's Approach," reports of Prime and Comstock, November 29, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 174.

¹³ Wilson to Rawlins, September 7, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 179.

¹⁴ Report of Maj. Genl. John A. McClernand, June 17, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. I, p. 155.

artillery behind the besiegers had to observe a minimum range limit that would reduce the effectiveness of their fire on the forward Confederate entrenchments. Otherwise ordinary range dispersion would produce casualties among the supported troops and also seriously damage the trenches and approaches constructed before the enemy's works. This danger was recognized by General Grant, who distributed to the various corps and divisions maps showing the positions of the advanced units. These maps were issued to the artillery in support as "a guide . . . in firing, to avoid throwing shot and shell in such direction as may endanger our own troops."¹⁵ Hence the most effective fire of which the numerous Federal batteries were capable could not be delivered against some of the foremost of the Confederate works, principally the 3rd Louisiana redan, from which, however, a destructive shower of musketry, grenades, and other hand missiles was maintained on the toiling engineer troops and infantrymen engaged in digging saps and parallels. The advantage of elevated ground occupied by the defenders in some of these positions also told heavily on the Union pioneers as the approaches were pushed forward. The relatively higher positions, as the distance between the forces shrank to a few yards, enabled the Confederates to hurl 6- and 12-pounder artillery shells with lighted fuses, as hand grenades, into the Federal saps and rifle pits.¹⁶ From several positions these missiles were freely used during the siege and, as General Leggett reported, "made sad havoc amongst my men."¹⁷ So effective was this method of attack that the Confederate Brigadier General Francis A. Shoup organized his artillerists into a "hand grenade and thunder barrel corps."¹⁸ The latter designation applied to the Confederate practice of filling barrels with cannon powder and rolling them with short fuses over the parapets into the Federal saps and trenches. Some of these improvised projectiles were packed with artillery shells interspersed with powder, nails, and scraps of iron.¹⁹ On one occasion a large thunder barrel containing 125 pounds of powder and equipped with a 15-second fuse was tossed over the outer parapet of the 3rd Louisiana redan and exploded with severe effect. "Fragments of sap-rollers, gabions, and pieces of timber were thrown into the air," wrote Major Samuel H. Lockett who had supervised the operation and personally lighted the fuse, "and I think some of the

¹⁵ Lt. Col. W. B. Scates (A. A. G., 13th Corps) to brigade commanders (circular letter), June 13, 1863, MS., Letters received, 2nd Brigade, 10th Division, 13th Corps (National Archives).

¹⁶ "Ewing's Approach," reports of Prime and Comstock, November 29, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 172; report of Maj. John F. Walden, June 26, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 313; Col. T. N. Waul to Maj. R. W. Memminger, July 30, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 358; report of Col. Francis M. Cockrell, August 1, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, pp. 415-16; journal of Capt. Andrew Hickenlooper, June 26, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 202; Dana to Stanton, June 26 and 28, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. I, pp. 109, 111.

¹⁷ Report of Brig. Genl. Mortimer D. Leggett, July 6, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 294.

¹⁸ Journal of operations, 3rd Brigade, Smith's Division, June 14, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 408.

¹⁹ W. H. Tunnard, "Reminiscences of the 3rd Louisiana Infantry in the Trenches in Front of Logan's Division," in Osborn H. Oldroyd, *The Siege of Vicksburg from the Diary of Osborn H. Oldroyd* (Springfield, Ohio, 1885), p. 134.

sappers must have been burned and smothered."²⁰ The survivors of the explosion retreated from the sap.²¹

The Federal pioneers were generally able to protect themselves reasonably well from musketry by the use of gabions and sap rollers, a number of which were built of packed cotton. But the closeness of the positions made possible the occasional destruction of these protective devices by fireballs thrown and fired from the Confederate lines. Musket balls, wrapped in cotton soaked in turpentine, were frequently fired into the sap-rollers and gabions, setting them afire in a dozen places at once.²²

Against these offensive operations at close range the Federal pioneers in a number of instances had little opportunity to retaliate. Their own artillery could not be fired on the outer Confederate lines for reasons above explained. In addition, a number of their positions in the forward parallels were below those of their opponents because of the elevated ground occupied by the defensive works. Consequently, the compliment of hand grenades and thunder barrels could not be reciprocated as the uphill throwing was more than even the strongest man could accomplish effectively. Even in attempting such tactics the Union troops would be dangerously exposed to musketry fire from the works only a few yards away. Some naval hand grenades had been obtained from Porter's squadron, but these were of an unusual shape and badly adapted for use in such positions. Because of their "peculiar form [they] could not be thrown at any considerable distance," wrote the Chief Engineer of the 13th Corps. "Even when the approaches were only ten feet from the ditch, it required an extraordinary man to throw one into the works."²³

Obviously the best solution of these several problems was the use of mortars. The accuracy of fire, short ranges, high trajectories, and effectiveness against defiladed positions which are characteristic of these weapons adapted them admirably to the situation confronting several positions held by advanced elements of the investing army. The Confederates in Vicksburg possessed a single 10-inch mortar which was used with effect from various parts of their inner lines.²⁴ On the river side Porter's mortar boats delivered a severe and destructive fire on the city, destroying houses, harassing the shore batteries, and even dropping shells

²⁰ Report of Maj. Samuel H. Lockett, July 26, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, pp. 333-34.

²¹ Lockett, "The Defense of Vicksburg," *Battles and Leaders*, III, 491.

²² Report of Lockett, July 26, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 332; Maj. Genl. John H. Forney to Memminger, July 2, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 364; journal of Lt. P. C. Hains, July 1, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 186; journal of Capt. Andrew Hickenlooper, June 18, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 200; Lockett, "The Defense of Vicksburg," *Battles and Leaders*, III, 491.

²³ Report of Lt. P. C. Hains, July 30, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 181.

²⁴ Reports of Prime and Comstock, November 29, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 175; report of Lockett, July 26, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, pp. 332-33; Pemberton to Col. Josiah Gorgas, April 23, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. I, p. 317; Dana to Stanton, June 15 and 18, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. I, pp. 99, 102; Maj. Genl. Francis J. Herron to Grant, July 1, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 318; report of Col. Edward Higgins (C. S. Artillery, Commanding Shore Batteries), July 25, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, pp. 338-40 *et passim*.

with accuracy into the Confederate positions beyond the town toward Grant's lines. Especially annoying was this fire when directed with precision on the cattle pens containing the scant stock of bees for the sustenance of the defending army.²⁵ But the Federal land forces did not have one such piece of effective ordnance at their disposal.

Grant and his staff soon recognized the need of this type of weapon in the forward investing lines on the land side of the city. "Coehorn mortars were particularly needed," reported the Chief Engineer of the 13th Corps,²⁶ and Major General Francis J. Herron complained that the lone 10-inch mortar of the enemy was "annoying us terribly."²⁷ On June 20 Grant sent an urgent request to the Chief of Ordnance in Washington for twenty mortars, half of which were to be Coehorns and the remainder 8- and 10-inch siege weapons. "Have them come through by special messenger as quickly as possible," he urged the Ordnance Bureau.²⁸ It appears that the request was repeated,²⁹ but, either from lack of matériel, shortage of transportation, or inefficiency, the pieces were not forthcoming. It was not until a month after Vicksburg fell that the large siege mortars finally arrived, and even then the Coehorns had not been received.³⁰ It is evident that previous attempts to secure these weapons had been futile for Lieutenant Peter C. Hains, Chief Engineer of McClernand's Corps, wrote in his journal of the siege on June 8 that "no mortars can be obtained, and the want of them is severely felt."³¹ Several weeks later the same officer noted, "In General Smith's front the saps are now about as close as they can get without first clearing the rebel works in front by means of mortar shells. Cohorn mortars would be invaluable at the present time."³²

Then the ingenuity of several engineer officers came into play, exemplifying the time-worn adage that necessity is the mother of invention. In the absence of regulation ordnance for the purpose, and after all reasonable attempts to secure such matériel had failed, a number of mortars were constructed of wood, an expedient that at first glance must seem highly impracticable. The largest and toughest logs procurable were cut into suitable lengths and then reinforced by shrinking on stout iron bands at the ends and middle. The logs were then bored out to receive 6- and 12-pounder shells and were mounted in the forward parallels

²⁵ Lt. Comdr. James A. Greer to Adml. Porter, May 31, 1863, *O. R. N.*, p. 53; Porter to Grant, June 3, 1863, *O. R. N.*, p. 59; Greer to Porter, June 8, 1863, *O. R. N.*, p. 65; Porter to Secy. Welles, June 9, 1863, *O. R. N.*, p. 66; Greer to Porter, June 11, 1863, *O. R. N.*, p. 68; Porter to Welles, July 4, 1863, *O. R. N.*, p. 104; report of Pemberton, August 25, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. I, p. 276.

²⁶ Report of Hains, July 30, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 181.

²⁷ Herron to Comdr. S. E. Woodworth, June 29, 1863, *O. R. N.*, p. 98.

²⁸ Maj. S. C. Lyford (Chief of Ordnance, Army of the Tennessee) to Brig. Genl. John W. Ripley (Chief of Bureau of Ordnance, U. S. A.), June 20, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. III, p. 422.

²⁹ Dana to Stanton, June 21, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. I, p. 105.

³⁰ Col. T. S. Mather to Maj. Genl. E. O. C. Ord, August 5, 1863, MS., Letter Books, 13th Army Corps, VI, 156 (National Archives).

³¹ Journal of Hains, June 8, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 182.

³² Journal of Hains, June 29 and 30, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 185.

of the Union lines.³³ The nature of the mountings is not disclosed in the available documents, though one report states that the improvised Coehorns were simply stuck into the ground. In most cases seasoned gum wood was found to be the most suitable material for construction.³⁴

The individual initially responsible for the idea is not clearly identified. It appears that Stewart R. Tresilian, a volunteer civilian engineer attached to Logan's Division, 17th Corps, played a prominent part in inaugurating the scheme,³⁵ and his example was followed by other officers in charge of engineer operations. Colonel Manning F. Force of the 20th Ohio, who also commanded a brigade in the 17th Corps, later declared that the novel weapons were devised by Private John W. Friend of Company C of his regiment.³⁶ Lieutenant Hains, however, claims to have taken the initiative and reports that the wooden mortars were constructed at his orders.³⁷

Hains had witnessed the havoc wrought in General Smith's lines by the Confederate hand grenades and sought to retaliate by constructing several spring-boards, not unlike ancient catapults in principle, for throwing grenades and shells over the parapets of the Confederate work designated as Fort B. He then learned that wooden mortars were being effectively used in General McPherson's (17th Corps) positions and directed Captain William F. Patterson of Smith's pioneer corps to build three of these wooden cannon to supplement the primitive devices then in use.³⁸ In his report he later stated that "Cohorn mortars were needed particularly. No mortars could be obtained, and . . . in the latter part of the siege the want of mortars was so severely felt that I gave orders to have several wooden mortars made . . ."³⁹

Although wood as a medium for cannon building seems entirely unsuited for the purpose, even for weapons of short range, the improvised Coehorns thus constructed proved to be entirely satisfactory. Their effective range was from a hundred to 150 yards, more than enough for the distance separating the lines where they were used. Tresilian reports that three of them were mounted about one hundred yards from the main Confederate redoubt fronting the 17th Corps and that immediately after the explosion of the mine of July 1 he opened fire with his crude weapons which dropped "nearly every shell in the proper place." The fire was sustained at intervals for forty-eight hours "with telling effect." During this period 468 rounds of 6- and 12-pounder projectiles were fired from the three

³³ "Logan's Approach," reports of Priine and Comstock, November 29, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 173.

³⁴ Journal of Hains, July 2, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 186.

³⁵ Reports of Priine and Comstock, November 29, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 173.

³⁶ Brig. Genl. Manning F. Force, "Personal Recollections of the Vicksburg Campaign," in *Sketches of War History* [papers read before the Ohio Commandery, Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States], vol. I (Cincinnati, 1888), p. 307.

³⁷ Report of Hains, July 30, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 181.

³⁸ Journal of Hains, July 2, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 186.

³⁹ Report of Hains, July 30, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 181.

mortars into the Confederate position and produced over ninety casualties.⁴⁰ Comstock and Prime reported that the wooden tubes "stood firing well, and gave sufficiently good results at 100 or 150 yards distance,"⁴¹ and Hains wrote that the mortars were said to "work admirably for about 100 yards."⁴² Captain John M. Wilson, Chief Engineer of the Department of the Tennessee, also stated that they were "very effective."⁴³ Only small charges of powder were required to propel the light shells the short distance required,⁴⁴ and thus stresses and pressure in the wooden tubes were reduced to a minimum.

Retaliation for the hand grenades and thunder barrels, now made possible by the small wooden mortars, appears to have given the Union soldiers much satisfaction. An Illinois chaplain, possibly of the "fighting parson" type, later set down in his regimental history that on July 2 "Our cannonading was especially furious, and we treated them very plentifully with 12-pound shells from a wooden mortar, in return for their hand grenades . . ."⁴⁵ Samuel H. Lockett, Confederate Chief Engineer, reported that one of these Cohorns firing on the 3rd Louisiana redan produced more than a dozen casualties in killed and wounded in the space of an hour.⁴⁶ Likewise Major General John H. Forney, one of Pemberton's division commanders, fully verified the Yankee chaplain's statement, and declared that on July 2 the enemy "opened from what is supposed to be a Cohorn mortar, which throws its missiles among the men with great accuracy, killing and wounding many and tending much to dishearten the men."⁴⁷ On the same day Brigadier General Louis Hébert, a brigade commander of the same division, recorded that the "enemy's fire was kept up as usual, our troops suffering more than before from his mortar shelling."⁴⁸ Similar testimony to the effect of the fire from these wooden weapons is found in a dispatch from Major General John S. Bowen, commanding the Confederate 2nd Division, who wrote to Pemberton's adjutant general on July 2,

Our position of the Jackson Road is fast becoming more dangerous. The enemy have a cohorn mortar and our exact range. They fire shell with heavy bursting charges, and our men are killed and wounded with fearful rapidity . . . I urge that every howitzer that can be brought to the vicinity be placed in position and fired at its greatest elevation with quarter charges to render the ground in rear and in vicinity of their sap as untenable as possible. No time is to be lost.⁴⁹

⁴⁰ Report of Tresilian, August 17, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 208.

⁴¹ "Logan's Approach," reports of Prime and Comstock, November 29, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 173.

⁴² Journal of Hains, July 2, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 186.

⁴³ Report of Wilson, September 7, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 179.

⁴⁴ Force, "Personal Recollections of the Vicksburg Campaign," *Sketches of War History*, I, 307; Brig. Genl. Andrew Hickenlooper, "The Vicksburg Mine," *Battles and Leaders*, III, 540; Report of Hains, July 30, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 181.

⁴⁵ R. L. Howard, *History of the 124th Regiment, Illinois Infantry Volunteers* (Springfield, 1880), p. 119.

⁴⁶ Report of Lockett, July 26, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 334.

⁴⁷ Forney to Memminger, July 2, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 365.

⁴⁸ Report of Hébert, July 9, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 377.

⁴⁹ Bowen to Memminger, July 2, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, pp. 413-14.

This was a high compliment indeed for the erstwhile gum log, now banded with iron and stuck into the ground to serve as a cannon. The urgent appeal for "every howitzer that can be brought" to neutralize the fire of the one wooden piece speaks eloquently of its effect. One of Bowen's brigadiers, Colonel F. M. Cockrell, mentions one of the log mortars in his report of the siege, adding that he later discovered that the infernal gun was of wooden construction. "This mortar did us great damage," he wrote, "having the exact range of our position, and throwing shells heavily charged with powder."⁵⁰ Among those killed by its fire were Lieutenant Colonel Pembroke S. Senteny, commanding the 2nd Missouri Infantry and reputed to be one of the best field officers of his division, and Lieutenants John C. Crenshaw and John Roseberry of the 6th Missouri.⁵¹ After the surrender one of Hébert's staff officers told Tresilian that twenty-one men had been killed and seventy-two wounded by the fire of three of these mortars in two days.⁵² Likewise Lieutenant Colonel R. S. Bevier of the 5th Missouri later recorded that on July 1, immediately after the explosion of the mine,

From the hostile works immediately upon the outside of our lines a small mortar had opened, throwing 12-pound shell, and every one lighted and exploded in our midst, rarely failing to kill or wound one or probably several of our men The artillery ceased firing for a while, but the destructive little mortar still continued to play upon us with serious effect. About 40 men of the regiment were struck by it, and more of them were killed than wounded.⁵³

Similarly another Confederate soldier wrote down in his reminiscences that "an immense number of 12-pound shells, thrown by wooden mortars, by the Yankees, descended among the troops, doing fearful executions."⁵⁴ Thus, as judged from the testimony of Confederate officers and men, the experiment in makeshift wooden ordnance was a remarkable success. On the Union side, General Grant makes special mention of the effectiveness of these mortars in his detailed memoirs and also in other accounts of the siege,⁵⁵ and Captain Hickenlooper, later a full brigadier, wrote that their fire was "exceedingly effective."⁵⁶

The capitulation of Vicksburg on July 4 terminated the use of these novel weapons, which had been conceived out of necessity and expediency and fabricated from crude substitute materials. Their successful use has a certain significance in the history of the unequal struggle that was still to ravish the divided nation for nearly two more years. Instances of expedients and substitutes for necessities, both civilian and military, were common and tragic occurrences in the economically

⁵⁰ Report of Cockrell, August 1, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 416.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*; Bowen to Memminger, July 2, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 413.

⁵² Report of Tresilian, August 17, 1863, *O. R.*, pt. II, p. 208.

⁵³ R. S. Bevier, "Incidents and Personal Sketches of the 1st and 2nd Confederate Brigades," Oldroyd, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

⁵⁴ W. H. Tunnard, "Reminiscences," Oldroyd, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

⁵⁵ Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, I, 540; *Id.*, "The Vicksburg Campaign," *Battles and Leaders*, III, 522.

⁵⁶ Hickenlooper, "The Vicksburg Mine," *Battles and Leaders*, III, 540.

stricken Confederacy. Here was one instance, at least, of a similar phenomenon in the armies of the richly supplied North. During the siege of Fort Pulaski, more than a year before, a regiment of Connecticut Yankees had resorted to their familiar pastime of whittling sticks to provide fuse plugs for shells when the ordnance stores failed to arrive in time, and a Georgian of the surrendered garrison sarcastically reminded his captors of the well-born New England story of "wooden nutmegs."⁵⁷ After the surrender at Vicksburg a similar jest might have been in order, but the comments of Confederate officers and men in official reports and personal memoirs show that the wooden Coehorns were no joking matter to the resolute garrison that bravely defended its lines for nearly seven weeks.

⁵⁷ Maj. Genl. Quincy A. Gillmore, "Siege and Capture of Fort Pulaski," *Battles and Leaders*, II, 7, 9-10.

PROFESSIONAL NEWS

Mr. Allen R. Boyd, who has served as Vice-President of the INSTITUTE since its organization in 1933, has asked to be relieved of the duties of that office. The INSTITUTE will continue to have the benefit of Mr. Boyd's interest and counsel as one of the most active of its Trustees.

Colonel Robert Arthur, whose name appeared among those of the Board of Trustees for the first time in the last issue of the JOURNAL, was appointed at the meeting of the Board held October 28. Colonel Arthur, like Brigadier General Oliver L. Spaulding and the late Colonel Charles E. T. Lull before him, is Chief of the Historical Section at the Army War College.

* * *

Mr. Robert G. Ballentine joins the staff of the JOURNAL with this issue as one of the Associate Editors. Mr. Ballentine did his graduate work in history at Clark and Harvard Universities and is now employed in the Division of War Department Archives at The National Archives.

* * *

The Thursday evening meetings at the headquarters have become increasingly popular among the local members and their friends. This success has been due in no small part to the local committee consisting of Lieutenant Colonels Ralph C. Bishop, L. A. Codd, William P. Wattles, Major Henry O. Swindler, Captain Frederick B. Wiener, and Lieutenant Harvey S. Ford. The planned meetings have been as follows:

January 25, Vice Admiral William L. Rodgers, "Possible Peace Terms upon the Termination of the Present War in Europe."

February 8, Lieutenant Colonel Calvin Goddard, "The Evolution of Small Arms Ammunition."

February 22, Dr. Edward B. Wilcox, "The Battle of Cannae."

March 7, Dr. Vladimir Gsovski, "Some Strategic Aspects of Southwestern Russia."

Similar groups not only could but should be formed in other metropolitan centers. The Secretary will do everything in his power to be of assistance. Why not write him for a list of members in your locality and for suggestions on how to get started?

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There has been an increasing demand, especially from libraries, for complete files of the JOURNAL. Volume I, number 2 (Summer 1937), is now out of print, and the INSTITUTE's supply of volume I, number 1 (Spring 1937), and volume II, number 1 (Spring 1938), is quite low. If any of the members have copies of these issues which they do not want to keep, the Secretary will appreciate being informed of the fact.

• • •

The last issue of the JOURNAL carried an announcement concerning *The Gun Report*, a new monthly publication devoted to the history of weapons and the events and personalities behind their manufacture and use. Six issues of this magazine have now been published, and its editors, Frank W. Funk, Jr., and Russell E. Patterson, have demonstrated their ability to select interesting and worthwhile subjects of study and to present them with professional skill.

It has been impossible for the INSTITUTE to offer students of weapons the specialized information they need. Its purpose is, rather, "to stimulate and advance the historical study of *all* that relates to war," and this broad view has been reflected in the JOURNAL.

In an effort to combine the specialization of *The Gun Report* with the more comprehensive approach of the JOURNAL, each of which complements the other, an agreement has been made whereby members of the INSTITUTE may receive both *The Gun Report* (independently \$2.00 a year) and the JOURNAL (independently \$3.00 a year) on a joint subscription basis for \$4.00 a year. Those members who wish to take advantage of this offer should send the additional fee of \$1.00 to the Secretary.

• • •

The War Documentation Service, with headquarters at 1300 Locust Street, Philadelphia, was begun in November 1939 under the direction of Dr. Richard H. Heindel of the University of Pennsylvania. The Service plans to keep a continuous record of sources of information relating to all phases of the present European conflict and to facilitate cooperation among libraries and other organizations in building up special collections. It has issued three mimeographed *Bulletins*: "Tentative List of Subject-subdivisions for Current European War Material" (December 20, 1939, pp. 13, 25c); "Notes on War Documentation and Research Activities" (January 11, 1940, pp. 6, 10c); and "Selective List of

Periodicals and News Letters" (February 20, 1940, pp. 8, 15c). The Service is sponsored by the Union Library Catalogue, the University of Pennsylvania, and the Bibliographical Planning Committee of Philadelphia.

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As part of a project which includes the preparation and publication of a guide book to Army posts in the San Francisco Bay region under Spanish, Mexican, and American rule, Lieutenant General Albert J. Bowley, Commanding General of the Fourth Army and the Ninth Corps Area, has had twelve redwood markers placed at historic sites in Fort Mason and the Presidio of San Francisco during the past year.

Work In Progress

Mr. Robert C. Lattimer, New York, New York, has recently completed a biography of Major John Andre (1751-80), aide-de-camp to Sir Charles Grey and Sir Henry Clinton, acting chief of British intelligence in 1780, and adjutant general of the British army in North America.

Dr. Carl Van Doren, New York, New York, has undertaken an examination of Benedict Arnold's treason as revealed in the British headquarters papers in the William L. Clements Library.

Professor David A. Lockmiller, North Carolina State College, is preparing a biography of Major General Enoch H. Crowder and would be glad to have anyone with letters from Crowder or knowledge of events of his life communicate with him.

Mr. Charles S. Hall, Columbia University, is working on a life of Major Benjamin Tallmadge, 2nd Continental Dragoons, for his doctoral dissertation.


Contributors To This Issue

Dr. A. Whitney Griswold is Assistant Professor of Government and International Relations at Yale University and the author of *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States*.

Dr. Wilfred Brenton Kerr, Associate Professor of History at the University of Buffalo, is the author of *Bermuda and the American Revolution, 1760-1783*.

Mr. F. Stansbury Haydon, who recently completed his doctoral dissertation for Johns Hopkins University on aeronautics during the Civil War, has been a frequent contributor to the JOURNAL.

Mr. Hugh Charles McBarron, Jr., Chicago artist, will be remembered for his first article on uniforms of the War of 1812 which appeared in volume III, number 3 (Fall 1939).



THE MILITARY LIBRARY

The Military History of Carlisle and Carlisle Barracks, by Thomas G. Tousey.
(Richmond: The Dietz Press. 1939. pp. 439. \$3.50.)

In his history of Carlisle and Carlisle Barracks Lieutenant Colonel Tousey has brought together much obscure material concerning one of the most interesting and important military posts in the colonial and national history of the United States. This hitherto little known center of military activity has been presented in a manner that reveals its strategic position from the beginning of the French and Indian War in 1754 through the American Civil War. The treatment of the era since the Civil War includes one of the better accounts of the Indian Industrial School at Carlisle and, since 1918, an account of the Medical Field Service School of the United States Army. To write this volume Colonel Tousey has consulted all of the important sources of information concerning his subject, including the official records in both the United States and English archives. Moreover, he has performed a real service to American historiography by his successful efforts in bringing to light much material which has not been available for historical research. In this respect the scope of the work is much more than the title implies.

Only two criticisms of the volume are justified. The first has to do with the organization of the materials. The author has gathered more data than he has been able to present effectively. Consequently, the continuity is too frequently interrupted by the necessity of recapitulating, or of going back to gather in the loose threads of the story which have been lost along the path of the narrative. Some of this might have been avoided had the author omitted events only distantly related to his story. Although a liability from the literary point of view, this diffusion does not impair the historical value of the work. The second criticism has to do with the paucity of social and economic history, a defect even more apparent in much of the military history of the past. Many readers are interested in the detailed results of the impact of periods of intense military activity upon the social and industrial life of the community. By implication Colonel Tousey has introduced a considerable body of this material into his history, but, judging from the extent of the sources examined, more information of real significance from this point of view might have been included, especially in those chapters dealing with the colonial

period. Even so, in contrast to most volumes on military history published in the past, this work is not nearly as destitute of such material.

The physical characteristics of the volume are in keeping with the technological progress of the contemporary period. The format and typography are pleasing, and the binding is a credit to the patient research and efforts of the author.

THEODORE R. PARKER

University of Pittsburgh

Revolutionary War Journals of Henry Dearborn, 1775-1783, edited by Lloyd A.

Brown and Howard H. Peckham, with a biographical essay by Herman Dunlap Smith. (Chicago: The Caxton Club. 1939. pp. 264. \$10.00.)

Henry Dearborn, later Major General and Secretary of War, kept journals of his eight years service in the Revolution. Of the six parts in which the manuscript is divided, one has not previously been published; the others have appeared variously. This is the first assembly and publication of the complete work, which is ably edited, annotated, and indexed.

The previously unpublished journal relates to the Yorktown campaign which, while it contains nothing new relating to that period, is an interesting sidelight on the numerous other accounts. Others of the journals relate to the Quebec expedition, the Burgoyne campaign, the battle of Monmouth, and Sullivan's Indian expedition. Much information of a general character appears as diary entries, and Dearborn's comments, though sparing are often enlightening. Almost nothing of a private character is included as Dearborn usually suspended his journal during periods when he was away from the army. However, he does not omit some description of celebrations of the Fourth of July and of various military victories.

A portrait, several reproductions of maps from the William L. Clements Library, and some diagrams are included in a book beautifully produced by R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company, the Lakeside Press, for the Caxton Club.

DON RUSSELL

Chicago, Illinois

Survival through War and Revolution in Russia, by D. Fedotoff White. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1939. Pp. 395. \$3.00.)

This very interesting volume, written by a former officer of the Imperial Russian Navy, describes the events of his life from his childhood in a naval family in old Reval through the storms of war and revolution. To add to the value of these memoirs the author had the experience of being on hand on many historic occasions. In 1914 he was serving on the cruiser *Rossia* while that ship was on a world cruise. When the *Rossia* put into Kiel in June 1914, its officers were not aware of the critical situation which had developed in Europe. Fedotoff was ordered to

pay the usual courtesy call at the German Naval Officers' Club and was surprised at the strange manner in which the civilian population eyed him. Later, when a group of officers of the German battleship *Preussen* visited the Russian cruiser, one of the German officers stated in an after-dinner speech that the diplomats had brought Russia and Germany to the verge of war and pointed out that they, as naval officers, would soon become nominal enemies. "But does that mean," he asked, "that our personal friendly feeling will be affected by what really is the performance of our professional duties? . . . *Hoch* to our friends, the officers of the Imperial Russian Cruiser *Rossia*!"

The first part of the book is devoted chiefly to the naval war in the Baltic Sea. In common with other navies, the Russians had quite superficial views as to the significance of the submarine, and their anti-submarine tactics reflected this. Some of the more humorous young officers of the *Rossia* parodied the official instruction thus: "Carry a large sledge hammer. Upon sighting a submarine make for the periscope at full speed and try to destroy the said periscope with the above-mentioned sledge hammer, or, failing this, put an empty flour bag on it to blind the enemy craft."

The author took part in a cruiser mine-laying operation under Captain Kolchak, the future admiral of the Black Sea Fleet, near Arkana, Germany. He describes the finding of the celebrated signal code of the wrecked German cruiser *Magdeburg*, a discovery which was to prove of so much value to Russia and her allies. During 1915-16 Fedotoff served as naval attaché in Washington, returning to active service in the Baltic as commander of a destroyer in 1916. He was on hand at Reval when the revolution broke out in 1917, saw its rapid development there, the massacre of officers at Kronstadt and Helsingfors, and the demoralization of the Russian army and navy.

The second part of the book describes the civil war which lasted from 1917 to 1921. The author tries to analyze the Russian tragedy and to find its causes. He familiarized himself with socialistic doctrines and understood the simple psychology of the Russian sailor who was deceived by the promises of equality and liberty falsely put forth by the Bolsheviki. Fedotoff apparently possessed a remarkable talent for gaining the confidence of his men. The whole story of the destitute Russian masses and their deception by the so-called "Workers and Peasants Government" is written with utmost objectivity. His account of the struggles of the White Russian armies in Siberia is valuable. He tells a memorable story of the winter march with a naval regiment through Siberian forests with the temperature at sixty degrees below zero. He was offered a commission in the German officered Moslem Corps which was to "invade" India.

Released from prison camp in 1920, he escaped to Finland in 1921. There he faced an entirely new problem—that of survival in a strange and none-too-friendly Western world.

DIMITRY KRASSOVSKI
Stanford University

Words that Won the War, by James R. Mock and Cedric Larson. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1939. Pp. 372. \$3.75.)

Neither authors' preface nor publisher's blurb exaggerates the timeliness of this book. For those, at least, who persist in their faith in the possibilities of history as an applied science it will be easy to agree that the lessons of the Creel Committee do "call aloud for recognition in this tense year of 1939." It can be said immediately that Messrs. Mock and Larson have succeeded splendidly in giving due consideration to "not only the actual mechanics and the work of the CPI but also the larger and more gravely urgent questions which are with us today—or may be tomorrow." In the compass of a single compact and very readable volume they have given us the amazing story of our first "propaganda ministry," the broad scope of whose activities was unsurpassed before the day of the totalitarian dictatorships.

For all who have been apprehensive about the effect of another war upon American democracy this story has little that is encouraging. There is small ground for edification in the thought that such freedom of expression as remained to us after we entered the war was the result, not of public resistance to repressive measures, but of the moderation and self-restraint of men who might well have acted otherwise. For this reason the reviewer cannot agree with the authors that in the event of another war there would be no need for Americans to read the story of the Committee on Public Information as they would in any case "relive it." It may well be that the most significant lesson to be learned from the success of the Committee in "holding fast the inner lines" is the fact that it was achieved in spite of the imposition of a self-denying ordinance. There may be little hope that the propaganda minister of the future will be another George Creel, who was so completely sold on the doctrines he preached. Nor will it be easy to find another Dean Ford, who saved so many academic reputations by filing away unpublished the manuscripts of "scholars" who had yielded too completely to the war spirit. But the fact that it was possible to operate effectively while observing restraint in the conduct of repressive measures may help us to escape from that gloomy defeatism which has led so many of us to accept the inevitability of a totalitarian strait-jacket in time of war.

While giving due credit to Creel and his associates for their sincerity in seeking to live up to the high standards of conduct they had set themselves, the authors make no attempt to gloss over the extent to which practical considerations obliged them to compromise with their ideals. Like the President himself, Creel was probably guilty of considerable self-deception in this regard. In the face of rather self-righteous claims to the contrary, CPI agents occasionally engaged in bribery and the subsidization of foreign newspapers and violated the laws of neutral states. The literature sent to enemy countries was usually a more or less direct incitement to political or social revolution, while the atrocity propaganda circulated at home scarcely accorded with the boast that "No hymn of hate accompanies our message."

The book is admirably organized and no phase of the Committee's work is

neglected. The activity of the CPI abroad, which has never received adequate attention, is at last assigned its proper place. In view of the thousands of documents involved, the authors have done a fine piece of work in separating the wheat from the chaff and in preparing so readable an account from such materials. They would have done even better if they had been somewhat more assiduous in getting at such information as is recorded only in the memory of those who were the actors in the piece. The CPI not being a permanently constituted governmental agency, even more than the usual amount of informal consultation preceded the decisions it arrived at. Though a certain number of interviews took place, some of these appear to have been too brief to be satisfactory. It might also have been well to submit the manuscript to such persons as might have been able to supply information to fill some of the gaps of which the authors themselves seem to be entirely aware.

HAROLD C. DEUTSCH

University of Minnesota

Perish by the Sword: The Czechoslovakian Anabasis and Our Supporting Campaigns in North Russia and Siberia 1918-1920, by R Ernest Dupuy. (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Company. 1939. Pp. 302. \$2.50.)

Colonel Dupuy has undertaken a task of great complexity and difficulty. He has attempted on the basis of a limited study of the vast sources available to tell the story of the mass movement of the *Czeska Druzina*—the Czech army corps of forty thousand men—from the Volga to Vladivostok and back again, how they maintained a new front in the East for two years, and finally how they traveled around the world to take part in the building of the ill-fated Czechoslovak state. To this gigantic problem was added the difficulty of describing two supporting American campaigns, one in north Russia, the other in Siberia. To have told this story adequately a study of Russian, Japanese, French, Czech, British, and American sources would have been necessary. In that case we should have no book at all. The author, however, has made the best possible use of the sources he has consulted. He manages to steer a straight course amid the wrack of White and Red Russians, through French, British, Japanese, and Czech intrigue, and pilots us through the endless masses of hopeless refugees cluttering the railroad route of the Czech legion. As an example of mass confusion, terror, suffering, beastliness, and intrigue, this period was unequalled in modern times until the Japanese invasion of China, 1937-40.

In the light of recent happenings in Europe, Colonel Dupuy is concerned with having the American people appreciate the strategical absurdity and the tactical awkwardness of the American mission in Russia. American troops were called upon to carry out Quixotic tasks in the face of complexities undreamed of when the expeditions were approved. He does not mince words about the exploitation of the American forces by the British and the lack of comradely support by the British

General Poole. He warns against ever again squandering American troops on a military wild-goose chase of this type under an alien command.

Many historic figures were involved in these vast and tangled movements: Generals Poole, Ironsides, Knox, Janin, Syrov, Kolchak, Semenoff, Otani, and Graves. American readers will leave this book with a new appreciation of the restraint, common sense, military toughness, and singular unselfishness of the American troops and leaders involved. General Graves merited all the praise and vindication given him by the American Chief of Staff, General March. He carried out a distasteful and illogical task with admirable forbearance and directness.

The book is well illustrated, and the pictures, particularly those showing the refugees along the railway, often convey impressions of confusion, despair, and tragedy which mere words could never carry.

H. A. DEWEERD

Denison University

Our Military Chaos, by Oswald Garrison Villard. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1939. Pp. 202. \$1.75.)

Here is a book that all interested in military and naval affairs should read. Unquestionably it will come as a stunning surprise to many. But its chief value lies in the fact that it shows how pacifists reason. In sweeping phrases the writer determines that the military are all wrong and he is right. Even Congress is deluded by the Machiavellian soldier class. Sly fellows they are. The country needs saving from them.

It is his belief in this world of war the United States is safe behind two great oceans. We do not need a sizeable army, navy, or air force. We are deluding ourselves, or quack military men deceive us, or smugly organize an inefficient army. Again and again he quotes General Hagood. Yet General Hagood was the one who stated that soldiers could be trained in ten days. Caesar and Napoleon had far different opinions.

Often he mentions opinions of people that back him. But in general he decides from his own ability what is needed. Yet, even the military people from a lifetime of study are none too sure of the future or the method of coming wars, or from where or when they will come. He is. He flatly states that only two hundred thousand men could possibly be launched against this country.

He quotes in sheer horror something the reviewer said in 1928. He calls him a poisonous Nazi who should be tried. Yet the reviewer was only telling how to train soldiers, not how to educate people in civil life. Soldiers are far different from scholars. But the author says nothing about that; perhaps he cannot understand it.

The fatal flaw in the book is that Villard avoids men who do not support him. For instance, he tells how our naval air force is wrong because it does not follow his ideas. He ignores Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, who in the

British Parliament some years ago said the American naval air force was the finest in the world, far superior to the British.

The author's knowledge of history, psychology, and human relations seems to be askew. He is a desk thinker. He has the fanatic's burning zeal for a cause—pacifism. Therefore he sees nothing else, and that which militates against it is damned.

But he writes well, castigates the Army and Navy, sketches in his own plans, and arrogantly tells all military men where they are completely wrong. He does not understand that all his ideas have already been thought over by the staffs. They are in flat disagreement with him, and they are most likely to be right.

The book is interesting because a pacifistic thinker writes adroitly, cleverly, and gives the twisted ideas of his class. It would have gone over big fifteen years ago, but not today, for huge wars are raging. Unfortunately, from reading his book one might think the soldiers pushed us into war. It is the civilian that leads the soldier into war. The soldier has nothing to do with making wars. He only fights them and growls at the government that brings on the war.

JOHN H. BURNS

Infantry Journal

The Next War, edited by Captain Lidell Hart: *Sea Power in the Next War*, by Commander Russell Grenfell; *Air Power in the Next War*, by J. M. Spaight; *Tanks in the Next War*, by Major E. W. Sheppard; *Gas in the Next War*, by Major-General Sir Henry Thullier. (London: Geoffrey Bles. 1938-39. Pp. 184, 181, 182, and 180. \$1.50 each.)

This is a series of books concerning various problems of modern war. After discussing the lessons of the World War in their respective fields, the authors deal with post-war developments and possible future problems. The books were published before the beginning of the present war; consequently the theories advanced are of special interest in the light of happenings since the outbreak of hostilities.

Commander Grenfell concludes that the development of the submarine and the airplane has exerted an influence on the minds of naval commanders out of proportion to the actual damage these new weapons can inflict. The constant increase in the size of capital ships with the consequent reduction in numbers may produce a tendency to avoid risks which may have an adverse effect on the offensive spirit in naval warfare.

The doctrine that future conflicts can be settled rapidly by the use of massed air power is not a sound one according to J. M. Spaight. Nevertheless the threat of such action on population centers will continue to have an enormous effect. At the time this work was written the author felt that such a threat might prevent the outbreak of hostilities.

Tanks in the Next War briefly sketches the part played by this weapon in the World War and discusses the plans of the Allies for its use which did not then

materialize. In spite of anti-tank measures in all present day armies, the author feels that the tank has come to be a permanent fixture in modern warfare.

The author of *Gas in the Next War* was Controller of Chemical Warfare at the Ministry of Munitions, and hence an authority on the subject. He holds that gas is peculiarly a weapon of surprise and that it would be unwise to place too much faith in any convention for its total abolition.

PHILIP T. McLEAN

Stanford University

OTHER RECENT BOOKS

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

Voennoe iskusstvo drevniago rabovladel'cheskogo obshchestva [Military Art of the Ancient Society of Slave-owners], by E. Razin. (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1939.) A brief sketch of the development of the military art of the ancient Orient (Assyria, Persia, and Egypt), Greece, Macedonia, and Rome.

L'Armée Moderne, by General Maurin. (Paris: Flammarion. 1938. Fr. 25.) The testament of the French general, twice Minister of War, written at the end of forty-five years of service. It is divided into three parts: (1) the nature and component parts of an army; (2) the organization of an army and its administration; and (3) the organization of a nation.

War in the Twentieth Century, edited by Willard Waller. (New York: The Dryden Press. 1940. Pp. 572. \$2.75.) A series of essays on war in the present century, designed primarily as a text book. The quality of the essays varies. The authors are professors in American universities.

Verdun, by Jules Romains. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1939. Pp. 500. \$2.50.) Volume VIII of the series *Men of Good Will*; one of the greatest World War novels.

Germany Rampant: A Study in Economic Militarism, by Ernest Hambloch. (New York: Carrick & Evans. 1939. Pp. 290. \$2.50.) A study of economic pressures in Nazi militarism.

Revolution of Nihilism: Warning to the West, by Dr. Hermann Rauschning. (New York: Alliance Book Corp. 1939. Pp. 300. \$3.00.) An alarming examination of Nazi philosophy and militarism by a former important Nazi official.

The Fall of the Russian Monarchy, by Bernard Pares. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1939. Pp. 510. \$5.00.) The story of the progressive breakdown in the power and prestige of the Romanov dynasty after 1914, told by an outstanding authority.

Profsoiuzy SSSR v sozdanii krasnoi armii, 1918-1920 [Trade Unions of the USSR in Building the Red Army, 1918-1920], compiled by K. Gulevich and E. Mikhailov. (Moscow: Profizdat. 1939. Pp. 191.) A documentary collection from materials of the Central Archives of the trade union movement and the organization of labor.

ART AND PHILOSOPHY OF WARFARE

Sea Power and Today's War, by Fletcher Pratt. (New York: Harris and Hilton Books. 1939. Pp. 237. \$3.00.) A popularly written estimate of the rôle of sea power in the present conflict.

Strategic Mineral Supplies, by Major G. A. Roush. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1939. Pp. 485. \$5.00.) A carefully written account of the problem of strategic raw materials with charts, tables, and index.

La Marina Italiana nella Grande Guerra: La Guerra al Traffico Marittimo [Volume IV]. (Florence: Vallecchi. 1939. Pp. 605. L. 15.) The story of Italian shipping in the Great War.

Il Servizio Informazioni dell'Esercito Italiano nella Grande Guerra, by General Odoardo Marchetti. (Rome: Tipografia Regionale. 1937. Pp. 262. L. 15.) An account of the Italian intelligence service in the World War; discusses the methods of obtaining information and of its use in the various Italian campaigns.

- Un Centre de Guerre Secrète, Madrid, 1914-1918*, by P. L. Riviére. (Paris: Payot. 1938. Pp. 321. Fr. 15.) An account of the intrigues carried on by the Austrian and German embassy officials in Madrid during the World War. Their activities were concerned with espionage, sabotage, and propaganda. The latter included the starting or subsidization of newspapers friendly to the German cause.
- Heerführer des Weltkrieges: Der Jünger Moltke, Joffre, Falkenhayn, Conrad von Hötzendorf, Alexejew, Enver Pacha, Cadorna, Haig, Foch: Die Feldherrnreinheit: Hindenburg-Ludendorff*, edited by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wehrpolitik und Wehrwissenschaften. (Berlin: Mittler. 1939. Pp. 296. Rm. 8.) A study in the military leadership of the World War from the German point of view.
- Mysl' ob ustroistvie budushchei vooruzhennoi sily. Obshchiiâ osnovaniâ* [Discourse on the Organization of Future Armed Forces. General Principles], by N. N. Golovin. (Belgrade: Voenno-nauchnyi institut. 1939.) The purpose of this work is to indicate the paths which the future armed forces of Russia will take. In connection with this, the author discusses military doctrine, quality and quantity of troops, significance of contemporary gunfire, and characteristics of the main theaters of Russian military actions.

MILITARY SCIENCE

- General Washington's Spies on Long Island and in New York*, by Morton Pennypacker. (Brooklyn: Long Island Historical Society. 1939. Pp. 302. \$3.50.) A documented account of the Revolutionary intelligence service containing new material on André and the Culpers.
- Maskirovka artillerii na pozitsii* [Camouflage of Artillery on the Front Line], by B. V. Badanin. (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1939.) Briefly describes the camouflage of artillery, the means of its destruction, false trenches, etc.; written for officers of artillery.
- Podgotovka pekhoty k nochnym deistviâmi* [Training Infantry for Night Operations], by I. Khorikov. (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1939. Pp. 159.) Numerous examples of night battles indicate that in the contemporary war night operations are occupying an essential place in the versatile battle work of troops. Seven chapters are devoted to various phases of the training necessary to meet this condition.

AUXILIARY SCIENCES

- Armies with Wings*, by James L. H. Peck. (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co. 1939. \$2.50.) A popular account of the actual operation of military planes under modern conditions of warfare by a pilot who served in the Spanish civil war.
- Sanitarnaia sluzhba Armii Soedinennykh Shtatov Ameriki v Mirovoi voïnu* [Sanitary Service of the Army of the United States of America in the World War]. Moscow: Gosvoenizdat. 1939. Pp. 254.) This book was written by a group of professors of the Military Medical Academy in Petrograd. It fully describes the questions of preparation and organization of the sanitary-medical service, chemical defense, sanitary-prophylactic security, sanitary tactics, general surgery, orthopedy, etc.
- Khirurgicheskaia pomoshch' vo Frantsuzskoi armii v Mirovoi Voïne 1914-1918* [Surgical Help in the French Army in the World War, 1914-1918], by V. Sheinis. (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat. 1938. Pp. 147.) A study of the organization of surgery in the French Army during the World War based on the study and analysis of numerous source materials. It shows that the first step in the efficient organization of surgical aid in war is the expedient combination of distribution, medical treatment, and evacuation of the wounded. It must be flexible and adaptable to conditions.

ESTABLISHMENTS

- One Hundred Years at Virginia Military Institute*, by Colonel William Couper. (Richmond: Garrett and Massie. 1939. 2 vols., pp. 705. \$6.00.) The history of a famous military school, with a foreword by General George C. Marshall.
- The History of the Fiftieth Division, 1914-1919*, by Everard Wyrall. (London: Humphries. 1939. Pp. 321. 10s.6d.)

The Lost Legion, by Gustav Becvar. (London: Stanley Paul. 1939. Pp. 312. 10s.6d.) The story of the Czech legion in Siberia by one of the participants.

Sardinian Brigade, by Emilio Lussu, translated by Marion Rowson. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1939. Pp. 274. \$2.50.) An account of Alpine fighting during the Great War by a participant.

Strelkovyi polk v nastuplenii; sbornik dokumentov (*TSentral'nyi arkhiv krasnoi armii*) [The Rifle Regiment in the Offensive; a Collection of Documents (of the Central Archives of the Red Army)]. (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1939). Characterizes the organization and action of the rifle regiment of the Red Army breaking through the Perekop (Crimea) fortifications of General Vrangel in 1920.

OPERATIONS AND BIOGRAPHY

Las Invasiones Inglesas al Rio de la Plata (1806-1807), by Juan Beverina. (Buenos Aires: edition of the *Circulo Militar, Biblioteca del Oficial*, vols. CCXLIV-CCXLV. 1939. Pp. 538.) A detailed account of the British invasion of the Platte in 1806-07.

Kutuzov; ocherk zhizni i deiatel'nosti velikago russkogo polkovoditsa [Kutuzov; a Sketch of the Life and Activity of the Great Russian General]. (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1938.) Generalissimo Suvorov's pupil to whom Russia turned for leadership in the most distressing moment of war with Napoleon.

United States

They Were Not Afraid to Die, 1775-1781, by A. C. M. Azoy. (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Company. 1939. Pp. 303. \$2.00.) A series of ten brightly colored pictures of the Revolution, skillfully drawn by an experienced military writer.

Keogh, Commanche and Custer: A True Account of an Army Man and His Army Horse as Taken from the Records of the 7th U. S. Cavalry, by Captain Edward Smith Luce. (St. Louis: John S. Swift Company. 1939. Pp. 128. \$3.00 [cloth], \$7.50 [de luxe].) An account of the rôle of Captain Myles W. Keogh in Custer's last stand and his famous horse Commanche, the sole survivor.

The Custer Tragedy, by Fred Dustin. (Saginaw, Michigan: privately printed. 1939. Pp. 273. \$10.00.) This account of the Custer battle is based on a long study of the controversial campaign.

Soldiers in the Sun, by Captain William T. Sexton. (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Company. 1939. Pp. 292. \$2.50.) An account of the American campaigns in the Philippines leading to the pacification in 1903.

World War

Greek Memories, by Compton Mackenzie. (London: Chatto & Windus. 1939. Pp. 370. 10s.6d.) A sequel to the author's *Gallipoli Memories* covering his activities in Athens through 1916.

Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre: La Campagne Offensive de 1918 et la Marche au Rhin [Volume VII]. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale. 1939. Pp. 540.) The official French history of the Great War from July 18, 1918, to June 28, 1919, published by the *Service Historique de l'État Major de l'Armée*.

Gorlitskii proryv 1915 goda [Breaking Through at Gorlice, 1915], by N. Krasil'nikov. (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1937.) A description of one of the most important battles on the Eastern front. The author, having used German and Austrian sources, presents the picture of the development of the plan of operations of the German command.

Plany Operacyjne Moarstw Centralnych Przewiaz Rosji [Plans of Operations of the Central Powers against Russia], by Jerzy Pajaczkowski-Dydyński. (Warsaw: Biuro historik. 1938. Pp. 150. R. 7.)

Podwodnie Lodki v Operatsiakh Russkogo Flota na Baltiskom More v 1914-1915 [Submarines in the Operations of the Russian Fleet in the Baltic Sea in 1914-1915], by A. V. Tomashevich. (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1939. Pp. 282. 8R.50k.)

Voennia Ussiliia Rossii v Mirovoi Voini [Russian Military Efforts in the World War], by N. N. Golovine. (Paris: Editeurs reunis. 1939. Pp. 210. Fr. 18.)

Balkanskii front Mirovoi voini 1914-1918 godov [Balkan Front in the World War, 1914-1918], by N. Korsun. (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1939. Pp. 124.) An objective study of

complicated and important military actions on the Balkan Peninsula based on numerous Russian and foreign sources.

CUSTOMS AND ANTIQUITIES

Old Times under Arms, by Colonel Cyril Field. (London: Hodge & Company. 1939. Pp. 476. 10s.) A military anthology of the days when war was still "glorious," showing war's unchanging capacity for the sane and the ridiculous, the pomp and the pain, the glory and the filth.

Life of an Irish Soldier, by General Sir Alexander Godley. (London: John Murray. 1939. Pp. 345. \$3.75.) Reminiscences about horses, society, and the British army.

The Artist of the Revolution: the Early Life of Charles Willson Peale, by Charles Coleman Sellers. (Hebron, Connecticut: Feather & Good. 1939. Pp. 293. \$7.50.) A biography based on Peale's diaries and letters.

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

"The Inner Nature of War," by Lieutenant-Colonel Graham Seton Hutchinson, in *The Army Quarterly*, January 1939 (XXXVII, 240-52). A pre-war plea for Great Britain to abandon its policy of trust and alliances and to prepare to defend itself.

"Civilian Control of Military Policy," by Lindsay Rogers, in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1940 (XVIII, 280-91). Historical and administrative treatment with emphasis on the recent experiences of democratic countries.

"Dictature ou Liberté. Le Problème Militaire," by Louis Marlio, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, May 15, 1939 (LI, 286-315).

"Bonapartism and Dictatorship," by Frederick B. Artz, in *South Atlantic Quarterly*, January 1940 (XXXIX, 37-49). Some arresting parallels between Napoleons I and III and present dictators.

Mexico

"La Mujer Mexicana en las Guerras de la Independencia," by Delio Moreno Bolio, in *Boletín de la Sociedad Mexicana de Geografía y Estadística*, March 1939 (XLIX, 199-208). The part played by women in the Mexican Wars of Independence.

United States

"The Richmond Daily Press on British Intervention in the Civil War," by Schuyler Dean Hoslett, in *William and Mary College Quarterly*, January 1940 (2nd ser., XX, 79-83). Preliminary work on a study to be made of Confederate public opinion.

"Federal Control of the Western Apaches, 1848-1866," by Ralph H. Ogle, in *New Mexico Historical Review*, January 1940 (XV, 12-71).

ART AND PHILOSOPHY OF WARFARE

"Blitzkrieg," by Henry J. Reilly, in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1940 (XVIII, 254-65). Brief historical and technical analysis, with particular reference to the Spanish revolution and succeeding wars.

"Si la Guerre Eclatait," by Général Serrigny, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, June 1, 1939 (LI, 609-25).

"La Conscriptio Britannique. Une Affirmation et un Avertissement," by Jacques Bardoux, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, June 1, 1939 (LI, 559-75).

"Germany's Economic Mobilization," by Fritz Sternberg, in *The Army Quarterly*, April 1939 (XXXVIII, 14-28).

United States

"Policy and Command in the American Civil War, 1864-1865," by Major E. W. Sheppard, in *The Army Quarterly*, January and April 1939 (XXXVII, 294-303; XXXVIII, 48-58).

MILITARY SCIENCE

"The Hindenburg Line," by Captain G. C. Wynne, in *The Army Quarterly*, January 1939 (XXXVII, 205-208). A study of the establishment of the 1916 plan of German defense.

- "Partisan Warfare," by Lieutenant Jack W. Rudolph, in *Infantry Journal*, January-February 1940 (XLVII, 41-48). The techniques of guerrilla tactics as developed by the Chinese Red Army during the 1930's.
- "Pallisadoes and Other Defenses," by Charles Houlkes, in *Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research*, Spring 1940 (XIX, 2-8). A short review of spiked field fortifications from early days to the present.
- "Divisional Artillery in the Polish Campaign," by Colonel Hartman, translated by Brigadier General Oliver L. Spaulding, in *The Field Artillery Journal*, January-February 1940 (XXX, 15-23). A brief official account released by the German General Staff.
- "Les Grands Manoeuvres de l'Armée Belge dans les Ardennes et le Mobilisation de Septembre," by Robert Leurquin, in *The Army Quarterly*, January 1939 (XXXVII, 284-93). The successful Belgian army maneuvers of September 1938 and the modernization and motorization of the army plus the development of anti-aircraft defense all indicate that Belgium will be able to defend itself in case of attack.
- "Air Power and Troop Movements," by Major Thomas R. Phillips, in *The Army Quarterly*, October 1938 (XXXVII, 96-111). A discussion of the problem of troop movements as affected by the threat of aerial attack.
- "The Use of Firearms by Cavalry," by Major G. Tylden, in *Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research*, Spring 1940 (XIX, 9-15). Brief summary of British Army experience in this connection.
- "La Lanza de la Caballeria en las Guerras de la Independencia Argentina," by Juan Beverina, in *La Prensa* (Buenos Aires), February 19, 1939. The beginnings of cavalry in the early wars of Argentina.

WEAPONS AND ORDNANCE

- "Arms of the Russo-Turkish War," by Allen P. Westcott, in *The Gun Report*, November and December 1939.
- "The German Anti-Tank Rifle," by G. Philip Roller, in *The Gun Report*, December 1939.
- "Colt-Marlin Machine Gun," by L. J. Willmott, in *The Gun Report*, January 1940.
- "The Remington .50-Caliber Single-Shot United States Army and Navy Pistols, Models of 1866, 1867, and 1871," Monograph No. 1 in *The Gun Report*, November 1939.
- "The Smith and Wesson Revolvers, First Model, Nos. 1, 2, and 3," Monograph No. 2 in *The Gun Report*, December 1939.
- "The Luger Automatic Pistol," Monograph No. 3 in *The Gun Report*, January 1940.
- "The Prussian Needle-Gun," Monograph No. 4 in *The Gun Report*, February 1940.
- "Some American Military Swords," by Alfred L. Hopkins, in *Regional Review*, January 1940.
- "The Von Kienbusch Collection of American Polearms," in *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, January 1940 (V, 116-19). A brief description of the seven examples recently acquired.

ESTABLISHMENTS

Brazil

- "Documents Relating to the First Military Balloon Corps Organized in South America: The Aeronautic Corps of the Brazilian Army, 1867-1868," by F. Stansbury Haydon, in *Hispanic American Historical Review*, November 1939 (XIX, 504-17). The story of James and Ezra Allen who had been assistants to Lowe.

France

- "Les Régiments Provinciaux et l'Ordonnance du 19 Octobre 1773," by Albert Depréaux, in *Revue d'Histoire Moderne*, July-September 1938 (XIII, 266-86).

United States

- "Virginia Frontier Defenses, 1719-1795," by Roy B. Cook, in *West Virginia History*, January 1940 (I, 119-30).
- "Old Fort Ashby," by J. C. Sanders, in *West Virginia History*, January 1940 (I, 104-109).
- "Story of Fort Henry," by A. B. Brooks, in *West Virginia History*, January 1940 (I, 110-18).

- "The Battery that Saved the Day," by Colonel Cary Ingram Crockett, in *The Field Artillery Journal*, January-February 1940 (XXX, 26-33). An account of Imboden's Battery at the First Bull Run.

OPERATIONS AND BIOGRAPHY

- "'Butcher' Cumberland *versus* Marshal Saxe, Fontenay, 11th of June, 1745," by Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. Burne, in *The Army Quarterly*, October 1938 (XXXVII, 138-49).
- "La Guerra de Texas, Causa formada al Gral. Filisola por su retirada en 1836," in *Boletín del Archivo General de la Nación* (X, 107-80, 347-408). Official documents pertaining to the investigation of the conduct of General Filisola during the Texan Revolution.
- "Chaos in the Crimea," by Helen Morris, in *The Army Quarterly*, January and April 1939 (XXXVII, 333-43; XXXVIII, 75-85). A study of the British Army during the Crimean War.
- "The Umheyala Campaign of 1863 and the Bhutan Expedition of '65-66," edited by Brigadier-General H. Biddulph, in *Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research*, Spring 1940 (XIX, 34-47). Letters of an officer of the Bengal Army.
- "The Black Hawk War: A Military Analysis," by Joseph I. Lambert, in *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society*, December 1939 (XXXII, 445-73).
- "Copy of Report of Colonel Samuel Cooper, Assistant Adjutant General of the United States, of Inspection Trip from Fort Graham to the Indian Villages on the Upper Brazos made in June 1851," edited by E. B. Ritchie, in *The Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, April 1939 (XLII, 327-33).
- "Colonel J. F. K. Mansfield's Report of the Inspection of the Department of Texas in 1856," edited by Colonel Martin L. Crummins, in *The Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, October 1938 and January and April 1939 (XLII, 122-48, 215-57, 351-87).
- "McKinley to Rowan to Garcia: Elbert Hubbard Didn't Tell the Half of It," by A. C. M. Azy, in *The American Legion Magazine*, February 1940. Colonel Azy adds a quarter more.

World War

- "The First Chief of Field Artillery: Orientation [part II]," in *The Field Artillery Journal*, January-February 1940 (XXX, 3-14). Extracts from the World War memoirs of Major General William J. Snow.
- "To Hold It High," by Fletcher Pratt, in *The American Legion Magazine*, February 1940. Some interesting side lights on Major Charles W. Whittlesey, the enigmatic commander of the "Lost Battalion."
- "Le Maréchal Foch," by André Tardieu, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, June 1, 1939 (LI, 517-36).
- "The Battle of Romani, 4th of August 1916," by Lieutenant-Colonel S. H. Kershaw, in *The Army Quarterly*, October 1938 (XXXVII, 84-95).
- "Hoffman," by H. A. De Weerd, in *Infantry Journal*, January-February 1940 (XLVII, 55-66). The story of the staff officer who worked to make Hindenburg and Ludendorff famous.

1910-1940

- "A Sort of War," by Brigadier-General A. B. Beauman, in *The Army Quarterly*, April 1939 (XXXVIII, 114-23). A British officer's experiences in Palestine in 1936.

CUSTOMS AND ANTIQUITIES

- "The 25th Foot in Minorca, 1771," by Percy Sumner, in *Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research*, Spring 1940 (XIX, 19-33). Critical review of a series of paintings of a British regiment, by England's outstanding authority on uniforms.
- "A Sword-Belt Plate of the Revolution," by William L. Calver, in *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, January 1940 (V, 110-14). A discussion of a plate of John Fellows' Massachusetts Regiment.
- "The Star Spangled Banner at Fort McHenry," by Roy E. Appleman, in *Regional Review*, January 1940.

NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

AMERICAN MILITARY DRESS IN THE WAR OF 1812

II. General and Staff Officers

There is almost no information of an official character concerning the uniforms worn by Regular Army general officers and their staffs when the second war with Great Britain was declared, June 18, 1812. Indeed, no mention was made of these uniforms in regulations issued as late as December 30 of that year.¹ But it should be remembered that for some time prior to 1812 there had been only three brigadiers and perhaps a half-dozen staff officers and that when war was declared there were but nine general officers in all. Doubtless they wore what they considered most appropriate.

Some idea of the current style may be gained, however, from the portrait of Major General Henry Dearborn painted by Gilbert Stuart in 1812.² The ranking general of the Army is shown in what is apparently a double-breasted blue coat with lapels, buttonholes on the breast, and collar embroidered with oak leaves and acorns in gold. The top two or three buttons on the breast remain unbuttoned, the turned back lapels showing that the buttonholes are embroidered inside as well as out. His sword belt is of the shoulder type, made of red morocco leather ornamented with an oval gilt plate. The plate apparently is an ornament only, serving no function as a regulator of length. No device is shown thereon, but a probably contemporary marble bust of Dearborn by Binon, in the Chicago Historical Society, displays on the plate an eagle of Napoleonic type grasping a thunderbolt in its talons. Doubtless this is the "oval plate, three inches by two and a half, ornamented with an eagle" mentioned in the dress regulations of 1800 and later. The shoulder belt for mounted officers, an unusual idea, is also mentioned in these earlier orders.

¹ Adjutant General to Maj. William R. Boote, Deputy Adjutant General of the Southern Department, December 30, 1812, forwarding dress regulations (Adjutant General's Office, Letters Sent Book, III, 59 [National Archives]). A copy of these manuscript regulations does not appear with the covering letter, but they were the subject of General Orders, Southern Department, January 24, 1813 (Southern Department, Orderly Book, August 27, 1812, to March 15, 1813 [National Archives]).

² In the Chicago Art Institute.



MAJOR GENERAL HENRY DE IRBORN

From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, courtesy of the Art Institute of Chicago Friends of American Art Collection

Dearborn, in this portrait, wears a white stock, a shirt ruffle, and a high-collared buff waistcoat. An interesting ornament is the order of the Cincinnati fastened to a buttonhole on the left breast. His sword is not visible, and, since no special model was prescribed, it might have been of any type, curved or straight. The uniform would be completed either by buff kerseymere pantaloons and half-boots or by breeches of the same material with four gilt buttons, an oval buckle at the knee, and high boots of light pattern.

General officers of militia of most of the states at this early period may generally be described as uniformed in blue faced and lined with buff, buff underclothes, yellow buttons and epaulets, and either a chapeau bras or cocked hat. These two forms of hat were by then quite similar except that the former could be folded flat when off the head while the cocked hat was made with a rigid crown. The latter type was found chiefly among older officers. The coats seem to have been of the type that hooked from collar to bottom edge with a broad facing down each side and were usually worn fastened only at the waist by the two lowest hooks. This fashion, of civilian origin, permitted the coat and vest to gap open for about seven inches below the collar, displaying the finely pleated shirt ruffle and white muslin stock tied with a knot in front. Another civilian style led to cutting the bottom of the coat front short enough to uncover the lowest one or two buttons of the waistcoat.

In the matter of details and ornament there was nothing approaching the uniformity we expect today. This was true with Regular and militia commanders and their staffs alike. Swords, sword knots, belts, epaulets, trimming on the chapeaux bras, and lace and embroidery on the coats were all according to personal fancy. This delightful freedom of choice and lack of restriction is indicated, for New York at least, by a letter dated November 27, 1810, from Governor Tompkins to Lewis S. Pintard, who had just been appointed an aide on his staff. The Governor, after mentioning his appointment and sketchily describing the uniform, informed him that "Myself and Aids, to distinguish ourselves from the inferior General Officers and their staff, mount no feathers. The sword, belt, sash, spurs and boots are left to the taste of each aid who also puts embroidery or lace on his coat or not at his pleasure."³ Obviously, then, any group of state general officers and their staffs must have displayed a complete line of the fashionable and unfashionable footgear, arms, and military haberdashery supplied by the military outfitters of the day, a condition strongly reminiscent of the Civil War.

Early in the summer of 1813 the uniform of the general officers of the Regular Army underwent some radical changes and became somewhat more wearable under the rigors of an American campaign.⁴ The official description of the coat is as follows:

³ *Public Papers of Daniel D. Tompkins, Military* (Albany, 1902), I, 550.

⁴ Authorized by "Military Laws and Rules and Regulations for the Army of the United States," approved by the Secretary of War, May 1, 1813. These regulations had been issued under the authorization of the Act of March 3, 1812, and appear to have been first printed in the *Army Register* of 1813. They were reprinted in *American State Papers*,

Single breasted, with ten buttons, and button holes worked with blue twist, in front, five inches long at the top and three at the bottom. The standing collar to rise to the tip of the ear, which will determine its width. The cuffs, not less than three and one-half nor more than four inches wide. The skirts faced with blue, the bottom of each not more than seven, nor less than three and a half, inches wide; the length to reach the bend of the knee. The bottom of the breast and two hip buttons to range.

(1) On the collar one blind hole, five inches long, with a button on each side.

(2) The blind holes on each side of the front, in herring-bone form, to be in the same direction with the collar, from the top to the bottom.

(3) Blind holes (in the like form) to proceed from four buttons, placed lengthwise, on each skirt. A gilt star, on centre of the bottom, two inches from the edge.

(4) The cuffs, to be indented within one and a half inch of the edge, with four buttons lengthwise on each sleeve, and holes to the three upper buttons, corresponding with the indentation of the cuff, on the center of which is to be inserted the lower button.

(5) All general officers will be permitted to embroider the button holes. The Commissary General of Ordnance, the Adjutants, Inspectors, and Quartermasters General, and Commissary General of Purchases, will be permitted to embroider the button holes of the collar only.

It will be noticed that general officers were still permitted to embroider their buttonholes with oak leaves and acorns, but it is doubtful that such coats were worn for other than dress occasions in the populated districts. A fine example of this later embroidered coat may be seen in the portrait of General Harrison reproduced on page 135 of the Fall 1937 issue of this JOURNAL. Flat buttons, with or without device, were given up in favor of the "gilt bullet" variety which continued throughout the war.

The fine broadcloth and gold embroidery that made up such coats as those of Generals Dearborn and Harrison were seldom, if ever, exposed to the severities of service on the sparsely populated American frontier, though certainly it was intended that they should be worn on campaign following the European tradition. For field service and certain other occasions a coat of the same cut, but without the embroidery or lace and known as undress, was permitted. This was, however, the only concession made by the regulations to the heat, dust, mud, rain, and tangled underbrush of a comparatively trackless wilderness. General Harrison, we know, made his Western campaign in an old hunting shirt and common hat, and it is probable that many high-ranking officers adopted equally nondescript habiliments for such occasions.⁵

Stocks were of black silk or leather. Vests, breeches, and pantaloons were of a buff color for general officers and white for their staffs. These vests were "single breasted, without pocket flaps," and the breeches carried "four buttons on the knee, and gilt knee buckles." In summer officers were permitted to wear pantaloons of nankeen, a yellow or buff cotton fabric of a suitably light weight; in winter they were permitted, but not required, to wear blue pantaloons of a heavier cloth.

Military Affairs, I, 425-34. The sections devoted to the uniform are short and incomplete. These sections were considerably amplified and slightly altered in the regulations issued the following year. These last appear to have been printed in the *Army Register* of 1814 and were shortly afterwards issued as a separate under the title *Military Laws and Rules and Regulations for the Army of the United States*, June 28, 1814.

⁵ Journal of Mrs. Lydia Bacon, October 1811 (New-York Historical Society).



GENERAL OFFICER AND STAFF, NEW YORK STATE, 1812-1814

White leg coverings, although quickly soiled by saddle and weather, were really more serviceable than would appear at first glance, much more so than the buff. White could be kept clean by the use of pipeclay in default of washing, but the buff became streaked and faded when washed and it was almost impossible to match the shade of the cloth by a mixture of pipeclay and yellow ochre, the usual cleaning material for buff colored leather or cloth. In 1821 the Governor of New York condemned buff for Captain Mott's artillery company at Congress Spring, in Saratoga County, saying that blue underclothes or even white would be better, "for although white shows dirt soon it can be washed oftener without injury. The buff will change color by frequent washing . . . which will destroy the uniformity in colour of the under cloaths."⁶

Fashion, though unsupported by regulations, came to the rescue with a garment, unfamiliar to us today, known as sherryvallies, literally over-trousers or overalls whose outside leg seams were completely open and made to button from top to bottom so they could be put on or off over spurred boots and pantaloons. An American aide-de-camp, writing of his experiences at Sackett's Harbor in 1813, states that they were worn even before the war, adding that the preparation for a holiday equitation "was no other than the superinduction of a pair of *cherrivallies* which were worn, however, more for the bright buttons and other ornaments of which they seemed to authorize the display, than as a guard against defilements, of which there was not much apprehension under a bright sun and over dry roads."⁷ The 'other ornaments' consisted of, on the front, either braided decorations known as Austrian knots, extending from the top edge part way down the thigh, or pocket flaps with buttons, set sloping in the region of the groin. At the bottom edge of the inside of the leg was fastened a chain about eighteen inches long which was passed under the boot and slipped over one of the buttons on the outside seam nearly on a line with the calf. The sherryvallies were invariably reinforced with buckskin or other leather on the inside and around the bottom of the legs.⁸

Later in the war it became usual to wear the sherryvallies as trousers, without the pantaloons underneath, which made the buttons on the leg unnecessary. These were consequently done away with except from about the top or the middle of the calf down. In that form, but without the leather, they became an increasingly popular style with foot officers; in fact, from that time on it becomes difficult to distinguish them from trousers, and, although the term sherryvallies remains in the vocabulary of the War Department until 1834 when used to describe the trousers of dragoon privates, it appears to refer only to the reinforcements of cloth on the inside and around the bottom of the leg. Of course, these garments

⁶ *Tompkins Papers*, III, 25.

⁷ Anonymous, "The First Campaign of an A. D. C.," *Military and Naval Magazine of the United States*, I (1833), 155.

⁸ Alice M. Earle, *Costume of Colonial Times* (New York, 1894), p. 216; Winfield Scott, *Memoirs* (New York, 1864), p. 172; Charles Lee, *Anecdotes* (2nd ed, London, 1797), pp. 427-31.

were not peculiar to America; they had been common among European light cavalry for some years.

Prior to 1813 the most common kind of footwear among general and staff officers was a boot of medium height which extended to the knee, but nearly contemporary portraits show that other types were also in vogue. "Hessians" with scalloped-topped fronts and tassels appear in the painting of General Morgan Lewis of New York," while long boots, of a light make but covering the knee, are to be found in portraits of Regulars. The regulations of 1813 allowed only "high military boots," and these were required as well of those officers taken from the line to serve on a general staff. Spurs were ordered to be of gilt; they were medium in size and had small rowels.

For headdress all general and staff officers wore the chapeau bras, a collapsible hat which could be carried under the arm, without feathers and of the following form:

Fan not less than six and a half, nor more than nine inches high in the rear, nor less than fifteen, nor more than seventeen inches and a half from point to point, band round the edge with black binding half an inch wide. Button and loop, black. Cockade, the same, four and a half inches diameter, with a gold eagle in the center.

These chapeaux had already begun the shrinking process that was carried to such ridiculous extremes by some British officers, especially Wellington.


Swords were "yellow mounted, with black, or yellow, gripe. For the officers of the Adjutant, Inspector, and Quartermaster General's departments, sabers; for all others, straight swords. Waist belts of black leather. No sashes." Obviously a great many variations of pattern in sword forms could be covered by this inadequate description. The portrait of Harrison mentioned above clearly shows the shape and detail of the hilt of the straight sword beginning to be used by most of the general officers. Though straight swords were required by regulations and carried by most general officers, a notable exception to the rule was Andrew Jackson whose portraits all show a curved saber. An example of one of these sabers, a French army type having a long heavy blade with a deep curve and broad central groove, is in the National Museum, Washington, D. C.¹⁰ The sabers of the staff officers were the familiar pattern with the eagle's head pommel and the single narrow strip curving inward sharply at half the length of the grip and then turning at a sharp angle at the blade, forming a quillon.

The black leather waist belts seem often to have been edged with gold lace, and the plate was apparently rectangular with an eagle of conventional type grasping olive branches and arrows. One of Sully's portraits of Jackson displays an elaborate gold embroidery along the center of the belt as well as the lace edging. The sword is suspended by chains instead of straps.¹¹

⁹ In the City Hall, New York, New York.

¹⁰ This saber, together with many other examples of this period, is illustrated and discussed in Theodore T. Belote, *American and European Swords in the Historical Collections of the United States National Museum* (Washington, 1932).

¹¹ See Marquis James, *Andrew Jackson; The Border Captain* (Indianapolis, 1933), p. 340.



A, Regular Army general staff officer in original sherryvallies, about 1813. B, sherryvallies of the later type, really trousers; these were also made without the leather reinforcements. C, General Dearborn's uniform in 1812, based on the portrait by Stuart. D, the uniform prescribed for general officers of the Kentucky militia, February 4, 1815. E, militia general officers' horse equipments, used by most of the eastern states. F, Maryland general officers' horse equipments, a variant type.

Epaulets of general officers were of gold with an ornate and rigid strap and crescent, usually mounted on a red cloth base. The bullion fringes were about one-half inch in width and from three to four inches in length. From contemporary letters it would appear that this item of the uniform had to be imported from abroad. Two silvered stars on the gold strap designated a major general; one, a brigadier. The epaulets of staff officers varied with their previous duties and branches of service, and their rank was indicated in the same fashion as the other officers of the line.

We would naturally expect the militia officers to have changed or simplified their uniform following the lead of the Regulars. Such, however, was not the case, and they continued to array themselves in the traditional blue and buff. By the end of the war, some in the West had adopted the Regular Army general officers' uniform with certain modifications. The militia law of Kentucky, passed February 4, 1815, required that general officers and general, division, and brigade staff officers be uniformed in "a blue coat and pantaloons made in fashion of U. S. dress uniform, yellow buttons, gold epaulets, spurs, boots, a round black hat, black cockade, white plume and small sword or hanger." A round or citizens' hat had been substituted for the chapeau bras, and no mention is made of buff pantaloons or breeches.

Horse furniture of the general and staff officers of the Regular Army throughout the war, though not prescribed by regulation, seems to have been plain and serviceable. Apparently it was simply a saddle of modern hunting type of either black or brown leather worn with a breast plate, crupper, surcingle, and a pair of holsters with gilt metal tips of no prescribed pattern protected by single or double bear skin flaps. Sometimes a square dark blue saddle-cloth edged with a wide gold lace was worn under the saddle. The bridle was plain and light in construction, usually with a single cheek-piece and either a straight branched or slightly "S" shaped bit. Sully's portrait of Andrew Jackson, painted shortly after the war, shows a bridle elaborated by crossed straps over the horse's face, fastened at the front-piece, with nose band and point of crossing decorated by rosettes. This was a common feature on British officers' bridles and, quite probably, on American as well. It seems strange for a general officer to pack his own saddle with his belongings, but the aide-de-camp whom we have quoted above found on joining a cavalcade of general officers at Albany that "most of the saddles had a valise en croupe" as the "cumbersome wain could not be supposed to keep up with our calvary in expedition."¹² Militia general officers' horse equipments were more striking by reason of a leopard skin saddle-housing which, since there was convenient lack of regulations or restrictions in such matters, may have taken a variety of forms. Probably it bore the same shape as the blue cloth of the Regulars, though it may have appeared as a full skin worn over the saddle and holsters in the form of a *schabraque*.

In the way of winter clothing there seems to have been as little preparation among the general officers as among the ordinary soldiers. The only piece of uniform that might be considered a winter garment was a cloak without sleeves having

¹² "First Campaign of an A. D. C.," *loc. cit.*, p. 156.

a scanty cape and a rolling collar, a totally inadequate piece of clothing for zero or sub-zero campaigning. In the West general officers usually substituted blanket coats, but in the East great coats in the fashion of the day were more popular. Such coats were of no prescribed color or pattern, and were not supplied with military buttons; in fact, it is not likely that general officers in the field during a winter in Canada or on the frontier in the West bore much resemblance to the picture formed for us by the dress regulations. Fur or woollen caps covering the head and ears could be substituted for the chapeau bras; and a great coat of heavy blanket-like material of gray, blue, olive, brown, or a deep piled fawn colored material known as "lion skin," lined with woollen cloth, sheepskin, or fur, would hide all distinctions of rank, except of course the sword which may usually have been worn outside.

HUGH CHARLES MCBARRON, JR.

DEVOTION BY DRUM-BEAT, 1779

Heidelberg—I have seen the troops perform their exercise every morning on the parade. I was a good deal surprised to observe, that not only the movements of the soldiers' muskets, and the attitudes of their bodies, but also their devotions, were under the direction of the major's cane. The following motions are performed as part of the military manoeuvres every day before the troops are marched to their different guards.

The major flourishes his cane;—the drum gives a single tap, and every man under arms raises his hand to his hat;—at a second stroke on the drum, they take off their hats and are supposed to pray;—at a third, they finish their petitions, and put their hats on their heads.— If any man has the assurance to prolong his prayer a minute longer than the drum indicates, he is punished on the spot; and taught to be less devout for the future.

—from *A View of Society and Manners in France, Switzerland and Germany*, by John Moore, 1793.

QUERIES

38. LEWIS MAP OF 1806. In Elliott Coues' *History of the Expedition under the Command of Captains Lewis and Clark* is a facsimile reproduction of a map copied by Nicholas King in 1806 from one sent to President Jefferson by Meriwether Lewis. Coues stated that this King version was found in the War Department, but where is the original Lewis Map?

W. O. T.

REPLIES

32. *REBEL WAR CRY* (III, 136). David L. Thompson, writing of his experience at Antietam (*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, II, 558), described the "rebel yell" as "a high shrill yelp, uttered without concert, and kept up continually when the fighting was approaching a climax, as an incentive to further effort." He found it quite distinct from "the deep-breasted Northern cheer, given in unison and after a struggle."

F. P. T.

INTELLECTUAL PREPAREDNESS


AN EDITORIAL

THE objective study of warfare has not been a recognized branch of knowledge in this country. In spite of this, the AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE has endeavored to provide an organization devoted solely to the purpose of stimulating and advancing the scientific study of all that relates to war. Its membership has of necessity been limited to those few persons who have specialized in some one or more of the various phases of military history. It has, also of necessity, conducted its activities thus far within the limits of these fields. Although it has sought to broaden the concepts of those already engaged in the work, no serious attempt has been made to attract or influence a wider group.

The time has come to take a different stand. The events of the past several months, especially those of this spring, have shocked the nation out of its lethargy. The awakening is but partial to be sure, and the man in the street is not yet altogether certain whether he is awakening to reality or is in the midst of a nightmare. He has been forced to think in terms of greater realism, however, and the nation is slowly beginning to question its former assumptions and to become at least aware of the existence of military problems. Faced with the task of reconciling defense measures with democratic ideals and wishing to avoid the pitfalls of unnecessary extremes and hasty action, the people of this country not only need but are seeking objective knowledge and unbiased guidance. This is the first step toward the intellectual preparedness which ranks in importance with economic and military preparedness.

Thus, the work of the INSTITUTE has taken on a new and wider meaning. Representing practically the only organized effort towards the study of war in its entirety, unencumbered by exclusive association with any single academic discipline, comprising both military and civilian viewpoints and leadership, it has already been of practical assistance to both civil and military agencies. There is now an equally important service which the INSTITUTE feels it must undertake—to actuate thought about and the study of our military problem as a whole; to strike at the apathetic American attitude and force home the fact that the scientific study of war is of vital concern to every citizen; to challenge the academic concept of social progress which must obviate war to be tenable. Towards this end, and as the first of a series of timely probing articles, is presented in the following pages Dr. Vagts' "War and the Colleges."

Military Training In Civil Schools
and Colleges!



PEACE!
THE MEMBERS - OF THE
C.M.T.C. CLUB OF N.Y.C.
WARNING!
MEETING AT THE C.M.C.
1000 10TH ST.
SATURDAY.


ANTI-WAR
NATIONAL

Educational Authorities Say Military Drill
Is Poor Education For Civilians

ALL CIVIL FELLOW
ARE YOU GIVEN A FREE VACATION?
ARE YOU TAUGHT TO OBEY?
ARE YOU TAUGHT TO OBEY OFFICERS?
ARE YOU TAUGHT DISCIPLINE?
ARE YOU GIVEN ANTI-COMMUNISM LECTURES?

THE CHURCHES
and
MILITARY TRAINING
SCHOOLS in COLLEGES

MILITARY TRAINING IN THE SCHOOLS
Building the Emotions That Help Keep War Alive!



CITIZENS! SO THIS IS WAR!

DEMONSTRATE
- INTERNATIONAL -
- YOUTH -
Friday - Farmers'
Sept. 9 - 7:00 pm - DAY - Market Square
AGAINST

WAR!



WAR AND THE COLLEGES¹

BY ALFRED VAGTS

THE preparation for and against totalitarian warfare must be reckoned with, whether actual war is avoidable or not, so long as totalitarian societies exist. Undoubtedly such preparedness makes and will make far greater demands upon national resources and energies than any previous form of modern warfare. Liberal economies, long accustomed to offer convenient "grants" of money and lives for military purposes—a procedure implying that something remains ungranted to war—are faced with the antagonism of totalitarian societies which "take everything for granted" that they or even unfortunate neighbors possess. While totalitarian warfare and its economy set the pace, mere sporadic effort, however violent, can no longer suffice; only a steady, reasoned and long-range application of a nation's potentials can arm it for the struggles of the future.

Germany and Russia have already gone far along the path of *Wehrwirtschaft*, the new sort of economy and technology designed for the total war. France and England, on the contrary, persisted far too long in maintaining the primacy of their economy, Liberal on the whole, over the claims of armament—so much so that German writers could "calculate" in advance of 1939-40 that French war economy as planned would fail.² Their plight now raises for America the question of how far democracy can bear an *unremitting* strain. Democracy, admittedly, is full of fire and initiative, proper to free men who want to become and remain free, giving it a possible advantage in morale—is it also capable of consistent military effort, of military thought enlivening and even amplifying economic and other "grants"?

The defense policies of liberal and democratic nations in retrospect offer a picture almost as full of ups and downs as the curve of their economies. spurts of activity alternated with long periods of relapse, sudden "scares" with surprising forgetfulness. The relationship between armament and economy was often, in fact, a close one: during a prosperity year, democracy might feel too safe to invest in guns,³ whereas, in a depression, it might prove more susceptible to fears or inclined to vote for armaments, particularly where these constituted

¹This article has also been issued by the AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE in mimeographed form for limited circulation as Document No. 4 of its Professional Series.

²Eberhard Grothe, *Frankreichs Wirtschaftliche Kriegserfahrung und Kriegsvorbereitung* (Hamburg, 1938).

³Part at least of the seeming unawareness of the Chamberlain Government to the dangers of the Munich policies must be attributed to the fervent desire of a group largely composed of business men not to permit a precarious prosperity to be threatened by a large military expenditure and a reorganization of some British industry. At this swing of the cycle they would not listen to the warnings of their own military experts.

a sizeable sector in the national economy, in order to give employment and a lift to business. The fever-chart of armaments seemed therefore to some extent to follow that of business, only normally in reverse. Armament by cycles was, however, inimical to long-term planning of defense; and even more serious dangers were inherent in armament which took place at moments of economic and psychological panic, often enough enhanced by conscious use of artificial "scares."

The "putting over" of a defense-program in the liberal-democratic nations has almost always to a large degree taken place less with the help of the rational processes than with those of the emotional sphere. Time was usually considered too short by those responsible for military policy to allow anything but such short-cuts in persuasion. There was, moreover, no institution or body, outside the armies, to nourish a continuity of thoughtful interest in military subjects. In the absence of such an informed civilian public, democracy had to be frightened into its own proper defense. As Viscount Esher, one of the civilian makers of British defense policies before 1914, wrote to Sir John Fisher, another bureaucratic insider, in the autumn of 1907 when, incidentally or not, British economy had taken a downward swing:

No state of mind in a nation is more dangerous—or as experience shows, more foolish than overconfidence It is the discussions which keep alive popular fears and popular interest, upon which alone rest the Navy Estimates. A nation that believes itself secure, all history teaches, is doomed. Anxiety, not a sense of security, lies at the root of readiness for war An invasion scare is the mill of God which grinds you out a Navy of Dreadnaughts, and keeps the British people war-like in spirit Invasion may be a bogey. Granted. But it is a most useful one, and without it Sir John Fisher . . . would never have got "the truth about the Navy" into the heads of his countrymen.⁴

With such incitement of mass alarms, of *grandes peurs*—Emerson's "great fears"—are bound equally great dangers. If overconfidence in Esher's sense produces a blind lethargy, under-confidence may easily lead to paralysis of judgment and will. Fear is likely to arouse a desire for pure and simple defense and to becloud the advantages of the offensive. A panic-stricken nation is apt to demand the biggest walls (Maginot Line) or the biggest ships, instead of considering the potentialities of smaller fighting units, tanks or airplanes, which might take the initiative against an invader. Panic may actually undo armament, as it did to a certain extent in the Spanish-American War; before the outbreak of that war, the American nation had indeed been frightened into voting for the ships which were needed, according to Mahan and others, but then, in its fright, insisted upon keeping some of the available ships close to the shore instead of sending them into action across the seas as originally designed.

Panic has never produced, in the nations subject to these periodic fits of alarm, any serious and intelligent interest in military affairs on a large scale. Instead it has tightened minds while loosening purse-strings; parliaments poured out

⁴ *Journals and Letters of Viscount Esher* (London, 1934), II, 249 ff.

funds with a largesse that is so often in modern society reserved for the medical specialist, feeling itself thereby excused from the duty of self-examination. Nations behaved, in the days before Freud and after, like the patients of psychoanalysts who spend money continuously to relieve their minds, without realizing that no act of the patient remains unanalyzed except that of paying the doctor's bill. Neurasthenic spending was worse than wasteful in that it permitted the democracies to go promptly and soundly to sleep again. Panic not only failed to produce thought—actually it tended to repress it by blunting the sensibilities of the public. Those who employed the scare-method did not consider whether they abused the appeal. A prolonged study of popular fears would probably bring out the fact that they have tended to diminish in duration if not in intensity: older forms of dread (including the "Yellow Peril") were more persistent, whereas the phases of modern frights are violent and short. In national and in individual psychology, fear sets up its own defense-mechanism; a nation frightened too often learns to forget readily. Long used to move only in panic, and growing immunized to fear, it may exhibit an astonishing stolidity even in the face of real danger—it may eventually balk at the extraordinary exertions and sacrifices demanded by modern preparedness.

What, then, is to be done about the fitful character of democratic preparedness? Who is to rationalize, or ration, our fears? Fear can be turned into a more productive emotion, as Pintschovius declares in his book on "moral resistance" in war;⁵ in this, one of the leading works in the new German science of *Wehrpsychologie*, "defense psychology," it is maintained: "Decisive for the honor and fighting value of a soldier is not the fact of fear but the manner in which he makes a compromise with fear. The morale of a soldier depends on his ability to transform fear into courage." How, in a Liberal society, is this transmutation of popular feelings to be effected? And what other motives and appeals, of a rational and enduring character, not transitory and exhausting like fear and anger, can be offered? In this national bewilderment many will be looking toward the still vacant campuses this summer: there are the institutions which represent tradition and continuity in the fluctuations of Liberal society, and which are dedicated to reason as well as memory, both elements of stability to oppose against stark fear. Above all, there are housed the academicians who represent, by a strange development of military technology, the ideal human material for the warfare of the future.

It should be obvious that the best possible officer-material for America's coming military program will have to be found in the colleges. Modern warfare no longer calls for rural stamina primarily, but makes the highest demands upon the best-educated members of society. In Germany this had long been recognized: the German Army probably contains a higher percentage of Ph.D's than any other. After Versailles, when the Reichswehr was limited to a hundred

⁵ Karl Pintschovius, *Die Seelische Widerstandskraft im Modernen Kriege* (Berlin, 1936).

thousand (the size of the American Army until not so long ago), every single man was selected by the severest standards and subjected to intensive technological training, with the result that the Reichswehr was literally an army with no privates—every man was a potential officer. This was certainly not the case here in years past: consequently, instead of relying upon enlisted men of the regular Army exclusively, it will be increasingly necessary to draw upon the best-trained youth of the nation to provide a large part of the skeleton of the future people's army, the reserve officers and non-commissioned officers. Out of the half-million academic youth, privileged as they are with the opportunity of a higher education, must come, and come soon, a great body of efficient and intelligent men, prepared to receive the fullest training in the technology of modern war and to assume the responsibilities of leadership. The term "academician" can no longer be used to describe one shrinking from the violence of the world; nowadays the academician is precisely the man best fitted to stand at the front of the fight.

Yet what is the actual situation on American campuses? There can be little doubt that we are today in the presence of a deep-cutting conflict of generations, a strange "revolt of youth" that in many ways escapes the patterns of the past. Traditionally, youth has represented the renewal of energy and enthusiasm in the race, often assuming forms embarrassing to cautious and settled age. This was true throughout the previous century, when each generation brought a fresh wave of nationalist ebullience on the Continent; it seemed the case even in America a short while ago, during that brief era when youth was commonly given the attribute of "flaming." But when or where have we ever witnessed enthusiastic elders issuing calls to action which fall on the deaf ears of a youth that appears lethargic to a great extent, that seems to worry about quite different things, about the "jobs" of the future, possibly? This spectacle, presented by England shortly before the present war, and by American colleges this spring, raises the gravest problems of national psychological preparedness.

Realization of the gravity of the situation has already led to some hand-wringing in college groves, to attacks upon "undisciplined" youth. "Discipline needed, Wesleyan is told" was a typical headline of the commencement weeks, when many a departing class was reproved for insubordination. One Harvard professor went so far as to say that "the college student has been more impervious to the facts [of military necessity] than the general public."⁹ Demands were heard for a stricter control of the young, even to putting them in camps where they would be taught not to criticize their elders. But apathy cannot be countered by mere criticism, as the Fascists of Europe long ago observed; never have Fascist tacticians assailed youth wholesale in an irritated tone but instead, while establishing compulsory drill, they have bent every effort to arouse

⁹ *The New York Times*, July 14, 1940.

confidence and enthusiasm among the young. Through faith, not the goose-step alone, they have set their young men marching. The same problem confronts a Liberal democracy now: the problem of awakening enthusiasm, rather than merely crushing resistance. Our rearmament calls for faith and conviction, not drill alone. As the first step in this direction, have we not to understand the lack of faith in American youth? Assuredly this is not due simply to a meaningless intractability or to a recent effeteness—in other ages, even in the vigorous Elizabethan, men have fled from the “cry of the sergeants.” Does not the source lie rather in the astonishing dearth of mental preparedness continued through many generations in America? For years there has been a curious want of military thinking, planning, teaching, and above all of military literature as the expression of such interests.

Easy as it is to brush aside this problem with the excuse of our geographic isolation, this is by no means the whole explanation. Of course, America has seemed far removed from dangerous neighbors until now. But she has been involved in several complex wars carried on across a vast continental theater and actually dwarfing, in scale at least, most European struggles: compared to the mighty struggle of the Civil War, for instance, the maneuvers of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 seem but a miniature bout. In fact, the greatest war between 1815 and 1914 was fought on American soil. At least two American conflicts, the Revolution and the Civil War, produced striking changes in the technology and strategy of warfare, as some Europeans were not slow to point out. In the former, the Prussian General Gneisenau was interested by American frontier block-houses and developed the notion with telling effect against Napoleon, when he successfully defended Kolberg in 1806-07. The rôle of the railroad in the Civil War was similarly noted abroad. Indeed, in a rather exaggerated way, it may be said that American experience was turned to better account abroad than at home.

Our wars were perhaps too widely spaced in time. The breathing period between them was long and permitted relaxation, or reaction, if you prefer. Moreover, these spasms appeared sudden and unrelated. Each was regarded as “decisive,” as a war to end war or at least a “nuisance” like Spain in the Caribbean, or to end some disagreeable or untenable situation, and hence as an experience that need not be repeated; thus each remained an isolated phenomenon, not heralded by long planning or followed by mature reflection. Civil War generals, certain that they would not have to fight that war over again, could devote their memoirs to political or sectional argument instead of strategic dissection. War in Europe, though often puny in scale compared to that continental struggle of America, was at least a constant school of campaigning, since every conflict was recognized as practice for another similar one in the more or less immediate future.

¹ John Dekker's “Strange Horse Race,” published in 1613.

Deeper than this, however, lies the question of Liberalism and its relation to military affairs. Neither in Europe nor anywhere else has Liberalism produced a military literature. Hostile to war, which was glibly said "never to decide anything," and confusing the proper study of defense with the excesses of militarism, Liberals shunned discussion of any aspect of the subject. They would not study the control and direction of the forces that most menaced their chosen way of life. In Europe, of course, the circles of Liberalism were comparatively constricted, and there remained always a strong group of conservatives who kept up the military tradition and did not renounce the study of defense. But Liberalism held full sway over America, where there was no Junker or Tory class to maintain interest in such matters. American education was in keeping with the general trend, generally managing to avoid the unpleasant topic, never enriching military thought and policy to any extent. Even where college land grants and R.O.T.C.'s brought military affairs to the campus, they were almost always relegated to the margin of academic life and concern. Nowhere were military matters admitted to a more central position; timid and innocent proposals to include military history and policy in the curriculum were turned down by authorities before they were even half formulated. When a student proposed to treat a problem of military history, he was told that this was not the path of success in America. Moreover, the consideration of military questions was shirked in the subjects where they most naturally belonged: history and international relations.

The most serious and well-nigh fatal flaw in Liberal education was its nihilistic attitude toward the First World War and the ethos of American participation in that endeavor. The American share in that conflict *could* have been taught, with much truthfulness, as a war for the balance of power in the world, as a preventive action undertaken against the contingency of a German victory in 1917; the war itself *could* have been presented as one which did, in fact, bring peace to the world for some time and even in its aftermath gave civilianism the greatest triumph it ever achieved—in the Washington Conference. The War was, of course, not considered from this realistic angle. It was left largely to the teachers of diplomatic history, which tended to become a sterile category, a collation and digestion of documents unaccompanied by fundamental study of international relations as military and potentially hostile relations. Diplomatic historians who confined themselves to documentary exchanges could not help uncovering a series of lies in this conflict; their story of the War, which was largely history leading up to the War, was essentially a "debunking" of lies and examination of the falsity of the numerous slogans, the "war to end wars," the "war for democracy," and others connected with Woodrow Wilson's policies. This debunking of World War diplomacy and propaganda, carried on in the colleges, had decidedly serious results. The unmasking of the guilt of diplomats and propagandists led the Anglo-Saxon peoples and above all the students of

those countries to view the efforts from 1914 to 1918 with conscience-stricken revulsion. They did not ask themselves whether the peoples had been as "guilty" as the diplomats or as insincere as the phrasemakers, or whether, beneath the slogans of politicians, there had not been real, if never adequately phrased, reasons for war.

This paralysis of will caused England and America to watch with complacency the regrowth of German armaments far beyond the point of danger to themselves. In the meantime, Germany suffered no such pangs of conscience; rather, German propagandists realized the advantages of the situation all too well. At this very hour, one of the leaders of discussion about the "war guilt question," editor of a German magazine devoted to the subject and containing contributions from America, Herr Alfred von Wegerer, is traveling in this country, visiting among others some of the American professors who have specialized in the *Kriegsschuldfrage*. It should be realized that he is an ex-officer, that through him the German Army undertook propagandizing among foreigners and, with a somewhat different accentuation, among the German people; only so can we understand that the German Army considered the war-guilt and war-innocence discussion as a military potential in the battle-zone of convictions. It used the "debunking" of propaganda as a powerful instrument of propaganda.

Liberal education has thus not merely shunned military matters; it has worked directly contrary to military defense. It is at least arguable that, had the World War been taught as the fight for America's physical safety, the German menace to that very safety would have been understood far earlier by the Anglo-Saxon peoples. Even more certainly, we should not be faced today with such problems of psychological unpreparedness amounting to national neuroses. The doubts raised about the "sense" of the First World War pushed the teaching of international relations into two directions—the cynical, which tended to lame the will to action, and the weakly over-hopeful, the latter represented by the proponents of "peaceful change." Neither impressed the student body very greatly or prepared the student mind for the unpeaceful change which was coming. In neither school of thought was there to be found that convincing greatness and scientific authority which goes with a high concept in politics or history—this quite aside from the authority that the academic personnel was able to wield through superior knowledge and ideas. The outcome of this enfeeblement of authority, of the undirected encouragement given to youthful criticism, was the juvenile pacifism culminating in the Oxford oath and other expressions of distrust in the war-making authority of the past and in the past surviving in the present through their teachers. If youth seems insubordinate and unwilling to act today, the responsibility lies heavily and, as a conscientious educator must realize, almost exclusively with the elders. If youth presents an unexampled problem in lethargy, it is because its leaders and teachers had first made an unexampled exhibition of self-reproach and defeatism. Age had abdicated before youth "revolted."

When the problem is approached from this side, it becomes evident that the remedy cannot lie solely in a sudden stringency of no longer reasoning control over the young. A too abrupt pedagogical departure in that direction would have a disastrous effect upon a youth prepared only for that authority in the teacher or college president that lies in the latter's wider knowledge or greater ability to persuade and convince. The new control cannot afford to crush doubts and repress the questions, intelligent or not, of a student who has for years been urged to discuss everything, to raise all issues in the classroom and outside. The net result would be a uniformed and obedient youth, at best, when what it needed is a fiery, a self-confident youth, to answer the challenge of Europe, which is emotional as much as physical. Youth must be able to imagine that something can be maintained by war, that something might even be decided and won by war—a conviction that, I think, is at the bottom of the German will and ability to achieve victory, or victories.

Does not the situation call, and call immediately, for the introduction of military affairs into the academic curriculum? In the fields of history and political science they would appear in the shape of military history and the study of military policy, for the purpose of answering the questions of American youth and making clear to them the vital importance of war and defense and their own vital function in the protection of their country. Economists should familiarize themselves at once with the—still largely German—literature of *Wehrwirtschaft* and contemplate its applicability to America. German *Wehrwirtschaft* as a theoretical and practical study is in large part the product of the universities where the Reichsheer sent its officers to study. The necessity of similar study in America, imposed by our new gigantic expenditures, is given emphasis by the statement of Congressman Ross A. Collins of Mississippi (on June 10), one of the legislators most seriously and honestly concerned with defense questions, who declared to General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, in a committee hearing: "All we can do is to ask you to protect the money and see that as much of it as possible goes for the purpose that the American people have been led to believe it has been appropriated for." The statement possesses high significance in the light of parliamentary history; for it means that the average parliamentarian, in default of military knowledge, cannot hope to maintain the old tradition of detailed budgetary examination which has long been the central point of parliamentary control over expenditure. It also means that the officers of the future will have the additional burden of taking on themselves a broad and deep knowledge of economic matters. The task of our economists will be, as has been the case in Germany, to educate officers who know the possibilities or limitations of price control and other elements of economic planning.

There is some risk, considering academic conventions, that the study of military history may provoke a mere antiquarianism and dissertations upon regimental buttons or inscriptions on ancient guns. Teachers and students may also

be tempted to justify by history or political science what has already been created in the military sphere, instead of looking ahead to possible and desirable weapons. But such studies can also lead to a treasure of not immediately repeatable yet still immensely thought-provoking experience which, as Clausewitz rightly insisted, is the function and use of military history for the soldier.

Anxious persons may protest that the Army and Navy might not care to see these topics included now in the academic curriculum, that the increasing secrecy of things military should prohibit it. But it might be pointed out that even the Germans have introduced military studies of many sorts into their universities since 1933. To be sure, they did not desire to raise and settle doubts about the suitability of rearmament; their highest purpose was rather to draw out and incite new interests and with the help of such interests, even if unconventional, to bring forth new ideas about military and economic policies and the technique of warfare. The result has already been a harvest of studies, not merely in military technology, but in the related fields of military psychology and economic preparedness, matters especially suitable for civilian study. One should not underestimate the contribution of the non-professional: for instance, one can imagine an outsider developing a scheme for mountain troops for the United States Army, similar to those of Germany and Italy, to fight in the difficult terrain of Alaska and other possible arenas.

The very vastness of the future military establishment of the United States makes imperative a civilian share in military thought, unless this vastness is to become from the outset an arid desert of over-discipline and under-thinking. Only such thought and instruction can give the American people some day a crop of legislators with sufficient expert judgment on military matters to cooperate with the military forces in the spending of money. We might also have publicists equal to their tasks and even newspaper correspondents with a little of that knowledge of military events which has been so conspicuously absent from the thousands of words cabled home from Abyssinia, Spain, and other theaters of war—despatches so utterly devoid of any recognition of the *military* significance of those wars that they contributed in no small degree to the bewilderment and unpreparedness of the American public mind. And most important of all, we might have a youth that fights, when it comes to fight, with understanding and conviction.

THE BATTLE OF MAI CHIO, 1936¹

By J. F. C. FULLER

LONG before shots echoed around Walwal, and in the self-same year which witnessed the birth of the League of Nations, were the seeds of the Italo-Abyssinian War sown. On January 1, 1919, in his journal *Il Popolo d'Italia*, Mussolini had written: "Imperialism is the law of life, eternal and unchanging. At bottom it is nothing but the need, the desire, the will to expand, felt by every individual and by every nation with vitality."² A follower of Machiavelli, Napoleon and Nietzsche, he believed with the last of these synthetic iconoclasts that "a man must have chaos yet within him to be able to give birth to a dancing star." Vittorio Veneto had emerged from out of the chaos of Caporetto; now a new Italy was to rise from out of the confusion of Italian Liberalism, and with it a new Roman Empire. To him the defeat of Adowa, in 1896, was a moral debt which demanded cancellation, and through it he sought his road to a second Zama. Years later, on October 7, 1935, I met him in the Palazzo Venezia, and I realised at once that the war, then but four days old, would prove itself to be a stupendous historical event, which, unless read aright, would surely be followed by a far greater cataclysm.

Later on I wrote³ (and here I will condense what I then had to say): As wars do not spring fully armed from out the head of Mars, what were the origins of this one (the Italo-Abyssinian)? Unhesitatingly I answer that, among several, there were two of supreme importance—namely, the Russian Revolution and the Democratic Reaction established by the League of Nations. The one threatened the liberty of all States; the other aimed at maintaining the stability of a group of States—the victors in the World War. The first was at once met by the Cæsarism of Benito Mussolini, whilst more gradually the second was faced by the dictatorship of Adolf Hitler. So it came about that Western democracy, hitherto confronted only by Bolshevik Russia, as in the Middle Ages Christendom had been faced by Islam, was politically rent in two, a rending as catastrophic to the unity of Europe as once had been Luther's Reformation.

¹ Reprinted by permission of Charles Scribner's Sons from General Fuller's recent book, *Decisive Battles: Their Influence upon History and Civilisation* (New York, 1940), pp. 984-1004. For a description and evaluation of this work see The Military Library section of this issue of the JOURNAL. (Ed.)

² Quoted from George Martelli, *Italy Against the World: The First Complete and Impartial Account of Italy's Repudiation of the League and Her Conquest of Abyssinia by an English Author* (London, 1937), p. 40.

³ As during this war I was with the Italian Army in Eritrea and Tigré for three months, and as the Italo-Abyssinian War is a recent event, in this chapter I intend to rely more on my own observations than upon the written works of others. Therefore it must be considered as being no more than provisional history. In my opinion time will have to elapse before this confused and complicated struggle is brought into historic focus.

The turning-point was the economic crisis of 1929-1931, which smote alike both the old and new orders, when at once the biological cause of war manifested. In other words, over-population, in the form of unemployment, created not only economic hardships, but a spiritual discontent. Though all nations were afflicted by it, the U.S.S.R. and the great democratic Powers—the U.S.A., Great Britain and France—possessing as they did vast tracts of under-populated land, saw in unemployment no more than a temporary disease. But in Germany and Italy there was no such relief; therefore in the souls of their peoples this disease took upon itself the form of a chronic spiritual terror—something intangible, yet above all things real.

It was in this climax and not in the skirmish of Walwal that must be sought the causes which precipitated the Italo-Abyssinian War. In it Mussolini found himself faced by a confused problem—namely, the relationship between Germany and the League. Because of Austria he was loath to side with the first, also for that self-same reason he was loath to break with the second, and for an identical reason the League was afraid to expel him. If by withdrawing he should smash the League, some day he might be left single-handed to face the Leviathan of the North. Should the League cast him out, it would smash itself; consequently the compromise and confusion which hid the main fact that the real war, already in being, was not a war of the League against Italy, or even of the League against Germany, but, instead, of the old political order against the new. As I wrote in 1936: "Hence the real war was not the conflict in a corner of Africa, but of Socialism, the final expression of democracy, against Fascism, the initial expression of a new world order. Such was the inner strategy of the first war between the Cæsars as foreseen by Oswald Spengler twenty years ago."⁴

Yet long before the existence of Walwal became known to Mussolini he had been turning over the conquest of Abyssinia in his mind. With remarkable candour Marshal de Bono informs us that, in 1933, he had begun to consider such an operation, and, further, that "the matter would have to be settled not later than 1936."⁵ Then, on March 18, 1934, addressing the second quinquennial assembly of Fascists, Mussolini spoke of "a natural expansion which ought to lead to a collaboration between Italy and the peoples of Africa and the East."⁶ In July he sent his Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Badoglio, to Eritrea to examine this question, and shortly after the Walwal skirmish, on December 20, he "personally compiled *Directions and Plan of Action for the Solution of the Italo-Abyssinian question*, which consisted in assembling a powerful army in Eritrea by October, 1935."⁷

⁴ See J. F. C. Fuller, *The First of the League Wars: Its Lessons and Omens* (London, 1936), pp. 1-9.

⁵ Emilio de Bono, *Anno XIII: The Conquest of an Empire*, translated by Bernard Miall (London, 1937), pp. 12, 13.

⁶ See Martelli, *Italy Against the World*, p. 6.

⁷ De Bono, *Anno XIII*, pp. 116, 117.

Obviously he must have realised that this would mean a tussle with the League; but reckoning on the rise of Hitler to keep France and Great Britain quiet, he little dreamt of the part the latter was about to play. Instead, I am of opinion that he expected a sure though silent British welcome, not only because he admired the British Empire and therefore assumed that British Imperialism would condone Italian, but because ever since 1884 Great Britain had welcomed Italian expansion in Ethiopia in order to relieve the Sudan of Abyssinian pressure. Though, in 1896, the battle of Adowa knocked Italian Imperialism on the head, the idea lived on, and Great Britain consistently supported it. Then, ten years later, in accordance with the Tripartite Treaty, Italian interests in the Abyssinian hinterland were recognised by Great Britain and France, and in accordance with the Treaty of London (April 26, 1915) Italy obtained a promise of compensation in Africa, though it was not until 1924 that in part this was recognised by Great Britain, who ceded to her Jubaland. Lastly, in December, 1925, an exchange of notes took place between the two countries, "by which each agreed to support the other's claim in Abyssinia," and this in spite of the fact that, in 1923, France had pushed Abyssinia into the League⁸ in order to thrust a spoke into Italy's wheel. Not being able to keep Abyssinia out, Italy welcomed the new member, and, on August 2, 1928, a Treaty of Friendship was signed by the two countries, which, however, was never complied with by the Negus. Then, in 1933, came the rise of Hitler, whereupon France began to reverse her anti-Italian policy, and, on January 3, 1935, the day the Negus first appealed to the League, drawing its attention to Italian activities, M. Laval left Paris for Rome, and, on the 6th, in a "tête-à-tête" with Mussolini, he bartered Abyssinian independence for French security. On the 10th a statement was issued by which it was made public that all questions concerning the application of Article 13 of the London Agreement of April 26, 1915, had been settled. Thereupon the Italian troops in Savoy were withdrawn from the Tyrol, and France, in consequence, was able to concentrate all her available man-power against Germany.

On January 7, the day the Franco-Italian agreement was signed, General de Bono, who had been selected to prepare the Abyssinian war, sailed from Naples to Massawa. His plan was a twofold one—namely, (1) to disintegrate the Ethiopian Empire, and (2) to make ready for the eventual onset. Knowing the Abyssinians well and that venality was "rampant among the ruling classes . . . and the Coptic clergy," his first task proved so successful that he writes:

⁸ "Though Christian Abyssinia has been admitted, with some heart-searching and hesitation, to membership of the League of Nations,' a correspondent wrote to *The Times*, 'she is a byword for disorder and barbarity: the disorder of feudal and tribal anarchy and the barbarity of the slave trade. In fact, the spectacle presented by the one indigenous African State that has succeeded in retaining its complete independence is perhaps the best justification that can be found for the partition of the rest of Africa among the European Powers.'" (Quoted from Martelli, *Italy Against the World*, p. 25.)

"From the very outset of the campaign there were signs of the results of this disintegrating political action, and that it deprived our enemy of at least 200,000 men, who either did not take up arms, or who, although enrolled and armed, remained inert."⁹

The second task proved far more difficult. Massawa was a neglected port, roads were few and bad, and the country was a tangled mass of mountains, table-tops, hollows and ravines. Not only had roads to be built, but aerodromes and water supply provided for, as well as magazines and barracks. Baggage animals had to be collected and, above all, motor vehicles—the greatest of his difficulties. In short, as de Bono writes, "I had to *create*" everything "in Eritrea,"¹⁰ and all had to be ready by October, for on March 3 he received the following letter from Mussolini:

It is my profound conviction that, we being obliged to take the initiative of the operations at the end of October or September, you ought to have a combined force of 300,000 men (including about 100,000 black troops in the two colonies), plus 300-500 aeroplanes and 300 rapid cars, for without these forces to feed the offensive penetration the operations will not have the vigorous rhythm which we desire. You ask for 3 Divisions by the end of October; I mean to send you 10; five Divisions of the regular Army; five of volunteer formations of Blackshirts . . .

Even in view of possible international controversies (League of Nations, etc.), it is as well to hasten our tempo. For the lack of a few thousand men we lost the day at Adowa! We shall never make that mistake. I am willing to commit a sin of excess, but never a sin of deficiency.¹¹

Having settled with France, the supreme champion of the League, Mussolini may have, and probably did, consider that his road was now clear, and more particularly so as Great Britain had never supported the French League policy and had no vital interests in Abyssinia. Further, he knew that the British Government did not want to get involved in a foreign quarrel, and was in no way prepared to fight one. Then, on March 17, once again the Negus addressed the League, and though this second appeal, like the first, met with little response, Hitler, in his realistic-mystical way, had so accurately sensed the approaching storm that, the day before the appeal was made, he cashed-in on the brewing crisis by announcing the reintroduction of conscription in Germany. This made France still less inclined to jeopardise her entente with Italy, and, on May 2, it led to her agreeing upon a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R.

Nothing happened until April 15, when the Council of the League met. This meeting was followed by the formation of the "Stresa Front," by which Great Britain, France and Italy were drawn together to face the new German menace. Quite naturally, the League was forgotten; France firmly clasped the hand of Mussolini, and Great Britain, startled by the resurrection of the old German military system, and fearing that her old naval one might follow suit, on June 15,

⁹ De Bono, *Anno XIII*, pp. 46, 54.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 118-19.

in violation of the principles of the League, concluded a naval treaty with Germany, by which the relative strengths of the two fleets were fixed in a ratio of three to one. Then, suddenly, the shadow of the League swept over Europe and eclipsed all hope of settlement.

This came about as follows: in England, in 1934, the League of Nations Union organised a "peace ballot," the object of which was to support the League by collective action. On November 12 this ballot was held, and nine days after the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was signed its figures were published: 11,559,165 votes had been cast, of which 10,027,608 were in favour of economic sanctions and 6,784,369 of military should any country fail to accept the rulings of the League. Concerning it Sir Austen Chamberlain declared that it was "little better than an attempt to obtain subscriptions by a fraudulent prospectus," because the issue presented was: "Are you in favour of peace or war? If you want peace, vote yes; if you vote no, it means war." Coming on the top of the Stresa Front, and faced by a general election in the autumn, the British Government was thrown into a cold sweat, because eleven million votes represented forty per cent. of the total electorate.

What could the Government do? The sole thing was to gain time and hope for the best. So a committee of five, consisting of representatives of Great Britain, France, Poland, Spain and Turkey (a curious combination), was appointed to discover a formula which would reconcile Italian aims with Abyssinian independence without infringing the Covenant of the League. On September 18 it made public its grand specific, which was to cede to Italy the Danakil and Ogaden regions of Ethiopia. Whereupon Mussolini, now thoroughly awakened to the dangers of delay by the frantic and frenzied anti-Italian propaganda which was pouring out of England, declared that he was no "collector of deserts."

In turn this propaganda, largely stimulated by the Archbishop of York, generated a violent quarrel between Great Britain and France, M. Henri Béraud declaring in *Guingoire* on October 11:

In France only hall-porters and M. Flandin are pro-British. I hate England in my own name and in the name of my ancestors. I hate her by instinct and by tradition. I say, and I repeat, that England must be reduced to slavery . . . The day will come when the world will have the strength and the wisdom to enslave the tyrant with his reputation for invincibility.

In the middle of this turmoil stood the British Prime Minister, Mr. Baldwin, facing both ways—his special formula. In November, 1934, he had proclaimed that a collective peace system was "perfectly impracticable"; now he described it as "the sheet-anchor of British policy." What could he do to make certain of the approaching General Elections? That was his great anxiety. The people demanded collective action; but he knew that no power on earth could collect it, yet he dared not say so. Therefore his object was "to reconcile support of the League with the avoidance of war with Italy," and his means—the

application of sanctions "de jure," but not "de facto." His position was most uncomfortable. For years he had been building up a dummy volcano, a cardboard Fuji Yama for pacific Britons to worship; now he discovered that, through the magic of public opinion, it had been endowed with life, and, worse still, that he was called to sit upon its lid. Though the means he decided upon would sell the Negus, they would buy the forthcoming elections; further, they would put the Covenant to the test and make it look ridiculous—then Great Britain could rearm.

Economic sanctions were therefore agreed upon; but only such as would do no injury to anyone except the plaintiff¹²—the unfortunate Negus, Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, Lion of Judah and King of Kings. Simultaneously they were of the greatest moral assistance to the defendant, for they rallied all Italy to Mussolini and his as yet none too popular intention of conquering Abyssinia. Seeing that his true enemy—Great Britain—lacked courage, on October 2 he issued his challenge to the fifty nations who opposed him. He declared:

To sanctions of an economic character we will reply with our discipline, with our sobriety, and with our spirit of sacrifice. To sanctions of a military character we will reply with orders of a military character. To acts of war we will reply with acts of war . . . Let the cry of your firm and unshakable decision reach the sky and be a comfort to the soldiers who are about to fight in Africa, and let this be a spur to them and a warning to enemies in all parts of the world, a cry of justice and a cry of victory.¹³

Thus the die was cast, and the Rubicon of the League—the river Mareb—was crossed by the Italians at 5 a. m. the next day. Well may Mussolini write:

Never was a war in general, and colonial war in particular, waged under conditions more singular: Italy had not only to face and utterly defeat an enemy trained by European instructors and armed with modern weapons on the plateaux of Ethiopia, but had also to fight on two other fronts—the political and the economic—in consequence of the sanctions decided upon and applied, for the first time and against Italy, alone, by the League of Nations. Thus there came to be held a kind of speed contest between Italy and the League of Nations—which latter, if the fortunes of war had not been favourable to the Italian arms, would have probably gone on to apply more drastic measures, as indeed was desired, both openly and covertly, in many League circles. The "time factor" was, therefore, a deciding element. If the war had been indefinitely drawn out after the manner of many other colonial wars, time would have worked against us. It was necessary, in order to avoid this terrible possibility, to confer upon a war which everyone expected to be colonial in character, the character of a continental war—that is, to send out from home forces of sufficient size and quality to obtain a certain and crushing victory in the shortest possible time.¹⁴

¹² On December 25, 1935, M. Laval, referring to the eve of the Assembly of the League in September, said in the French Chamber of Deputies: "I had some conversations with Sir Samuel Hoare and Mr. Eden. We were convinced that our first effort at conciliation had failed and that hostilities were going to begin almost immediately. . . . We found ourselves instantaneously in agreement upon ruling out military sanctions, not adopting any measure of naval blockade, never contemplating the closure of the Suez Canal—in a word, ruling out everything that might lead to war." (See Martelli, *Italy Against the World*, p. 150.)

¹³ Quoted from Martelli, *Italy Against the World*, p. 152.

¹⁴ Pietro Badoglio, Marshal of Italy, Duke of Addis Ababa, *The War in Abyssinia* (New York, 1937), p. v.

Nevertheless, bearing in mind the nature of the theatre of war—one of the most difficult in the world—this decision was a stupendous gamble, not with the League, but instead with Nature and human endurance. This, indeed, was realised by the General Staff, whose opinion was that the conquest of Abyssinia would take three years, possibly five.¹⁵ Further still, no one from Marshal Badoglio and General de Bono downwards expected to reach Addis Ababa in a single campaign.

The original plan, which was adhered to throughout, was to attack in Eritrea and distract by a subsidiary operation in Somaliland,¹⁶ the forces there, some 60,000 strong, being placed under the command of General Graziani. The basic elements of its eventual success were: (1) the driving force and audacity of Signor Mussolini—the true Commander-in-Chief; (2) the extraordinary simplicity of the Italian General Staff in the field, which assisted instead of impeded the will of the executive Commander-in-Chief;¹⁷ and (3) the remarkable endurance and self-sacrifice of the Italian soldiers, whose needs were phenomenally small and whose power of work was phenomenally great.¹⁸

Opposed to this formidable army—formidable numerically and spiritually—was the Negus and his courageous rabble of intriguing Rasés and indifferently armed local levies. He was a man of culture, heroic in his simplicity, without authority or military knowledge, and imbued with a pathetic faith in the League and in the honesty of Great Britain. His plan, if he really had one, was to fall back in Tigré, advance reserves north and then accept battle. Though, in order to gain time, he urged organised guerilla warfare, this suggestion went unheeded, because most of his Rasés considered such fighting beneath their dignity; besides, they were too ignorant to realise that tactical conditions had utterly changed since the days of Adowa. Militarily the conclusion of the war was foreordained, though Marshal Badoglio admits that at the opening of the campaign the fighting power of the Abyssinians was over-estimated. It was only a matter of time before the Negus must be crushed, yet he did nothing to gain time, and time was vital to him if the League was to render him any assistance.

When, on October 3, the flag fell and without a declaration of war, General de Bono had three corps in line—namely:

First Corps: General Santini. Headquarters, Senafé.

Native, or Eritrean Corps: General Pirzio-Biroli. Headquarters, Coatit.

Second Corps: General Maravigna. Headquarters, Adi Ugri.

Each consisted of three divisions and a number of Blackshirt battalions. Two divisions were held in general reserve, and G.H.Q. was at Coatit.

¹⁵ See Martelli, *Italy Against the World*, pp. 273, 235.

¹⁶ See Badoglio, *War in Abyssinia*, p. 11.

¹⁷ See Fuller, *First of the League Wars*, pp. 55-56.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 56-64.



ABOVE: BERSAGLIERI MACHINE GUN COMPANY. BELOW: "BLACKSHIRTS."

Photographs: Courtesy of Italian Library of Information



The advance was a straightforward one, directed on to the line Adigrat-Enticcio-Adowa, the first being occupied by the First Corps on the 5th, and the second and third respectively by the Native and Second Corps on the 6th. Simultaneously Graziani moved forward in Somaliland and occupied Gherlogubi. Little opposition was met with, and once Adowa was in Italian hands, de Bono issued a proclamation suppressing slavery in Tigré and with his usual candour informs us that it "did not have much effect on the owners of slaves, and still less, perhaps, on the liberated slaves themselves."¹⁹

As regards the Abyssinian forces, little was known except that Ras Seyoum at the head of some 25,000 men was in southern Tigré, that Ras Kassa and 40,000 were in the neighborhood of Sokota, and that the main army was collecting further to the south, but that it was as yet in no condition to advance, its commander, Ras Mulugeta, the Minister of War, being still in Addis Ababa. Further, it was reported that Ras Immiru was recruiting in Gojjam and that Dejak Ayelu Burru with a small force was moving towards the Italian right flank.

Though, from a tactical point of view, de Bono had little to be anxious about, the supply of his three corps was already giving him much trouble, when on the 29th, he received the following telegram from the Duce: "To synchronise the political exigencies with the military, I order you to resume action objective Makallé-Takazzé the morning of 3rd November. The 3rd October all went well, now it will go better."²⁰

Though far from being prepared for such a move, de Bono forthwith obeyed this order, and though Makallé was occupied on the morning of the 8th, at once supply broke down. Then, on the 11th, he received another telegram ordering him to "march without hesitation on Amba Alagi."²¹ Good Fascist though he was, he could not obey this order, whereupon, on the 17th, he was removed from his command and replaced by Marshal Badoglio, who arrived at Massawa on the 26th.

The reason for these peremptory orders was that, whilst de Bono was struggling with the mountains, Mussolini was wrestling with the League. On October 5 the Council of the League had met and Mr. Eden had proclaimed: "The real issue is whether or not the League of Nations can prove itself an effective instrument in this dispute, and whether its members are prepared to respect and uphold the Covenant The present dispute is a test case."²² Then, on the 11th by an overwhelming majority of fifty members to four, the Assembly voted the application of sanctions;²³ which decision was announced on the 31st, sanctions to come into force on November 18.


¹⁹ De Bono, *Anno XIII*, p. 253.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 283.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

²² Quoted from Martelli, *Italy Against the World*, p. 153.

²³ "The apparent readiness of fifty nations to make sacrifices for the League ideal . . .



NORTHERN ETHIOPIA

Though the sanctions adopted did Italy little harm and indirectly much good by infuriating her people, Mussolini clearly saw that, once applied, unless the war could rapidly be won, their radius of action would inevitably be extended, and, should it embrace oil and petrol, not only would it be impossible for him to carry on the war, but most difficult to retaliate. Hence his orders to de Bono; yet the mountains remained unmoved.

Without question, Badoglio was the first soldier in Italy. Born in 1871, he took part in the last phase of the Adowa campaign, though he was not present at the actual battle. As a Major he served in the Libyan campaign, and, in 1915, when Italy entered the World War, he was a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Second Corps. From then on his promotion was so rapid that, during the battle of Caporetto, he was in command of the Twenty-Seventh Corps, and had the misfortune to lose an entire division. In the route, whilst sitting in a farm, so the story goes, he turned to one of his staff and said: "The situation is overwhelming; if we remain here we shall be shot by the enemy; if we retire we shall be shot by our Higher Command." Yet, curiously enough, a little later on he was summoned to G.H.Q., and, on arriving there, what was his astonishment when he was informed that the King had appointed him Sub-Chief-of-Staff to the new Chief-of-Staff, General Diaz. The following year, as we have seen, he assisted in working out the plans for the battle of Vittorio Veneto.

When he arrived in Eritrea the situation which confronted him was a perplexing one. The army was strung out as if to fire a "feu de joie"; the lines of communication were breaking down daily; a guerilla war had started in the Tembien massif, which lies, like a bastion, between the Aksum-Takkazé track and the Adigrat-Dolo road. Lastly, sanctions had gone to the heads of the Abyssinians, and the dream of a second Adowa was daily adding to their intoxication. The following groups of men were on the march northwards: Ras Kassa and 50,000 at Lake Ashangi; Ras Mulugeta and a similar number near Dessié; Dejak Ayelu Burru and 10,000 had entered the Cafta region; and Ras Immiru and 40,000 were moving north from Gojjam.

The first thing to do was clear the Tembien; that task Badoglio handed over to General Biroli.

Whilst Badoglio was setting to work, the question of oil sanctions was raised at Geneva. This not only perturbed Mussolini, but also thoroughly agitated Great Britain and France; for though the Duce had in no way wanted a war in Europe, those two nations wanted it still less, so much so that M. Laval was determined, cost what it might, that oil sanctions had to be quashed. Having decided that the League had gone sufficiently far in endangering the peace of the world, and knowing that Great Britain dared not risk a war in the Mediterranean on account of her quarrel with Japan, on November 1 he met Sir

assisted by bribes on the part of Great Britain, generally in the form of promises to buy somebody's bacon." (Martelli, *Italy Against the World*, p. 159.)

Samuel Hoare, the British Foreign Minister, at Geneva, and together they concocted a peace plan acceptable to Mussolini. It was to persuade the Negus to surrender to his adversary half his empire in exchange for an outlet to the sea. Then they decided that as such a proposal would jeopardise the success of the British Government at the General Elections, now fixed for November 14, on no account must it be made public until after that date. Once won, as they were on the votes of the League of Nations Union, it was decided to return to it, when it was announced that oil sanctions were again to be discussed on December 12.

To scotch this, on December 7 Sir Samuel Hoare hurried over to Paris, and there with M. Laval, who had meanwhile satisfied Mussolini, it was decided to ask the Negus to cede to Italy Tigré, Ogaden and Danakil as well as grant his enemy a zone of influence in the fertile region of Balé. Then, suddenly, on the 9th, whilst the Negus's acceptance was being sought, these proposals were published in two Paris newspapers, when all supporters of the League were thrown into consternation. Lastly came the Negus's reply, which was that "the Franco-British proposals would be not only cowardice toward our people, but a betrayal of the League of Nations and of all the States which have shown that they could have confidence up to now in the system of collective security. These proposals are the negation and abandonment of the principles upon which the League of Nations is founded"²⁴—which is true.

What was the result? On the 12th oil sanctions were set aside in order that the peace plan might be discussed. It was, and was knocked on the head, and with it all idea of imposing an oil embargo. Thus writes Mr. Martelli:

The Hoare-Laval Plan was the death-blow to collective action. It revealed the real face of the League and showed the flimsiness of its facade. The sheep-like battalions of small States, in whom the attitude of Britain had instilled a certain courage, on seeing their leader turn tail, broke and scattered for cover. Disillusionment, defeatism and demoralisation set in, and though efforts were made to rally the Geneva forces, their fighting spirit had ebbed and they had no heart for further battle . . . The proceedings at Geneva were no longer taken seriously, and what interest was still taken in the conflict was centred in the plateau and deserts of Abyssinia. There and there alone, it was now realised, would the fate of the Ethiopian Empire be decided.²⁵

Though this is true, the Hoare-Laval proposals had been welcomed at Marshal Badoglio's headquarters, because the situation at that moment was anything but reassuring. The clearing of the Tembien had accomplished very little, for no sooner had Biroli returned than that wild region was reoccupied by Ras Seyoum. Then, suddenly, on December 15, Ras Immiru at the head of some 5,000 warriors, surprised an Italian detachment 1,000 strong at Mai Timchet on the Takkazé river, and so severely handled it in the pass of Dembiguina that it lost 401 officers and men in killed and wounded. This bold advance and the sub-

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 223-24.



Photograph: Courtesy of Italian Library of Information
ARTILLERY, ERITREAN CORPS

sequent fighting in the neighbourhood of Abbi Addi in the Tembien, west of Makalé, compelled the Italian right wing to fall back to a defensive position a little south of the Adowa-Aksum track, which in turn uncovered the main rear communications of the left wing.

As Badoglio writes, the situation which now faced him "seemed extremely delicate,"²⁰ so much so that Mussolini in Rome for a moment began to speak of the possibilities of a long war; then, regaining his self-confidence, he urged Badoglio to push on. As this was not possible until the Tembien had been cleared and his communications resecured, he first set to work to turn the Makalé area into a formidable entrenched camp, whilst Mulugeta and 80,000 followers occupied the district of Amba Aradam. Then, on January 20, he moved two columns into the Tembien, and though the action following, known as the first battle of the Tembien, was not conclusive, the incessant quarreling between the Rases—Kassa, Seyoum and Mulugeta—so completely paralysed his enemy that, on February 10, he moved against Mulugeta, and in the following nine days annihilated his army in the decisive battle of Enderta; then, following up his

²⁰ Badoglio, *War in Abyssinia*, p. 123.

success, on the 28th he planted the Italian tricolour on Amba Alagi, which had been so heroically defended by Major Toselli in 1896. This battle was at once followed by those of the second Tembien and of Sciré, in which respectively the forces of Rases Seyoum and Kassa and Ras Immiru and Dejak Ayelu Burru were destroyed. Thus, by March 6, these three battles, together called the Great Battle of Tigré, cleared the whole of the northern area and opened the road to Dessié and Addis Ababa.

The Abyssinian losses were immense, totalling some 35,000, and those of the Italians insignificant. According to Marshal Badoglio, the casualties in killed and wounded were 133 officers, 1,874 Italian and 345 native soldiers. What rendered the former so overwhelming were the mass formations the Abyssinians employed and the action of the Italian aircraft in the pursuit. Thus, in the battle of Sciré, 80 tons of explosive were dropped and 25,000 rounds of machine-gun ammunition fired, and in that of Enderta no less than 396 tons of explosives and 30,000 rounds of ammunition.²⁷

After the considerable pause which had followed the occupation of Makalé, these three battles came not only as a surprise, but as a shock to the members of the League, which, on March 7, was followed by a greater one, for that day Herr Hitler announced in the Reichstag that, as the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Pact (actually ratified twenty days later) had violated the Treaty of Locarno, he intended forthwith to occupy the Rhineland. Under cover of this excitement, Badoglio pushed forward his victorious campaign.

Except for an army of unknown strength, commanded by the Negus in person, which lay between Dessié and Kobbo, the northern flank was now clear, so Badoglio split his forces into a number of self-contained columns, which, advancing on an arc 360 miles long, had as their objectives "Gondar, 200 miles; Debarech, 90 miles; Socota, 120 miles; Mai Ció, 30 miles; and Sardo, 192 miles; from the various starting-points."²⁸ That on Mai Chio, which he selected as his line of decision, consisted of the First and Eritrean (Native) Corps.

This distribution of his army was the lesser part of his task, the main part consisting in:

1. The construction and organization of a complete network of roads, comprising three separate and distinct systems of communication

2. The creation of a complete defensive organisation consisting of two lines of entrenched camps and a system of detached works, corresponding with the outer edge of our occupied area and protecting the main lines of communication

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 118, 85. In these bombardments considerable quantities of mustard gas were used. This chemical was employed in two ways: (1) defensively, to protect the flanks of advancing columns, and (2) offensively as follows: "Holding back the enemy with his machine-guns, he gassed the area in rear of them as well as their obvious lines of retreat, and then by aerial attack drove them into these areas. As the Abyssinians fight barefooted, so far as wounding is concerned the results must have been appalling; so appalling that, as if by an act of magic, their morale collapsed." (Fuller, *First of the League Wars*, p. 39.)

²⁸ Badoglio, *War in Abyssinia*, p. 134.

3. The distribution of artillery and labour "to increase the existing stocks of provisions and ammunition at the advance bases."

To facilitate the replenishment and distribution of supplies to the various corps by forming as far forward as possible new supply bases holding large stocks of every kind.

To supplement the transport forming part of the various corps from its own transport resources, reinforcing the former with lorries and pack-animals.

To have in readiness containers and other materials for the dropping of supplies from the air, in the expectation that this method, already widely adopted, might be still further employed.²⁹

Considering that his army was now operating 360 miles from its base—Massawa—from which the whole of its supplies as far as Asmara had to be brought along one good motor road supplemented by a narrow-gauge mountain railway, and that ultimately these supplies had to be moved over desert and mountain and some of the roughest country in the world, well may he write: "All these achievements, both on the ground and in the air, simply had a prodigious quality about them; yet they were accomplished happily, in good order, and—a truly characteristic feature of this hard but glorious campaign—in a joyful spirit and with the most consoling good humour, as well as with an invincible physical resistance to every fatigue and discomfort, and with an ardour undamped even by bad weather; even when it rained for days on end."³⁰

As the First and the Eritrean Corps set out southwards along the Dessié track, information was received that the Negus's army, numbering between thirty and fifty thousand men, lay north of Lake Ashangi. Then, when towards the middle of March its first units appeared in the Agumberta Pass, remembering that the Emperor had repeatedly urged his Rases not to give battle, but instead to restrict themselves to guerilla action against the Italian communications, Badoglio's one fear was that the Negus would take alarm and retire, which in turn would compel him "to organise a large-scale battle" hundreds of miles from his base. This, however, was a needless anxiety, because, as the Negus's Russian adviser, Colonel Konovaloff, says, it was impossible for the Emperor to do so "for reasons of honour."³¹ Further, he did not dare retire, for had he done so his precarious authority would have vanished and the Galla tribes would have risen in his rear, as we shall see they eventually did, and as they had done when Mulugeta was driven back. His tragedy was that he had to attack, though he must have realised that, failing a miracle, to attack meant disaster.


On the 27th Badoglio's mind was set at ease, for that day he intercepted a message from the Negus to the Empress informing her that he had decided to advance and storm his enemy's fortifications.³² Thereupon he ordered the First Corps to take up a defensive position between Bohara and the Mekan Pass, with

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 126-27.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

³¹ George L. Steer, *Caesar in Abyssinia* (Boston 1937), p. 298.

³² See Badoglio, *War in Abyssinia*, p. 142.



BATTLE OF MAI CHIO, MARCH 31—APRIL 5, 1936

the Eritrean Corps on its left rear between Mai Chio and Corbetta, the one to hold and the other to envelop the enemy.

Three days later the Imperial Army approached, its advanced guard, 15,000 strong, occupying a position west of Aia, immediately south of the First Corps, with the main body in rear of it between Gherti and Mount Agumberta. It numbered between thirty and thirty-five thousand men, and among them "was the Imperial Guard, consisting of 6 full battalions of infantry, and 1 battalion of artillery with some thirty guns . . . trained on European lines."³³

The night of the 30th and 31st passed quietly; then, "at five-twenty" on the morning of the 31st, writes Konvaloff, "as at the stroke of a magic wand, the silent chain of mountains woke to a rattle of rifles and machine-guns. Thousands of little blue lights burst at every moment from different points . . ." Later "as the sun rose, the lights became invisible; but I had already noted the end of the fusillade on the Italian left flank of their two fortified camps. The Ethiopians had got in."³⁴

Though Badoglio does not agree with this, he informs us that between 7 a. m. and 8 a. m. the main attack was launched on Mekan, "after preparation by well-directed artillery and machine-gun fire," but that it was broken by artillery fire and air bombardment. Next, at 9 a. m., the Imperial Guard advanced in rushes, "giving proof of a solidity and a remarkable degree of training combined with a superb contempt of danger." Then he writes:

Against it a veritable avalanche of fire was let loose, the attack was cut short; those who had succeeded in reaching the dry-built walls of our defences were thrust back with the bayonet and with bombs. Held up on this section, the enemy sought to extend his attack eastwards, where the ground, being more broken and giving better cover, was favourable to an advance. Here he made some progress; but, counter-attacked by the 4th, 5th and 24th Eritrean battalions of the 2nd Division supported by fire from the artillery of both the divisions, his troops were first stopped and then repulsed decisively with very heavy loss.³⁵

At four o'clock another desperate attack was launched, this time against both flanks of the line, but in its turn to be broken, when at five the enemy fell back along his whole front and, as Badoglio writes, "the battle upon which the fate of the Empire depended was over." The Negus's defeat was complete. "He had lost many thousands of men, and had had to abandon on the field of battle all his artillery, vast quantities of arms, ammunition and material of every kind."³⁶

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

³⁴ Steer, *Caesar in Abyssinia*, p. 311. Konvaloff says, "The Ethiopian soldier, if his assault succeeds, does not go on—he withdraws. And if he loses a position, instead of trying to take another one he withdraws too . . . Under cover, they preferred to blaze away until their cartridge belts were empty. Then they withdrew." (*Ibid.*, pp. 312-13.)

³⁵ Badoglio, *War in Abyssinia*, pp. 145-56.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

On April 1 a few minor actions were fought, yet it was not until the 3rd that the two Italian corps took up the pursuit, the Eritrean advancing directly south of Corbetta to turn the original right flank of the retiring enemy. On the 4th it debouched from the east on to Mekaré a little north of Quoram, and fell upon that part of the Abyssinian forces which was retiring along the track east of Lake Ashangi. Then the retreat passed into the rout, and the Galla tribesmen from hill-top and village fired upon the human flood as it surged southwards, and for days continued to attack it.

This battle cost the Italians in killed and wounded 68 officers, 332 Italians and 873 Eritreans. The Abyssinian losses are only conjectured. Badoglio gives them as "more than 8,000."

Whilst the air pursuit continued, a pause was made at Quoram in order to speed up work on the roads. Then, on the 9th, the Eritrean Corps was ordered to advance on Dessié, which it did in echelons of divisions, "by stages of as much as 30 miles and 12 hours' duration." Then, writes Badoglio: "During the whole of the march, and for the first eight days of its stay in Dessié, ration supplies were brought almost entirely by air,"³⁷ the aeroplane "dropping as much as 25 tons weight of rations daily." On the 15th Dessié was entered. There, "on great strips of cloth, stretched across the decorated streets of the town, the population had written, in the local language, 'The Hawk has flown.'"

At Dessié a halt was called until the 24th, when a force of 10,000 Italians and 10,000 Eritreans, accompanied by 11 batteries of artillery, 1 squadron of light tanks and 1,725 motor vehicles set out along the Imperial Road—a bad cart-track—to Addis Ababa, which lay 250 miles to the south. As the capital was neared, Badoglio hastened his speed, because the flight of the Negus, on May 1, had unleashed a general tumult. There at 4 p.m. on the 5th, after a march "which had been carried through by iron will-power . . . ten days of passionate determination and unheard-of effort," Addis Ababa was entered.

The following day, at a quarter to eight in the evening, Mussolini, from his balcony overlooking the Piazza Venezia, spoke to a great multitude. He announced that the war was won and that peace was re-established. He had conquered Abyssinia, but in fact he had done far more than that, for he had emerged triumphant from out the First of the League Wars: he had defeated the philosophy and the politics of fifty nations.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 150-51. From a supply point of view this march on Dessié was one of the most remarkable feats in the history of war. Certain particulars concerning it are given in Fuller, *First of the League Wars*, pp. 42-48.

A NOTE ON CONFEDERATE ORDNANCE RECORDS

BY LESTER J. CAPPON

AS THE southern states, one by one seceded from the Union during 1860-61 they took over the United States forts and arsenals within their borders.¹ The arms, cannon, and ammunition thus secured, plus those in a few state arsenals and in the hands of the militia, formed the basis of material equipment in the impending war. None of these arsenals south of Virginia contained foundries or machinery for the manufacture of arms and ordnance. When at length the Virginia Convention voted for secession in April 1861, soldiers of the Old Dominion rescued the machinery from the Harper's Ferry arsenal which United States troops had attempted to destroy before they evacuated. This valuable property was removed to the Virginia State Armory at Richmond; part of it was forwarded to North Carolina for the armory at Fayetteville.²

The Confederate government began without any equipment whatsoever. The Provisional Congress, however, in its first session at Montgomery, recommended in tactful phrases that the various states assign to the Confederacy all forts and arsenals essential to southern defense.³ Meanwhile, during the last weeks of Buchanan's administration, Jefferson Davis sent Captain Raphael Semmes to Washington and northern cities as Confederate agent to place orders for ordnance supplies before trade with the South was cut off.⁴ In April Major Josiah Gorgas was appointed chief of the Confederate Bureau of Ordnance.⁵ In an agrarian society where mining and manufacturing industries were a generation behind those in the North, Gorgas faced the almost superhuman task of developing a far flung system of factories and foundries, armories and workshops. Some were owned and operated by the government; others were private enterprises subsidized with public funds. By 1863 the well planned organization which Gorgas and his loyal staff had built up was running efficiently, increasing production, and supplying the armies' needs with remarkable dispatch, in

¹ J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War, 1861-1865* (New York, 1919), pp. 6-7; R. S. Henry, *The Story of the Confederacy* (Indianapolis, 1931), pp. 27-28.

² *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, 1880-1901) [hereafter cited as *O. R.*], ser. IV, vol. I, pp. 379, 504; Josiah Gorgas, "Contributions to the History of the Confederate Ordnance Department," *Southern Historical Society Papers*, XII (1884), 69-71, 84; Jefferson Davis, *A Short History of the Confederate States of America* (New York, 1890), p. 114.

³ J. D. Richardson, comp., *Messages and Papers of the Confederacy* (Nashville, 1905), I, 57; J. M. Matthews, comp., *Statutes at Large of the Provisional Government of the Confederate States* (Richmond, 1864), p. 74.

⁴ *O. R.*, ser. IV, vol. I, pp. 106-107.

⁵ Special Order No. 17, C. S. Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, April 8, 1861, p. 8; *O. R.*, ser. IV, vol. I, p. 211.

spite of defects in transportation and lack of skilled labor.⁶ To relieve pressure a Niter and Mining Bureau, headed by Major I. M. St. John, was established in April 1862 to handle contracts for mineral products and to exploit hitherto undeveloped resources.⁷

The Confederate arsenals, armories, depots, and government-owned ordnance works extended from Richmond to San Antonio. Most important, because of their strategic location and size, were the works in Richmond, Atlanta, Macon, Augusta, and Selma. Richmond, political and industrial capital of the Confederacy, was the home of the Tredegar Company, largest iron works in the South and indispensable to its ordnance needs. Near the Tredegar and other iron firms were located a Confederate arsenal and the state armory leased to the general government.⁸ Atlanta, significant for its commercial ties with the upper and lower South, became an important center of ordnance supply after the evacuation of Nashville and the fall of New Orleans in 1862. Equipment from both these cities was shipped to Atlanta for an arsenal and armory.⁹ When Atlanta's capture was imminent in 1864, part of these works was removed to Augusta.¹⁰ Here was an old Federal arsenal founded soon after the War of 1812.¹¹ Powder works were developed at Augusta during the Confederacy.¹² Macon was chosen as the location for an armory in 1862, originally intended for Atlanta until real estate speculation there discouraged the government. The city council of Macon offered to donate thirty acres for the site, and the Ordnance Bureau accepted with gratitude. Here, too, were the Central Laboratories with Captain J. W. Mallet as superintendent.¹³ The Mount Vernon (Alabama) Arsenal was removed to Selma on the Alabama River below Montgomery during the first year of the war. The elaborate ordnance works of both army and navy at this point became increasingly important to the life of the Confederacy, situated as they were within convenient reach of

⁶ *O. R.*, ser. IV, vol. II, pp. 379, 957-58; Richardson, *op. cit.*, I, 374.

⁷ J. M. Matthews, comp., *Public Laws of the Confederate States of America* . . . (Richmond, 1862-64), p. 113; Niter and Mining Bureau, report to the Secretary of War, April-July 1862 (MSS. Confederate Records in The National Archives).

⁸ W. L. Brown, "The Red Artillery: Confederate Ordnance during the War, *Southern Historical Society Papers*, XXVI (1898), 367; Kathleen Bruce, *Virginia Iron Manufacture in the Slave Era* (New York, 1930), pp. 293-99.

⁹ Confederate Records (MSS. in The National Archives), chap. IV, vol. X, p. 367, and vol. VIII, *passim*; Gorgas, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

¹⁰ *Report of the Secretary of the Navy*, Nov. 5, 1864 (Richmond, 1864), pp. 8-9, 43.

¹¹ Works Progress Administration, "Inventory of Federal Archives in the States: Series IV, Department of War: No. 10, Georgia" (unpublished MSS. prepared by the Survey of Federal Archives in Atlanta).

¹² J. C. Wise, *The Long Arm of Lee* . . . (Lynchburg, 1915), I, 40-41; G. W. Rains, *History of the Confederate Powder Works* (Augusta, 1882).

¹³ J. W. Mallet, "The Work of the Ordnance Bureau of the War Department of the Confederate States, 1861-1865," *University of Virginia Alumni Bulletin*, III (3rd ser., 1910), 165.

the newly developed iron and coal region of Alabama and a safe distance from the enemy until the last months of the conflict.¹⁴

After the fall of Richmond and the surrender of Lee's and Johnston's armies, Union troops proceeded to occupy the last outposts of the "lost cause." Such records as the Confederates had failed to conceal or destroy, or had escaped the invaders' torch, were removed to Washington.¹⁵ Among these were the official papers of the various ordnance works. They became a part of the "Confederate Records" or "Rebel Archives" in the United States War Department. During the reorganization of these archives by department clerks for research and publication in the 1870's, the Ordnance Bureau volumes were classified as "Chapter IV." This group, together with most of the other Confederate records in the custody of the War Department, was transferred to The National Archives in 1938, where they are accessible to *bona fide* research scholars.

"Chapter IV" appears to have consisted of 159 volumes of various sizes. These were numbered from 1 to 147 with twelve "half numbers" interspersed. Five volumes are now missing. The existing collection of 154 volumes includes letters received at various arsenals and armories, "letter press" copies of letters sent, account books of arms, provisions, and supplies received and issued, ledger entries of materials and products of manufacture, inventories of tools and machines, records of repairs, abstracts of contracts, roll- and time-books of employees, lists of men detailed for ordnance work, *etc.* A few Confederate imprints are also to be found among these manuscript records.

Most of the volumes in "Chapter IV" came from the lower South, especially from Georgia. Slightly more than half of them are from Macon. The records of the Central Laboratories and the Macon Armory are most numerous; but the arsenal is well represented with sixteen volumes, the Macon Pistol Works with five, and the ordnance depot with four.¹⁶ Some of the twenty-five volumes

¹⁴W. L. Fleming, "Industrial Development in Alabama during the Civil War," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, III (1904), 262; Ethel Armes, *The Story of Coal and Iron in Alabama* (Birmingham, 1910), pp. 140-42 ff.; *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion* (Washington, 1894-1927), ser. II, vol. II, pp. 534, 548-49; John Hardy, *Selma: Her Institutions and Her Men* (Selma, 1879), pp. 46-47. In addition to the ordnance works described above, there were arsenals in Virginia at Lynchburg, Danville, Staunton; in North Carolina at Fayetteville, Salisbury; in South Carolina at Charleston; in Georgia at Columbus, Savannah; in Alabama at Montgomery, Mobile; in Mississippi at Jackson, Grenada; in Tennessee at Memphis, Nashville, Knoxville; in Arkansas at Little Rock, Arkadelphia; in Louisiana at New Orleans, Baton Rouge; in Texas at San Antonio. Some of these were established to replace others captured or destroyed. Naval ordnance works were located in Charlotte (North Carolina), Atlanta, and Selma, and in Norfolk until early in 1862.

¹⁵O. R., General Index, p. vi; Dallas D. Irvine, "The Fate of Confederate Archives," *American Historical Review*, XLIV (1939), 823-41. While preparations were under way to begin publication of the *Official Records*, the War Department obtained considerable Confederate material by gift, purchase, or on loan from southern veterans and their descendants (O. R., General Index, p. x).

¹⁶The Macon works were removed to Savannah and Columbia in December 1864 to

from the Atlanta Arsenal begin with entries at Nashville in 1861, thus providing proof of the transfer of this arsenal to Atlanta when Nashville was evacuated.¹⁷ Two volumes from the Atlanta Armory and one from the Ordnance Office there have survived. Others extant from the lower South were recorded at the Savannah Ordnance Office, the New Orleans Arsenal, the depots at Dalton (Georgia) and Corinth (Mississippi), and the office at Tyler (Texas). The records at Selma were destroyed very probably in the conflagration which the city suffered at the hands of the Federal soldiers in March 1865.¹⁸ Only fifteen volumes of the Richmond arsenal, armory,¹⁹ and depot, and one of the Engineer's Bureau in that city were carried to Washington. From the upper South also came a few records of the Nashville Percussion Cap Factory, the ordnance offices at Dublin (Virginia) and at Murfreesboro and Tullahoma (Tennessee), and the ordnance depot of the Army of Tennessee.

Even a cursory examination of the material in "Chapter IV" shows it to be a rich mine of information on many phases of economic and social life in the Confederacy. The routine business of the Ordnance Bureau sheds much light upon relations between private enterprise and the government. Most detailed, of course, are the data on the iron industry—economic, technological, and military—as the Confederacy found itself involved ever more deeply in production and in contracts with private manufacturers. Some of the practical workings of the conscription and exemption laws are revealed in the Bureau's correspondence. The growing scarcity of raw materials in the South is evident, due partly to undeveloped natural resources when the war began, partly to lack of equipment and skilled labor to exploit them. War demands, however, provided incentive for rapid production, wherever possible, of coal, iron, copper, lead, niter, alcohol, and other materials of mine, forest, and field. How the Confederacy's individualistic and inefficient railroads hindered industrial activity and military plans is also apparent from the Ordnance records. Labor conditions may be glimpsed indirectly from the reports of foremen, lists of detailed men, and workers' time records. The embarrassing problem of state rights, for

escape the enemy (Confederate Records, chap. IV, vol. XXVIII, p. 165). It was at these places that the Macon ordnance records most likely were seized by Federal authorities at the close of the war.

¹⁷ Confederate Records, chap. IV, vol. VIII (letters of Lt. M. H. Wright at Nashville Arsenal, December 1861 to February 1862, subsequently at Atlanta), and vol. X, p. 367. Almost all records in the Nashville Arsenal prior to mid-December 1861 were destroyed by fire (*ibid.*, vol. VIII, pp. 1, 139).

¹⁸ Hardy, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-53. Armes, *op. cit.*, p. 142, quotes from a letter dated "Ordnance Office, War Department, Washington, D. C., Janv. 28, 1884," and written by Brigadier General S. V. Benét, Chief of Ordnance, regarding certain records of the Confederate ordnance works at Selma which "have been examined carefully by the Board"; these records have not been located as yet.

¹⁹ Some of the records of the Virginia State Armory are in the Archives Department of the Virginia State Library, Richmond.

which the Confederate government could hardly be expected to find a solution, appears occasionally in official letters.

The policies, plans, and immediate business of the Ordnance Bureau have never been studied in detail. All the accounts of contemporaries have been written as reminiscences,²⁰ and they are not entirely accurate. The materials for a history of the Bureau, its personnel and problems, are preserved at last where they will be of increasing use to scholars.²¹ The staff of The National Archives, through scientific classification and indexing, may be expected to facilitate the research worker's approach to the whole *corpus* of rich and relatively unexploited Confederate records.

U. S. WAR DEPARTMENT COLLECTION OF RECORDS OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA

"CHAPTER IV"—ORDNANCE BUREAU

- Vol. 1. Macon Armory, monthly consolidation of stocks machined and components pistols fabricated and manufactured, October 1862 to June 1864.
- Vol. 2. Same, December 1862 to December 1864.
- Vol. 3. Macon Arsenal (Captain Richard M. Cuyler, commanding), letters received, June 13 to July 17, 1862.
- Vol. 4. Same, July 18 to September 3, 1862.
- Vol. 5. Office of the Superintendent of Laboratories (Captain J. W. Mallet, superintendent, Atlanta and Macon), letters received, June 23, 1862, to May 13, 1863.
- Vol. 6. Macon Arsenal (Major Richard M. Cuyler, commanding), letters received, September 4 to October 23, 1862.
- Vol. 7. Same (including many orders and circulars), September 19, 1862, to May 12, 1863.
- Vol. 8. Nashville and Atlanta Arsenals, letters sent (letter press copies, many badly faded), December 23, 1861, to April 26, 1862.
- Vol. 9. Same (invoice letters only, many badly faded), December 25, 1861, to August 23, 1862.
- Vol. 10. Atlanta Arsenal, letters and telegrams sent (letter press copies), May 17, 1862, to April 6, 1863.
- Vol. 11. Atlanta Arsenal, letters sent (letter press copies), April 6 to July 20, 1863.
- Vol. 12. Same, April 20 to October 9, 1862; index.
- Vol. 13. Same, October 9, 1862, to January 9, 1863.
- Vol. 14. Same, September 5, 1862, to May 6, 1863.
- Vol. 15. Same, May 6, 1863, to February 5, 1864; index.
- Vol. 16. Same, February 5 to July 10, 1864.
- Vol. 17. Atlanta Armory, account book (receipts and issues), December 1, 1863, to May 13, 1864; index.
- Vol. 18. Same, May 14 to July 1864.
- Vol. 19. Nashville and Atlanta Arsenals, ordnance and ordnance stores purchased (listed by date), September 25 to December 31, 1861; received and issued (by item), January to August 1862.
- Vol. 20. Macon Armory, letters sent, June 11, 1862, to April 6, 1863; index.
- Vol. 21. Commissary Store of Engineer Bureau (Richmond), provisions issued, September 1, 1862, to March 27, 1865.

²⁰ E. g., Gorgas, Davis, and Mallet, *op. cit.*

²¹ The Confederate Records in The National Archives also include many file boxes of unbound papers. To what extent these contain MSS. of the Ordnance Bureau is still unknown.

- Vol. 22. Macon Armory [Arsenal?], record of machine operations and workers' names, November 17 to December 22, 1862.
- Vol. 23. Central Laboratory (Macon), ledger (accounts of materials and products of manufacture), October 1, 1863, to March 1865.
- Vol. 24. Office of the Superintendent of Laboratories (J. W. Mallet, superintendent, Macon), letters sent (Book No. 2), April 17, 1863, to April 12, 1864; index.
- Vol. 25. Military Storekeeper of Ordnance (W. H. McMain; Corinth, Columbus, Dalton, and Macon), letters sent, April 15, 1862, to June 21, 1864; index.
- Vol. 26. Same (Macon), November 24, 1864, to April 14, 1865. *Reverse:* Central Laboratory (Macon), blotter (goods received and issued, labor employed), November 19, 1864, to April 15, 1865.
- Vol. 27. Military Storekeeper of Ordnance (W. H. McMain, Macon), letters sent (letter press copies), April 9, 1863, to October 10, 1864; index.
- Vol. 28. Office of the Superintendent of Laboratories (J. W. Mallet, superintendent, Macon), letters sent (Book No. 1), May 27, 1862, to April 17, 1863; index.
- Vol. 29. Macon Armory (James H. Burton, superintendent), letters sent, August 29, 1864, to April 17, 1865.
- Vol. 30. Macon Armory (J. Fuss, Master Armorer), letters sent, December 30, 1862, to April 11, 1865.
- Vol. 31. Macon Armory (James H. Burton, superintendent), letters sent, April 7, 1863, to August 29, 1864; index.
- Vol. 32. Macon Arsenal, letters sent (letter press copies), April 4 to 17, 1865.
- Vol. 33. Military Storekeeper of Ordnance (Richard Lambert, Macon), letters sent, November 20, 1862, to January 12, 1864.
- Vol. 34. Military Storekeeper of Ordnance (W. H. McMain, Macon), letters sent (letter press copies), October 11 to November 17, 1864.
- Vol. 35. Macon Armory, record of repairs and machine work done by each laborer, October 1864 to March 1865.
- Vol. 36. Ordnance Office (Savannah) and Macon Arsenal, letters received, April 28 to June 12, 1862; index.
- Vol. 37. Office of the Superintendent of Laboratories (J. W. Mallet, Superintendent, Macon), letters received, June 22, 1864, to April 3, 1865.
- Vol. 38. Same, May 11 to October 16, 1863; index.
- Vol. 39. [Macon Armory?], inventory of tools and machines, 1863-1864.
- Vol. 40. [Macon Armory?], machinery and building accounts, 1862-1864; index.
- Vol. 41. Central Laboratory (Macon), issues for expenditure and use at the Laboratory (articles, to whom issued, for what purpose), October 29, 1862, to April 12, 1865.
- Vol. 42. Macon Armory, return of officers, armorers, and other employees, and of arms and appendages manufactured, June 1864 to February 1865.
- Vol. 43. Central Laboratory (Macon), roll book of white employees (wages, whether conscript, kind of work), 1864-1865; index.
- Vol. 44. Central Laboratory (Macon) [?], issues to other ordnance officers (supplies), December 1862 to April 1865.
- Vol. 45. Central Laboratory (Macon) [?], receipts from other officers (supplies), November 1862 to April 1865.
- Vol. 46. Macon Armory, roll of employees (name, occupation, rank, description, where born, when work began and ended), 1863-1865.
- Vol. 47. Macon Pistol Works, time book, 1859-1861. *Mislabeled:* Macon Armory, 1861-1862.
- Vol. 48. Macon Arsenal, foreman's monthly time book, 1863-1864.
- Vol. 49. Superintendent of Armorers (Macon), order book (official orders), July 26, 1862, to March 28, 1865.
- Vol. 50. Office of the Superintendent of Laboratories (Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Mallet, superintendent, Macon), special orders, August 24, 1864, to April 8, 1865.
- Vol. 51. Same, general orders, September 1, 1864, to March 8, 1865.

- Vol. 52. Same, telegrams sent, October 28, 1863, to April 17, 1865; index.
- Vol. 53. Macon Armory, Master Armors' Office, employees (white and colored, showing names and wages), no date.
- Vol. 54. Macon Arsenal, Pistol Factory, Machine Department, foreman's monthly time book, February 1864 to January 1865.
- Vol. 55. Macon Armory, Pistol Department, price book, no date.
- Vol. 56. Same, memorandum book, no date.
- Vol. 57. Macon Arsenal, Pistol Factory, memorandum book, February to November, 1864[?].
- Vol. 58. *Missing.*
- Vol. 59. *Missing.*
- Vol. 59½. Macon Arsenal, inventory of ordnance and ordnance stores, January 1, 1865.
- Vol. 60. Central Laboratory (Macon), roll book (detailed from military command and slaves), 1864-1865.
- Vol. 61. Central Laboratory (Macon), orders to issue supplies, September 28, 1864, to April 14, 1865.
- Vol. 61¼. Military Storekeeper of Ordnance (Macon), orders to issue supplies (stubs), November 28, 1863, to April 1, 1865.
- Vol. 61½. Central Laboratory (Macon), orders to issue supplies (stubs), November 1864.
- Vol. 62. Same, memorandum book, December 1861 to August 1862.
- Vol. 63. Same, articles issued, 1864-1865.
- Vol. 64. Macon Armory, Machine Department, tool account book, 1862-1865. *Laid in:* Requisition book for Master Bricklayer, 1864.
- Vol. 65. Macon Armory, account book (tools and machinery repairs), 1864-1865.
- Vol. 66. Same, requisitions for articles at Macon Armory, September 23, 1862, to December 18, 1863; index.
- Vol. 67. Central Laboratory (Macon), receipts of purchases, October 1862 to December 1863; day book (Book No. 2), January to April 1865.
- Vol. 68. Macon Armory, account book, 1862 (incomplete).
- Vol. 69. Same, account book (lumber taken), 1864.
- Vol. 70. Same, record of experiments, no date (only 4 pp.).
- Vol. 71. Central Laboratory (Macon), detail book (men detailed from army to work in laboratory), 1864-1865.
- Vol. 72. Macon Armory, list of employees on furlough, 1864-1865.
- Vol. 73. Same, blotter (day book, receipts and shipments), March 1862 to September 1863.
- Vol. 74. Same (No. 12), March 1862 to October 1863.
- Vol. 75. Macon Armory, Master Builder, slaves employed (by year), no date.
- Vol. 76. [Macon Armory?], issues to contractors (accounts of materials ordered), 1863-1864.
- Vol. 77. Atlanta Arsenal, order book (official orders), March 1862 to December 1863.
- Vol. 78. Nashville and Atlanta Arsenals, contracts, January 1862 to December 1863, June 1864.
- Vol. 79. Atlanta Arsenal, petty memorandum book (advertisements, furloughs, etc.), March to May 1864.
- Vol. 79½. Same, ordnance accounts, August 1862 to March 1863.
- Vol. 80. Nashville and Atlanta Arsenals, invoices, January to June 1862.
- Vol. 80½. Same, Percussion Cap Factory, account book, 1861-1862.
- Vol. 81. Atlanta Arsenal, time book, March 1862 to June 1863.
- Vol. 82. Same [?], record of repairing and cleaning machinery, October 1864 to January 1865.
- Vol. 83. Macon Arsenal [?], receipt book (of supplies, stubs), January 1864 to April 1865.
- Vol. 84. Atlanta Arsenal, time book, April to June 1862.
- Vol. 85. Same, letters sent (list of names and postage), April 1862 to July 1864.

- Vol. 86. Same, receiving and forwarding records (supplies, men detailed, contractors and conscripts), 1862-1864.
- Vol. 87. Atlanta, morning reports of ordnance stores arrived at and passed through Atlanta, March 1863 to June 1864.
- Vol. 88. Ordnance Office (Atlanta), Blotter (No. 2), August 19 to November 30, 1863.
- Vol. 89. Ordnance Department of Western Virginia, Headquarters (Dublin), letters sent, November 14, 1862, to January 23, 1864.
- Vol. 90. Richmond Arsenal, Ordnance Depot, letters sent, November 8, 1862, to January 30, 1864.
- Vol. 91. Same (letter press copies), April 20 to September 2, 1864; index.
- Vol. 91½. Same (letter press copies), September 3, 1864, to February 25, 1865; index.
- Vol. 92. Same (letter press copies), February 25 to March 31, 1865.
- Vol. 93. Same, letters received, June 1864 to January 1865; index.
- Vol. 94. Same, March to July 1864; index.
- Vol. 95. Richmond Armory, account book, 1861.
- Vol. 96. Richmond Arsenal, Ordnance Depot, day book, November 1861 to March 1862; abstracts of contracts, September 1862 to June 1863.
- Vol. 97. Same, requisitions invoice book, November 1861 to June 1863.
- Vol. 98. Virginia State Armory (Richmond), order book (official orders), March to April 1864.
- Vol. 99. Richmond Arsenal, time book (women employees), January 1863 to April 1, 1865.
- Vol. 100. Nashville and Atlanta Arsenals [?], cash book, January to May 1862.
- Vol. 101. Macon Arsenal, telegrams sent (letter press copies), May 9, 1862, to April 19, 1865; index.
- Vol. 102. Central Laboratory (Macon), returns (hired men employed, ordnance and ordnance stores sold, receipts and expenditures), December 1862 to February 1865.
- Vol. 103. Same, day book of accounts, July 1863 to February 1865.
- Vol. 104. Nashville and Atlanta Arsenals, ordnance and ordnance stores received and issued, January to April 1862.
- Vol. 105. Same, February to April 1862.
- Vol. 106. Central Laboratory (Macon) [?], time book, July 1863 to August 1864.
- Vol. 107. [?], list of enlisted men detailed (name, description, where born, occupation, where and when enlisted, by whom, how disposed of; listed chronologically), January to November 1864.
- Vol. 108. Ordnance Department (Richmond) [?], invoices of supplies sent to various stations (copies), December 1861 to August 1862.
- Vol. 108½. Military Storekeeper of Ordnance (O. H. Edwards, no place indicated), invoice of ordnance and ordnance stores turned over to various officers in Virginia and elsewhere, January to March 1862.
- Vol. 109. [?], orders to issue supplies, (stubs), January 14, 1863, to July 4, 1864.
- Vol. 109½. Richmond Armory, orders for shipments of arms and ordnance stores (stubs), April to May and November 1861.
- Vol. 110. C. S. Army, 7th Mississippi Volunteers, Company I (Captain J. T. Fairly), morning reports and ordnance account, 1862-1864.
- Vol. 111. Central Laboratory (Macon), general receipts (supplies, *etc.*), 1862-1865.
- Vol. 112. Macon Pistol Manufacturing Company, accounts with certain skilled mechanics and time book, 1863.
- Vol. 112½. [?], Store House, time book, 1862-1863.
- Vol. 113. Military Storekeeper of Ordnance (Captain W. H. McMain, Dalton), ordnance and ordnance stores turned over, September 1862 to April 1863.
- Vol. 114. *Missing.*
- Vol. 115. [?] Arsenal, receipts and deliveries of ordnance stores, December 1862 to April 1863.

- Vol. 116. Virginia State Armory (Richmond), receipts of arms and supplies, September to November 1861; check-roll of workmen and wages, 1862-1865.
- Vol. 116½. Same, arms sent out, July 1862 to June 1863.
- Vol. 117. [?] Arsenal, record of supplies received and prices, 1862-1863; index.
- Vol. 118. [?] Arsenal, receipts book and ordnance and ordnance stores, 1862.
- Vol. 118½. *Missing*.
- Vol. 119. [?] Arsenal, foreman's monthly time book, June 1 to October 1, 1863.
- Vol. 120. [?] Armory, receipts and deliveries, 1861-1862.
- Vol. 121. [?], supplies fabricated, 1863-1865.
- Vol. 122. Corinth Ordnance Depot, issues of ordnance and ordnance stores, May 1862.
- Vol. 123. Same, February to May 1862.
- Vol. 124. Nashville Percussion Cap Factory, time book, June 1861 to February 1862.
- Vol. 125. Ordnance Bureau, *The Field Manual for the use of the Officers on Ordnance Duty* (Richmond, Ritchie & Dunnivant, 1862).
- Vol. 125½. [?], index to orders and letters, no date.
- Vol. 126. *Missing*.
- Vol. 127. Major A. W. Stark, *Instructions for Field Artillery* . . . (Richmond, A. Morris, 1864).
- Vol. 128. *Regulations for the Government of the Ordnance Department of the Confederate States of America* (Richmond, West & Johnston, 1862).
- Vol. 129. *Second Report of the Board of Artillery Officers, Assembled at Augusta, Georgia, by Special Orders No. 278, Headquarters Dep't S. C., Ga., & Fla., Dated December 19th 1863* . . . (no place, no date).
- Vol. 130. [?] Armory, time book (by departments), 1863-1864.
- Vol. 131. C. S. Army, Army of Mississippi and East Louisiana, Green's Brigade, return of ordnance and ordnance stores, 1862.
- Vol. 132. Murfreesboro, abstract of invoices of ordnance and ordnance stores, no date.
- Vol. 133. Dalton Ordnance Depot, list of employees and statement of receipts and expenditures and amount of work done, 1863; Murfreesboro, invoice of ordnance and ordnance stores, 1862.
- Vol. 134. Savannah Ordnance Depot, letters received, October 22 to December 7, 1861; index.
- Vol. 135. Same, August 27 to October 22, 1861.
- Vol. 136. Same, December 2, 1861, to January 15, 1862; index.
- Vol. 137. Same, January 16 to March 1, 1862; index.
- Vol. 138. Same, March 1 to April 6, 1862.
- Vol. 139. Same, letters sent (letter press copies), October 1, 1861 to May 5, 1862; index.
- Vol. 140. Ordnance Department, general and special orders (those received by Captain R. M. Cuyler, Savannah), August 29, 1861, to September 19, 1862; index.
- Vol. 141. Tullahoma Ordnance Office (Lieutenant Colonel H. Oladowski), letters sent, November 27, 1862, to May 11, 1863.
- Vol. 142. C. S. Army, Army of Tennessee, Ordnance Depot, letters sent, June 26 to November 11, 1862.
- Vol. 143. C. S. Army, Army of Tennessee, Ordnance Office, letters sent, May 16, 1863, to February 19, 1864.
- Vol. 144. Military Storekeeper of Ordnance (Richard Lambert, New Orleans), letters sent, December 21, 1861, to February 20, 1862.
- Vol. 145. Military Storekeeper of Ordnance (W. H. McMain, Dalton), receipts and expenditures, list of men employed, account current, property return, August 1862 to January 1863.
- Vol. 146. W. Eugene Ferslew, comp., *First Annual Directory for the City of Richmond to which is Added a Business Directory for 1859* (Richmond, Geo. W. West, no date).
- Vol. 147. Tyler Ordnance Office (Lieutenant Colonel G. H. Hill), letters sent, March 4, 1864, to May 26, 1865; index. *In back*: business letters of G. H. Hill (drug store), Danville, Missouri, May 4, 1868, to January 5, 1875. *Stamped in front*: Received, Oct. 16, 1903, from Col. G. H. Hill, Charlottesville, Va.

PROFESSIONAL NEWS

The Board of Trustees appointed Miss Bess Glenn to the newly created office of Librarian of the INSTITUTE on May 11. Miss Glenn is employed in the Division of Cataloging in The National Archives and is well qualified to undertake the work necessary to organize the INSTITUTE's small but growing collection. The tedious but fundamental tasks of inventorying, cataloging, and classifying the existing library is now well under way with the capable assistance of Mr. Robert E. Runser of the District of Columbia Public Library. When this work is completed, the INSTITUTE will be able not only to render more efficient service to members but to undertake an accessioning program with full knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the present collection.

* * *

Because of the pressure of other work Dr. Siert F. Riepma has found it impossible to continue to serve as a member of the editorial staff of the JOURNAL. Although by no means his only contribution, Dr. Riepma's preparation of the annual indices to the first three volumes of the JOURNAL has been particularly noteworthy. His assistance will be missed.

* * *

As a means of acquainting the membership with the problems and work of the INSTITUTE informally and more frequently than is possible through the JOURNAL, a series of Circular Letters is being issued in mimeographed form and distributed to all members. A Professional Series is also being issued, mainly for the discussion of technical problems of interest only to specialists. It is possible by this means to distribute very inexpensively to a limited number of members and non-members material of particular value to them which is not of sufficient general interest to publish in the JOURNAL. This series has thus far included the following:

Document No. 1, Frederick P. Todd, "An Introduction to the Classification of the New Military History."

Document No. 2, Dallas D. Irvine, "A Charter for the Study of War."

Document No. 3, Frederick P. Todd, "A Tentative Classification System for the New Military History."

Document No. 4, Alfred Vagts, "War and the Colleges."

Those documents of this series which do have more general interest will also appear in the JOURNAL from time to time as Dr. Vagts' article is published in the present issue.

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Before adjourning for the summer, the following regular meetings of local members were held at the INSTITUTE headquarters:

March 21, Major Henry O. Swindler, "The Siege of Washington: Early's Maryland Campaign of 1864."

April 4, Major General Frank Parker, "Our Pacific Policy."

May 23, Lieutenant Colonel Leo A. Codd, "The Past Decade in America's Munitions."

During April 25-27 there was on display at the headquarters a graphic exhibit of the work of local members in the military field. This proved to be extremely educational to members and non-members alike, being a forceful reminder of the wide range of interests and the diverse methods of approach to a common problem.

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The nucleus of another local group was formed on July 10 when ten members of the San Francisco Bay region met at the home of Mr. Olaf T. Hagen in Berkeley. The Managing Editor of the JOURNAL, who was vacationing on the Pacific coast at the time, was present and able to answer the many questions about the way the Washington group had been organized. Mr. Bernard L. Kronick, 2215 Derby Street, Berkeley, was appointed temporary secretary, and the members present were agreed on the advisability of meeting regularly to discuss mutual problems and ideas. Dr. Ralph H. Lutz, Director of the Hoover Library on War, Revolution and Peace, offered the facilities of that institution for meetings in Palo Alto as soon as its new building is completed.

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Among recent accessions The National Archives announces the following of interest to the military historian: general correspondence files of The Adjutant General's Office, 1861-1917; 5200 glass-plate negatives of Virginia documents relating to the Revolutionary War; the Matthew S. Brady collection of photographic negatives of the Civil War period; the Signal Corps' collection of motion pictures portraying activities of the A. E. F. in this country and abroad during the World War; records of the Marine Corps expeditionary forces in Haiti, 1915-34, and in Nicaragua, 1926-33. The recently published *Guide to the Material in The National Archives*, for sale by the Government Printing Office for 40c, describes briefly all records received through December 31, 1939.

The National Park Service has recently acquired the sites of the Battles of Manassas and of the McLean House at Appomattox Court House. The Petersburg National Military Park has received from the War Department over a hundred pieces of artillery of the Civil War period.

* * *

American Patent Models, Inc., 630 Fifth Avenue, New York City, announces that it has acquired all of the original United States patent models supplied by inventors from 1790 to 1880 and is prepared to show and sell many ordnance models.

Contributors to This Issue

Dr. Alfred Vagts of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey, will be remembered for his "Land and Sea Power in the Second German Reich," which appeared in volume III, number 4 (Winter 1939).

Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, C. B., C. B. E., D. S. O., is well known for his many volumes on both historical and technical aspects of warfare including *The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant* and *Grant and Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship*.

Dr. Lester J. Cappon, Archivist and Assistant Professor of History at the University of Virginia, used the Confederate ordnance records in connection with his study on the iron and steel industry in the South.

Mr. Eric F. Goldman, Instructor of History at Johns Hopkins University, is writing a biography of McMaster.

Mr. Harrison K. Bird, Jr., is the Curator of Uniforms at the Fort Ticonderoga Museum.

Dr. Alfred F. Hopkins is Field Curator in the Museum Division of the National Park Service.

Captain Carl O. v. Kienbusch, New York City, is the outstanding collector of American polearms.

Notices of Deaths

Mr. William L. Calver, authority on American and British military artifacts and a member of the INSTITUTE, in New York City on May 14, 1940.

Dr. Francis R. Hagner, Professor at the George Washington University School of Medicine and a charter member of the INSTITUTE, in Washington, D. C., on July 7, 1940.

Brigadier General Charles Richard, U. S. A., Retired, charter member of the INSTITUTE, in Washington, D. C., on April 19, 1940.

Mr. Martin A. Roberts, Chief Assistant Librarian of the Library of Congress, charter member of the INSTITUTE, in Baltimore on June 15, 1940.

Brigadier General George P. Scriven, U. S. A., Retired, charter member of the INSTITUTE, in Southern Pines, North Carolina, on March 7, 1940.

THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Defence of Britain, by Liddell Hart. (New York: Random House, 1939. Pp. 443. \$3.50.)

Occasional books become important not only for their contents but also for their historical influence. Fifty years from now this may possibly be regarded as one of them. At any rate, it looks, at the close of the first six months of the war, as though the author's doctrines are exerting a strong influence, and that perhaps tens of thousands of men are alive today who might not have been had he not pointed out so vigorously the supposed advantages of "limited war" and the defensive.

At forty-four, Captain Hart has had a career quite unique in military annals. In a nation where the military mind has been regarded as unusually conservative, he has made sweeping criticisms of existing doctrines and methods. What is more, the British government has called upon this civilian critic (wounded in the World War and subsequently retired from service) for advice, and has put into practice scores of the sweeping changes which he recommended.

The present volume is his twentieth since his initial book recommending changes in infantry drill in 1918. In addition, he has written regularly for the *Times* as its principal authority in military matters. The book contains considerable material which had first appeared under other auspices, particularly in the *Times*. This assembling of material from various sources gives somewhat of a piecemeal impression, involving frequent repetitions, but it serves perhaps to hammer home all the more thoroughly the author's distinctive doctrines. The general reader will probably prefer the earlier portions of the book where he surveys Britain's general situation at home, on the Continent, and outside in the Empire. The military profession, however, will doubtless find equal value in the latter part where he takes up in detail his specific recommendations for military reorganization.

Foremost among his distinctive doctrines is the abandonment of the exhausting offensive "total war" of the 1914-1918 type and a return to the "limited war" of the eighteenth century variety which, he points out, had brought England such success in the past. "The prospect of this limited solution," he

writes, "may be as unsatisfactory in principle to moralists and pacifists as to militarists, but it offers the most practical possibility of saving civilization." He stresses, of course, the fact that recent innovations have made the offensive more costly than ever.

Only one twelve-page chapter is devoted to "Sea Defence." The emphasis is almost entirely upon land warfare, together with the new situation in the air. His principal specific recommendations are that England should not again pour out her chief efforts in a huge infantry expeditionary force on the French left flank, but might most properly limit her contribution to a highly mobile mechanized reserve force there. As for home defense, he points out that the danger of invasion by sea has become so slight that extensive infantry defense should give way to the use of the Territorials for antiaircraft and technical engineering functions. For the Empire, he advocates a strong reserve force in the Near East and perhaps another at Singapore, so that troops will be at hand even though sea communications might be temporarily threatened.

There is no space to enumerate the scores of reorganization details which he proposed and many of which were adopted—readjustment of the proportional strength of the different arms, different types of divisions for different functions, a revised promotion scheme which would bring younger men into responsible command, and his original suggestion of drill reform to mention only a few. The next few months may show whether or not England has been fortunate to have had such sweeping and influential criticism of her time-honored methods of waging war on land.

ROBERT G. ALBION

Princeton University

Naval Warfare under Oars: 4th to 16th Centuries, by Vice Admiral William Ledyard Rodgers. (Annapolis: United States Naval Institution. 1939. Pp. 358. \$5.00.)

Sailors home from the seas often turn their thoughts backward upon a busy life and write of their activities—often very well. Admiral Rodgers has chosen a more useful and difficult task; he has continued to serve his country and his profession by relating the experiences of others in his profession who have done warlike acts on great waters. The present volume is a continuation of the story begun in *Greek and Roman Naval Warfare* and carries developments to include the campaign of the Great Armada of Philip II. In general it may be looked upon as supplementary also to the historical labors of Sir Charles Oman, so that now general historians and students of military history have adequate accounts of the development of warfare by sea as well as by land written "in our English and natural tongue."

After four chapters devoted to naval affairs in the East Roman Empire to include the First Crusade, there is a brief summary of "The Organization of

Ancient Navies" in a fifth chapter, followed by three chapters on the Vikings, the Medieval wars of the French and English, and on Italian naval wars. The story reaches a climax in the concluding chapters which deal with the campaign of Lepanto and the story of the Spanish Armada.

The treatment of the topic is eminently judicious. The scope of the book is vast because the study is not merely technical: it is "a study of strategy, tactics, and ship design"; but Admiral Rodgers views these matters in the light of offsprings from the political, economic, and other social conditions of the times. A survey so wide in range has caused him to rely mainly on standard works. He might have chosen to pursue his inquiries into more recondite details—in which case it is likely that he would still have an uncompleted manuscript and we no book. The sources used are sufficient for the accomplishment of his mission because he has selected them with discretion. Thus, for the period of the later Roman Empire, we find cited Vegetius, Procopius, Eusebius, Leo VI, Anna Comnena, and Joinville, the general histories of Gibbon, Finlay, and the Cambridge Medieval History, and such special treatises as those of Delbrück, Kromayer, Gfrörer, Veith, and Manfroni.

In evaluating this work it seems impossible to escape from commenting on the question whether military histories should be written by professional historians, by military men, or by one in cooperation with the other. Few have been the professional historians who have managed to write judiciously of war-like events, and few are the military men who have been able to satisfy the canons of historical scholarship. Cooperation usually seems advisable in some form and to some degree. In this instance Admiral Rodgers has done better than any except an unusually well-equipped and accomplished historian could be expected to do. For it takes a judgment fortified by a wide experience and ripened by study and reflection to be able to interpret the higher aspects of war and to evaluate materials in the light of the moral forces which are paramount in determining its outcome.

Thus, in his account of the Battle of Lepanto, Admiral Rodgers writes, "Let no one think that the work of the priesthood in battle was an insignificant thing and unworthy of mention in a study of naval tactics. It is the impoundables that win battles." And again, in discussing the war of Queen Elizabeth with Philip II, after relating the fabulous and foolish tales of powers credited of Drake in Spain and England alike, he rightly holds that they are worthy of the serious attention of the historian because they "effected the resolution and confidence with which combatants went into battle and weighed heavily in the balance of defeat and victory."

In fact, of so little importance are refinements of technique in comparison with the requirements of character and judgment, that it seems ungracious and carping to mention a defect which stands out largely by contrast with the excellencies of this book. The author might have profited by advice or assistance

from a technically trained historian in the matter of citations. They are sufficient unto the purposes of the volume and not unnecessarily elaborate as is often the case among professional writers, but, parenthetical in the text, they are not uniform or always complete. Thus, equipped only with the Loeb edition of Procopius, it was confusing to try to verify a citation on page 19.

And yet, history as written by Admiral Rodgers is much to be preferred to the run-of-the-mine works of academic historians which are frequently as formal, dull, and obscure as a physician's prescription. The Admiral's prose is as lucid as "Let go the starboard anchor!" which means just that and nothing more. He writes simply and to the point in a straightforward narrative which is as refreshing as an ocean breeze. His language is compact. Like a captain mounting the bridge, glancing at the sky, and sweeping the horizon, he opens his first chapter forthrightly, saying, "For over 350 years after the battle of Actium there was no large-scale naval warfare within the Mediterranean, on whose shores Rome was the only State." The chapter on Lepanto, a model narrative, is the highlight of the book.

The text is further clarified and illuminated by 11 maps and 51 illustrations. The maps are sufficient, pertinent, clear, and not overburdened. The plates are of uncommon excellence and are finely reproduced. An index of 13 pages increases the value for reference. The United States Naval Institute has done its share in making a book in keeping with the quality of the text. The AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE should salute its President for an achievement which reflects credit upon it.

J. M. SCAMMELL

Oakland, California

Heralds and Heraldry in the Middle Ages: An Inquiry into the Growth of the Armorial Function of Heraldry, by Anthony Richard Wagner. (London: Oxford University Press. 1940. Pp. 146. \$3.50.)

This book represents an inquiry into the origin of the herald and the growth of his armorial functions, especially in England. The author finds that heralds, familiar in France for a century, appear in English documents about 1270 as official broadcasters for tournaments and at them. This duty led to familiarity with the armorial devices affected by the combatants, and so the herald came to know heraldry as we use the term. Shield devices appear first in the Bayeux tapestry; from about 1150 they are fairly common and hereditary; and by 1270 a technical jargon is fully formed and the herald is the expert on it.

At first the herald has no good social standing and is in fact classed with the minstrel for wages and liveries. But he has ambitions; he becomes a sort of secretary for jousts, dresses like the knight (to the knight's dismay), discharges minor military and diplomatic duties from the time of Edward III, and finally acts as full ambassador for Henry VII. In the meantime the Hundred Years'

War has greatly increased the number of soldiers and corporations interested in patents of arms and eligible for them. Some organization seems necessary; kings of arms are appointed for various provinces and are placed under the preeminence of Garter king of arms in 1417; and the first chapter of kings of arms and heralds meets at Rouen in 1420.

The herald now has a social function to discharge, that of according recognition to social climbers. A man should first acquire nobility or gentility by service to the king and have a certain financial standing; then the king of arms may, for a fee, grant him a patent of arms or ratify the device he has already assumed and thus place him in the Social Register. But rules are not rigid and it would seem in the last resort that the fee is the thing unless there is some taint of blood or conduct; this applies especially to corporations. The author devotes some attention also to the visitations which kept heraldry in order, especially that of 1530.

Books on heraldry usually evoke faint smiles from the medieval historian, as implying much ado about nothing in an incomprehensible tongue. This book, while dealing with certain technical questions of little general interest, touches on the art of social climbing and has a definite importance for the study of medieval society. The author has used the standard sources, some chronicles and poems of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, official documents, and two manuscript records hitherto neglected. Quite a few chronicles and literary works have not been cited but doubtless have been combed in vain.

W. B. KERR

University of Buffalo

Propaganda in Germany during the Thirty Years' War, by Elmer A. Beller.
(Princeton: The Princeton University Press. 1940. Pp. 49; 24 plates.
\$10.00.)

All wars are wars of the word. They begin in the clash of ideas as well as of appetites. Usually, although not always, they end by propagating the ideas of the victors. Also, as the term "propaganda" reminds us, words themselves are weapons in the struggle. By them the spirits of one's own side can be exalted and those of the enemy abased, sometimes as successfully as by success in arms. One's own more or less hypothetical righteousness can be proclaimed, and the more or less supposititious wickedness of one's opponent denounced.

The interest and timeliness of this book is that propaganda flourishes and takes on a special color in "hate wars," that is, in wars which not only seek a political objective but also—in Clausewitz' phrase—serve to "vent a hostile feeling" between the entire communities concerned. Of course no actual fighting was ever done in cold blood, just as no child was ever begotten in cold blood; the attempt to kill others who are trying to kill you lends itself to complete serenity no more than does the attempt to procreate new life. The distinction between

hate wars and political wars is whether or not the populations of the two fighting groups are stimulated to fury against each other or must be so stimulated if the armed effort is to succeed. Just as most of the great wars of our own democratic era have been hate wars, so were those of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries wars of religion. The Thirty Years' War was the climax of these.

The technique of effecting opinion throughout this most horrible military episode in the history of western civilization was, of course, somewhat different from that of today in that journalism, although made possible by the invention of printing nearly two hundred years before, was in its infancy. Printed propaganda—now, as the author notes, beginning to recede via the movie and the radio toward its medieval reliance upon images and the spoken word—used for its earlier vehicles pamphlets and broadsheets distributed by hawkers who carried their wares in wooden trays slung over the shoulder by a strap. A picture of one of these forerunners of the modern newsboy forms the frontispiece of the book. The twenty-four plates, each reproducing a broadsheet, are admirably done and deserve high praise. Incidentally, the average artistic competence of the pictures reproduced is considerable; the popular art of the early seventeenth century shines by comparison with much that parades under the name of fine art today.

Until the series begins to approach the end of the war, most of the themes of the pictures with their accompanying texts in verse and prose follow patterns which would fit contemporary practice. The villainies, disappointments, and humiliations of the enemy are contrasted with the virtues and achievements of the propagandist's side. Sometimes the themes are cruder than those of such twentieth century propaganda as the reviewer has yet seen: one picture rejoices over the plight of hostile soldiers who have lost arms or legs in battle, while another applauds the castration of priests and especially of Jesuits practiced during a Protestant raid into Hungary.

An interesting variant from what would be possible today is noted in the author's text and illustrated by several plates towards the end. As the ghastly struggle dragged on, with its original religious motive increasingly confused by French nationalism and by the complicated ambitions of princes, organized propaganda in favor of peace began. In other words, seventeenth century governments had far less authority over their subjects than that wielded both by the dictatorships and the "democracies" of today.

The most striking of the peace pictures represents war as a monstrous two legged beast with the head of a wolf, one arm and one leg like those of a man, the other arm like a lion's paw, and the other leg like the hind leg of a horse. Behind it the creature drags a long naked tail described in the text as ". . . a poisonous rat's tail covered with many unclean vermin which in retreat destroys everything which could still be useful."

It is pertinent to any consideration of the Thirty Years' War to note that,

unlike many other armed conflicts, it directly accomplished precisely nothing. After the deaths of perhaps a third of the German-speaking peoples, due chiefly to plague, pestilence, and famine, the result was a compromise which merely perpetuated the existing religious divisions of Europe.

HOFFMAN NICKERSON

Oyster Bay, New York

Up and At 'Em, by Lieutenant Colonel Harold Hartney. (Harrisburg: Stackpole Sons. 1940. Pp. 333. \$2.50.)

In the light of very decisive blows struck by aerial forces in the present European war and their destruction of morale in the Spanish civil conflict, we might be pardoned for considering the rôle played by aviation in the first World War as relatively insignificant. Aviation was insignificant then, but only in one respect—mass attack. Otherwise it outgrew its puny origins, and airmen blazed trails across the skies like meteors; plane after plane hurtled into mortal combat with the bravery and desperation of men fighting for ideals and a cause. Young fliers faced tremendous odds and sometimes won immortal glory. Others never came back.

Individual feats aloft were written in letters of fire as enemy aircraft were downed in combat, crashing to earth or bursting into flames. Every pilot who went up to battle knew that he faced destruction constantly, but the spirit of self-sacrifice and adventure provided ample impetus; every pilot knew that it was up to him and to his squadron to conquer the air and grimly set to work to accomplish this task.

How these young men went into battle far above No Man's Land and how some of them came back is told movingly, sympathetically, dynamically by the commanding officer of the First Pursuit Group, A. E. F., who, after two years of aerial combats as a member of British squadrons in France, himself led his own squadrons into combat and to victory. The story of how the First Pursuit Group came into being, how it was faced with ridiculous orders and commands from armchair officers totally lacking in familiarity with the front and its requirements, and how inadequate materials, repair facilities, and inferior equipment found American pilots above the lines with little likelihood of coming back is told in very human prose. But most of those boys did come back, and they brought with them invaluable victories by the dozens, having conquered death innumerable times and vanquished a brave enemy. It was not work for weaklings nor the faint of heart.

Running like a thematic thread throughout the book is the warning that America will soon be engaged in aerial combats again. The plea is voiced constantly that American men will not again be forced into the air with ill-adapted planes and lack of strategic and tactical preparation. In almost every chapter Colonel Hartney points out defects in the past, with warnings for the

future, that America may be prepared for its coming struggle in the air. No alarmist, he predicts aerial warfare that will eclipse anything hitherto known and declares that it will follow certain basic formations first evolved by himself and others in the heat of war at the front. His predictions are already becoming realities abroad.

Colonel Hartney has been intimately identified with aeronautics even since 1914, for the last several years in the thick of things in Washington. His story of the war has lost nothing by publication twenty years after; it has gained much through tempering and comparison with present war trends. It is one of the most thrilling, yet basically sound, books I have ever read.

HORACE S. MAZET

Santa Maria, California

Squadron A: A History of Its First Fifty Years, (New York: Ex-Members of Squadron A. 1939. Pp. 390. \$3.00.)

It is not difficult to write a chronicle of a military organization that will appeal to its own personnel, but this book will interest the ordinary layman as well. Certainly no members of the present organization, or of its ex-members' association, should be without it.

A number of writers have added their quota to this book, and the different extracts from diaries and personal reminiscences make it very interesting. The discussion of the Manassas Maneuvers in 1904 gives a National Guardsman's view-point and his reactions upon suddenly being called from his desk in civil life to field service. The many rosters are only of interest to those concerned or for reference, but this organization is noteworthy for the number of its ex-members who later became prominent in civil life and, like its sister organization of New York City, the 7th Regiment, has furnished from its enlisted personnel many officers to the National Guard and the Regular Army.

The founder of the parent organization was Horace J. Brooks, a veteran of the 7th Regiment, who, in 1889, organized the Social Riding Club at Dicols Riding Academy, New York, into a mounted cavalry platoon. Its full fruition was never attained until Captain (afterward General) Roe took over its command. He was a Regular Army officer who had resigned from the service, and he brought it from a social organization to a real military troop. He not only inspired the respect and admiration of those he commanded, but he also inspired real affection. All of the personal reminiscences prove how much they thought of the man who gave them their first inspiration and brought them into the National Guard of New York; the reviewer, who knew General Roe personally, can readily understand this.

Squadron A served in the Buffalo railroad strike in 1892, the Brooklyn car strike in 1895, the Porto Rico campaign in 1898, the Croton Dam strike in 1900; the Connecticut maneuvers of 1912, and on the Mexican border in 1916;

dismounted units reconstituted into the 105th Machine Gun Battalion of the 27th Division served with the Fourth British Army in Belgium.

A. POILLON

Fort Dix, New Jersey

Notes on United States Ordnance: Volume I, Small Arms, 1776-1940, by Captain James E. Hicks. (Mt. Vernon, New York: the author. 1940. Pp. 200. \$4.50.)

The planned series, in which *Small Arms, 1776-1940* constitutes the first volume, is well named. It does not pretend to be other than it is, namely, an exhaustive compilation of source material arranged chronologically and held together by a few brief introductory, connecting, and explanatory notes. It is not a pre-digested textbook, but the careful reader will find that it contains a surprising wealth of contemporary first-hand authenticating matter relating to its subject, much of which has never before been published.

Not only is the collector enabled to recognize and verify the particular model of most of his specimens (many of which have been erroneously classified by previous writers) and discover how many of each were made and by whom, but also he will undoubtedly be astonished (I know I was!) to discover the proved existence of types, models, and varieties of United States regulation or authorized firearms of whose very existence he had probably never before heard. For example, how many students of American military history know of the Rifle battalion of 1792 and that it was armed with regulation U. S. Contract Rifles of Kentucky pattern; that many Springfield Model 1795 Muskets had their bayonets permanently brazed to the barrel; that there existed a regulation U. S. Indian Service Musket, Model 1807, or a regulation heavy Wall Gun, also of 1807? Colt collectors will be interested in the original documents relating to the much disputed "Walker Revolver"; also particularly worthy of note is the "United States Small Arms Data, 1795 to 1936," which gives on a single page the dimensions and other model data of every important U. S. gun and pistol from the Musket of 1795 to the Garand Automatic Rifle of 1936.

Not the least important part of this work is the section devoted to illustrations of the more important models, both in full length and in detail with the exquisite precision which characterizes the drawing of Andre Jandot. If, as the Chinese say, "one look is worth a thousand words," this section speaks volumes.

It is true that the composition and arrangement of the text show some evidences of haste, and the information contained in the numerous official documents might have been more fully digested. Nevertheless, when one considers the vast amount of research, as shown by the remarkably numerous and pertinent documents collected and transcribed, the author might well have decided to place this source material at the disposal of the public with the least possible delay, possibly leaving for a future edition the task of analyzing, digesting,

and classifying the extraordinary amount and variety of information to be found in these original texts.

Captain Hicks has very wisely refrained from duplicating the efforts of Mr. Claud E. Fuller in his book on *American Breech Loaders* and of Messrs. Haven and Belden in their forthcoming work on Colt firearms, to which he expressly refers the reader, since both have so fully covered their respective fields.

To sum up, therefore, Captain Hicks has performed a most patient and exhaustive piece of research work which presents *facts* rather than *theories*. The most careful conclusion is often overthrown by the discovery of new material which modifies or nullifies the premises upon which it was made; but facts are, and will always remain, facts, the value of which cannot be diminished by new discoveries or subsequent treatises. Hence this volume constitutes a permanent contribution to American arms literature which no student or collector of U. S. small arms can afford to be without.

WILLIAM G. RENWICK

Weston, Massachusetts

OTHER RECENT BOOKS

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

Memoirs of the Peace Conference, by David Lloyd George. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1939. 2 vols. \$10.00.) An addition to his completed war memoirs, containing some new material on the conference; noteworthy for stinging pen portraits of peace conference colleagues and maintaining his claim of being right on all questions.

ART AND PHILOSOPHY OF WARFARE

Decisive Battles: Their Influence upon History and Civilisation, by Major General J. F. C. Fuller. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1940. Pp. 1060 \$4.50.) A brilliant survey of decisive battles from Arbela, 331 B. C., to that of Aragon, 1938. Nothing of such scope has previously appeared in the English language. Engagements have been placed against the social and political background of their day. Not all readers will agree with General Fuller's interpretations, but none can deny his grasp of the whole field of military history. A valuable book for any small military library.

Word Warfare: Some Aspects of German Propaganda and English Liberty, by John Gloag. (London: Nicholson and Watson. 1939. Pp. 154. 3s.6d.) Observations on the working of the Nazi propaganda machine at the outbreak of the war, pointing out its strength through coordination and its weakness through exaggeration.

Oberste Heeresleitung und Reichsleitung, by Erwin Direnberger. (Berlin: Junker & Dunnhaupt. 1939. Pp. 147. Rm. 6.50.) Observations on military and civilian leadership.

Les Espoirs de Napoleon à Sainte-Hélène, by General Brice. (Paris: Payot. 1938.) A psychological study of Napoleon during his exile written by a medical officer.

Polkovodcheskoe iskusstvo Napoleona [The Genius of Napoleon as a Military Leader], by N. A. Levitskii. (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1938. Pp. 279.) In a brief sketch the author shows the development of the military talents. The general trend of the book is to be found in the statement that his most brilliant victories were when the aim of the war was the struggle with feudalism, the losses when the war was aggressive.

MILITARY SCIENCE

- Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Classics*, edited by Thomas R. Phillips. (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 1940. Pp. 448. \$3.00.) A long needed compilation in a single volume of *The Art of War* by Sun Tzu, *The Military Institutions of the Romans* by Vegetius, *Reveries on the Art of War* by Marshal Saxe, *The Instructions of Frederick the Great for His Generals*, and *The Military Maxims of Napoleon*.
- Boi v okruzhenii* [Battle in Case of Encirclement], by M. S. Angarskii, (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat. 1939.) A study and characterization of fundamental tactical peculiarities of battle actions when military units are surrounded and when the units break through such a position; considered in terms of battalion, regiment, and division.
- Oborona korpusa na shirokom fronte* [Defense of the Army Corps on an Extensive Front], by A. E. Gutor, (Moscow; Voenizdat. 1939.) A study of a characteristic problem of modern war which has been given scant attention.
- S-2 in Action*, by Shipley Thomas. (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 1940. Pp. 128. \$1.50.) A practical discussion of problems of enemy intelligence by a former Captain of the 26th Infantry, 1st Division, A. E. F.

AUXILIARY SCIENCES

- Tanki v obshchevoiskovom boiu* [Tanks in Battles Using All Armed Forces], by A. Ignat'ev. (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1939. Pp. 140.) A systematic exposé of the tactics of the tank units and their interdependence with other military units in all stages of battle.
- Konstruktsiia i raschet tankov i traktorov* [Construction and Specifications of Tanks and Tractors], by A. N. Blagonravov. (Moscow: Oborongiz. 1939.) A text book for the students of the Academy of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army.
- Vozdushnaia armia* [Air Force], by A. N. Lapchinskii. (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1939.) On the rôle of the air force in war, designed for officers of the Red Army.
- Vozdushnaia razvedka* [Aero-reconnaissance], by A. N. Lapchinskii. (Moscow: GVIZ. 1938.) Historical examples illustrating the uses of aviation for reconnaissance.
- Les Flottes de l'Air 1938*, by Robert Gruss. (Paris: Société d'Éditions Géographiques, Maritimes, et Coloniales. 1938.) A guide to aerial equipment of the various powers in 1938, giving photographs, silhouettes, statistics, etc.
- Oborudovanie pirosilinovogo proizvodstva* [Organization of the Pyroxen Industry] by IU. Talantsev. (Moscow: Oborongiz. 1939.) A text book for students in this branch of industry.

WEAPONS AND ORDNANCE

- Kratkii kurs pirotekhniki. Chast' I: Pirotekhnicheskie sostavy* [A Short Course in Pyrotechnics. Part I: Pyrotechnic Compounds], by I. Bystror. (Moscow: Oborongiz. 1939.) Fundamental information regarding the pyrotechnic compounds used for military purposes.
- Annotirovannaia bibliografiia inostrannykh patentov po vzyvchatym veshchestvam, opublikovannykh za vremia s 1917-po 1938 g. vkhlichii* [Annotated Bibliography of Foreign Patents on Explosives, Published for the Period 1917-1939 Inclusive], by M. S. Fishbein. (Moscow: Oborongiz. 1939. Pp. 192.) Designed for the scientific research and engineering personnel of the defense industry.

ESTABLISHMENTS

- The United States Military Academy and Its Foreign Contemporaries*, by Lieutenant Colonel Herman Beukema. (West Point: The Department of Economics, Government, and History. 1940. Pp. 81.) A brief survey of the Academy prepared primarily for the cadets.
- La France et Son Armée*, by Charles de Gaulle. (Paris: Plon. 1938.) A historical sketch of the French Army from its origins to the World War.

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World War

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1919-1940

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RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

HISTORIOGRAPHY

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INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

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- "Lessons of a Blitzkrieg," by Major General H. Rowan-Robinson, in *Infantry Journal*, May-June 1940 (XLVII, 210-22). A brief interpretation of the Polish campaign of 1939.
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1919-1940

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CUSTOMS AND ANTIQUITIES

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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

A FOOTNOTE ON NEW ENGLAND'S COLONIAL HALBERDS

The existence of seventeenth and eighteenth century polearms which could without risk of error be labelled "made in America" was, in 1928, almost unknown. It was common knowledge, of course, that halberds, partisans, spoontoons, and pikes were in use among our earliest colonists. Alice Morse Earle¹ cites the "List of Apparell" furnished in 1624 to the emigrants of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, which includes:

- 2 Partisans; one for the Captain & one for the Leftenant.
- 3 Halbreds for the 3 Sergeants
- 60 Pikes
- 20 Half Pikes

Colonial wills and inventories are full of references to polearms. The vast majority of these, however, were importations brought from England, France, or Holland, differing in no way from the equipment of European armies. That colonial metal workers should copy European forms and give them a distinctly American character seems reasonable enough. That they did so, that these local products have survived in fair quantity, that they show, especially in New England examples, definite diagnostic features which set them apart from their foreign relations, was first brought to the attention of the public by Dr. Bashford Dean, Curator of Arms and Armor at the Metropolitan Museum. His illustrated paper "On American Polearms" remains the most important contribution on its subject.² Recently Stephen H. P. Pell, Director of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum, has published further important information.³ Of the fifty-nine polearms illustrated by the latter, only six seem to have been known to Dr. Dean. Soon afterward seven additional pieces from the collection of

¹ *Two Centuries of Costume in America* (New York, 1903), p. 685.

² *Metropolitan Museum Studies*, I (1928), 32-48; reprinted in this JOURNAL, I (1937-38), 108-21, 177-85.

³ *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, V (1939-40), 66-90.

A



B



C



D



NEW ENGLAND COLONIAL HALBERDS

A, from Red Lion, York County, Pennsylvania, about 1700. B, from Portsmouth, New Hampshire, about 1720. C, from Guilford, Connecticut, dated 1739. D, from Wellesley, Massachusetts, about 1740.

the present writer, including three of the four reproduced here, were illustrated and briefly described.⁴ All are recent finds, purchased since 1935.

From an examination of these four it is immediately apparent that the Pennsylvanian (fig. A) has little in common with the three New Englanders, which resemble each other closely. Like theirs, however, its head is made of two pieces, the blade-beak plate passing through the bifurcated base of the spike. A European armorer would have made the entire head in one piece. The Pennsylvanian's blade is shaped on lines strongly reminiscent of the elaborate iron door hinges still prevalent throughout York, Lancaster, and neighboring counties. The long bayonet-like spike derives from a late sixteenth century European model. If it were not for its two-piece construction, we might well mistake it for something imported from Germany by the "Pennsylvania Dutch."

Contrast with this the earliest and most skillfully wrought of its three New England companions (fig. B). Again two-piece construction; again excellent workmanship. Note that the wooden staff slips into a ferrule which is held in place by a pair of nailed straps. That, though not uncommon elsewhere, is typically New England. Equally characteristic are the crescent-shaped blade, the set of the triangular beak, and the leaf-shaped apical point. A pronounced median ridge runs the length of this element, a feature more European than American. The apices of European halberds are, however, seldom pierced. In the present example, as also in the remaining two, small round apertures serve as decoration, in groups of six. A New England halberd without an ornamentally pierced apex would be most unusual. Blade and beak are also pierced, showing hearts, *etc.*, in negative silhouette. Bits of woolen fabric nailed to the staff where it meets the ferrule are probably remains of a tassel or (less likely) of a small regimental flag. Whichever it may have been, the writer knows of no other colonial halberd retaining tassel or flag shreds. Altogether, this halberd from Portsmouth is one of the finest, if not the finest piece of true armorer's work in its class yet discovered.

Of dated New England halberds Bashford Dean was able to find only two—one from Salem, Massachusetts (1679); another from York, Maine (1745). Dates on weapons about which so little is known are of vital importance. Hence, we are fortunate to be able to add a third from Guilford, Connecticut (fig. C). This should be especially important to students, for it is of a type which Dean and others have, for structural reasons, placed in the late eighteenth century. Since there is no reason to consider its pierced date apocryphal, we must revise our dating of similar pieces and admit that they appeared as early as 1739. This halberd, as compared with the Portsmouth halberd, is a "blacksmith's job," degenerate in structure and workmanship. It lacks the sturdiness of its older brother. The blade-beak is not hammered from an ingot as an

⁴ *Ibid.*, V (1939-40), 116-19.

armorers would have made it, but cut from a sheet of rolled iron. It passes through a slot in the slender neck of the apical point and is held in place only by the pressure of a tight fit. For pierced ornaments it has daggers and diamonds. The apex bears the usual group of six holes and also a perforation shaped like a nail. The effect of the weapon is one of frail futility for any warlike purpose. We know such things were carried by minor officers as insignia of office, by attendants in courts of law, by the town watch, and occasionally by church wardens. For ceremonial use such "arms" were sturdy enough.

The Wellesley halberd (fig. D) being almost identical with that from Guilford, we must assign it approximately the same date. Its quality is a trifle better (the ferrule, for instance) and the outline of the apex more ornate. Again we have diamonds and daggers as pierced decoration, not to mention the ever present group of six holes. Whether or not there is any connection between the hearts, diamonds, commas, daggers, disks, wheels, crosses, *etc.*, that appear as brass or silver inlays on the stocks and forearms of so-called "Kentucky" rifles of the eighteenth century and the similarly shaped piercings on New England halberds, this writer is not prepared to say. Did the colonial gunsmith borrow ornaments from halberds? Were halberds made by gunsmiths?

For the roving collector who comes upon a halberd which may be of colonial New England origin it is well to check such diagnostic features as we have come to recognize:

1. Heads are made of two pieces, one passing through the other.
2. Apical points are leaf-shaped and ornamented with groups of perforations.
3. Blades are crescent-shaped, pierced in designs resembling the inlays on colonial rifles.

Should such a halberd reward your search, be duly grateful. You have found one of the rarest and most desirable treasures in all the field of military Americana, and this writer, if he hears of your good fortune, will be properly envious.

CARL O. V. KIENBUSCH

TWO LEATHER CAPS OF THE WAR OF 1812

In view of the articles by Hugh Charles McBarron, Jr., on the American uniforms of the War of 1812 which have been appearing in this section, the two contributions which follow are of particular interest as illustrating the leather cap introduced, in 1813.

1. *Cap in the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*

This cap appears to be the type recommended in 1812 to replace the round cloth cap then in use by Infantry. Whether it was actually authorized in that



*Photograph: Courtesy of Fort
Ticonderoga Museum*

year is not certain, but by February 1813 bids were being received for its manufacture. The leather cap was issued widely in 1813, and there is little doubt that by the end of the war it was being worn by the bulk of the Infantry and Artillery.

The specimen illustrated shows unusually careful workmanship; one is inclined to believe it may have belonged to an officer. The arrangement of the cords is unlike any other of the period and, of course, may not correspond to that originally worn. The cap plate bears a device found on belt plates of the period. This same size and shape was adopted by some state organizations which replaced the eagle with their state coat of arms.

HARRISON K. BIRD, JR.



Photograph: Courtesy of National Park Service, Morristown National Historical Park, Morristown, New Jersey

2. Cap in the Morristown National Historical Park

In the museum of this park is a cap from the de Lancey Kountze Collection, a gift of the Washington Association of New Jersey, which appears to be the type issued to foot troops of the United States Regular Army in 1813. This shako is of brown leather, which may once have been black. It is hand sewn, $8\frac{1}{4}$ inches high in front, $6\frac{1}{2}$ in back, and $7\frac{1}{4}$ inches in diameter at the bottom edge. A folded flap at the back, approximately $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches deep, could be let down to protect the neck. The visor (indicated by a dotted line in the photograph) is missing, its presence at one time is suggested by the shaped front and empty stitching. A double perforation exists near the top on the right side, and a leather socket for a pompon wire runs down the left.

ALFRED F. HOPKINS

RELIVING HISTORY: JOHN BACH McMASTER AS AN
ARMY CLERK

Until John Bach McMaster became famous as an historian, he was not thought of as an historian at all. During the first thirty-one years of his life until the first volume of the famous *History of the People of the United States* appeared in 1883—McMaster's career seemed to tend toward engineering. Writing for scientific journals, working as part of the Army Engineer Corps, teaching civil engineering in the John C. Green School of Science at Princeton University—these were the activities his friends saw.

But the outward appearances were outward only. As early as his college days, McMaster had dreamed of writing a great history, and this ambition, far from being diminished, was stimulated by the activities which gave him a livelihood. Important in this respect was the period he spent working with Army surveying parties around Winchester, Virginia. Here the momentous past was so well preserved that McMaster relived history, and by reliving history he received a further impetus to write his own story of the American past.¹ McMaster's Army experience is described in the following excerpt from his unpublished memoirs.² The selection is interesting not only for what it reveals about the making of an historian but also for what the historian said about General Sheridan and old Chicago.

ERIC F. GOLDMAN

An Excerpt from the McMaster Memoirs

... [In 1874] I was appointed chief clerk and civil assistant to Major L. Gillespie of the Engineer Corps, U. S. Army. General Sheridan was writing his memoirs and had obtained from Congress an appropriation for a topographical survey of his battlefields of Winchester, Cedar Creek, and Waynesboro, and had chosen the Major to take charge of the surveys. Three parties were to be in the field. One was assigned to me. Winchester was a most interesting sight. Nine years had passed since the battle, but the greater part of the field over which the fight had raged had never been ploughed and was strewn with the wreckage of war. Lead bullets, fragments of exploded shells, belts and caps, insignia were scattered everywhere. Trees which had been shot away lay on the ground full of bullets. The door of a house which stood on the field was so full of bullets that you could not put your finger between them. I picked up and sent home a "dud" and had it mounted as a paper weight,

¹ McMaster testified to this effect in a biographical after-dinner talk delivered late in life. Notes on this talk were taken by Professor A. T. Volwiler of Ohio State University and are preserved among the McMaster papers.

² There are two manuscript drafts of the McMaster memoirs, the one carrying the autobiography almost to the end of his life, the other apparently a redrafting of a portion of the section dealing with his family and boyhood. The memoirs were written hastily in odd moments, and McMaster had no intention of publishing them in the form in which they were left at his death. The excerpt quoted here is from the first draft. The memoirs are among a considerable body of unpublished McMaster materials to which I have been given access through the generous courtesy of the historian's son, Dr. Philip D. McMaster of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research.

and as a memento of the horrors of war, the "os frontis," or forehead, of some poor soldier whose head had probably been shot away. While other parties of surveyors were busy at Cedar Creek, I was sent to Waynesboro and gathered material for a map which later appeared in Sheridan's *Memoirs*.²

The surveys all done, the head of one of the parties and I, as chief clerk, were ordered to Sheridan's headquarters in Chicago where the maps were drawn. There I saw something of Sheridan, who came into the office to see how the drafting progressed. He was a hot-tempered, ugly-faced, long-armed little Irishman, but undoubtedly a good fighter and fine cavalry officer. I remember one of his outbreaks of ill temper. His headquarters were in the Western Union Telegraph Company's building, corner of Washington and La Salle streets. Electricity was obtained, in those days, from wet batteries, and those the telegraph company used were stored on the top floor. One day Sheridan went to the elevator and pressed the button, but the car passed on up without stopping. It was loaded with wet batteries for the top floor. Sheridan went into a rage and, having a book in his hand, smashed the glass in the elevator door. The superintendent of the building thereupon put up a wire netting so that the elevator boys could see the General and at once take him on board. Sheridan went into another passion, sent an orderly to tear out the wire, and told the superintendent he would move headquarters elsewhere. He was told, so the story runs, that his quarters were leased for a term which would not expire for several years, and that it did not make any difference if he did move. He calmed down and the wire net remained.

My work as chief (and only) clerk was to copy the Major's letters for him to sign, copy them in long hand in a letter book, since there were no typewriters in those days, file all incoming letters, and every three months make a return of government property in the office and send it to the Chief of Engineers. The city [of Chicago] was interesting. The great fire of 1871 had swept great areas, and much of it was still just as the fire had left it. The City Hall had not been rebuilt, and its blackened and defaced walls and burnt trees in the park were dismal sights. Save in the rebuilt shopping districts, the sidewalks were of worn planks from which knots protruded. In North Chicago, where the city was raising the grade of the streets, the plank sidewalks were placed several feet above the roadway to reach which at each street crossing you went down a flight of two or three steps, and then up again to the sidewalk. From the newly built Grand Pacific Hotel you looked over a wide area of the burnt district.

Map making was finished in the spring of 1874 and all hands were discharged . . .

² The map appeared in the *Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan* (New York, 1883), II, 117.

SPENSER WILKINSON AND THE DEFENSE OF BRITAIN

By J. M. SCAMMELL

Fenced by your careful fathers, ringed by your leaden seas,
Long did ye wake in quiet and long lie down at ease;
Till ye said of Strife, "What is it?" of the Sword, "It is from our ken";
Till ye made a sport of your shrunk hosts and a toy of your armed men.

THUS wrote Rudyard Kipling in 1902. But as early as 1874, at the age of twenty-one, Henry Spenser Wilkinson saw this condition and "determined to understand it." He gave a full lifetime to distilling the meaning of it.

Young Wilkinson chose to serve his country for honor because he was his father's son. "The idea which pervaded my father's house was that the mark of any man worth the name was public spirit, that a man must earn his living, must be interested in literature, art, history, and all that makes up civilization, all this in order to devote himself to the public good, which must always be his first object."¹ To the end of a long and active life he abided steadfastly in this code. Even toward the end, though beset by blindness, he labored for his country and his countrymen still. He raised to the masthead anew the immortal signal of Nelson at Trafalgar, "England expects that every man will do his duty." This theme runs like a scarlet thread through his writings; in one of his works the last words are, ". . . if Englishmen would come to see how natural it is that they should spend their lives for England."² On April 26, 1918, speaking at a memorial service for members of Manchester University who had fallen in the war, he said, "The mark of nationhood is Leadership, the secret of leadership the will to learn, the single eye. In that spirit we shall forget self and shall live or die—it matters not which—for the new England that is to be."³

He had the will to learn, the single eye. His whole life was an earnest inquiry to discover what war is and what it means. Although his investigation often was carried on under handicaps (for he did not overlook that part of his code which said that "a man must earn his living"), he made all roads lead to Rome. As he once remarked, "Plato used to say that there were two distinct arts: that of mastering your subject and that of getting paid for your work. He thought they had no connection with one another but were antagonistic. Another Man in a later age made disagreeable remarks about two masters."

Although according to the standards of King Croesus he could not be judged a fortunate man, he was according to those of the wise man Solon; for as Solon

¹ Wilkinson, *Thirty-Five Years* (London, Constable & Company, 1933).

² *Britain at Bay* (London, Constable & Company, 1909).

³ *Learners as Leaders* (Manchester, University Press, 1918).

said to Croesus, "He who unites the greatest number of advantages, and retaining them to the day of his death, that man alone, Sire, is in my judgment entitled to bear the name of 'happy.'" Yet he could never be completely so, because his country had again become endangered. But when he passed on into the company of the Great Captains, he left behind him a precious legacy which may yet save his England.

For sixty years he had sought the truth about wars and the way in which they should be conducted. What he found he expressed in his published writings which are like himself—simple, direct, honest, forthright, courageous, and wise. Some people listened; when they did it was to their advantage, but in general it was a case of "too little, and too late." He thought that the next best thing to having his fellow countrymen listen was that our people should. In one instance, at least, both peoples hearkened.

Few books on military subjects in modern times have had more far-reaching influence than Wilkinson's *The Brain of an Army*.⁴ It was appreciated by von der Goltz who used it in his work on *Kriegsführung*, and Sir Charles Dilke used it to advocate the formation of a general staff in Great Britain. In time it and its companion volume, *The Brain of a Navy*, came to be used as textbooks at the United States Naval War College. The story of this book is instructive.

In 1887 Wilkinson prepared a series of articles on the Prussian general staff and submitted them to the *London Times*. They were rejected. He revised his drafts and submitted them to *Macmillan's Magazine*. Again they were rejected. Once more they were revised, this time as chapters in a book which the Macmillan Company accepted and published in 1890. About ten years later an American militia officer who was a friend of Wilkinson came to him to say that General Ludlow was in London, sent by President McKinley to Berlin to report on the Prussian general staff. Some years before General Ludlow had been the American military attaché in London, and Wilkinson had met him at that time. Accordingly he went to call on the General to offer such assistance as he might, and he took along a copy of his book to serve as an introduction to the system that Ludlow had been sent to study. Now General Ludlow was a good soldier. Good soldiers do not commonly have a profound respect for the judgment of civilians on military matters. But he was an officer and a gentleman by more than act of Congress, and he accepted the book graciously, however skeptical he may have been in his heart—and what is more, he read it.

In the fulness of time a telegram from General Ludlow came to Wilkinson asking the latter to come to see him as he was sailing the next day for New York. This time his graciousness was not that of a well-bred man merely; it was that of a soldier to an esteemed colleague. To quote from *Thirty-Five Years*: "He said, 'Would you like to have your book? I have made some notes in it.' So I

⁴ 2nd ed., London Constable & Company, 1913.

asked him to let me look at the notes. In about a dozen places he had written in the margin 'Is this correct?' and in every case his Prussian mentor had written under his query the word 'Yes'—so I suggested that he should keep the book."

"Why do you not try to awaken your countrymen to a sense of military realities?" asked General Ludlow.

"I have been doing nothing else all my life," replied Wilkinson, "but it is no easy matter to interest the people in a democratic government in a matter that has no apparent bearing on their domestic policies. You too who live in a democratic country might appreciate that condition."

"Well," said General Ludlow, "we do have democracy in America, but you have something that we haven't got."

"What is that?" asked Wilkinson.

"Stupidity at the top, all the way round."

In 1903 Elihu Root went to London, and it was arranged that after dinner he and Wilkinson should have the evening together to talk. Root told how Ludlow had given him *The Brain of an Army* which he had studied carefully before reforming the United States Army. They got on together famously. In his memoirs Spenser Wilkinson says, "He was the ablest American I ever met, and when we parted we both felt that we had contracted a friendship for life. We never met again." On October 15, 1919, Root wrote a letter which reads in part:

. . . Plainly, it would have been impossible both for England and for America to play the rôles they have in saving us from German domination but for the existence of the General Staffs whose business it was to think and plan and secure information.

I do not forget, although I daresay a great many people do, what a great part your little book "The Brain of an Army" played in bringing it to pass that both countries had some sort of an institution of that kind already in existence when the sudden emergency came.

So great a thing it is to have in a country a man who understands war. But it is not of much use unless there are enough others to know sufficient of it to make use of his counsel. That is why it is important today to describe the writings of Wilkinson and their character, to describe his life and the fruits thereof to help us the better to understand what he has to say, to sum up the essence of his thought for such as may not have free access to his writings, and to illustrate their importance to us today. Since our safety is directly proportionate to our sound knowledge of war, we should know how he imparted his knowledge to others so that we may go and do likewise.

One can not drive his life and his writings in a team. We cannot follow the method of approach recommended by Alice in her adventures in Wonderland, to begin at the beginning and when you come to the end to stop. Neither will it do to follow the perverse method of Admiral Sir John Fisher in writing his memoirs, to begin at the end and gradually work backward. For dates of publi-

cation give no clue to the sequence or to the importance of Wilkinson's labors. He would not venture to discuss a subject at all unless he had mastered it. Sometimes the mastery of a subject took many years, for whatever his hand found to do he did with all his might. Thus, in preparation for an article on Moltke's projects for the campaign of 1866, which was published in the *United Service Magazine* in July 1896, he translated and made a *précis* of Moltke's correspondence during the campaign against Austria. The first part was published by the General Staff in 1902, the second part in 1915.⁵

*Government and the War*⁶ is most useful to study first. How it came to be and how well it accomplished its mission is an instructive story the full meaning of which cannot be grasped without an understanding of Wilkinson's views as to the real nature of war and the way in which it must be conducted. A summary of these views will be useful also for those who may not have access to his principal works.

Wilkinson began with the nature of the State which he looked upon as the organized attempt of a community to realize its conception of the best life. The Nation is the organized State in which government and people are combined into one. The State produces a condition of orderly life for its citizens, which is called internal peace, by identifying force and right. Without the State there can be no war; but neither can there be peace—there can be only anarchy. He held that pacifism had its roots in a lack of faith in the State (which may explain why so often pacifists are seen consorting with the internal or even the external enemies of the State).

Wilkinson held that the State cannot fulfill its mission of promoting domestic welfare without right action in the external field—not wrong action. The external relations of the State may take on the form of conflict; and "The true idea of war is that it is a social effort, a part of a struggle for self-realization, its peculiar form being that of a violent conflict with another society its rival or enemy." The origin of wars lies in conflicts of policies among States. Policy is defined as the intelligence and will of the State personified. Spenser Wilkinson held that rationally the State will not go to war except to overcome some obstacle in the way of its realization of the purpose of its being. It will go to war in defense of its continued existence, and therefore the first condition of

⁵ London, Harrison & Sons. The following from the preface suggests the importance of the relationships which Wilkinson brought to the aid of military history: "As the campaign against Austria is one of those studied for the Honours School of Modern History at Oxford, I have now carried on the *précis* to the end of Part III, Section 2 The Imperial General Staff, which has heartily cooperated with the University in all that concerns the study of Military History, has kindly undertaken to publish this continuation of the *précis*, which, in conjunction with the volume already published, gives a complete account of Moltke's work in the preparation for and conduct of the principal part of the great central campaign of the nineteenth century."

⁶ London, Constable & Company, 1918.

national existence is the power to resist dictation from outside. A State will go to war when another State is determined to do something which it feels bound to resist because it is a serious injury to the well-being of its people. Thus all wars are acts of force or violence with a political aim. The object of war is peace upon acceptable conditions. Therefore it is the duty of a government to know which of its aims are vital to the existence of the State and which are not, and to determine what terms it can afford to accept as a condition of peace either without or after a conflict. The safest hope of avoiding a war in the world, as it is and not as dreamers picture it, is to stand ready to accept boldly the challenge of war when vital interests are at stake and to be willing to compromise on matters which do not affect the essential welfare of the whole people. "Between nation and nation there is no judge except time," and "The true test, probably the only test, which a nation can apply to the morality of its policy is to be found in its own self-respect."

These conclusions did not flow from abstract thinking; they were distilled from the facts of the history of many wars. Rightness in external relations is a powerful factor toward success in war, because the purpose for which a statesman calls upon his people to draw the sword will largely condition the degree of unity within the State and the resolution with which a war can be prosecuted. The cause for which a war is fought must be such that it will arouse a consciousness of a partnership toward a common good. This is why Machiavelli held that wars of aggression were dangerous, for:

The last word in the theory of war is that a nation's strength in conflict is measured by the hold which the motive of the war, the cause, has upon the hearts of the people composing the State engaged; in other words, a nation united in support of a cause unanimously recognized as good, and fighting is the only way, should have good hopes of victory, for in such a case the whole nation and every man in it will apply the rule of common sense which says "Do it with thy might."¹

But in itself a just cause is not enough. The determining factor in war is always the nature and character of the States engaged in the conflict. The weapons and tactics and leadership reflect the character of the societies at war. Success lies ultimately in the moral fiber of the Nation and in the ethics of its government. There must be what Wilkinson called "right action" in the internal as well as in the external field.

Right action in the external field is impossible, however, unless the government has organized its warlike resources and stands ready to protect its tasks. It is therefore the duty of the statesman not only to know which national policies must be defended at all costs but to assess the possible forces by which they may be opposed and to measure the moral as well as the physical forces by which each potential enemy nation may support its aims. Wilkinson was fond of quoting the words from Holy Writ, "Or what king, going to make war against another

¹ Wilkinson, *August 1914: The Coming of the War* (Oxford Pamphlets, University Press).

king, sitteth not down first and consulteth whether he be able with ten thousand to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand?"

Victory, as a rule, comes from forethought. The only safe assumption is that a war once begun must be fought to a finish. Therefore the whole resources of the State, moral and physical, material and human, must be thrown into the conflict from the start and be used continuously upon a clear and total plan. Thus a war may be made short and decisive and less costly in lives and property. In order that this may be so, more and more as nations have become more highly organized, the chief effort for victory has passed into the period of peace which precedes the actual collision, and the powers of the State have been thrown into thinking, planning, and organizing beforehand. "A government surprised in a matter relating to war is already half defeated."

The duty of preparing the State to defend its vital policies and the actual defense of them in war is not, as is commonly supposed, the duty of soldiers. It is the duty of peoples and their governments. "The control and direction of a war, or the activity of a state in and in regard to war, is the function primarily of the statesman." Only a government can begin a war or conclude a peace, decide on the distribution of forces, name their commanders, give them their missions, and furnish them with support. Those who do these things are the government.

Thus, policy is the master and strategy the servant. The business of the military commander is the use of the armed forces in action. His aim is to crush the main armed forces of the enemy and otherwise paralyze his will or ability to resist. To this end, all military efforts must be concentrated against the center of gravity of the enemy's main armed forces and action must be swift and resolute. It follows that the secret of success in war lies in maintaining harmony between policy and strategy; and this in turn depends upon both statesmen and military commanders seeing things as they really are. They must understand war.

Such were the views which Wilkinson developed from his studies and his experiences. It was against this background that he noted that the statesmen of Prussia in 1806-1812 were not content merely to reorganize the army on the basis of universal service but had reorganized the whole nation, fostering industry and commerce, freeing the peasants, and furnishing public education. He noted that von Bernhardi openly proclaimed that the German army was designed for conquest, though he discounted the statement as irresponsible. He saw that the military preeminence of Germany really lay in her understanding of the importance of knowledge and in her ability to choose leaders who had it. He saw too that, while Germany had been going through a period of disciplined striving and sacrifice for unity and power, England during the same time was in the Victorian Age of smug complacency—while Germany was consolidating nationhood, England was losing it. Such, then, was the background against which

was written first *The Great Alternative*,^{*} an appeal for a return to duty, and later *Britain at Bay*:

We have ceased to be a nation; we have forgotten nationhood, and have become a conglomerate of classes, parties, factions, and sects. This is a disease. The remedy consists in reconstituting ourselves a nation

England is drifting into a quarrel with Germany which, if it cannot be settled, involves a struggle for the mastery with the strongest nation that the world has yet seen—a nation that under the pressure of necessity has learned to organize itself for war as in peace

There has been no such challenge these hundred years, no challenge so formidable as that represented by the new German fleet these three hundred years.

With the coming of that war, in August 1914 Wilkinson wrote, "A great war is the day of judgment . . . in which men and nations find themselves alone and naked in the presence of God." Years before he had pointed out to them the weakness in a popular government for waging war:

The leaders of both parties, the men who fill the places which, in a well-organized nation, would be assigned to statesmen, are placed in a position in which statesmanship is almost impossible. A statesman would be devoted solely to the nation Security would be his prime object But our leaders cannot possibly think first, second and third of the nation. They have to think at least as much of the next election and of the opinions of their supporters.

Early in 1918 Britain was fighting desperately with her back to the wall. To win she had to be worthy to win. She was not worthy to win as long as her people allowed to exist a condition which represents a moral deficiency in a nation, a toleration of selfish classes and factions and unwillingness to make the greatest sacrifices for the common weal. That national unity and singleness of purpose is a rare as well as a vital factor in war has been demonstrated too often within the past year for us to doubt it. It had not yet come to Britain by the end of 1917, so Wilkinson again spoke to his people.

He told them nothing new. In the preface to *Government and the War* he said, "Why then do I venture to offer you a book and why should you read it? I have not had to change my mind during the war. Half my book was written long before the war." He ended his volume with these uncompromising words:

Unless the spirit in which the constitution has been worked for the last fifty years is changed within the next six months, the constitution and those who have worked it will disappear in defeat and revolution. Today the submarine and the aeroplane are telling all men that the alternative is between defeat and victory. Victory cannot be won by a government of amateurs. A government that seeks victory must begin by entrusting the conduct of the war to men who understand war.

In 1918 Alfred Milner was active in France as the representative of the British cabinet. He furthered inter-Allied cooperation and played a prominent part in securing the appointment of Foch to lead the Allied armies. On April 19

^{*} London, Swan, Sonnenschein & Company, 1894.

he became Secretary for War and president of the Army Council. Alfred Milner understood war. He understood it because of his friendship with Spenser Wilkinson. Their friendship dated from 1879. Said Wilkinson: "He had a clear head, a great grasp of mind, and a personal charm. I thought him our best man, our future statesman. A letter of 1888 reveals the political ideals which he then cherished and with which I was in close sympathy." Early in 1897 Milner wrote that into every conversation on political questions he managed to introduce the admonition, "Read Wilkinson." As Governor-General of the Cape and High Commissioner for South Africa, Alfred Milner consulted his friend, and Wilkinson (like a latter day Socrates to a modern Pericles) told him to study war:

It is very important that you yourself should have sound views on the conduct of war and should have first-rate military advice. The sound views you will get if you read the first and last books of Clausewitz on War. As for military advice, you're bound to have a military secretary. Why not get the best staff officer in the Army as your military secretary?

After this, anyone who likes may think that Spenser Wilkinson's *Government and the War* did not have a decisive influence on the conduct of the war in 1918. And anyone who masters it will conclude that it is a trustworthy guide for a people who may be called upon to defend their vital interests in war.

It is a bold book. The preface is blunt and brutal. The aim of Germany was the overthrow of the British Empire. To prevent this it was necessary to destroy the Germany navy and crush the Germany army, neither of which was being done. This was the plain job of the government and the ministers were not doing their job. Said Wilkinson, "I have no faith in any of the politicians, least of all in any of those who have been or are ministers . . . I cannot convince myself that any one of the whole number is fit to lead the nation in this war, and I will tell you why." The people were being misled by the press into a belief that they were winning. Either they did not know the truth or were not allowed to tell it. He went on to say:

I have given my life to trying to get to know about war and to endeavor to arouse my countrymen to the realities of their position. For a whole generation I have been telling you that your army was not ready. I tried to tell you . . . above all that it must be conducted by a statesman, and that a statesman's first business was to understand it . . . I have tried to set forth the lines upon which a British government must work if it is to obtain victory, and I believe that, if these main lines are rejected, defeat is certain.

The first chapter of the book was a printing of "The Study of War," Wilkinson's inaugural lecture at Oxford upon his assuming the chair in Military History, November 27, 1909. Other lectures printed as chapters were "What is Peace?" (June 3, 1911), "What is War?" (June 19, 1914), "England and Germany" (June 8, 15, 1912), "The theory of War" (February 26, 1916), and "Neglected Aspects of the War" (October 27, 1917). Three chapters were reprinted from

articles which had appeared in *The Nineteenth Century and After* in 1915, 1917, and January 1918. Only three chapters were printed for the first time, and half the total number of chapters had been written before the war. He allowed to stand unchanged a statement, made in June 1912 in discussing the relations between Germany and England, that "If either State can well exist though it does not have its will, the truth will be realized in the course of the struggle, and the side which exaggerated its interest in the matter in dispute will obtain peace upon such terms as can be had."

Before the close of 1918 this prediction came true. And in the chapter called "Thoughts on the War" written in 1915 there is another prophecy which we have lately seen come true: Unless the German army was crushed in the field, the German navy shattered in battle, and the Allies marched to Berlin, Munich, and Hanover, there would be no peace; there would be only a truce, for "Unless she is well beaten Germany will begin it all over again." Wilkinson knew that Germany's unalterable aim was the destruction of the British Empire, and he saw clearly toward the end of his life that unless the Almighty sent a tidal wave to wipe out the German people the war which is now in progress would inevitably come.

His foresight—and it was foresight—came from his singleness of purpose and the resolution and thoroughness with which he went to work to master a subject. Once he put his hand to the plow he did not look backward until the furrow was completed. Feeling the need to know more about guns, he "picked the brains" of Sir Joseph Whitworth who had experimented with steels and new types of weapons. He had the run of Sir Joseph's factory. He mastered the processes of manufacture. He experimented with small arms in the shooting gallery of the shop. In order that he might discuss with conviction the defense of the north-western frontier of India, he went to see the ground and talk with those who knew it well. He would not venture an opinion on a topic unless he knew it inside and out.

As a result, any of his works is worth reading; even those on current political matters are surprisingly useful today notwithstanding the dates of publication. In addition to the works already mentioned, the following of a political character should be mentioned: *War and Policy*;⁹ the two Oxford Pamphlets, *The Coming of the War* and *Great Britain and Germany* (a reply to Professor John Burgess's defense of German policy); *Imperial Defense*¹⁰ written in collaboration with Sir Charles Dilke; and *Germany, 1815-1890*¹¹ written in collaboration with Sir Adolphus Ward. Among his technical works in addition to those mentioned before are his translation of Gizycki's tactical and strategical problems,¹² a translation of

⁹ New York, Dodd, Mead & Company, 1900.

¹⁰ London, Macmillan Company, 1892.

¹¹ Cambridge, University Press, 1916-1918.

¹² H. von Gizycki, *Exercises in Strategy and Tactics* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1915).

the German field service regulations of 1887,¹³ and a little book called *First Lessons in War*.¹⁴

These studies were preparatory to his creative work in the field of military history. Perhaps his translation of Jean Colin's *Les grandes batailles de l'histoire*¹⁵ may also be considered. Wilkinson had a profound admiration for von Moltke the Elder and thought him a very great man. Early in life he sought to write a biography of this great soldier, but George Meredith, the editor of the series of military biographies, thought the task beyond the capacity of a young volunteer officer. He did write *The Early Life of Moltke*,¹⁶ however, and in his eightieth year he thought of completing the life; but it was too heavy a task for his failing strength—especially as he knew under how severe a taskmaster the work would have to be done.

Hannibal's March,¹⁷ like *The Early Life of Moltke*, grew out of lectures at Oxford University. It is a little book of some forty-five pages of modest erudition in simple language. No imposing bibliography or array of footnotes suggests the depth of learning that went into it, but if one can find the publication in which Spenser Wilkinson reviewed Cecil Torr's *Hannibal Crosses the Alps* a clue will be found.¹⁸ Mr. Torr lacked an appreciation of the method of Polybius, a thorough knowledge of the terrain, and a sound knowledge of the mechanism of armies. Wilkinson, on the other hand, was a fine classical scholar, knew his military techniques, and during twenty years spent most of his vacations in the Alps studying the terrain and "tracking" Hannibal. It is no wonder that he found himself in disagreement with Mr. Torr and in agreement with Jean Colin whom he called "the finest mind that in my time has dealt with the art and history of war."

The lifetime of labor was crowned by the publication of a trilogy devoted to a study of how Napoleon Bonaparte learned the business of making war. The first of these, *The French Army before Napoleon*,¹⁹ grew out of lectures delivered before the University of Oxford in 1914 and was published the following year. It describes by way of introduction the immediate background of Napoleon. *The Defence of Piedmont, 1744-1748*²⁰ is called "A Prelude to the Study of

¹³ *The Order of Field Service of the German Army* (London, Edward Stanford, 1893). This translation, made with the cooperation of Major Gawne, was adopted by the War Office and was declared officially to be a model translation of a professional military work.

¹⁴ London, Methuen, 1914. Field Marshal Lord Nicholson, former Chief of the Imperial General Staff, stated that it "Describes the soldier's business . . . in singularly terse, lucid, and appropriate language."

¹⁵ Paris, Flammarion, 1919; translated as *The Great Battles of History* (London, H. Rees, 1915).

¹⁶ Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1913.

¹⁷ Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1911.

¹⁸ Cambridge, University Press, 1924. A printer's proof furnished by Wilkinson to supplement his book is at hand.

¹⁹ Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1915.

²⁰ Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1927.

Napoleon" and is more than a review of what the Great Captain owed to his remoter predecessors such as Conti, Maillebois, and especially to Bourcet. It is also a study of "that interdependence of generalship and policy which is after all the first and last lesson of the history of wars." In the third of the series, *The Rise of General Bonaparte*,²¹ Wilkinson took as his theme the message sent by Napoleon to the King of Westphalia that war is a profession which must be learned, and he shows how Napoleon learned and practiced that profession. This trilogy is an attempt to understand the processes of war by inquiring into the manner in which a master learned his business.

The last published work of Spenser Wilkinson is his *Thirty-Five Years*, which is useful as showing how a civilian and officer of volunteers learned to master the study of war. The impulse was in the air following the American Civil War and the great European campaigns of 1866 and 1870. A volunteer movement began in England even earlier, in 1859. In 1875 Sir Edward Hamley published his *Operations of War*. It was against this background that the young Wilkinson studied a pamphlet showing the armed strength of the great powers and the relative military weakness of his own country and "determined to understand it." At Oxford he started a *Kriegspiel* Club. In 1878 he accepted a commission in the 2nd Manchester Volunteers. In 1881 at his suggestion the Manchester Tactical Society was formed by the officers of the 20th Lancashire Rifle Volunteers (later the 8th Battalion Manchester Regiment). Some of the military monographs published by this society were recognized by eminent soldiers as excellent. In time Spenser Wilkinson began to contribute articles to the *Manchester Guardian*, some of which later appeared in book form as *Citizen Soldiers* and *The Volunteers and the National Defence*. He wrote also for the *Militär Wochenblatt*, which in 1895 stated in a book review that "Wilkinson's very remarkable writings deserve a much more general interest than they have hitherto attracted."²² The activities of the Manchester Tactical Society led to the formation of similar societies for professional studies, to professional examinations for volunteer officers, to changes in the War Office regulations governing the volunteers, and finally most of its suggestions were embodied in the Haldane reforms. So important was the influence of this organization that the minutes of its meetings were sent to the War Office Library.

As early as 1902 *The Quarterly Review* observed that "The essential idea or purpose of his [Wilkinson's] works is that of application of organized knowledge to the problems of our national life." He fought his guns to this end with such resolution that, although he himself had helped to found the Navy League, he left it because "It thought less of brains than of big ships." In 1908 Professor Tout of Manchester University invited him to lecture on military history. He declined on the ground that he could not modify his plan of studies to prepare

²¹ Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1930.

²² September 25, 1895.

candidates for examinations. The University replied that it had no intention of asking him to adapt his studies to the convenience of the students or of university rules, all would be adapted to his studies. On this basis he lectured at Manchester University in 1908.

Earlier, in 1903, Foster Cunliffe had asked Wilkinson if he would recommend him for a lectureship in military history about to be installed at Oxford University. Wilkinson declined to do so on the ground that Cunliffe was a beginner who had not mastered the basic facts of war. The young man received the appointment nevertheless, and became, not an enemy, but a friend. He too determined to understand war and before he was through he mastered it, only to fall in battle later. In 1909, when the lectureship in military history at Oxford was to be made a professorship, Professor Firth asked Wilkinson to apply. He declined to do so if Cunliffe was a candidate; but Cunliffe not only would not have it, but declared that he would support the candidacy of Wilkinson against any rival. It was thus that Spenser Wilkinson came to be Chichele Professor of Military History, All Souls College, Oxford.

He came to the chair with the firm conviction that learning could not be in a healthy state if it did not embrace the phenomenon of war as it exists in the world, and that the nature of the State cannot be understood fully without a knowledge of the nature and meaning of the conflicts of wills and the collisions between states which are a part of the life of the State. "A study of the State or of states that should omit to examine war must needs be crippled and defective. It would be like a study of the ship which should take no account of the sea." He defined his subject as "The effort to understand war, to get to know what war is and what it means." He felt that a university could not accomplish its mission, the pursuit of universal knowledge, or turn out sound citizens, public servants, and statesmen, if it did not equip them for all of their duties, which must include those in war as well as in peace. The aim of education was to make every man a good workman, every man a gentleman, every man a complete servant of his country.

The only way to know war is to study past wars. This is the province of military history which records the facts of war as ascertained by the methodical collection, sifting, and classification of the evidence. "Full and trustworthy knowledge of any war can be had only as a result of prolonged and patient research." The nature and meaning of war as a whole can be wrested only from the analysis of as many wars as it is possible to know fully so that one knows what factors are common to all and which are peculiar to others and why. Thus military history is the only basis for a science or for an art of war. The university is the right place to carry on this inquiry because, "If our work is rightly carried on, we may throw some light upon aspects of war with which the professional soldier has not always time to occupy himself."

In approaching his task as teacher Wilkinson conceived of knowledge as a liv-

ing and growing thing, and he believed in the tradition of Oxford that what really matters is "Not the substance of the thing communicated, but the act of communication between the older and the younger mind." The statute of Oxford which regulated the duties of professors was congenial to him and lent itself to the study of military history (which the similar regulations in our American universities commonly do not.) Professors were to give instruction to students, to assist in the pursuit of knowledge and contribute to its advancement, to give assistance to students in their studies by advice, by informal instruction, and otherwise as in their judgment might seem fit.

These regulations are wise, and their latitude is especially necessary for a study of war. The whole province of military history is summed up in the study of the relations between its two principal parts, the scope of the statesman and the scope of the soldier; the relationship between these parts can not be fully understood without knowing each of the parts. To some extent it is possible to get to know the duties of the statesman in relation to war without elaborate maps and other equipment, and much instruction may be given through lectures. But with the scope of the soldier's duties this is not true. Maps—often large scale maps—must be pored over and pondered. There must be reference works at hand, measuring devices, paper and pencils for calculations. If possible excursions must be made to see the ground which was the scene of the operations studied. Laboratory and field work are necessary and lectures are not of great use. We speak now of mastering knowledge and not of pretending at it; for it is nowhere more true than in the study of war that "A little knowledge is a dangerous thing."

Wilkinson taught military history mainly by guidance and counsel. He and his students were colleagues pursuing knowledge together, the older mind freely placing at the disposal of the younger inquirer the fruits of its experience and the sound judgment that flowed from it. First he probed the limits of the student's knowledge. This probing was a friendly business, often in his "digs" before a glowing hearth, with pipes drawing well, and tea at the appointed time. What have you read on war? Have you read Hamley? You should master Hamley, not for historical accuracy because it isn't accurate, but because Hamley did what he set out to do which was to illustrate the operations of war by concrete examples. "There is only one theory of war—that which is set forth, with some differences of expression and of detail, by Clausewitz, by Jomini, by Mahan." Sir Reginald Custance is sound. Colin is a master of military history. It might be an excursion into the Bodeleian Library or the military library at All Souls, with a running commentary on the titles: This man is no good because . . . The strong points of this book are so-and-so . . . Here is Foucart's 1806—that will give you a healthy dose of Napoleon. It was an epoch-making book because it was the first study of Napoleon based upon all the documents.

Bibliographies, original sources. One learned to make symbols in the notebook to keep up.

The student might be dismissed for a fortnight or more to get his background or to master a particular work. He might be sent back to write an essay to show how well he had mastered a subject or to review a particular book. He might be set the task of playing at being general and be told to write an appreciation of the situation from one side or the other as of a particular phase or to draw up operation orders appropriate in a given situation. Or there would be walks and talks beneath the trees, delightfully informal discussions, often very illuminating.

Such were his methods, and they were effective. He never ceased to teach and he never ceased to learn. Toward the end of his life he wrote:

It is going to be hard to induce people to believe in military history because, to most people, there seems to be such a complete cut between the methods of the Nineteenth Century and those of the Twentieth. But I think there are permanent elements, those which are not material but human.

Moreover, war is always an affair of the State and part of the changes in war are changes in the Constitution of the State.

There never were and never will be recipes for victory.

A clear head and a strong will can make the most of the resources available. Discipline will always be a source of strength, and courage raised to the highest power by good leadership will always work miracles.

Spencer Wilkinson passed away before the shame of Munich came, but his counsel still lives on. Even now he would not change it. It is there to guide his people and our people in dark days.

THE FRENCH DISCOVERY OF CLAUSEWITZ AND NAPOLEON

BY DALLAS D. IRVINE

THE war of 1870-71 awoke the French army with a jolt from its previous self-satisfaction and forced on most of its officers the realization that they knew very little about the conduct of modern war. After the war, therefore, the younger officers, at least, sat down with grim faces to study and find out what had been the trouble with them in the war. Though ideas bloomed luxuriantly, the decade after the war was, however, a period of utter intellectual confusion, because the French were intellectually unprepared to understand what had been the matter. The gulf between the conduct of war under the Second Empire and the standard now set by the Germans was as wide as that between Wallenstein and Moltke, and the transition was not easy.¹

Just before the French Revolution, as a result of the lessons of the mid-eighteenth-century wars, military theory had reached in France perhaps as high a point as it has ever attained.² The long flood-tide of war which ensued, however, was destined to sweep all this thought into oblivion. It was the day of great men of action and not great methodologists. The generation that remembered the Seven Years' War and its lessons was soon gone, and the new generation trusted to its own experience. For the most part the great generals of the period were men who rose from obscurity, during a long process of selection in actual war, by dint of that force of character and native acumen for which theory can be no substitute and which can dispense with theory under favorable circumstances.³ These men who had learned war from war and not from books were not inclined to put much stock in books or study. They tended to assume that war had to be learned in the way they had learned it and practiced as they had practiced it: on the basis of inspiration as vouchsafed to individual genius. Yet there were a good many exceptions of a sort—a considerable number of men who were led to generalize in a way upon their experience after the wars were over.

Napoleon himself was one.⁴ The amorphous writings of Saint Helena, how-

¹ See my article on "The French and Prussian Staff Systems before 1870," *Journal of the American Military History Foundation*, II (Winter 1938), 192-203.

² Édouard Guillon, *Nos écrivains militaires* (2 vols.; Paris, 1898-99), I, chs. VII-X; Rudolf von Caemmerer, *The Development of Strategical Science during the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1905) ch. II; Max Jähns, *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften vornehmlich in Deutschland* (3 vols.; Munich, 1889-91), III, ch. II *passim*; Spenser Wilkinson, *The French Army before Napoleon* (Oxford, 1915), chs. II-IV.

³ Cf. Henri Bonnal, *De la méthode dans les hautes études militaires en Allemagne et en France* (Paris, 1902), p. 5.

⁴ Guillon, II, ch. I.

ever, furnished but a confused mass of commentaries and not an architectural system of thought.⁵ In spite of his famous statement to Gouvion St.-Cyr in 1813 that he could teach the art of war easily enough, it is doubtful that Napoleon was then capable of analyzing his own methods. It is a commonplace of real life that a great artist seldom can teach his own art. It is simply because his reactions have become unconscious, instinctive, infinitely complex, and hence unresolvable into components, that he is a great artist.⁶ It is normally the second-rate performer, who has to govern his own actions by conscious deliberation, that has the analytical capacity to write methodologies. Napoleon, the artist, sowed nothing but confusion by his writings, for they lent pontifical authority to the idea that the art of war was mostly a matter of genius and not of system.⁷ The publication of the vast bulk of his correspondence during the Second Empire merely added to the confusion, for no induction of a system could be made from it *de novo* without titanic labors that only a whole generation of students could perform with any reliability. The contribution of Napoleon to military thought, therefore, is typified by the incoherent jumble known as his *Maxims*.

Napoleon's advice to study the art of war in the campaigns of the great captains was also of ill result, for it sanctioned the idea that the art of war was to be acquired by some subtle process of intellectual osmosis, whereas in fact it can be acquired only by the applicatory method, either in war or in tactical exercises, staff rides, and maneuvers in time of peace.⁸ Skill already developed may be refined by the study of past examples, but skill is only acquired in actually dealing with present examples, hypothetical or otherwise. In the same way comprehension of principles may be refined by case-study, but it can only be acquired by the application of the comparative method in laborious induction or, second hand, from the exposition of principles by those who have cumulated such inductions. The study of military history without any key to its meaning, therefore, is of little value, unless it is perchance so intensive and inquisitive as to be inductive.⁹

The writings of Napoleon's marshals and generals¹⁰ were of much the same character as his own insofar as they tended to generalization. None of his paladins produced any great system of thought about the conduct of war. Various theoretical works were produced by minor figures,¹¹ but of these writers only one was deserving of lasting fame, and it was his fortune to win more than his

⁵ These writings were first published as a whole in *Commentaires de Napoléon* (6 vols.; Paris, 1867), forming part of the collected *Correspondance de Napoléon I^{er} publiée par ordre de l'Empereur Napoléon III* (32 vols.; Paris, 1858-70).

⁶ Cf. Bonnal, pp. 22-23.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-9.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25, 31-33.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 34.

¹⁰ Guillon, II, chs. II-IV.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, ch. VI.

due, for he bestrode the world of military thought (outside Germany) like a colossus for decades on end.

This was Antoine Henri Jomini,¹² a Swiss-Italian who rose in the armies of France to be chief of staff to Marshal Ney, but whose egotism won him such hostility that he went over to the Russians in 1813 to finish his active career in the service of the Czar. He spent a large part of his life, which ended only in 1869, in writing, beginning with a *Traité des grandes opérations militaires*¹³ which was in large part a critique of the campaigns of Frederick the Great. The next twenty years were spent on his *Histoire critique et militaire des guerres de la Révolution*,¹⁴ a monument which dominated this subject until the end of the century. His great work of theory, however, was his *Précis de l'art de la guerre*, of 1838,¹⁵ which was a by-product of his tutoring the Czarevitch Alexander in the subject.

The theory of Jomini¹⁶ was held in respect by Napoleon and without any doubt was a sound analysis of war at the time—as far as it went. It was an anatomical analysis, however, more than a physiological or psychological one, and it was distinctly a post-mortem analysis rather than a creative work for the future. Jomini had little or no conception of the effect of the evolution of the art of war on operations, but believed that the immutable principles of war could be seized in the wars he had known. These principles he sought mainly in the *geometry* of operations. His system was a system of *lines of operations*, his great contribution being the concept of operations on interior lines with a concentrated main force. It was a closed and perfect system which he set up, leaving apparently nothing to be added, and the impression of finality which it gave was made the greater by the dogmatic manner of treatment. Its limpidity, its impeccable and brilliant logic, and its pontifical assumption of authority made it appeal very powerfully to the French mind, to which it naturally seemed the ultimate in military "science." There was no god but Napoleon, and Jomini was his prophet! In fixing the minds of the French upon the geometrical aspects of military operations, in lulling them into ignoring the effects of technological developments and the psychological aspects of the art of war—which in the end are of vastly superior importance—he worked definite harm, for his work lay

¹² *Ibid.*, II, 207-19.

¹³ 3 vols.; Paris, 1803.

¹⁴ 5 vols. and atlas; Paris, 1806; plus 15 vols. and 4 atlases; Paris, 1819-24.

¹⁵ *Précis de l'art de la guerre, ou, Nouveau tableau analytique des principales combinaisons de la stratégie, de la grande tactique et de la politique militaire* (2 vols.; Paris, 1838). This work grew out of his *Introduction à l'étude des grandes combinaisons de la stratégie et de la tactique* (Paris, 1829).

¹⁶ Caemmerer, ch. III; Georges Gilbert, review of Ferdinand Lecomte, *Jomini, sa vie et ses écrits* (2 vols.; Paris, 1894) in *La nouvelle revue*, Dec. 1, 1888, pp. 674-85. The last is an important article marking emancipation from Jomini's theory, as is indicated by the remark: "Jomini nous paraît donc accorder une importance trop exclusive à la géométrie, Clausewitz à la dynamique de la guerre" (p. 676). See also Bonnal, pp. 15-17; Wilkinson, pp. 13-15.

like a dead hand upon all progress in thought. After Napoleon and Jomini, none but epigoni!

The generation to which Jomini belonged, the generation of writers who sought to glean what wisdom was to be gleaned from their experiences in the great wars, flourished in print under the Restoration, lingered on into the days of Louis-Philippe, and withered away as mid-century approached. The body of thought which these writers produced was not without some merit, representing as it did the experience of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, however misleading that experience may have been, but, with the exception of Jomini's, none of the works produced were of great distinction, and they were soon more or less deservedly neglected. So had it been, also, with the reforms attempted under the Restoration, reforms closely correlated with this thought. A new generation of officers took hold upon the army even as the sages wrote, a generation that was allowed to "just grow" intellectually, like Topsy, and to imbibe its ideas from misleading tradition and the *razzias* of Algerian warfare.¹⁷

In the forties, fifties, and sixties the old men had mostly gone and a period of intellectual drought set in. It will have been noticed that even the writings of the passing generation had not been based upon systematic study. They were reflections upon ripe experience, garners of wisdom acquired in a full life. The very superficial richness of so much experience of course discouraged study in others, and in the lack of any system of higher military education there was no counter stimulus.¹⁸ More than that, study came to be actually frowned upon. Speaking of the army officer, an official instruction of the Second Empire states: "If a special aptitude inclines him toward the sciences, it is principally to geodesy that he ought to consecrate his studies."¹⁹ But even cartographical studies came to be frowned upon, and the criterion of an officer's ability reduced almost to his horsemanship. The story is told of a staff officer named Lafourge, who had long been devoting himself to the serious study of geology but whose studies, when he was proposed for advancement to a special commission charged with classifying staff officers after the war of 1870-71, inspired the following remark from one member of this august commission upon which sat two marshals of France: "Peuh! An officer who occupies himself with geology!" Said another member: "Yes, but who rides a horse like a centaur!"—whereupon the advancement was promptly accorded.²⁰ Also typical is the remark of Marshal Randon upon discovering—working after hours in the archives of the *Dépôt de la guerre*—an officer he had

¹⁷ Max Jähns, *Das französische Heer von der grossen Revolution bis zur Gegenwart* (Leipzig, 1873), pp. 434-38; Victor Derrécagaix, "Guerre de 1870," *Le spectateur militaire*, 4^e sér., XXIII (1870), 70-71; Charles Thoulas, *Les transformations de l'armée française* (2 vols.; Paris, 1887), I, 206.

¹⁸ Bonnal, p. 15; Jules Lewal, *Études de guerre; partie organique* (Paris, 1873), pp. 5-14.

¹⁹ Victor Saussine, *Dictionnaire de législation et d'administration militaires* (3 vols.; Paris, 1867-76), I, 1153.

²⁰ Théodore Fix, *Souvenirs d'un officier d'état-major, 1846-1870* (Paris 1898), p. 228.



GÉNÉRAL ANTOINE HENRI JOMINI

From Ferdinand Le Comte, le Général Jomini, sa vie et ses écrits (3d ed., Lausanne, 1888)

known in the field previously: "I didn't expect to find *you* in the archives; you loved to be on horseback in the old days!"—and he left without another word.²¹

Officers who read, who studied their profession, were looked upon as pedants really unfit to command troops. The soldierly ideal of the Imperial army was that of the *beau sabreur*, a man of boundless courage and audacity but no reflection. The officers looked back to the brave but scatter-brained Ney and the dashing but stupid Murat rather than to the studious and spectacled Davout or the thoughtful Gouvion St.-Cyr. The few officers who studied were called in derision "cossacks" because they wanted to ride out for themselves.²² There were a few such officers, however, such as Favé, who wrote on fortification and the history of tactics and artillery and who "collaborated" with Louis Napoleon in writing the *Études sur le passé et l'avenir de l'artillerie*, a work which has never been superseded.²³ There was Susane, who wrote on the history of the French infantry and, later, the French cavalry and artillery;²⁴ and if these were primarily historians, there was one theorist of keenest intellect and clearest insight into what modern conditions of war implied for the military art. This was Colonel Ardant du Picq, the only officer of the Second Empire who studied inductively and treated comprehensively, in that period, the fundamental theory of the art of war.

Ardant du Picq²⁵ sought in military history the secrets of tactics and strategy, first making a very careful study of warfare in ancient times under the title of *Le combat antique* and then, on the basis of further study, writing a more didactic work on *Le combat moderne*. His conclusions were, in general, very sound and remarkably similar to those of the great German theorist Clausewitz, whose teachings had become the doctrines of the German army and were later to dominate the whole world's military thought. The essential contribution of Ardant du Picq was his emphasis of the importance of moral force and the human equation in war, the very same idea which lay at the base of the German doctrines and which was a very sharp reaction away from the diagramaticism of Jomini.

Ardant du Picq's works were not published during his own lifetime, for he was overtaken in his studies by the Franco-Prussian War, and almost in the first fighting of that war he was killed at the head of his regiment.²⁶ If he had

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 227-28.

²² "The State of the French Army," *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, CXVIII (Aug. 1875), 129.

²³ Ildephonse Favé, *Études sur le passé et l'avenir de l'artillerie* (6 vols.; Paris, 1846-71).

²⁴ Louis Susane, *Histoire de l'ancienne infanterie française* (8 vols.; Paris, 1849-53); *Histoire de la cavalerie française* (3 vols.; Paris, 1874); *Histoire de l'artillerie française* (Paris, 1874). One should not fail to mention the prolific director of studies at the school of St.-Cyr, Nicholas Delabarre-Duparcq, noting his *Commentaires sur le Traité de la guerre de Clausewitz* (Paris, 1853), *Éléments d'art et d'histoire militaires* (Paris, 1858), and *Histoire de l'art de la guerre* (2 vols.; Paris, 1860-64).

²⁵ Barthélemy Palat, "Un précurseur, le colonel Ardant du Picq," *Revue de Paris*, May 15, 1904, pp. 347-66.

²⁶ Jean Dany, "La littérature militaire d'aujourd'hui," *Revue de Paris*, Apr. 1, 1912, p. 612 n.

lived, he would undoubtedly have been the man to teach the chastened French army the real art of war. As it was he exercised posthumously a very powerful influence over French military thought. This influence, which began to be felt when some of his notes were published in the *Bulletin de la Réunion des officiers* in 1876 and 1877, became especially important after 1880, when his works were completely published for the first time.²⁷ This was the same year that the *École de guerre* was made the heart of the French staff system. In this institution and throughout the army his writings at once became widely studied and prepared the way for the renaissance that came a few years after.

Toward the end of the Second Empire, after the disturbing battle of Sadowa, there were signs of re-awakening. The interest and feeling aroused, however, was primarily over the "military institutions" of France, the two most prominent works resulting being Trochu's *L'armée française en 1867*²⁸ and the Duc d'Aumale's *Les institutions militaires de la France*.²⁹ At the *Dépôt de la guerre*, however, seeds were germinating, particularly as a result of the series of lectures and conferences instituted there as a sort of precursor of the *École de guerre*. Most of the officers who participated were destined to make significant contributions to post-war military thought or the post-war reforms, or both. Such were Fay, Fix, Iung, Derrécagaix, D'Andlau, Le Pippre, Samuel, Vanson, and Niox.

The one among these officers who was to achieve the greatest eminence, however, was Colonel Jules Louis Lewal,³⁰ already chief of the historical-statistical bureau and credited with being one of the most brilliant staff officers in the French army, though much of his distinguished service had been in Algeria and Mexico. It was not without reason that Marshal Niel called him to head that bureau of the *Dépôt* which corresponded to a "great general staff." In connection with the lectures there inaugurated, and in which he was the pre-eminent participant, Lewal began to synthesize the results of his experience and of study, and in 1869 he published a series of articles in the *Moniteur de l'armée* which contained in outline the theories upon war he was to spend the rest of his life in developing.

After the war a spontaneous movement on the part of the French officers to provide for their own education led to the establishment of a *Réunion des officiers* which in the next few years, by various means, performed a great service in raising the intellectual level of the officer corps.³¹ This organization, how-

²⁷ Charles Ardant du Picq, *Études sur le combat* (Paris, 1880). There is an English translation under the title *Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle* (New York, 1921).

²⁸ Paris, 1867.

²⁹ Brussels, 1867. There was a Paris edition, 1867, anonymously published under the title *Les institutions militaires de France*; Louvois, Carnot, Saint-Cyr.

³⁰ Guillon, II, 377-78; Fix, p. 246; Gustave Vapereau, *Dictionnaire universel des contemporains* (5th ed., Paris, 1880), p. 992.

³¹ *Dictionnaire militaire*, rédigé par un comité des officiers de toutes armes (2 vols. and suppl.; Paris, 1898-1911), under "Réunion d'officiers"; Théodore Fix, *Souvenirs d'un officier d'état-major, 1870-1894* (Paris, 1899), pp. 110-29; "The State of the French Army,"

ever, was only an expedient, for it was destined to be superceded in the intellectual leadership of the army by a war college to be founded on the model of the Prussian *Kriegsakademie*. Plans for this institution were undertaken by a commission of which General Castelnau was the head, appointed in 1874.³² The problem was not simple, because the whole question of the reorganization of the staff service was still in dispute, and there was already a staff school in existence. In 1876, however, a *cours militaire spéciaux* for the higher education of staff officers was established in connection with the staff school under the direction of its commandant, General Gandil, and the supervision of Castelnau's commission, which continued to form a sort of advisory board.³³ The course did not amount to much until both it and the staff school were taken in charge by Lewal in 1877 and reorganized (1878) as the *École militaire supérieure*.³⁴

General Lewal³⁵ was already indicated as the natural person for this work. During the war he had served as chief of section in the staff of the Army of the Rhine and had been made prisoner at Metz. Since the war he had resumed his studies with the benefit of his new experience, and, besides an important work on *La réforme de l'armée*,³⁶ itself quite theoretical, he had already published two volumes of what was to be a long series, under the general title of *Études de guerre*,³⁷ covering in great detail all the aspects of the conduct of war. Nothing similar, not even in the works of Jomini, had appeared in France for nearly a century. His studies were searching both in research and thought, but his ideas were practical rather than purely abstract. In this he was pointing an essential lesson of the recent war—that war was something that escaped from any direction according to a fixed, preconceived system of logic—and beginning a necessary reaction against the geometrical theory of Jomini.³⁸

Lewal reorganized the courses given at the staff school in accordance with these ideas, making it a school for practical instruction in tactics for officers of all arms. No instruction in the tactics of combined arms was attempted, since it was necessary that officers learn to walk before they could learn to run, and since theory was not yet ready to offer such instruction in France. His instruction

loc. cit., pp. 130-31. Fix was the founder of the *Réunion* and president during the period of its importance. The organ of the league, *Bulletin de la Réunion des officiers* (Paris, Dec. 1871-1886), contains much information upon the organization, e.g. its statutes (1872, p. 492). The league was reorganized in 1875-76, being deprived of its leader; in 1886 it was converted by Boulanger into a mere political club (*ibid.*, 1876, pp. 97, 353-54, 449; *Fix, Souvenirs*, 1870-94, pp. 127-28).

³² Presidential decision, May 19, 1874; *Journal officiel*, May 29, 1874, p. 3561.

³³ Report and decree of Feb. 18, 1876; *ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1876, p. 1305; Georges Girard, *La vie et les souvenirs du général Castelnau, 1814-1890* (Paris 1930), pp. 281, 284-85.

³⁴ Decree of June 15, 1878; *Journal militaire*, partie réglementaire, 1878, 1^{re} semestre, pp. 282-84.

³⁵ Guillon, II, 378-80; Vapereau, p. 992.

³⁶ Paris, 1871.

³⁷ 8 vols.; Paris, 1872-90.

³⁸ Caemmerer, pp. 229-39.

in minor tactics was very sound and made of the staff school an effective institution of military education, if not an institution in the same category as the *Kriegsakademie*.

General Lewal thus deserves to be considered as the father of the French war college, both as an organizer and as an intellect. He was not the creator of a great system of thought, but the French army was fortunate in having an able thinker at its command in the lack of any real genius. Ardant du Picq would have furnished genius, but Ardant du Picq was dead. Lewal concerned himself but little with the art of grand strategy but confined himself mainly to teaching the mechanics of modern war, which was perhaps just as well, since this was the thing in which the French were far behind the Germans. In this his works were complementary to those of Ardant du Picq's, covering the lower branches of the art of war as Ardant du Picq's did the higher. To the intellectual awakening in the French army following 1884, therefore, Ardant du Picq and Lewal stand in somewhat the same relation respectively as Dante and Petrarch to the Italian Renaissance.

Lewal left the war college in 1880 at the same time that the law on staff service of that year made the *École supérieure de guerre*, as it was henceforth called, the rock upon which the French staff was to be founded anew.³⁹ By this time new theorists had begun to rise, such as Pierron with his *Les méthodes de guerre actuelles*⁴⁰ and Berthaut with his *Principes de stratégie*,⁴¹ both works of considerable merit, if still rather confused by the contradiction between old ideas and new experience. In 1880, also, Ardant du Picq's *Études sur le combat* found publication.⁴²

On the other hand, the tremendous impulse which had been given to military study by the defeats in the war began to wear itself out, and the tendrils of routine, which had never been successfully thrown off, began to wind themselves about the *École*. After Lewal's departure the school did not progress, but showed unmistakable signs of relapsing into what it had formerly been: the old *École d'application d'état-major* with its wooden exercises, its great pretensions, and small accomplishments.⁴³ The old feeling made itself strongly felt that it was impossible to teach the higher art of war, which was the purpose for which the

³⁹ Law of Mar. 20, 1880; Jean B. Duvergier, *et al.*, *Collection complète des lois* . . . (30 vols. and annual vol.; Paris, 1834 *et seq.*), LXXX, 111-16. The old permanent staff corps was abolished and staff service assured by officers who had passed through the *École de guerre*, assignments being made for four years after which the officers had to serve at least two years with troops and were not assured of being recalled to staff duty.

⁴⁰ Édouard Pierron, *Les méthodes de guerre actuelles et vers la fin du XIX^e siècle; conférences faites à l'École supérieure de guerre en 1876-77* (4 vols.; Paris, 1878-81).

⁴¹ Henri Berthaut, *Principes de stratégie; étude sur la conduite des armées* (Paris, 1881). See Caemmerer, p. 228.

⁴² On the post-war literature in general see Guillon, II, ch. X, and Dany, *loc. cit.*, pp. 611-24.

⁴³ L. Brun, "L'École supérieure de guerre," *Le spectateur militaire*, 4^e sér., XXVII (Mar. 1885), 345-61.

school had been founded. The entrance requirements were kept impossibly difficult on paper and lax in reality. The curriculum attempted to cover everything and covered nothing very thoroughly. Favoritism crept into selection for admission and discouraged officers from undertaking the arduous labors otherwise necessary to secure admission. Jealousy manifested itself in the army of the graduates, who assumed that they were destined by their title of *breveté* to become generals. The instruction remained good, as far as it went, for the professors were mostly able men, but they themselves were still in the process of learning and did not carry the conviction of authority. Most matters were still controversial, for no one had yet discovered any key to what it was all about.⁴⁴ The school thus drifted because it had no unified system of doctrine to teach; it lacked that pervading inspiration of knowing what was needed; it was a church without a gospel; it was the form without the substance, just as was true of the French capital staff at the same time.⁴⁵ Both were waiting for a revelation. That revelation, however, was not long in coming.

Naturally enough, after their catastrophic defeat, the French had turned to studying the methods of their conquerors, even though this was highly distasteful to them. Having scant conception of any real methodology of war, believing unconsciously still in individual genius as the only secret of success, they studied the operations of the Germans in the hope of distilling some of German genius into their own heads.⁴⁶ Gradually, however, they saw that there was a uniformity in the methods of the German officers that could only come from similar training, and they were misled for a time into thinking that uniformity and thoroughness of training was the whole secret.

As the French contemplated and studied the German system more closely, however, they began to perceive that uniformity of method was not just the result of a centralized intellectual administration of the German army but the result of a philosophy of war which was a folk possession; furthermore, that the real secret of German success was the nature of that philosophy and not just its uniform application.⁴⁷ The French therefore began to probe more deeply into German writings on military theory.

Of these the French were quite ignorant. In the period of the Second Empire the German nation was considered as incapable of having any important military ideas, so that the vast majority of officers did not even think of learning the German language, and German thought was a closed book to them. Lack of the language continued to be a serious handicap long after the war. Thus officers who were supposed to have a fluent command of the German language before

⁴⁴ Bonnal, p. 17.

⁴⁵ Cf. Ferdinand Foch, *The Principles of War* (New York, 1920), p. 2.

⁴⁶ The German official history was published promptly after the war: Grosser Generalstab, Kriegsgeschichtlichen Abteilung, *Der deutsch-französische Krieg, 1870-71* (7 vols.; Berlin, 1872-80).

⁴⁷ Bonnal, pp. 6, 14.

admission to the *École de guerre* actually came out of that institution with no more than the ability to spell out the language laboriously with the aid of a dictionary.⁴⁸ Hence the great necessity for translations such as appeared in the *Revue militaire de l'étranger* and most of the other military journals.

There were, of course, officers with a real command of German—those that made translations, for example—but knowledge of German did not necessarily correspond with the deepest insight into the significance of German literature. The few real military scholars such as Lewal did know a good deal about that literature, but what they had to say lacked the authority of the original, itself an authority not yet recognized. To the French officers as a body, German military theory therefore remained a *terra incognita* for a long time after the war.

As the mind of French officers expanded sufficiently, however, to be able to comprehend that there could be another philosophy of war than that in which they had been raised, and as they began to recognize that this was fundamental to German achievements, it could not be long before they should find out what lay at the roots of that philosophy. It seems to have been a German who gave them their revelation.

In 1883 Colmar von der Goltz published his famous work *Das Volk in Waffen*,⁴⁹ which was intended to be a convenient synthesis of German theory on military policy and on war in general. The intrinsic worth of the work, and the fact that Goltz was a star pupil of Moltke, immediately won for it great acclaim in Germany, and it has remained ever since a standard work of German military literature. In view of the state of mind the French had reached such a work naturally attracted the closest attention.⁵⁰ Now the opening lines of Goltz's introduction were a statement to the effect that anyone who presumed to write on war after Clausewitz was like a poet who should attempt a *Faust* after Goethe or a *Hamlet* after Shakespeare, and he goes on to state that Clausewitz had said all that was to be said upon the subject.⁵¹ Throughout he acknowledges his debt to Clausewitz. It was almost inevitable, therefore, that some inquisitive French officer should look into Clausewitz, and he must immediately have been impressed by the fact that the main work of this author had gone through three editions and an abridged edition in recent years, although it was half a century old.⁵² The last edition had just been published in 1880. At

⁴⁸ Brun, *loc. cit.*, p. 354.

⁴⁹ *Das Volk in Waffen: Ein Buch über Heerwesen und Kriegsführung unserer Zeit* (Berlin, 1883).

⁵⁰ Cf. G. Valbert, "La guerre moderne d'après un écrivain militaire allemand," *Revue des deux mondes*, Jan. 1, 1884, pp. 190-210; Louis Cosseron de Villenoisy, "La nation armée: à propos de l'ouvrage du baron von der Goltz," *ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1884, pp. 513-50.

⁵¹ Colmar von der Goltz, *The Nation in Arms* (London, 1887), p. vii.

⁵² Carl von Clausewitz's classic work "Vom Kriege" was first published by his widow in the first three volumes of his *Historischen Werke über Krieg und Kriegsführung* (10 vols.; Berlin, 1832-37), the remaining volumes of which dealt with IV: Napoleon's campaign of 1796; (V-VI) the campaigns of 1799 in Italy and Switzerland; VII: the

any rate, upon going into Clausewitz, he was soon impressed that he had discovered the secret of everything, and he made ready to proclaim his discovery from the housetops. This officer was Major Lucien Cardot of the intelligence section of the French capital staff, and his great "discovery" was made in 1884.⁵³ Apparently, it took him some time to read and digest so much philosophical German, for it was only in the next year that he imparted his discovery to the army in a series of brilliant lectures at the *École de guerre*.

This was the revelation for which the French had been unconsciously waiting. In order to understand what it meant, however, it is necessary to know something about Clausewitz's doctrines.

The essential ideas of Clausewitz may be listed—if with some trepidation, since interpretation of Clausewitz is likely to be as much subject to criticism as interpretation of the Bible—as follows:

1. The conception of war as merely the continuance of the perpetual conflict between states with the added instrument of violence.⁵⁴
2. The doctrine that absolute war is the form to be approximated as closely as possible, by absolute war being meant war in which violence is employed to the utmost limit of its effectiveness without voluntary restriction of effort or means.⁵⁵
3. The doctrine that the destruction of the enemy's armed forces should consequently be the immediate end in war.⁵⁶
4. The doctrine that moral force in the application of violence is, rather than geometrical maneuvers, the primary means to this end.⁵⁷
5. The doctrine of the necessity of the offensive in war whenever and wherever it can have a chance of success.⁵⁸
6. The doctrine that the simple, direct attack is the best.⁵⁹

These may be summed up in the following statement:

War must be an utmost exertion of force, and especially of moral force, for the complete destruction of the enemy's armed resistance, and to this end the offensive should be undertaken whenever practicable and in its simplest, most direct, and most vigorous form.

In this, note should be taken of the phrase "whenever practicable," for it is in

campaigns of 1812-14 in Russia, Germany, and France; (VIII) the campaign of 1815; (IX-X) critiques of various campaigns of great captains from Gustavus Adolphus on. The second edition of the *Hinterlassene Werke* was published in 1853-63 (10 vols.; Berlin). The third edition of *Vom Kriege* appeared in 1867-70 (3 vols.; Berlin); the fourth edition in 1880 (3 vols.; Berlin); another in vol. I of the collection *Militärische Klassiker des In- und Auslandes* (5 vols.; Berlin, 1880-82). An English edition, translated by Colonel J. J. Graham, appeared (London 1873) under the title *On War*.

⁵³ Hubert Camon, *Clausewitz* (Paris, 1911), pp. 1-2 n.

⁵⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (3 vols.; London, 1911), I, 22-23; III, 121-30.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 5-6; III, 123 and above all 82-83.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 4-5, 239, etc., etc.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, I, 178-80. While Clausewitz continually emphasizes the importance of moral forces, the doctrine that they are the primary means for success in war is implicit rather than explicit in his work—very clearly implicit, however.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 135-36.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 241-42.



GENERALMAJOR CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ

From Karl Schwartz, Leben des Generals Carl v. Clausewitz (Berlin, 1878).

the ignoring of the conditional aspects of Clausewitz's teachings that many military men have gone astray.

No extended critique of Clausewitz's doctrines need be attempted here.⁶⁰ One may merely say that he inducted his theories from peculiar conditions of war existing in his own time—that of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars—assuming as his disciples have done after him that the principles of war do not change and that consequently the conditions of his own time were quite a sufficient basis for elaborating a theory of war. For the most part, his work was based upon an intensive study of the campaigns of Napoleon. In selecting so narrow a field on which to base his theories, he fell into the egregious error of neglecting the effect of the evolution of the conditions of war as set by changes in civilization and, especially, the mechanics of armament. As a result almost every one of his theories had lost their universal validity half a century later.

In justice to Clausewitz it should be said that his doctrines were not advanced by him in an extreme form. Indeed, almost everything he says is so qualified that it is difficult to find any positive doctrine at all. The great criticism leveled against him by his contemporaries was that he was almost entirely negative. In the sense that he founded no system of strategy and grand tactics, this is certainly true. His work is rather a philosophy of war than a conveniently useful guide to practice. Clausewitz and Jomini are at opposite poles and, be it said, mutually complementary. The superiority of Clausewitz, the great contribution of Clausewitz, lay in his warning that no system could be relied upon alone, and in harmony with this thought it was certainly not his intention to set up an iron-clad dogma of war in place of a mechanical system. The dogma of war based on Clausewitz by later generations was obtained by emphasizing certain passages of his work and passing over others lightly. The Germans, for whom his work was written, did this much less than the French, whose pride rather rebelled at accepting Clausewitz's doctrines without demonstrating that they could improve upon them. The interpretations they saw fit to make aggravated extremely the error already inherent in Clausewitz. The work itself was far sounder than the use made of it.

Such, then, was the work of the great German military philosopher upon which Cardot began to lecture at the *École de guerre* in 1885. Immediately after, he commenced the first instruction in general tactics ever given at the *École*, utilizing Clausewitz's works as a basis of theory.⁶¹ In this instruction he emphasized those doctrines of Clausewitz which the subsequent French thinkers continued to emphasize and later exaggerated—the necessity of destroying the enemy's forces by battle, moral force as the principal means, and the simple direct offensive as the principal method. Cardot also echoed Clausewitz's historical works and

⁶⁰ See Caemmerer, ch. V; Camon, p. 62; Bonnal, pp. 9-11; Wilkinson, pp. 15-18; Jean Colin, *Les transformations de la guerre* (Paris, 1911), pp. 254-59.

⁶¹ Camon, pp. 1-2 n.; Dany, *loc. cit.*, p. 612.

thus called attention to study of Napoleon's method. In the campaigns of Napoleon, Cardot said, Clausewitz had learned the secrets of the conduct of war. The French, therefore, should not be satisfied with a second-hand view of these through Clausewitz but mount to the ultimate source of all knowledge of the true art of war: Napoleon himself. Thus was inspired what was to be a most remarkable activity in the military-historical study of Napoleon.

No sooner had Cardot begun his lectures on Clausewitz than the French officers became excited and wished to read Clausewitz for themselves. To their chagrin they discovered that there was no translation available. Back in 1849 a Belgian officer had indeed made a translation of *Vom Kriege* into French, but only rare examples of this publication were to be found.⁶² The gap was filled by a disabled officer named De Vatry, who set himself to translating *Vom Kriege*. This translation appeared in 1886 and was immediately seized upon avidly by the French officers.⁶³ Vatry had planned to continue his work and translate Clausewitz's critiques of Napoleon's campaigns, but before he could begin these translations he unfortunately died. Since no one else was audacious enough to attempt the task, Clausewitz's historical works remained untranslated until the end of the century. In the meantime the French army had *Vom Kriege* in translation under the title of *Théorie de la grande guerre*.

The publication of this translation caused a wave of excitement in French military circles and, in conjunction with the new opportunity at the *École* for the fascinating study of grand tactics, proved a powerful intellectual stimulus to the French officers—perhaps as great even as the whole Franco-Prussian War. The effect was the greater because the doctrines of Clausewitz seemed so suited to the French temperament with its tendency to audacity and to French military tradition with its spirit of *élan* and the offensive. After all, thought the French, these doctrines are really French doctrines because they are derived from the examples of the campaigns of Napoleon.

One may note in passing, as a matter of much interest, that Foch, who was destined to win a reputation as the greatest military thinker of modern France, entered the *École de guerre* in 1885, the same year that Cardot began his stirring lectures on Clausewitz.⁶⁴ He was therefore subjected to the full first blast of the invigorating gale that swept the cobwebs out of French military thought. That the effect upon him was profound is indicated by the nature of his own theoretical teaching of later time.

The first new thinker to make himself heard after Cardot's discovery of Clausewitz was another disabled officer named Georges Gilbert.⁶⁵ Shortly after the publication of the translation of *Vom Kriege*, this officer appeared in the

⁶² *De la guerre* (tr. by Jean B. Neuens; 3 vols.; Paris, 1849-52). A copy of this publication is in the library of the AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE.

⁶³ *Théorie de la grande guerre* (tr. by Lt.-Col. de Vatry; 3 vols.; Paris, 1886-87).

⁶⁴ George Aston, *The Biography of the Late Marshal Foch* (New York, 1929), pp. 64-65.

⁶⁵ See Atalone, "Le capitaine Gilbert," *La nouvelle revue*, Dec. 15, 1901, pp. 551-66.

Nouvelle revue with an extraordinary essay on Clausewitz that attracted wide attention in France and helped to make Clausewitz more than ever a fad.⁶⁶ This was shortly followed by a second study in which a striking comparison was drawn between the operations leading up to Jena in 1806 and those leading up to Sedan in 1870, a study in which the fact was borne home cogently that the French had been defeated in 1870 by the very same methods which they had employed against the Prussians in 1806.⁶⁷ This was enough to arouse even the most indifferent. The lesson, Gilbert said, was to go back to the study of Napoleon's campaigns.

The immediate effects of the discovery of Clausewitz by the French were two: (1) it led to the careful study of the operations of the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War in the light of the new discovery, and (2) it led to a careful study of the campaigns of Napoleon in the same light.⁶⁸ Gilbert had already pointed the way in his second essay to both procedures. Work in the first field was almost immediately taken up by Major Maillard, professor of infantry tactics at the *École de guerre*, who was soon to become renowned for his masterly lectures on the battle of St. Privat.⁶⁹ The same work was soon carried to even greater heights by Major Bonnal, also of the *École de guerre*, a man who was destined to exercise a contemporary influence on French military thought second only to that of Foch.⁷⁰ Bonnal lectured on the whole strategy of Moltke, but perhaps the most famous of his discussions were those on the battles of Sadowa and St. Privat. As may be imagined, he did not approach his studies with any prejudice in favor of Moltke. He soon brought to light, therefore, the many defects in Moltke's strategy which had not been apparent from the German official history. Gilbert had already depreciated the ability of Moltke as being merely a reflection of the genius of Napoleon, and Bonnal's factual expositions now struck smashing blows at the clay feet of the legend that Moltke was a strategist of great brilliance.

It must have been most exhilarating for the French at this time to be able to test the Germans by the standards of their own theory, and certain it is that the discovery that the Germans had not been so good after all was a tremendous tonic for French self-confidence. The French were freeing themselves at last from a bad inferiority complex and beginning to feel like a person who has just fully recovered from a long illness. They had had their revelation, and now it was a case of "Follow the gleam!"—which they did with all the fervor of religious pilgrims.

⁶⁶ Georges Gilbert, "Étude sur Clausewitz," *La nouvelle revue*, Aug. 1 and 15, 1887, pp. 540-61, 752-75.

⁶⁷ *Idem*, "Septembre et octobre 1806—juillet et août 1870," *Essais de critique militaire* (Paris, 1890).

⁶⁸ Foch, p. 6-19.

⁶⁹ Dany, *loc. cit.*, pp. 613-14.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 614.

Bonnal was also the outstanding leader in the study of the Napoleonic campaigns, on which he delivered a long series of lectures at the *École*. These and other lectures of his were later elaborated and published.⁷¹ In this period before 1891, however, most of the work inspired by the discovery of Clausewitz did not appear in print.

An important exception was General Pierron's *Comment s'est formé le génie militaire de Napoléon I^{er}*? published in 1888.⁷² This began an attack on the problem of Napoleon's methods of war which was ultimately to yield the truth. This was a genetic attack as distinct from efforts to analyze Napoleon's methods *in situ*. The hypothesis advanced by Pierron was that Napoleon had modelled his first Italian campaign upon the closely similar campaign of Marshal de Maillebois in the same region in 1745 and 1746 as described by the Marquis de Pezay. This was an extraordinary divination, for it missed the truth but by inches. As shown by Colin a decade later,⁷³ Bonaparte learned the way to fight through the Alps, learned his whole basic system of grand tactics, from Bourcet's *Principes de la guerre de montagnes*—and Bourcet had been Maillebois's chief of staff. Pierron's theory was of course promptly subjected to valid criticism, and the problem remained unsolved for the moment, but his work was of greatest importance in opening up vertical historical research in addition to horizontal, and much of the higher progress of military history in the twentieth century has developed directly from the approach Pierron took up.⁷⁴

At the beginning of the new decade the work of the other men who have been mentioned began to be reduced to printed form. In 1891 Maillard published his *Eléments de la guerre*,⁷⁵ a more ambitious work than Ardant du Picq's *Études sur le combat* and having no peer in French military literature since Guibert. In this work Maillard promulgated Clausewitz's doctrines anew with emphasis on those aspects that applied more particularly to absolute war. The tendency was very marked to turn Clausewitz's rather cautiously stated doctrines into very positive dogmas. From independent study of Napoleon's campaigns Maillard added an emphasis on maneuver that was not to be found in Clausewitz. About the same time Bonnal wrote out his studies for the use of the *École de guerre* in manuscript.⁷⁶ These included special studies of the campaigns of Marengo, Ulm, Jena, Landshut, Vilna, Sadowa, Froeschwiller, and Héricourt. The most important was that on Jena, from which campaign Bonnal principally deduced

⁷¹ Henri Bonnal, *Froeschwiller* (Paris, 1899); *Sadowa* (Paris, 1901); *De Rosbach à Ulm* (Paris, 1903); *La manoeuvre d'Iéna* (Paris, 1904); *La manoeuvre de Saint-Privat* (3 vols.; Paris, 1904-12); *La manoeuvre de Landshut* (Paris, 1905); *La manoeuvre de Vilna* (Paris, 1905).

⁷² Edouard Pierron, *Comment s'est formé le génie militaire de Napoléon I^{er}*? (Paris, 1888).

⁷³ Jean Colin, *L'éducation militaire de Napoléon* (2d ed.; Paris, 1900), pp. 135-37, 353-67.

⁷⁴ Wilkinson, pp. 19-21.

⁷⁵ Louis Goujat dit Maillard, *Eléments de la guerre* (Paris, 1891).

⁷⁶ Dany, *loc. cit.*, p. 614.

his theory of the general advance guard. This theory, into which one need not go—beyond saying that the general advance guard was conceived as having somewhat the same functions as interference in football—enjoyed a great vogue in the nineties and was the basis for one or two of the principal war plans of that period.⁷⁷ It bore a very close relationship with Jomini's analysis of the Jena campaign and his idea of the formation "*bataillon carré*." It is to be noticed that both Maillard and Bonnal still had not wholly escaped from the diagrammaticism of Jomini, which had dominated all their predecessors, *e.g.*, Lewal, Berthaut, and Iung.⁷⁸

In 1892 Gilbert published his *Sept études militaires*,⁷⁹ all of which had already appeared in the *Nouvelle revue*, the first two being those already mentioned. These studies were recognized at the time as classics. At the same time other thinkers began to do for the separate arms what Cardot, Maillard, and Bonnal were doing for general tactics. Thus, in 1892, also, appeared Colonel Langlois' *L'artillerie de campagne en liaison avec les autres armes*.⁸⁰ This became the foundation for the French theory on the use of artillery in the field.⁸¹ At this time the famous 75 millimeter rapid fire cannon was being prepared,⁸² and in this work Colonel Langlois worked out *a priori*, but correctly, the tactics of its employment. This, and his able teaching at the *École*, where he was professor of artillery tactics and of which he was later to become the head, marked him as the greatest French artillery theorist since Du Teil, Napoleon's artillery schoolmaster. About this same time a Major Cherfils performed similar work at the *École* for the cavalry.⁸³ He relied principally on the lessons of the war of 1870-71 and overemphasized the use of the *arme blanche*, that is, the cavalry charge. Somewhat earlier Major Niox had begun the teaching of military geography at the *École* with an extraordinary insight into its importance in the art of war which deserves him an equal place among the military thinkers that decorated this decade.⁸⁴

The work of all these men having hammered out a tentative theory of war for the French army,⁸⁵ their doctrines were formulated in 1895 in a book of field

⁷⁷ Arthur Boucher, *L'oeuvre du général de Miribel* (Paris, 1924), pp. 172-77.

⁷⁸ Caemmerer, pp. 228-39; Guillon, II, 382-88. An egregious late example is Victor Derrécagaix, *La guerre moderne* (2 vols.; Paris, 1888), a work of "scissors and paste," frankly adhering to Jomini, which might well have been written under the Second Empire.

⁷⁹ Georges Gilbert, *Sept études militaires* (Paris, 1892). The studies on Clausewitz and the Jena campaign had been published in 1890 as *Essais de critique militaire*. One should also mention Gilbert's *Lois et institutions militaires; six études organique* (Paris, 1895) which is an important document in the history of French military policy as distinct from French military theory.

⁸⁰ Hippolyte Langlois, *L'artillerie de campagne en liaison avec les autres armes* (Paris, 1891-92).

⁸¹ Dany, *loc. cit.*, pp. 614-15.

⁸² Charles de Freycinet, *Souvenirs, 1878-1893* (Paris, 1913), pp. 413-14.

⁸³ Maxime Cherfils, *Cavalerie en campagne; études d'après la carte* (Paris 1893).

⁸⁴ Dany, *loc. cit.*, p. 615.

⁸⁵ "Le plan XVII," *Revue de Paris*, Feb. 15, 1920, p. 703; Dany, *loc. cit.*, pp. 613-14, 618-19; Bonnal, *De la méthode dans les hautes études militaires*, p. 17.

service regulations which laid down officially the rules for the conduct of war.⁸⁶ The influence of Clausewitz is therein manifest, as is shown by the following excerpt:

Combat may be offensive or defensive, but it always has for its end to break by force the will of the enemy and to impose on him our own. Only the offensive permits the obtaining of decisive results. The passive defense is doomed to certain defeat; it is to be rejected absolutely.⁸⁷

This may be compared with the following sentences from *Vom Kriege*:

War . . . is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will Violence is therefore the *means*; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object If the defensive is the stronger form of conducting war, but has a negative effect, it follows of itself that we must only make use of it so long as our own weakness compels us to do so, and that we must give up that form as soon as we feel strong enough to aim at the positive object.⁸⁸

The spirit of the new regulations can only be appreciated in collating them with the field service regulations of 1883,⁸⁹ in which the formalism of Jomini is still apparent, hiding the lack of any real doctrine of war. The 1883 regulations are as neuter as the instruction of a pedant parroting a textbook; the 1895 regulations are inspired by fervent beliefs.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ Field service regulations, May 28, 1895; *Bulletin officiel*, partie réglementaire, 1895, 1^{er} semestre, pp. 710-800; see also the accompanying report, pp. 701-10.

⁸⁷ *Loc. cit.*, p. 780. The most conclusive evidence of the influence of Clausewitz is to be found in the accompanying report, *loc. cit.*, pp. 702-03, where it is stated that the regulations contain only general principles rather than formal prescriptions, which cannot always fit the infinitely variable circumstances of war. This condemnation of formal systematization was one of the unique contributions of Clausewitz and has always been absolutely counter to the French mentality. Cf. Bonnal, *De la méthode dans les hautes études militaires*, p. 33.

⁸⁸ Clausewitz, *On War* (3 vols.; London, 1913), I, 2; II, 135-36.

⁸⁹ Field service regulations, Oct. 26, 1883; *Journal militaire*, partie réglementaire, 1883, 2^e semestre, pp. 570-740.

⁹⁰ The conservatism of the 1883 regulations is shown by the following extract (p. 681): "En raison de la puissance considérable des feux d'infanterie, les attaques de front, même fortement préparée par l'artillerie, peuvent ne pas réussir." The spirit of the 1895 regulations, in contrast, is shown in the following (*loc. cit.*, p. 781): "Reserver une partie des forces pour produire un effort violent et concentré sur le point décisif—c'est l'acte principale de la lutte, l'attaque décisive."

GEORGE W. PATTEN

POET LAUREATE OF THE ARMY

BY PHILIP D. JORDAN

LIEUTENANT Colonel George W. Patten is known to military historians and bibliographers as the author and illustrator of several Army texts and manuals which were widely used during the Civil War,¹ but he was better known in the United States during his life time for a volume of military verse and for several popular songs describing Army activities on the western plains. Although not a major literary figure, Patten became known as the "poet laureate of the Army" and was recognized as an able interpreter of the military frontier. His volume, then, becomes significant for students of American literature as well as of Army life. *Voices of the Border*, published in New York in 1867, is a collection of verses which the versatile Patten penned while at West Point, during engagements against the Seminole Indians, in the Mexican War, and while guarding emigrant wagons on their way to the gold fields of California.

Patten was born in Newport, Rhode Island, on December 25, 1808, the youngest son of a Congregational clergyman and the great-grandson of the Reverend Eleazar Wheelock, the founder of Dartmouth College.² After having been graduated from Brown University at the age of sixteen with sufficiently

¹ His contributions to military tactics include *Patten's Army Manual: Containing Instructions for Officers in the Preparation of Rolls, Returns, and Accounts Required of Regimental and Company Commanders, and Pertaining to the Subsistence and Quartermaster's Departments* (New York, J. W. Fortune, 1861; four editions, 1861-64; all editions also printed in German); *Patten's Infantry Tactics, Bayonet Drill, and Small Sword Exercise: Compiled Agreeably to the Latest Regulations of the War Department from Standard Military Authority* (New York, J. W. Fortune, 1861; five editions, 1861-65; all editions also printed in German); *Patten's Artillery Drill: Containing Instruction in the School of the Piece and Battery Manoeuvres: Compiled Agreeably to the Latest Regulations of the War Department from Standard Military Authority* (New York, J. W. Fortune, 1861; New York, D. Van Nostrand, 1869; both editions also printed in German); and *Patten's Cavalry Drill and Sabre Exercise: Containing the Schools of the Trooper, Platoon, and Squadron* (New York, J. W. Fortune, 1863; New York, D. Van Nostrand, 1864; both editions apparently also printed in German). Patten illustrated with some sixty diagrams the second and subsequent editions of Philip St. George Cooke, *Cavalry Tactics; or, Regulations for the Instruction, Formations, & Movements of the Cavalry of the Army and Volunteers of the United States* (2nd ed., New York, J. W. Fortune, 1862).

² Sketches of Patten's life appear in *The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography* . . . (New York, 1906), XIII, 183; *Appletons' Cyclopaedia of American Biography* (New York, 1888), IV, 671; and in George W. Cullum, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U. S. Military Academy* . . . 1802 to 1890 . . . (3rd ed., Boston, 1891), I, 466-67. Except as otherwise noted the facts concerning Patten's life are taken from these sources.

high standing to have become a member of Phi Beta Kappa,³ and "not wishing to study a profession or engage in commercial pursuits," young Patten applied to the Secretary of War for an appointment to the United States Military Academy in the fall of 1825. He received the desired appointment early in the following year and was admitted as a Cadet on July 1, 1826.⁴ He was graduated four years later, standing thirty-sixth in a class of forty-two, and received his commission as 2nd Lieutenant in the 2nd U. S. Infantry on July 1, 1830.

Patten served with the 2nd Infantry, except for two intervals, from the time he left West Point until the outbreak of the Civil War. During a large portion of this time the regiment was stationed on the frontier—in Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Dakota, and on the Pacific coast. He took part in the operations against the Creek Nation in 1836 and in the Seminole War from 1837 to 1842. During the War with Mexico he was in the battles of Vera Cruz and Cerro Gordo, losing his left hand in the latter engagement for which he was brevetted Major. He had become a 1st Lieutenant in 1837 and a Captain in 1846. He was now offered a captaincy in the Quartermaster's Department but declined because of ill health. He found it necessary to obtain leave because of his health in 1848-50 and again in 1859-60.

At the outbreak of the Civil War Patten was commissioned Major in the 9th U. S. Infantry and served for a short time in California and in Washington Territory, but in 1862 he became a Lieutenant Colonel and returned to his old regiment. His health was not such, however, that he could take an active command, and he served during the remainder of the war on various military commissions in Washington, D. C. Although he retired from active duty on February 17, 1864, he became a member of the permanent court martial board sitting in New York City and continued in that position until the board was dissolved in 1869.

Patten returned to private life to collect his verse and spend his time with his wife and family. He had married Sarah Taresa Smith in Woodstock, New Brunswick, on April 7, 1834, and to this union had been born eight children, one of whom, William S., also became a Lieutenant Colonel.⁵ Patten died in Houlton, Maine, his home, on April 28, 1882, and was buried on May 3 in the village cemetery.⁶ A fitting epitaph might have come from lines written early in his youth:

³ Letters to the author from Helen L. Urquart, Recorder, Brown University, November 16, 1939, and from Helen O. Mickle, Keeper of Graduate Records, Brown University, November 17, 1939. Cullum, *op. cit.*, p. 467, states that Patten received the M. A. degree from Brown University in 1830, but there appears to be no record of such a degree in the Recorder's Office.

⁴ United States Military Academy, Cadet Applications, 1826-1832 (MSS. in The National Archives).

⁵ Thomas W. Baldwin, *Patten Genealogy* (Boston, 1908), p. 191.

⁶ Houlton, Maine, *Aroostook Pioneer*, May 2, 1882, and *Aroostook Times*, May 4, 1882.

Oh! toll no bell
 When I am gone.
 Let not a bugle swell
 The mournful tale to tell:
 But let the drum
 With hollow roll,
 Tell when the angels come
 To take my soul:
 And let the banner, borne before me,
 Wave in azure glory o'er me,
 When I am gone.⁷

Patten was a genial and kindly person, possessing rare humor, and given to "vigorous expletives and forcible adjectives."⁸ The loss of his hand undoubtedly did much to turn his attention from active military duty to the writing of military manuals and verse, although, in spite of the limited time available to a Cadet at West Point, he had begun to write poetry while a plebe. During his varied military career, he saw an expanding America, and he could not help but try to catch the spirit of Manifest Destiny as it marched westward. He sang the song of the sword, described the Rio Grande as a "shining land where the gold-mines lay," pictured the *Spitfire* shelling the castle of San Juan d'Ulloa, wept at the burial of a West Point Cadet, and told of the young scout who loved to wear his weapon bright.

His stirring description of the landing of troops at Tampa Bay in October 1837 is both typical of his military subjects and indicative of his poetical abilities:

Strike up the rattling drum!
 Shake out the guidon free!
 Hurra! with the succoring bands we come
 Across the bounding sea.⁹

He also wrote in lighter vein, however, and his comic verse seems to have been received as enthusiastically as his sentimental moralizing:

Down in a little lane,
 Lived a little maid so vain,
 So sure she was of beating when she ran, ran, ran:
 And this little maiden said,
 "Oh, I'm not the least afraid.
 So, little sir, come, catch me, if you can, can, can."¹⁰

The rhyme and meter of Patten's style may perhaps be illustrated best by his swinging "Song of the Dragoon," which was picked up and reprinted in many American journals:

⁷ From "The Soldier's Dirge," in *Voices of the Border*, p. 31.

⁸ *Thirteenth Annual Reunion of the Graduates of the United States Military Academy, at West Point, New York, June 12, 1882* (Philadelphia, [1882?]), p. 93.

⁹ From "Landing of the Florida Regulars at Tampa Bay," in *Voices of the Border*, p. 60.

¹⁰ From "The Foot-Race," in *Voices of the Border*, p. 358.

THE EMIGRANT'S DYING CHILD

Written by

Maj. G. W. Patten

U.S. ARMY.

Music Composed with a Piano accompaniment

By an

AMATEUR.

The last words of the Emigrant's Child, as uttered on the banks of the San Joaquin, near Fort Miller, California, are thus conveyed to the ear of the world through the medium of song. The circumstances which gave rise to the verses are peculiarly touching. Owing to the winter rains, to such height had the rivers risen that they could not be ferried, and the roads had become impassable.

A family of emigrants arrived on the banks of the great San Joaquin, in the last stage of exhaustion. Desperation started them to the fire. The mother had been buried on the plains, and on the arrival of the family at the San Joaquin an infant and her mother six years of age, comprising all of the children, died also, leaving the disconsolate father to prosecute his further journey to the gold mines alone.

GEO. P. REED & CO., 71 Tremont Row, BOSTON.

Illustrated by **ALBERT L. JONES.**

MORACE WINTERS, Printer.

24 1/2 x 3 1/2

Entered according to act of Congress, in the year 1850, by Geo. P. Reed & Co., in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts.

TITLE PAGE OF "THE EMIGRANT'S DYING CHILD"

From the collection of Philip D. Jordan.

Our march is like the thunder gust!
 We prostrate where we pass,
 And broader is the trail we leave
 Along the tangled grass.
 From North to South we range the wood,
 We tread the wilds afar,
 We tread the brake, we swim the flood,
 Onward! Huzza, huzza!
 Our halt is where the prairie wolf
 Barks at the grizzly bear,
 And every robe we lie upon
 The buffalo must spare.
 Break not, my boys, the squadron's line,
 Down with the forest spar!
 Cut with your swords the tangled vine!
 Onward! Huzza, huzza!
 Our steeds are like ourselves, my boys,
 Born for a martial train,
 Fearless and strong they prance along,
 And yet they heed the rein.
 Then let the merry bugle sound,
 We'll follow Freedom's star,
 For battle, or for hunting-ground—
 Onward! Huzza, huzza!¹¹

During the early 1850's Patten was stationed at Fort Miller, near the San Joaquin River, to protect emigrants crowding the California trails on their trek to the diggings. This assignment furnished him the stimulus for his famous song, *The Emigrant's Dying Child*, one of those tragic tales so common to the period. One evening, so Patten tells the tale, a family of gold seekers, exhausted and starved, arrived at the banks of the swollen San Joaquin. The mother had been buried on the plains, and within a short time an infant and its sister also died, "leaving the disconsolate father to prosecute his further journey to the gold mines alone." Patten adds that the last words of the dying child were to be conveyed to the "ear of the world through the medium of song." When George P. Reed of Boston published Patten's delineation of the episode in 1853, with music and piano accompaniment by "an Amateur," its success was immediate. Abby Hutchinson, of the famous traveling troupe of Hutchinson singers from New Hampshire, frequently included it upon her programs. This song, as well as others composed by Patten, is now eagerly sought by collectors of nineteenth century music.

Patten's brother officers frequently complained that he exhibited his rhymes too obviously. One calloused soldier termed his verse "damned nonsense,"¹² and as judicious a commentator as Cullum notes that he was the "author of numerous poetical effusions." But if Patten's comrades did not take kindly to a soldier-

¹¹ *Voices of the Border*, p. 42.

¹² *Thirteenth Annual Reunion of the Graduates of the United States Military Academy*, p. 93.

poet, newspaper editors of the country did. They liked his simple meter, descriptions of troopers, and sentimental songs, and his verse found publication from Florida to New York and from Michigan to Ohio.¹³

His sentimental and lyrical verse also found publication in the literary annals so popular as gift books during the 1840's and 1850's. "The Bowl," a temperance poem describing the evils of strong drink, appeared in 1857 in *Friendship's Token*, a volume dedicated by its publishers to "the Sons and Daughters of Temperance" throughout the world. Two other poems, "The Trumpets" and "Babe's Requiem," were published in the 1845 edition of the *Religious Souvenir*, edited by Lydia H. Sigourney.

When his *Voices of the Border* appeared, dedicated to General Winfield Scott, it received a favorable review in the *American Literary Gazette* of October 15, 1867, but apparently was ignored by most American and English journals. The *Poughkeepsie Press*, however, said that his martial lyrics depicted the soldier's life with the "fire and genius of real poetry."¹⁴ If his verses merited little attention from reviewers, the American people read and enjoyed them, and they caught the spirit of the Army from Patten's pen.

¹³ *The New-Yorker*, for example, from 1837 to 1839, reprinted verses originally appearing in the *Tampico Sentinel*, *Savannah Georgian*, *New York American*, *Detroit Journal*, and the *Ohio Germantown Gazette and Miami Valley Advertiser*.

¹⁴ Quoted in *Thirteenth Annual Reunion of the Graduates of the United States Military Academy*, p. 92.

PROFESSIONAL NEWS

The annual joint session of the AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE and the American Historical Association will be held on Friday afternoon, December 27, in the Pennsylvania Hotel, New York City. Two papers will be presented on "The Civil Mind in an Armed Society." Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin, Military Editor of *The New York Times*, will speak on the subject, "At the Turning Point in the Study of War." Dr. H. A. De Weerd, Professor of History at Denison University and Editor of this JOURNAL, will discuss "The Changing Relationship of Civilian and Military Elements in Modern Warfare." These papers will be followed by discussion of them by Dr. Herbert Rosinski of the Institute for Advanced Study and Colonel Herman Beukema of the United States Military Academy. Brigadier General Oliver L. Spaulding will preside.

* * *

Miss Bess Glenn has tendered her resignation as Librarian of the INSTITUTE, and Mr. Robert E. Runser is Acting Librarian pending the appointment of her successor by the Board of Trustees.

* * *

Two unusually important memoranda were issued in mimeographed form by the American Committee for International Studies at Princeton, New Jersey, during October. Both are by Dr. Edward Mead Earle of the Institute for Advanced Study. The first, "Studies of National Defense an Obligation of Scholarship," was submitted for comment and criticism at a dinner held in New York City on October 18 which was attended by a small group of outstanding students of our military problem. Mr. Frederick P. Todd, Secretary, officially represented the AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE, but several of the other persons present were members.

From both this paper and the one following, "The Defense of the United States: Our Problem, Our Potential, Our Policy," it is immediately apparent that the objectives of the American Committee for International Studies and of the AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE are strikingly similar. The approach is somewhat different, that of the former being primarily through political science while our own emphasis has been on history. Even this distinction is none too

clear, however, and the following quotations from the memoranda mentioned above express equally well the beliefs of the two groups:

It is a striking paradox that, although military defense has been a perennial problem of the American people since the first colonists landed on this continent, there has been no conscious, integrated, and continuous study of military security as a fundamental problem of government and society. It is another paradox that, although we live in a warlike world and have ourselves been participants in large-scale wars, there has been almost no systematic consideration by American scholars of the rôle of war in human affairs—this despite the transparent truth, however deplorable, that war is a recurrent phenomenon which from time to time transcends all other human activity and assumes command of our lives, our fortunes, and our destiny Military problems are susceptible of analysis, criticism, and practical contributions by informed laymen, and factual data upon which to base sound scholarship are generally accessible. Indeed, it is imperative that laymen, especially scholars, concern themselves with the problem of national defense, for failure to do so may be disastrous to the success of rearmament or of the war effort In a democratic society, it is imperative that we have the widest possible discussion of military problems, conducted on the highest possible plane. In the absence of such discussion, we cannot formulate intelligent and practicable foreign policies or, for that matter, domestic policies It is not, of course, suggested that there should be any competition with the permanent personnel of the armed forces There are certain subjects which the civilian can take within his purview but which the professional soldier can deal with not at all or only with the greatest reserve Only the scholar is capable of maintaining a *continuous, objective, and documented* study of the problem One of the surest ways to avoid the militarization of our world is, within the United States at least, to maintain a considerable body of civilian interest and competence in what is one of the basic problems of all government and, therefore, of self-government: the common defense.

The INSTITUTE welcomes a fellow organization in the field and looks forward to cooperation with it.

* * *

Dr. Dallas D. Irvine has been conducting at the headquarters of the INSTITUTE since October 2 a Seminar-Conference on the Total Science of War, the stated object of which is to found a distinct academic science of the phenomenon of war. Toward this end it is hoped to prepare a syllabus in this field, to equip young men of established professional qualifications with a knowledge of the apparatus for studying it, and to develop in them special mental faculties for the teaching of courses in the total science of war. A journal of the proceedings of the Seminar-Conference is being kept, which, with the planned syllabus and other documents which may be produced, is to be deposited with the INSTITUTE.

Contributors to This Issue

Lieutenant Colonel J. M. Scammell, formerly Secretary of the INSTITUTE, studied under Spenser Wilkinson at Oxford and thus writes about him from first-hand knowledge of his methods and personality as well as from his own military experience.

Dr. Philip D. Jordan is Associate Professor of History at Miami University.

Mr. Hugh Charles McBarron, Jr., needs no introduction after his previous articles and illustrations on uniforms of the War of 1812 (III, 191-99, and IV, 55-64).

THE MILITARY LIBRARY

The Art of Modern Warfare, by Hermann Foertsch, Colonel of the German General Staff. (New York: Veritas Press. 1940. Pp. 273. \$2.75.)

This work is reminiscent of a book about sex for tender young minds. Some imp in the mind of the reviewer has persistently suggested the subtitle: *What Every Young Idiot Ought to Know*. As an addition to German military literature it is a primer for the public rather than an important contribution to military ideas. Let no one suppose that it is a book of revelations for the more literate of military men.

Considered as a primer of German military thought, the book is excellent and particularly valuable because it represents traditional orthodoxy in the face of recent conditions of war rather than any daring but dubious flight of individual genius. Since the educated public in this country has been caught by the march of events in a state of appalling ignorance of all military thought, and particularly of German military thought, the very propaedeutical and canonical qualities possessed by this book make its appearance in English translation a peculiarly happy event. It is just what is needed, and it only remains to induce those who need to read the book to perform that exercise. To this end it may be reported that the style is clear, flowing, and non-technical, the organization logical, business-like, and climactic, and the thought-content of a quality to make the reader feel that the author has something to say that is worth saying and the ability to say it efficiently and well. As the author's valet for this appearance before the American public, the translator deserves a bouquet for a good job of grooming.

In the light of recent campaigns military men will find in this work many points for controversial discussion. On the whole, the ideas presented seem to fall short of explaining the extraordinarily sure touch with which these campaigns have been conducted by the Germans. Foertsch's notions on the "war of tomorrow" are notions not sufficiently gelled to account for any such display as we have seen. One may wonder, therefore, whether the dynamic political direction of the German state was not responsible for injecting into German ideas on the conduct of war an added "oomph" beyond the capacity of German military orthodoxy to produce. On the other hand, one may wonder whether

the possibility of so doing was not dependent largely upon peculiar political circumstances and whether the thought represented in Foertsch's work may not prove to be of greater validity in the long run. This question arises particularly in connection with the relative potency of the offensive and defensive, a matter on which the ideas of Foertsch are closer to those formerly expressed by Liddell Hart than to the demonstrations which have recently been given in actual war.

Foertsch brings out very effectively the relation between the political and military direction of war, and for this reason alone his book should be placed on the "must" list of our civil leaders. For the unschooled political direction of war is the terrifying weakness of the democracies.

DALLAS D. IRVINE

The National Archives

The Cost of the World War to Germany and to Austria-Hungary, by Leo Grebler and Wilhelm Winkler. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1940. Pp. 192. \$2.50.)

The two studies assembled in this volume constitute a timely, if posthumous, epilogue to the *Economic and Social History of the World War* under the editorship of James T. Shotwell.

Of the two, Mr. Winkler's study pertaining to the war-cost of Austria-Hungary is superior in theoretical elaboration of the problems involved. Mr. Grebler, proceeding on different lines, evaluates the war-cost defrayed by Germany by way of comparison between Germany before, during, and after the war. Both writers are aware that they are working on an insoluble problem in that the costs of the war are indeterminable in quantitative monetary measures. The real cost of the war can be described but not statistically ascertained. There are many imponderable elusive items involved; on the whole we can better appreciate who is footing the bill than what the bill amounts to. The methods applied in calculating the war-costs by the two writers do not tally and are, therefore, not easily comparable.

Mr. Winkler, analyzing the war-cost of Austria-Hungary, makes the following assumptions: (1) Under the head of direct costs of war are grouped all lives lost in military service, all the cost of carrying on the war, and all damages due directly to acts of war. (2) Indirect costs of war comprise all other losses, whether of population, national income, or national wealth in the course of the war. (3) Forfeited gains are those increases in population and the progress of national economy which would have been attained except for the war.

Austria-Hungary's total losses in population due to the war amounted to about seven million, or 14 per cent of the pre-war population. The economic losses experienced by Austria-Hungary, and caused by the war, are summed up as follows: direct cost, 62,032 billion gold-Kronen; indirect cost (losses in agriculture, industry, commerce and transportation, dwelling houses, consumed stocks of goods, unfavorable balance of trade), 58,800 billion gold-Kronen; forfeited

gains in national wealth and income, 1.7 billion gold-Kronen; total cost of the war, 122,532 billion gold-Kronen.

As for Germany, Mr. Grebler reckons that the direct financial costs of the war during the war years ranged from 85 to 95 billion gold Marks (of 1913), or in the neighborhood of 21 or 22 billion pre-war gold Dollars. Nor is this all. A summary of the main items which are not ascertainable in round figures involves: the impairment of man power as a result of reduction in population and under-consumption, the exhaustion of soil and liquidation of live stock in agriculture, the depletion of stocks throughout the economy, the deterioration of equipment in industry and transportation (caused by neglected maintenance and replacement and by adjustment to war requirements), the housing shortage resulting from the vast amount of construction left undone during the war, the loss of gold and investments abroad used as a means of payment for war imports, the loss of foreign markets as a result of war-time isolation, and the costs involved in the readjustment to peace conditions.

These costs, seen in terms of national income, imply that the direct financial costs of the world war to Germany during the war years were equivalent to almost two years' national income in peace time, or, to put it differently: for almost four and a half years the war diverted an annual average of goods and services equivalent to 50 per cent of the value of goods and services annually produced in peace time. For Austria-Hungary, corresponding to far smaller national income and wealth, the costs of the war were about five times as great as the annual national income and almost four-fifths as great as Austria-Hungary's national wealth. The extent to which this diversion was made possible through reduction of current consumption, through neglect of maintenance and replacement, and through liquidation of stocks cannot be statistically ascertained. But it stands to reason that the direct expenditures for war weigh less than the losses caused by it in income and wealth; not less than 62 per cent, or almost two-thirds, of the total costs of war were indirect. The nature of war costs can best be grasped in terms of capital consumption without maintenance and replacement, hence a decline of production capacity and real income.

The writers of this volume, it is true, had no intentions to philosophize on their subject matter. Yet the reader cannot help reading between the lines and drawing the moral of the tale. Under this aspect several striking conclusions impress themselves. All the facts suggest the notion that modern capitalist countries display a surprisingly great recuperative ability from losses incurred by war, even though they have to start from scratch; unless the population is virtually decimated the capital losses are quickly made good. Next we are taught that, all popular views to the contrary, economic interests do not breed the actual germs of war; there was no industrial group or section in pre-war Germany which was interested in, or benefited by, plunging the country into war. The driving motives leading to war lie elsewhere than in the economic field. That

certain groups divert the national energies for their special profit during the process of war is, of course, another story. Furthermore, we learn that a special structure and organization of the national economy such as the German, characterized by elaborate integral corporations, facilitates the transition from a peace-economy to the singularity of purpose of a war-economy. Finally, it is evidenced that even for the calculation of the war-cost much depends on whether a country is the winner or the loser of the war.

ARTHUR SALZ

Ohio State University

The German Army, by Herbert Rosinski. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. 1940. Pp. 267. \$3.75.)

Though Dr. Rosinski has long enjoyed a European reputation as an expert on military and naval affairs, this is his first work in the English language. He was one of the founders of the German Society of Military Sciences, assistant to the head of the Institute of Military Studies at the University of Berlin, lecturer on military subjects at the University of Oxford, and is at present connected with the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. His book appears at a time when interest in the development, organization, and fundamental concepts of the German army is universal. He presents in a single volume the most comprehensive treatment of the theme available in our language. Since few Americans have the time or linguistic equipment to trace the foundations of the Prussian army through Jany's *Geschichte der Königlich-Preussischen Armee* (Berlin, 1928) or Dette's *Friedrich der Grosse und sein Heer* (Halle, 1914) to the creation of the present Nazi army, this work should have a wide appeal.

Though not discounting the groundwork laid by Frederick William I, Dr. Rosinski begins his study with the Prussian army under Frederick the Great. For he holds that Frederick contributed more than the army's mere existence or outward organization; he gave it immortal spirit and inner form. He stamped upon this army "a new form of life, narrow, harsh, with many faults and shortcomings; yet with all its defects a mighty spiritual force not ignoble in its subordination and sacrifice of everything to one idea: duty." Frederick's army was built upon twin pillars, the mobilization of the aristocracy of Prussia for military leadership, and the recruiting of the manpower of Prussia by the "canton-system." He fostered the cult of honor among his noble-born officers, uniting them by this device to his person and to the state. He provoked loyalty but not affection among his officers. The social uniformity and sense of honor of the Prussian officer corps were among its greatest military assets, for although the army suffered tremendous losses in personnel, met defeat in later years, and even lost its organization in the period of Napoleon, the spirit of duty in the officer corps lived on. Around this spirit the rebuilding of the army was possible.

One chapter is devoted to the era of reform which followed the breakdown of Frederick's state and army at Jena and Auerstadt. Dr. Rosinski summarizes

the civil and military reforms of Stein, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau. Although not all of Scharnhorst's reforms were adopted in time for the war of liberation, he penetrated the secret of Napoleonic success and applied its lesson to the Prussian army. He inspired a group of younger officers: Grolman, Boyen, Tiedemann, Rühle, and Clausewitz. Scharnhorst saw that, unless Prussia conducted war with all the resources of the state and was willing to sacrifice everything for the continuance of the struggle, it could not defeat the forces unleashed by the French Revolution.

During the 19th century Prussia became the leader in the movement for German unification. In the growing materialism which followed the unification, Dr. Rosinski feels that the "army as a representative of the old Prussian spirit remained like a monolithic block in a changing landscape." This century saw the extension of universal service, the reforms of Roon, and the establishment of a modern general staff. The author comments at some length on the influence of Clausewitz on the development of the German general staff. He holds that two misconceptions about Clausewitz are common: first, that he merely completed the work of Scharnhorst; and, second, that he was merely an exponent of Napoleonic warfare. He places Clausewitz above Scharnhorst, Moltke, and Schlieffen as one who first "grasped the idea of war as a coherent, continuous whole, directed at the complete overthrow of the enemy's power of resistance."

Germany's disaster in 1918 was due in part to political and economic failures in preparation for the war. With the assumption of trench warfare the German army lost all the advantages in power of maneuver and skill of the general staff. Trench warfare also changed the character of the officer-soldier relationship in the German army, for front line conditions called for a new type of soldier, the front line fighter. The prolonged struggle of attrition brought vast new elements into the army which in the end sank to the "level of a militia." The officer corps, which expanded from 26,000 in 1914 to 226,000 in 1918, no longer possessed the virtues and loyalties of the old régime. Political and military power finally fell into the hands of Ludendorff whose gambler's instinct and narrow vision led the nation and the army into defeat.

American readers will find Dr. Rosinski's chapters on the "Reichswehr and the Republic" and the "Reichswehr and the Nazis" extremely helpful additions to the literature on the background of the present war. The organization, training, and political position of the Reichswehr is developed against the extremely complicated background of post-Versailles Germany. One gets a clear picture of the rôles of such men as Seckt, Schleicher, and Fritsch in the torturous politics of the period. In a final chapter on the "New German Army," the development of the Nazi army, its equipment, training, and military doctrines are discussed. This is such an excellent book that the reviewer regrets the absence of documentation, a bibliography, and an index.

H. A. DE WEERD
Denison University

War Propaganda and the United States, by Harold Levine and James Wechsler.
(New Haven: Yale University Press. 1940. Pp. 363. \$2.75.)

As a readable and entertaining survey of what the propagandists of England, Germany, and Russia are doing in the present war to influence the United States in favor of their separate causes, this work has no competition. It gives facts and names in its demonstration of what has been happening since the Germans invaded Poland, describing the activities of the agents of foreign governments, analyzing the forces in American life and the elements in American thinking which are competing for mastery of this country's foreign policy which range from the professional supporters of Anglo-American "cooperation" to professional believers in Albion's perfidy, dealing with the "propaganda of pathos" conducted by pro-Ally relief societies in America and the "propaganda of hatred" fostered by native fascist groups, and pointing out how the belligerent countries operate through prejudices and symbols that are already part of American thinking.

Our enthusiasm must not, however, blind us to several weak spots of the book. In the first place, the "introduction," signed by E. C. Lindeman, president of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, and by Clyde R. Miller, its executive secretary, defines propaganda as "a method, a device for conditioning behavior." We cannot take apart such an untenable definition. But the fact remains that such a definition would even include a mother's relationship to her child, since the feeding, spanking, cajoling, and everything else that every mother does is "a device for conditioning behavior." Lindeman's and Miller's definition is, strange to say, nearly meaningless. If the term is to have any specificity of denotation it must be limited—a task which certainly has not been discharged here. Furthermore, the treatment plays so heavily on the British aspects of propaganda that one wonders whether anything that London does is not propaganda. While at least three chapters are devoted to England, Germany, the greatest and most able of all propagandists, comes off with one chapter only (although, of course, references to both countries are scattered throughout the publication). Finally, Levine and Wechsler unconsciously raise indirectly the same point which was so well dealt with in Alfred Vagts' article on "War and the Colleges" in the previous issue of this JOURNAL (IV, 67-75): we have taught juvenile pacifism in most of our institutions of higher learning to the accompaniment of viewing every organized social action in terms of "so what?" Today, when this nation needs to preserve itself by awakening its youth from "an unexampled exhibition of self-reproach and defeatism," can we do it by describing every organized social effort as just another phase of "propaganda"?

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

Hofstra College

Mobilizing Civilian America, by Harold J. Tobin and Percy W. Bidwell.
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 1940. Pp. 236. \$2.75.)

This volume, with a foreword by Major General Frank R. McCoy, U. S. A.,

Retired, is a penetrating, lucid examination of national defense as applied to the civilian population of the United States. Beginning with a review of mobilization techniques from 1917 to 1918, characterized as a period of "improvisation," the study next considers early "planning" attempts from 1919 to 1939. Then the authors, with admirable clarity, describe recent attempts of the Army to plan in conjunction with American industry. Such attempts, in many instances, seemed hindered by Congressional, literary, and public attitudes which indicated that the "American people have been greatly concerned with avoiding, if at all possible, entanglements in another European war" (p. 57).

Since President Roosevelt's special message to Congress in January 1939, however, national defense has become a major interest to Americans, and the collapse of France has further stimulated the point of view that the United States must prepare. Citizens who wish to have outlined the primary purposes and types of defense can find no better narrative than this volume. Principles of censorship, an evaluation of volunteering *versus* conscription, mobilization of industrial labor, control of prices and profits, and the economics of procurement planning are all analyzed with care and objectivity.

In addition, suggestions are offered as to intelligent actions prior to any actual declaration of war. These include guarding industrial and power plants, surveillance of aliens and groups suspected of subversive tendencies, survey of natural resources and of labor, survey of prospective munitions plants and transportation systems, and, finally, "accumulation of stock piles of strategic and critical raw materials . . ." (p. 234). The nature and extent of both Executive and Congressional powers necessary to carry these and other suggestions into efficient action are discussed. It is indicated, however, that no existing legislation is sufficiently inclusive to mobilize civilian America effectively. "To make the expression of the national will effective, Congress must resume its independence of the Executive. Any grant of power to the President, enabling him to limit civil liberties and to assume the legislative functions of Congress should therefore be clearly restricted to the period of hostilities" (p. 235).

Perhaps one of the more stimulating discussions is found in the chapter dealing with the mobilization of industrial labor, for obviously no modern conflict can be waged only by armed forces. American labor must ignore its internal squabbles, must refrain from strikes and lockouts, and must devote itself to longer hours of labor and greater intensity of effort. Perhaps the energy of women, children, and old people can be utilized advantageously (p. 140).

This volume could easily be considered as obligatory reading, not only for students of military organization, but also for contemporary economic planners. Written plainly, its use is indicated for the attention of the bulk of citizens who may wish to understand and, therefore, to function intelligently in the event of hostilities.

PHILIP D. JORDAN
Miami University

Foreigners in the Confederacy, by Ella Lonn. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1940. Pp. 566. \$5.00.)

It is the common view that the South was not only predominantly native American but also in the broad sense British by origin—i. e., that most of its people stemmed from countries over which (at the moment of writing!) the British flag waves. Alien elements in the Confederacy have therefore received little attention, and Miss Lonn's able volume becomes at once the standard treatment of this neglected subject. Where many thousands of foreign-born are involved, their story, when singled out and put into a book, requires a good deal of telling; yet, when all is said and the millions of native whites put back into the picture, the old view is shown to be in error only insofar as it pictures the population of the seceded states as almost exclusively native born. Furthermore, it takes a careful second thought to avoid identifying the term native-born with the term Anglo-Saxon. This is itself significant; were not the South predominantly Anglo-Saxon, such an offhand assumption would come less readily.

In certain Southern cities the foreign-born element was considerable, though far from predominant, amounting to 23 per cent of the white population in Richmond, 30 per cent in Charleston, 33 per cent in Savannah, and 40 per cent in New Orleans. (In the latter city the Irish and German groups each outnumbered the French.) Germans were numerous in Texas, where they avoided assimilation with American culture and held themselves apart in little *Deutschlands*, as in the Bastrop and New Braunfels colonies. Not only did the colonizing motive cause foreigners to herd together; this swarming also occurred where heavy work on docks and levees was done by Irish, Italians, or Germans, so that Canal Street in New Orleans witnessed the un-Southern picture of an Irishman waiting upon a Negro mason. Generalizing as to numbers all over the South, Miss Lonn shows that there were "in the eleven states of the Confederacy nearly 5,500,000 white people, of whom nearly 250,000 had been born abroad, or roughly between 4 and 5 per cent."

The marshaling of foreign elements for the anti Union cause was only in part a matter of genuine and sincere support; to this factor, which is not to be ignored and which amounted to burning Southern zeal in a Cleburne, must be added pressure in various forms, the background of state rights associated with democracy, the habit of obeying Texan or Louisianian authority, the feeling of a Scotsman that he could not decently stay out or the fear of some far-Southern Irish that the war would be over before they got to Virginia, and withal the hopelessness of a small minority setting itself against the government. Yet many foreigners did not ardently embrace the cause, and Texan Germans in Confederate military service might feel little regret if captured or if kept in quiet sectors. Trouble appeared on the *Alabama*, whose crew was nearly all foreign, and Governor Brown of Georgia saw fit to order that every foreigner should do military service or leave the country. Refusal of Germans to take

the Confederate oath in Texas resulted in a sinister man hunt, a multiple lynching, and a "massacre" on the Neuces River for which the author finds justification in the disordered times and need for discipline.

Though perhaps less significant than the unnamed thousands who served inconspicuously as engineers, surgeons, scouts, intelligence agents, orderlies, cooks, and attendants, those foreigners who attained prominence take up, naturally enough, a good deal of space. In the cabinet were the exotic Benjamin and the diligent Memminger; in foreign service were Rost, Soulé, Hotze, Father Bannon in Ireland, Bishop Lynch at Rome, Quintero and Reily in Mexico. Conspicuous in military service were Patrick R. Cleburne, John A. Wagener, Colonel Heros von Borcke whose plumed hat and fancy uniform found appropriate setting in Stuart's cavalry, and Prince de Polignac whose French mind found it hard to understand a soldier's reference to Colonel Censer's "lay-out" or "shebang." To such men was accorded the courtesy usually given to knights-errant or soldiers of fortune; few among them, however, attained a rank above that of colonel.

Materials for Miss Lonn's volume are derived from a wide variety of sources, many of which are out-of-the-way or available only in foreign tongues; this material is well ordered and the story is told with vividness, appreciation, and a wealth of incident and human detail. Again, as in the past, historians of the Civil War period are in her debt for a task ably done.

J. G. RANDALL

University of Illinois

A History of the Uniforms of the British Army [Volume I], by Cecil C. P. Lawson. (London: Peter Davies. 1940. Pp. 213. 12s.6d.)

The publication of a book on military uniforms at this moment in British history will appear a gallant gesture to some, a shallow anachronism to others. It depends largely on the relationship you can bring yourself to see between antiquities and military force. But let there be no doubt that there is a close tie, nowhere better illustrated than in the British Army. To the British soldier this functioning of tradition is natural and unquestioned. Regimental customs are handed down by act or word of mouth rather than by the written word. There are thousands of idiosyncrasies but few published accounts of them. History, in fact, is in such current use that there seems little cause to study it as history.

This has been the case with studies of British military dress. No uniform is as generally known as the "red coat," but Captain Lawson is the first to attempt its full history. He has chosen as his method a prose treatment dotted with fascinating pen sketches of his own making. As a result, the volume is pleasant reading and often instructive in other than clothing matters. This will aggravate some specialists who, feeling that antiquities can never be made generally palatable,

contend they should be presented in a forthright, factual manner. Others, less exacting, will enjoy it. So broad is the treatment, in fact, that one may read this book with profit as a companion to the standard histories of Fortesque, Firth, and others. The present volume carries the story to 1760. Subsequent volumes are promised and, it is hoped, will appear shortly.

FREDERICK P. TODD
The National Archives

OTHER RECENT BOOKS

HISTORIOGRAPHY

Special Collections in the Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace, by Nina Almind and H. H. Fisher. (Stanford University: Stanford University Press. 1940. Pp. 111.) A description of the various collections of papers in the Hoover Library and a general survey of the library by the Librarian and Vice-Chairman. This small volume should be of great value to students of the period 1914-1918.

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference from the Standpoint of the American Delegation, by Philip Mason Burnett. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1940. 2 vols., pp. 1148 and 833. \$15.00.) A contribution to the series "The Paris Peace Conference, history and documents" published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History.

ART AND PHILOSOPHY OF WARFARE

Twentieth Century Warfare: How Modern Battles are Won and Lost, by Lowell M. Limpus. (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1940. Pp. 205. \$1.75.) A tightly written, elementary introduction to the subject for the civilian or citizen-soldier; non-technical and well organized for the most part, but breaks down somewhat at the higher complexities of supply, air service, etc.

Industrial Relations in Wartime: Great Britain, 1914-1918: Annotated Bibliography of Materials in the Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace, compiled by Waldo Chamberlin. (Stanford University: Stanford University Press. 1940. Pp. 239. \$3.00.) This volume, prepared under the direction of the Division of Industrial Relations of the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University, makes available "a possible source of information on the experience of Great Britain with the problems of industrial relations" during the World War as a contribution toward the solution of the serious problems now facing this country. A similar bibliography, covering the same material for Germany, 1933-40, is being prepared.

MILITARY SCIENCE

The 25th Army Brigade R. G. A. on the Western Front in 1918, by C. S. B. Buckland. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1940. Pp. 110. 7s.6d.) The story of the operations of a group of batteries of long-range and super-heavy guns and howitzers during a critical phase of the war. Captain Buckland comments on the rôle of heavy artillery in modern warfare, is full of irony at the way in which heavy guns were ordered around the whole British front and then never used, and conveys a true artilleryman's love of his weapon.

AUXILIARY SCIENCES

Chemistry in Warfare: Its Strategic Importance, by F. A. Hessel, M. S. Hessel, and Wellford Martin. (New York: Hastings House. 1940. Pp. 164. \$2.00.) Besides discussing gas, explosives, and other obvious applications of chemistry to warfare, this brief book also discusses armor plate, tanks, airplanes, photography, strategic raw materials, the development of steels and alloys, and other industrial aspects

of warfare. The treatment is partly historical. The appendix gives methods of manufacture of explosives and gases.

WEAPONS AND ORDNANCE

- The Gun Collector's Handbook of Values*, by Charles Edward Chapel. (San Leandro, California: published by the author. 1940. Pp. 220, 32 plates. Paper, \$2.00; cloth, \$3.00.) Described by a leading authority as "an excellent check-list for the young collector" and one useful for those more advanced or specialized; as offering "a more or less practical working basis for the sale and exchange of duplicates"; and as a means of protection "against gross overcharge or deception on the part of unscrupulous sellers."

ESTABLISHMENTS

Germany

- Entwicklungsgeschichte des Deutschen Heerwesens: Das Heerwesen in der Zeit des Dreissigjährigen Krieges* [Volume III]: *Die Landesdefension* [Part II], edited by Eugen Frauenholz, Walter Elze, and Paul Schmitthenner. (Munich: C. H. Beck. 1939. Pp. 364. Rm.12.) The third volume of an ambitious history of the German army dealing with the efforts of the German states to establish a militia during the Thirty Years' war.

- Das Deutsch-Türkische Waffenbündnis im Weltkrieg*, by Carl Mühlmann. (Leipzig: Koehler & Ameland. 1940. Pp. 340. Rm.18.) A comprehensive study of the German-Turkish military alliance of 1914-1918, based on official documents.

Great Britain

- The Anatomy of British Sea Power*, by Arthur Marder. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1940. Pp. 476. \$5.00.) A careful study of British naval policy in the pre-dreadnought period 1880-1905, based upon Admiralty archives.

- Der Suez-Kanal im Weltkrieg und in der Nachkriegszeit: Eine Völkerrechtliche Studie*, by Hartmann Freiherr von Richthofen. (Berlin: Siegmund. 1939. Pp. 89. Rm.3.) A critical study of the Suez Canal convention of 1888 as it worked out in the time of the World War and post war period.

United States

- The Politics of Our Military National Defense*, by E. Brooke Lee, Jr. (Senate Document No. 274, 76th Congress, 3rd Session [Washington: Government Printing Office. 1940. Pp. 140.]) Prize-winning thesis on a subject of great importance; well documented and ably conceived, but suffering from a lack of mature background.

- The American Empire*, edited by William H. Haas. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1940. Pp. 408. \$4.00.) A collective effort by a number of distinguished geographers and political scientists to acquaint the American reader with the manifold problems of the outlying territories of the United States.

- The Story of a Regiment: The Twenty-First United States Infantry*, by Captain Judson MacIvor Smith, based on research by Major Carleton Coulter. (Honolulu: privately published. 1940. Pp. 147.) A well illustrated regimental history with a modern and vigorous style. The appendix is amply stocked with pertinent official documents and registers and a detailed chronology.

OPERATIONS AND BIOGRAPHY

- Alexander the Great*, by Lewis W. Cummings. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company. 1940. Pp. 462. \$3.75.)

- Gustav Adolf the Great*, by Nils Ahnlund. (Princeton and New York: Princeton University Press and American-Scandinavian Foundation. 1940. Pp. 314. \$3.00.) A notable life of the great Swedish soldier-king translated by Michael Roberts.

- The Papers of Sir William Johnson* [Volume IX], edited by Almon W. Lauber and Alexander C. Flick. (Albany: University of the State of New York. 1939. Pp. 970. \$3.25.) Documents bearing on colonial affairs in New York from King George's War to 1758.

- Ethan Allen*, by Stewart H. Holbrook. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1940. Pp. 283. \$2.50.)
- The Armies of the First French Republic and the Rise of the Marshals of Napoleon I: The Armies on the Rhine, in Switzerland, Holland, Italy, and the Coup d'État of Brumaire 1797-1799* [Volume V], by Colonel Ramsay Weston Phipps. (London: Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. 479. 12s.6d.)
- Men of Marque: Baltimore Privateers in the War of 1812*, by John P. Cranwell and William B. Crane. (New York: Norton. 1940. Pp. 427. \$3.75.)
- Little Mac: The Life of General George B. McClellan*, by Clarence E. McCartney. (Philadelphia: Dorrance & Company. 1940. Pp. 363. \$3.00.)
- General George A. Custer: A Lost Trail and the Gall Saga: Some Interesting Deductions Regarding the Battle of the Little Big Horn, June 25-26, 1876*, by Charles Kuhlman. (Billings, Montana: privately published. 1940. Pp. 46. \$1.00.)

World War

- Dvadsat piat let Pervoi mirovoi imperialisticheskoi vojni 1914-1918 gg kratkii ukazatel' literaturi* [The Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the First Imperial World War, 1914-1918: A Short Guide to Its Literature], by V. Altman. (Moscow: Institut Bibliografii. 1939. Pp. 16. 40k.)
- Official History of the Great War: Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1917: The German Retreat to the Hindenburg Line and the Battle of Arras*, compiled by Captain Cyril Falls, with maps by Major A. F. Becke. (London: The Macmillan Company. 1940. 12s.6d. Volume of appendices, 6s.6d. Case of maps, 5s.6d.) The latest volume of the British official history.
- Die Kaukasusfront im Weltkrieg*, by Felix Guse. (Leipzig: Koehler & Ameland. 1940. Pp. 140. Rm. 4.) A German account of the operations in the Caucasus, 1915-1918.
- Souvenirs et Anecdotes de Guerre, 1914-1918*, by General V. d'Urbal. (Paris: Berger-Levrault. 1940. Pp. 293. Fr. 24.) The memoirs of a French army commander.
- Sen-Gondsie boi (5-10 Sentiabria 1914)* [The Battles of St. Gond (September 5-10, 1914)], by A. Grasse. (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1939. Pp. 192. 5r.50k.)
- With Ironsides in North Russia*, by Andrew Soutar. (London: Hutchinson. 1940. Pp. 250. 12s.6d.) Memoirs of the British campaign under the ex-chief of the Imperial General Staff.
- 1919-1940
- War Check List: A Working Guide to the Background and Early Months of the War*, compiled by Richard H. Heindel and others. (Philadelphia: War Documentation Service. 1940. 2 parts, pp. 46 and 78. Mimeographed, \$1.00.) A bibliography covering items published between September 1938 and January 3, 1940, on the present war.
- Why France Lost the War*, by A. Reithinger. (New York: Veritas Press. 1940. Pp. 75. \$1.25) A biological and economic survey of French weakness made by a German prior to the French collapse.

CUSTOMS AND ANTIQUITIES

- The Ranks and Uniforms of the German Army, Navy and Air Force*, by D. Erlam. (London: Seeley, Service & Co., Ltd. 1940. 8s.6d.) Material for this volume is drawn largely from German semi-official sources, such as the drawings of Knötel; it contains over 450 illustrations in black and white and in colors; a detailed and valuable study.

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

HISTORIOGRAPHY

- "The Essence of War," by J. M. Scammell, in *World Affairs Interpreter*, Autumn 1940 (XI, 255-66). A statement of the contributions of Spenser Wilkinson to a new academic discipline devoted to the study of war.
- "The American Professional Soldier," by Major John H. Burns, in *Infantry Journal*, September-October 1940 (XLVII, 419-23). Thoughts on the relationship of the soldier and the scholar in America.

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

- "National Security and Foreign Policy," by E. M. Earle, in *Yale Review*, Spring 1940 (XXIX, 444-60). An examination of the relationship of American security to foreign policy.
- "The War and America's Destiny," by Adamantios T. Polyzoides, in *World Affairs Interpreter*, Autumn 1940 (XI, 240-54). America's rôle in world affairs as conditioned by the rise of totalitarianism.

ART AND PHILOSOPHY OF WARFARE

- "The Mongol Method of War," by Harold Lamb, in *Infantry Journal*, September-October 1940 (XLVII, 444-54). Resumé of the Mongol invasions of the 13th century and comparison of their methods with current German strategy.
- "Clausewitz—A Century After," by Hoffman Nickerson, in *Army Ordnance*, July-August 1940 (XXI, 16-19). An investigation and interpretation of Clausewitz in the light of modern military experience.
- "A Re-examination of Mahan's Concept of Sea Power," by Captain William D. Puleston, in *United States Naval Proceedings*, September 1940 (LXVI, 1229-36).
- "German Naval Strategy in 1914," by Waldo Chamberlin, in *United States Naval Proceedings*, September 1940 (LXVI, 1277-83).
- "The Franco-British Bloc," by Kurt Lachmann, in *Social Research*, May 1940 (VII, 229-42). A study of the economic and financial pooling of 1939 as an instrument for winning the war.
- "The War Industries Board, 1917-1918: A Study in Industrial Mobilization," by Randall B. Kester, in *American Political Science Review*, Autumn 1940 (XXXIV, 655-84). A broad review of the organization, techniques, and legal basis of industrial mobilization as exemplified in the operations of the War Industries Board.
- "How Many Planes When?" in *Fortune*, August 1940 (XXII, 49-53 ff.).
- "Strategic Canals," by Lieutenant A. D. Starbird, in *The Military Engineer*, July-August 1940 (XXXII, 247-52). Compares the Panama, Suez, and Kiel Canals in the light of current events.
- "Duty as Military Attaché," by Major Lowell M. Riley, in *The Field Artillery Journal*, September-October 1940 (XXX, 364-66). Brief notes on the qualifications and responsibilities for this duty.
- "Treachery in War," by Hans Speier, in *Social Research*, September 1940 (VII, 258-79). An historical review of "fifth column" activities and their social background.
- "The Trojan-Horse Bibliography," compiled by Thomas W. Huntington, in *Bulletin of the New York Public Library*, October 1940 (XLIV, 741-44). A short tentative list, selective but not critical, of the more recent articles and books on the European "fifth column" and American morale-resistance.
- "Lord Haw Haw of Hamburg," by Harold Graves, Jr., and Henry and Ruth Durant, in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, September 1940 (IV, 429-51). An analysis of a new radio technique by members of the Princeton Short Wave Listening Station.
- "The Yeomanry as an Aid to Civil Power, 1795-1867: Part II, 1831-1867," by Major Oskar Teichman, in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Autumn 1940 (XIX, 127-43). A review of a phase of the British militia system.

MILITARY SCIENCE

- "The Dawn of British Artillery," by Major General Sir John Headlam, in *Coast Artillery Journal*, September-October 1940 (LXXXIII, 444-51). Notes on techniques and matériel of the 16th and 17th centuries.
- "Toward an Elite Infantry," by Major Thomas R. Phillips, in *Infantry Journal*, July-August 1940 (XLVII, 316-23). A significant contribution to the philosophy of the "Infantry spirit."
- "Troop Transport," in *Fortune*, August 1940 (XXII, 72-76 ff.). Presents the problems involved in the movement of men and supplies over water.

NAVAL SCIENCE

"Our Merchant Navy," by Vice Admiral J. E. T. Harper, in *Quarterly Review*, July 1940 (CCLXXV, 1-13). The rôle of small craft in the present war.

AUXILIARY SCIENCES

"Geographic Service in the French Armies during the War, 1914-1918," by General G. Perrier, in *The Military Engineer*, July-August 1940 (XXXII, 266-70). Brief summary of organization and activities.

"The German Armored Divisions," in *The Field Artillery Journal*, July-August 1940 (XXX, 311-12). A *précis* of General Guderian's *Achtung, Panzer!*

"Engineers in the Blitzkrieg," by Captain Paul W. Thompson, in *Infantry Journal*, September-October 1940 (XLVII, 424-32). Notes on current German field engineering organizations and techniques.

"Selection of Military Pilots," in *Fortune*, September 1940 (XXII, 77-80 ff.).

"Tanks," in *Fortune*, September 1940 (XXII, 61 ff.).

WEAPONS AND ORDNANCE

"The Implements of War: I, the French Army," by John Scofield, in *The American Rifleman*, October 1940 (LXXXVIII, No. 10, pp. 24 ff.). A summary of current French ordnance.

"The Exigencies of War," by John Scofield, in *The Gun Report*, July 1940. Two examples of the emergency fabrication of revolvers in the Confederacy.

"The Evolution of the Webley Revolvers," Monograph No. 10 in *The Gun Report*, August 1940.

"The Franco-Prussian War, or Chassepot vs. Dreyse," in *The Gun Report*, October 1940. "A compilation of contemporary critiques, with certain modern parallels and implications."

"The German 'M. G. '34' (Solothurn)," by Ludwig E. Olson, in *The Gun Report*, September 1940. A brief description of the machine gun used by German parachute troops.

"The German Mauser," by W. J. Landen, in *The American Rifleman*, September 1940 (LXXXVIII, No. 9, pp. 18 ff.).

ESTABLISHMENTS

British Empire

"British Forces in North America, 1774-1781: Part II," by C. T. Atkinson, in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Autumn 1940 (XIX, 163-66). Continuing this statistical study from XVI, 3-23.

"The Permanent Colonial Forces of Cape Colony," by Major G. Tylden, in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Autumn 1940 (XIX, 149-59).

"Canada's New Defense Program," by Edgar P. Dean, in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1940 (XIX, 222-36). An account of the readjustment of Canada's war program following the fall of France.

Germany

"The New German Army Showing Organization of Panzer Divisions," by Lieutenant Colonel A. T. McAnsh, in *The Cavalry Journal*, July-August 1940 (XLIX, 309-14). Brief summary of current organization and techniques.

United States

"The Florida Militia and the Affair at Withlacoochee," by Samuel E. Cobb, in *The Florida Historical Quarterly*, October 1940 (XIX, 128-39). An account of an incident in the Seminole Wars.

"Portrait of an Army," by Fairfax Downey, in *Infantry Journal*, July-August 1940 (XLVII, 364-71). Intimate picture of the Regular of the 1870's.

"General Pershing and His Headquarters in France," by Major General H. B. Fiske, in *Command and General Staff School Military Review*, September 1940 (XX, 5-10).

"American Industrial Mobilization for War, 1917-1918," by H. A. DeWeerd, in *The Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly*, July-September 1940 (XLIX, 249-61).

- "National Defense: Plan or Patchwork?" by Lindsey Rogers, in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1940 (XIX, 1-12).
- "U. S. Defense: The Armed Forces," in *Fortune*, September 1940 (XXII, 59-60 ff.). Analysis of men and matériel available for the defense of the western hemisphere.
- "The New American Army," by Hanson W. Baldwin, in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1940 (XIX, 35-54). A thought-provoking account of the present status and future hopes of the new national army.

OPERATIONS AND BIOGRAPHY

- "British Operations on the Penobscot in 1814," by George F. G. Stanley, in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Autumn 1940 (XIX, 168-78).
- "The Activities of the Texan Revolutionary Army after San Jacinto," by William C. Binkley, in *The Journal of Southern History*, August 1940 (VI, 331-40).
- "A Commerce Raider off New York," by Charles C. Hanks, in *United States Naval Proceedings*, September 1940 (LXVI, 1237-40). An account of the activities of the Confederate raider *Tallahassee*.
- "The Fight at the Big Dry Wash in the Mogollon Mountains, Arizona, July 17, 1882, with Renegade Apache Scouts from the San Carlos Indian Reservation," by George H. Morgan, in *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Order of Indian Wars of the United States* . . . February 24, 1940.
- "The Daily Journal of Alvin H. Sydenham: Part IV," in *Bulletin of the New York Public Library*, July 1940 (XLIV, 529-36). Conclusion of a series recording the life of an officer of the 8th U. S. Cavalry, 1889-90.
- "Gunner in Luzon: Parts V and VI," by Brigadier General E. D. Scott, in *The Field Artillery Journal*, July-August and September-October 1940 (XXX, 300-305, 384-93). Continuing the experiences of an artillery officer during the early part of the Philippine Insurrection.
- "The Sino-Japanese War," by Colonel E. M. Benitez, in *Command and General Staff School Military Review*, September 1940 (XX, 25-29).

World War

- "Training for War" and "Signposts of Experience," in *The Field Artillery Journal*, July-August and September-October 1940 (XXX, 249-60, 341-45). Continuing the extracts from the World War memoirs of Major General William J. Snow.
- "The March of the 26th," by Lieutenant Colonel Elbridge Colby, in *Infantry Journal*, September-October 1940 (XLVII, 462-74). A documented account of the 26th Division, A. E. F., in the St. Mihiel drive.

1919-1940

- "The Blitzkrieg in the Low Countries," by M. W. Fodor, in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1940 (XIX, 193-206). A newspaperman's account of the military campaign leading to the defeat of France.
- "The Downfall of France," by Hamilton Fish Armstrong, in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1940 (XIX, 55-144). A running account of the events of the thirty days from the invasion of the Low Countries to the capitulation of France.
- "Reflections on the French Disaster," by A. L. Guerard, in *Virginia Quarterly Review*, Autumn 1940 (XVI, 498-512). An examination of the causes of the French collapse by an outstanding French historian.
- "The Balkans: Key to World War II," by Joseph S. Roucek, in *World Affairs Interpreter*, Summer 1940 (XI, 179-97). Economic warfare in the Balkans.
- "Present War and a Future Europe: Parts I and II," by Hugh M. Cole, in *The Military Engineer*, May-June and July-August 1940 (XXXII, 174-79, 255-59).

CUSTOMS AND ANTIQUITIES

- "Frederick Remington," by Lieutenant Alvin H. Sydenham, in *Bulletin of the New York Public Library*, August 1940 (XLIV, 609-13). First publication of an article written shortly before the author's death in 1893; a soldier's appraisal of Remington as a man.

NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

AMERICAN MILITARY DRESS IN THE WAR OF 1812

III. Regular Infantry

The history of the Regular Army infantry uniform in the War of 1812 may be divided into two general periods. Through 1812 and a large part of 1813 the foot soldier was usually arrayed in an attractive uniform. While lacking the gaudiness which so often characterized the European infantry, it was quite in the military fashion of the day. Except for color, the coat greatly resembled that of the British, with its laced buttonholes on breast and cuff. The cap, a plain cylindrical hat crown of well stiffened felt with the brim cut off except in front where it was left to form a visor, was strongly reminiscent of the type given up by the British army in 1811.

Yet the Army was not particularly pleased with the uniform. In fact, the opening of hostilities caught it in one of those periods of uncertainty and restlessness concerning dress which were to plague it so often thereafter. This, coupled with economic difficulties, led to a change in 1813 whereby it was stripped of all color and almost all trimming, reducing it to the drab and uninteresting style retained for seventeen years after the war had ended.

The design of the first uniform, although recently adopted, does not appear to have been of common knowledge at the opening of hostilities. As late as August 21, 1812, Callender Irvine, the Commissary General of Purchases, had to write to the Secretary of War "for a copy of the regulations of the War Department for the uniform clothing."¹ Obviously there must have been considerable variation from the established pattern, especially among the officers and men in districts far removed from Washington. The Adjutant General's Office, on December 30, 1812, in response to a request by Major General Pinckney of the Southern Department, issued a fairly detailed description of the uniform for the various branches of the service.² The coat of the field officer was used

¹ Secretary of War, Document File, 1812 (National Archives), hereafter cited as S. W. Docs.

² Southern Department, Orderly Book, August 27, 1812, to March 15, 1813 (National Archives). All uniform regulations of 1812 quoted hereafter are from this source.

as the basis for all other grades; the uniform for infantry was as follows:

Field officers will wear blue coats with scarlet collars & cuffs; the length to reach to the bend of the knee; single breasted with one row of ten buttons in front, with blind holes worked on each side, $3\frac{1}{2}$ inches at bottom & $5\frac{1}{2}$ inches at top; the length of the waist not to extend below the hips; white linings; the buttons white, bearing the name of the corps & [the number] of the regiment, standing collar to rise so as to reach the lower part of the ear, with two buttons & holes in each side laced $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches long with silver lace. The lace to continue round the lower & upper edge of the collar. The cuffs not less than 4 nor more than $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide, on each, 4 buttons & blind holes worked with silk. The pocket flaps cross, indented below, nor more than 10 nor less than 7 inches in length, nor less than $2\frac{1}{4}$ nor more than 3 inches wide, with four buttons & blind holes worked on each, the bottom of the breast, top of the pocket flaps, & hip buttons to range. The breadth of the back will not be more than 6 nor less than 4 inches; the bottom of the skirts not more than $7\frac{1}{2}$ nor less than 4 inches wide, lined & faced with white cloth, with a diamond of scarlet cloth, $1\frac{1}{4}$ inches on each side, laced with silver lace, the center of the diamond to be 2 inches from the bottom of the coat.


Figure I shows a field officer in the coat described above. Platoon officers were ordered to wear "coatees, trimmed similarly to the coats of the field officers" (fig. J). A "coatee" was a coat in all respects except as to skirt, which was reduced usually to 12 inches in length. Enlisted men's coatees and buttons were "of the same fashion as those of the platoon officers; the button holes in front, on the pocket flaps & cuffs, & the collar laced with white binding." This extra trimming consumed a great amount of time and labor, and Irvine wrote to the Secretary of War on June 23, 1812, that, "if white binding is not required to be sewn on Infantry coats, they could be made in half the time." He did not mean, however, to discontinue the decoration, for he suggested that "Materials could accompany coats" so that they might be completed by the company tailors.³

Quite probably commissioned officers often wore the "undress coat" in the field. This coat was permitted for field and platoon officers and was to "be of the same fashion as that described for the field officers full dress; the cuffs and standing collar of blue, the collar laced like the full dress but the skirts not turned up."

Enlisted men had both blue and white woolen pantaloons or overalls of a peculiar cut; they were made "gaiter fashion . . . with a tongue to cover the instep & straps, leather, under the shoe to keep the overalls in their proper places"⁴ (figs. G and H). The linen ones for summer, however, were made in the ordinary way, and with them were worn black linen gaiters. Pantaloons and gaiters in one, though smart and well thought of by military men, seem badly designed for service; they must soon have become fouled with mud and dust to a point well above the ankle. Apparently Regulars in the West had been in the habit of cutting off the gaiter part of the pantaloons as early as the Tippecanoe campaign. Detachment orders at Vincennes, December 6, 1811,

³ S. W. Docs., 1812.

⁴ Undated memorandum on clothing in the handwriting of Callender Irvine (S. W. Docs., 1812).



A, leather cap after sketch in a letter of Captain William Gates, 1816. B, leather cap after Vanderlyn's portrait of Andrew Jackson. C and D, side and back views of an original leather cap in the museum of the Morristown National Historical Park. E, drummer, from the middle of 1813 to the end of the war. F, commissioned infantry officer's silver epaulet, after an original in the collection of Hugh Charles McBarron, Jr. G and H, front and back views of the linen, cotton, or woollen jacket in use as a provisional uniform throughout the war. I, field officer of infantry. J, subaltern officer of infantry.

informed the men of the 4th Infantry that "The colonel views the cutting off of the pantaloons of the soldiers presumptuous . . . [and] he . . . positively forbids it. The regimental orders of June and October relative to clothing is considered in force."⁵ Presumably the summer gaiters had been substituted for the part of the woolen pantaloons which had been cut off. As has been observed before, white pantaloons could be kept clean by means of the pipeclay or whiting used to clean white buff leather belts and lace and so enjoyed an advantage over blue. But blue or white, they possessed the drawback of any tight leg covering; no matter how well fitted, they had a tendency to become torn in the seams and at the knees.⁶

Commissioned officers were allowed breeches or tight pantaloons of ordinary form "of white cloth or cassimere in winter and jean, &c. in summer Breeches (or pantaloons) with 4 white buttons at the knee for field officers & long boots with white tops" (fig. I). These white topped boots for the mounted officers were a civilian touch affected also by foot officers of the Napoleonic armies. Platoon officers were ordered to wear "pantaloons & short boots" (fig. J). Field officers, too, might wear pantaloons instead of breeches.

For head gear platoon officers wore "black caps of cylindrical form with cockades on the left side to rise one inch above the top of the cap; a silver band & tassels falling from the crown of the cap on the right side, an oblong silver plate in front of the cap bearing the name of the corps & number of the regiment; a white plume worn in front, the stem placed between the silver plate & surface of the cap, the plume to rise above the cap 8 inches" (fig. J). Enlisted men's "Caps, cockades, eagles, plates in front of the cap, & cord & tassel of the same fashion as directed for the platoon officers, the plume white & to rise 6 inches above the top of the cap, cord & tassel for the cap to be of white cotton." In December 1812 the 6th Infantry had buck tails instead of feather plumes,⁷ an ornament often used in the militia and formerly by the Army and a portion of the Marine Corps.⁸

Field officers were required to wear "chapeaux de bras, the fan not less than 9½ nor more than 11 inches in height & not less than 16 nor more than 18 inches in length, bound round the edge with a black ribbon, one half inch wide, with a white button, silver tassels & loop; black cockade 3½ inches in diameter, with a silver eagle in the center; the cockade to rise one inch above the brim, a white plume to rise 8 inches above the brim of the hat."

⁵ Logan Esarey, ed., *Governors Messages and Letters: Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, Vol. I, 1800-1811* (Indiana Historical Collections, vol. VII, Indianapolis, 1922), p. 658.

⁶ Charles Cadell, *Narrative of the Campaigns of the Twenty-eighth Regiment . . .* (London, 1835), pp. 83-84.

⁷ Clothing Return, 6th U. S. Infantry, December 1812 (Commissary General of Purchases, Document File [National Archives], hereafter cited as C. G. P.).

⁸ Edwin N. McClellan, "Uniforms of the American Marine Corps" (mimeographed document in the Naval Records and Library), p. 30.

For neckwear commissioned officers might wear either leather or silk stocks, but the enlisted men were issued "stocks of stiff black glazed leather" to be fastened in back with a clasp.

Although vests no longer formed a visible part of the uniform, they were required to be of white cloth for all grades; officers might have them of jean in summer. They were to be made single breasted, without pocket flaps, and were not to appear below the breast of the coat. The enlisted men's vests had "welts across the pockets," and all had high standing collars. By the late summer of 1812 great difficulty was experienced in procuring the white cloth for soldiers' vests, and cloths of various colors, grey, drab, and the like, were substituted.⁹

The epaulets of the commissioned officers were of silver; field officers were to "wear one on each shoulder; captains one on right & subalterns one on the left shoulder." The rank of sergeant was designated by two white silk epaulets and corporals by one, on the right shoulder. Epaulets during the entire war were made with an extremely concave, short strap, the bullion end finished with a thick metalwork cord, and the bullions held out in an extended curve by a pad underneath (fig. F). The epaulet was usually secured to the shoulder by being slipped through a loop of silk or cloth ornamented with metal lace and buttoned to the lowest button on the collar or one sewed near the lower edge. Some of the older officers, however, still wore the epaulet with flexible strap that had been in use during the latter part of the eighteenth century.

Although not mentioned in the 1812 regulations, drummers and fifers appear to have worn coats of scarlet cloth with blue collar and cuffs. Everything else was the same as that worn by the musketmen. Captured British coats were readily altered for such use.

Surgeons and mates attached to the infantry were uniformed quite plainly in a single breasted blue coat with blue cuffs and collar, "the collar or cape trimmed all round with lace or embroidery, with one button hole laced. Upon the cuffs & pocket flaps, three buttons each." They wore chapeaux like the field officers, ornamented with a "black cockade & eagle, & a black ostrich feather." Their vests and breeches or pantaloons were white, and for arms they carried either a "small sword or dirk." Buttons and lace were silver.

Hospital surgeons and mates, who were something of an independent corps, had a uniform of similar style, but their coats were "edged with buff, made & trimmed as above, with yellow lace & buttons." The vests and breeches or pantaloons were buff. A "small sword or dirk" completed this dress also.

Early in 1813 the radical change in the uniform of the Army that had been threatening so long was finally effected. On March 30, 1813, Irvine wrote to the Secretary of War that every officer of the Army "whose judgment &

⁹ Commissary General of Purchases to Secretary of War, August 27, 1812 (S. W. Docs., 1812); Secretary of War to Commissary General of Purchases, August 29, 1812 (Secretary of War, Military Book, VI [National Archives], hereafter cited as S. W. M. B.).



REG'ULAR INFANTRY, 1912

taste ought to be consulted" would approve the substitution of "A plain blue coatee, without a particle of red to it, with white or buff cross belts, white vests & white overalls with black gaiters for Infantry & Artillery The coats should be single breasted, to button from the collar to the waist."¹⁰ Less than a month later, with commendable dispatch, Irvine sent three infantry coats of slightly different patterns to the Secretary of War, requesting that the seal be affixed to the pattern chosen.¹¹ A few days thereafter, on May 1, the "Changes in the Uniform of the Army of the United States" were approved by the Secretary of War and issued as regulations. This uniform of 1813 is described in considerable detail in various printed sources and need not be more than outlined here.¹² The infantry coat was ordered to be "uniformly blue. No red collars or cuffs." Lace was no longer to be worn by any grade "excepting in epaulets and sword knots."

The officers' coat lost thereby its white skirt facing and scarlet diamond. The platoon officers' "coatee" was abolished, and all commissioned ranks were required to wear skirts reaching to the knee. These changes, doubtless an attempt to standardize the coat in the face of rapidly shifting rank, made it practically the former undress uniform, and so the rules with respect to undress were done away with except that the cockades were always to be worn. The coat, then, was "single breasted, with ten buttons, and button holes worked in blue twist" straight across the front, "i. e. not to represent herringbone." The collar was blue, with two buttons on each side, trimmed with blue twist. The skirts were blue, as was the "diamond." Buttons were "silver or plated."

The coat of the enlisted men remained a "coatee" with short skirt, but with blue collar, cuffs, and, presumably, skirts. The new regulations are very vague concerning the soldiers' uniform, but a stray remark concerning it is that its button holes were to be "trimmed with tape on the collar only." Yet one of the coats which Irvine sent to the Secretary of War for his approval in April 1813 had "white cord on the breast, in imitation of holes," and it seems possible that this was the one selected. Contemporary estimates of materials necessary for clothing include "white cord for trimming the button holes of coats and infantry pantaloons."¹³

Officers' vests remained white. Breeches and pantaloons were of white nankeen in summer, but a heavier blue material was permitted for winter.


The chapeau bras, or collapsible hat, was shrinking. The minimum height in 1812 had been 9½ inches; now it was 3 inches less. The minimum width was

¹⁰ S. W. Docs., 1813.

¹¹ S. W. Docs., 1813.

¹² *Military Laws and Rules and Regulations for the Army of the United States*, June 28, 1814 (Washington, 1814), pp. 262-77; a shorter version, taken from the Army Regulations of May 1, 1813, is contained in *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, 433-34. Uniform regulations of 1813 quoted hereafter are from the first of these.

¹³ Estimate of Deputy Commissioner Amasa Stetson of materials needed for 1814, February 22, 1814 (C. G. P.).



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decreased from 16 to 15 inches. The silver button and loop were changed to black, and the cockade was increased an inch in diameter. The 8 inch feather remained, but a special one of white and red was permitted the adjutant of each organization. Platoon officers appear to have been authorized to wear this chapeau bras, anything but a convenient or useful form of hat, although caps were permitted "on service."

Sashes were worn by officers around the waist, but "only on a tour of duty." Epaulets, buttons, spurs, buckles, and trimmings were silver or plated. Adjutants, quartermasters, and paymasters were distinguished by a counterstrap on the opposite shoulder to the epaulet. A counterstrap, merely an epaulet without fringe, appears on the 1813 portrait of Jean Terford David, a paymaster holding the rank of second lieutenant.¹⁴ This portrait, peculiarly, exhibits on a subaltern officer the oak leaf embroidered collar holes permitted paymasters.

The pantaloons or overalls, apparently, had not yet lost their gaiter character, although without doubt the ordinary trouser shape, usually associated only with the cotton fatigue trousers, had begun to appear in company with the uniform coat. This was partly due to fashion and to contact with the British soldiers, but partly also to the greater ease of manufacture of the simpler form which seldom required alteration when issued. Vanderlyn's portrait of Andrew Jackson at New Orleans shows foot artillerymen in ordinary trousers of the period, while a print, published in 1815 in Philadelphia, also of the Battle of New Orleans, shows infantry in overalls, made gaiter fashion.¹⁵

Drummers' and fifers' coats were still made of scarlet cloth, but now with the cuffs and collars of the same color as the coat (fig. E). Incidentally, one is struck by a peculiarity of the fit of both coats and jackets during this period and for the twenty years immediately following, the extremely long sleeves which were cut to cover most of the hand. The Commissary General was informed on October 24, 1814, that, owing to the inferior quality of the cloth, "The sleeve of a jacket, being cut to come to the knuckle, after whetting will shrink nearly to the wrist bone."¹⁶

The most radical alteration effected by the new uniform regulations was in the cap which until the middle of 1813 was the cylindrical hard felt already described. Just when the idea for a new form made of leather was determined on is not yet clear, but in December 1812, in a letter to the Secretary of War, Irvine proposed to furnish leather caps to the Army. On January 23, 1813, the Secretary of War acknowledged the receipt of a new model infantry cap and approved it, suggesting only minor alterations.¹⁷ In February estimates were

¹⁴ *Catalogue of Memorial Exhibition of Portraits by Thomas Sully* (Philadelphia, 1922), p. 49.

¹⁵ Carl W. Drepperd, *Early American Prints* (New York, 1930), p. 84.

¹⁶ Maj. Gen. Jacob Brown to Commissary General of Purchases, October 24, 1814 (C. G. P.).

¹⁷ Irvine, memorandum on clothing, no date (S. W. Docs., 1812); Secretary of War to Commissary General of Purchases, January 23, 1813 (S. W. M. B., VI).

received for "leather hats with tin mounting or front piece" at \$1.92 each, and in March the first contracts were let for their manufacture.¹⁸ These new caps were being distributed at least as early as October.¹⁹

The style of the new cap was almost identical with the British, having a front rising above the crown. A sketch and description of its form, as worn during the last year of the war, is given in a letter of complaint from an artillery officer to Irvine.²⁰ The dimensions in inches which he notes are as follows: "Height of back— $7\frac{1}{2}$, height of front above the crown—2, diameter of top—7, diameter of bottom— $7\frac{3}{4}$. Flaps on the back, turned inside. Top arched. Front of the cap supported by the arch of the top, which slopes down from its top" (fig. A). Actual examples in museums are all made generally according to this plan but show a considerable variation in proportion and form (figs. C and D). The essential part was that the high front was sewn to the crown or, in other words, was an integral part of the crown proper.

Without doubt much variety existed in the manufacture of these leather caps. Toward the end of the war some appear to have been made in the actual British fashion, with the front piece distinct from the crown and without the top being sewn to the front. A "Statement of leather articles" of 1815 speaks of caps with their "fronts sewn to the crowns" as being "made on the old plan."²¹ Contemporary caricatures and paintings portray all the different types, but this diversity is scarcely to be wondered at. New in style and made in relatively small lots under contracts controlled by the most elementary specifications, these caps naturally varied widely in pattern. Even the War Office and the Philadelphia Arsenal appear at times to have been uncertain as to the precise dimensions.

On these caps were worn a braided cord and tassel (silver for officers and white for men), a leather cockade, a pompon of white felt, and a white metal plate. Some of the old caps show no sign of ever having had plates affixed to them, and it is quite probable that many were issued with only a part of their trimmings. The plate first used on the leather cap was the large one worn on the old felt cap, but on January 12, 1814, Irvine recommended a new plate that was "lighter, neater, & would not cost half the price—. The present plate covers the greater part of the front of the leather cap; it is heavy in its appearance & adds much to the weight of the cap." The new plate was approved.²²

One of the greatest difficulties in the matter of supplies was the growing

¹⁸ Bids and estimates (C. G. P.).

¹⁹ Invoice of shipment of clothing to 44th Infantry at New Orleans, October 14, 1813 (C. G. P.).

²⁰ Capt. William Gates to Commissary General of Purchases, January 16, 1816 (C. G. P.).

²¹ "Statement of leather articles of military supply, now in store at New York and unfit for the regular service of the United States this 12th day of August 1815" (C. G. P.).

²² Commissary General of Purchases to Secretary of War, January 12, 1814 (S. W. Docs., 1814).

scarcity of blue and scarlet cloth of the broadcloth type which up to that time had been imported, mainly from England. The natural failure of this source made the coarser grades suitable for enlisted men's uniforms so difficult to procure that some substitute was necessary. Soldiers serving in the South had long been accustomed to wearing a sort of unofficial summer dress composed of a roundabout jacket and overalls of linen or cotton drilling. Apparently even before the war the need of making up similar jackets and overalls of various colored woolen cloths to serve for a time in place of the uniform had been anticipated. In January 1812 the Secretary of War, in authorizing the procurement of twenty thousand new uniforms, wrote: "At the present crisis, we must dispense with the colour, even of the coat. Drab coloured and mixt cloths must be made to answer" The shortage of materials continued to be emphasized during the spring and summer, and by October "woolen round jackets and . . . woolen overalls of drab or mixed cloth" had been accepted officially as a substitute (figs. G and H).²³

Another difficulty presented itself, however. Active campaigning in the intense heat of summer in the North had brought to the notice of the authorities the necessity of a cooler dress than the flannel-lined woolen coatee. Irvine submitted for consideration on June 17, 1813, that inasmuch as "roundabout linnen jackets are issued to the troops stationed south of the 35 degree of Northern latitude . . . should not linnen Roundabouts be issued to the troops West & North, in addition to the clothing now issued to them? I fear they will suffer much in July & August with Wol. Coats." These considerations, coupled with the huge losses of equipment in the disasters of the previous several months, induced the Secretary of War to approve such an issue, and so linen jackets took their place on the field along with the wool.²⁴

The difficulty of procuring blue cloth continued to the end of the war. Domestic manufacture was found to be inadequate, and it was difficult to get other colored cloth dyed a good fast blue. The grey and drab jackets which were substituted could not have been popular at first, and Irvine in January 1814 excused their issue on the grounds that they would look better than blue ones with the grey overalls.²⁵ With trepidation were some of these grey jackets sent to General Scott's army, drilling during the summer of that year at Niagara, and with reluctance were they received. But Scott was not long worried about the color; in fact by that time he was happy to receive new

²³ Secretary of War to Purveyor of Public Supplies, January 15, 1812 (S. W. M. B., V); Commissary General of Purchases to Secretary of War, March 23, 1812 (S. W. Docs., 1812); Secretary of War to Commissary General of Purchases, October 1, 1812 (S. W. M. B., VI).

²⁴ Commissary General of Purchases to Secretary of War, June 17, 1813 (S. W. Docs., 1813); Secretary of War to Commissary General of Purchases, June 25, 1813, (S. W. M. B. VI).

²⁵ Commissary General of Purchases to Secretary of War, January 21, 1814 (S. W. Docs., 1814).

clothing in any form. Nor did his troops long feel ashamed, for in them had been born a new spirit of pride and confidence which transformed the rough grey kersey into something close to a badge of honor. The rifle regiments, too, were wearing grey, and, when these men of Scott trounced the British at Chippewa on July 5, the grey uniform became a fixture in the American Army.²⁶

In fact the demand for grey jackets that followed was distinctly embarrassing. On July 14 Irvine wrote the Secretary of War that "Col. Clark of the 26th Infy. & the officers of his Regmt. have called for Rifle Clothing," which consisted of grey coatees and overalls with yellow buttons.²⁷ Whether or not Colonel Clark was successful is uncertain, but in August Irvine lamented to the Secretary of War that "grey jackets with sleeves are very highly approved," and in December, when rifle clothing had been issued to the 20th Infantry under authority of the War Department, that he feared trouble since all regiments might want rifle uniforms.²⁸

Unfortunately, even suitable grey kersey had by 1814 become so scarce that in February the Deputy Commissary in charge of clothing reported it was "impractical . . . to provide the Jackets & Pantaloons of any one colour" and suggested "mixed Cloths" for the artillery and light artillery and "Drab" or "Brown" for the other corps.²⁹ With all this, some units still clung to their white trousers for field use. During the fighting on the Niagara frontier, Lieutenant Colonel Harvey, in his order for the British attack on Fort Erie, commented that the Americans would be exposed in the night attack by their "white trousers, which are very conspicuous marks . . ."³⁰ Thus, we begin to glimpse what the infantry really looked like and to understand what Irvine meant when he wrote about the "highly approved" grey jackets, "if there had not been so many changes within a short period . . . I would recommend such a change now."³¹

HUGH CHARLES MCBARRON, JR.

²⁶ Winfield Scott, *Memoirs* (New York, 1864), I, 128-29. This engagement of July 5, in which the British to their sorrow mistook the grey-clad Regulars for militia, is one of the great romances of the American uniform. Scott always maintained that it led to the adoption of grey at West Point, which is certainly borne out by contemporary evidence. The correspondence between Irvine and Scott about the grey uniforms may be found among the records of the Quartermaster General. See also Charles W. Elliott, *Winfield Scott: The Soldier and the Man* (New York, 1937), pp. 161-65.

²⁷ S. W. Docs., 1814.

²⁸ Commissary General of Purchases to Secretary of War, August 10, 1814, and December 2, 1814 (S. W. Docs., 1814).

²⁹ Commissary Amasa Stetson to Commissary General of Purchases, February 22, 1814 (C. G. P.).

³⁰ Lt. Col. Harvey to Capt. Elliott, August 14, 1814, in E. Cruikshank, ed., *Documentary History of the Campaign on the Niagara Frontier in 1814* (Welland, Ontario, no date), I, 140.

³¹ Commissary General of Purchases to Secretary of War, December 2, 1814 (S. W. Docs., 1814).

THE TOTAL SCIENCE OF WAR

AN EDITORIAL

IN JULY the AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE issued for limited circulation a professional paper by Dr. Dallas D. Irvine entitled "A Charter for the Study of War." This paper contained extracts from a larger thesis setting forth several indispensable doctrines to be observed by any one who would undertake the mastery of this immense problem. The first doctrine enunciated the "vital importance" of the study, and the second its wide interrelation with other fields of knowledge and activity.

We believe that the importance of this study is now generally recognized. Many may concede it only as a temporary measure in the present emergency, but the conclusions reached by enlightened academic groups at Harvard, Princeton, Chicago, and elsewhere are eminently realistic and indicate a clear appreciation of the need for a sound and permanent effort at research into military institutions and policy—constructively critical and independent of official opinion.

But an appreciation of the problem does not necessarily indicate a realization of its size and scope, nor yet a well thought out plan for its solution. Like many another specialist, our undergraduate teachers today are reluctant, if not often incompetent, to venture outside of their precise fields. The lack of broad cultural training in graduate schools has too often been deprecated to deserve repetition here; yet this represents the gravest danger with which any scientific study of war is confronted. Hundreds in the academic world may see the need for such a study, but by most of them it is recognized only as an extension of an existing field of knowledge and is applied only within these limits. We ourselves have thought of it as a segment of the general field of history, often calling it "military history." Others consider the study—or at least its more impressive portions—as related solely to economics, still others to political science, while many have never divorced it from the pursuit of military science.

It is unfortunate that war is not so academically minded, not so inclined to observe the politely artificial boundaries of our fields of learning. War is universal in character, interrelated to all nature and society. To cover war, the science must be equally comprehensive in scope. It must consider not only war in its differentiation from other phenomena; it must consider every way in which nature and society affect war and every way in which war affects them. The study of war must be an *integral* field of study, not coordinate with any one or two already recognized studies, but coordinate with the sum total of *all* recognized studies. It must be oriented upon all aspects of the use of force rather than upon the present conception of peace as the only framework of reference. It must be a *total science of war*.

Purveyor's Office, *Philadelphia, Dec. 5th 1811.*

THE present situation of the United States, impressively suggests a considerate anticipation of the most serious possible exigencies. Though many articles of supply for immediate use are in our public and private stores, tho' many articles are continually imported, tho' branches of the laws may occasion some supplies in peace and captures may produce some in war, tho' the constant operations of our established manufactories, afford more than we can want of some commodities, yet it appears beneficial and necessary to make an early and universal operation with respect to the exhibition and examination of our local and general resources and capacities.

It is respectfully hoped and trusted, that it will be found convenient and prove agreeable to every gentleman in public station to give such direction to one copy of this paper, as will ensure its reception, by three or more public spirited and intelligent citizens in their respective states and districts.

It is hoped, that those three or more public spirited and intelligent citizens, will promptly take the proper and necessary measures to communicate this paper to every township, hundred, town, ward, or other smallest section of our counties, cities and boroughs, in order to ensure a general and effectual attention to the measure.

The gentlemen described and other public spirited and intelligent citizens in the wards, townships and other smallest sections of the cities, boroughs and counties are respectfully invited to procure every master-manufacturer and all persons dealing in raw materials, to make an early and full communication by mail, addressed to this office, shewing, with exactness, their respective residences, kinds of goods manufactured, and current prices, and the quantities and whole amount, if they think proper. Two forms of such a communication are subjoined, for uniformity and explanation.

This operation may be easily made. The information, which may be obtained, when digested by this office, will place the resources and capacities of the country more fully before the various branches of the government, so as to enable them to act as the nature of their powers and duties may appear to require or admit. It will facilitate the operations of the purchasers for the public supplies, whom it will enable to deal with manufacturers adjacent to the divisions of the public forces, and distant from their offices.

Very considerable advantages, costing nothing, would result to manufacturers from this measure, by the light it would give upon the subject of this spontaneous and very increasing branch of the national trade and business. Not only would the public agents and the people at large, be enabled to know how, and where they could procure supplies of American manufactures, but the Legislature and the Executive, with its assistants, would be enabled to consider, for every necessary purpose, the value, the quantity, the local situations, the instruments and means, the capacities, the denominations or kinds, and other facts relative to the manufacturers of the United States, their stocks of *domestic* and foreign raw materials and *their goods and manufactures*.

A note of any manufactures on hand, at this time, or which could be completed within a few months, might be an useful addition to the communication, particularly of blue, grass green, buff, white, black and scarlet broad cloths, at prices above two dollars, and narrow in proportion; white swanskins and white plains above fifty cents; strong woollen vest-back cloths; woollen or worsted lining stuffs, blue, green, &c. Blankets of 5 to 5 1-2 pounds weight, 6 feet long 6 1-2 feet wide, and tweeled; white linen 28 1-2 inches wide, above 55 cents, or any other proper military goods.

TENCH COXE, PURVEYOR OF PUBLIC SUPPLIES.

FORM OF A MANUFACTURER'S STATEMENT.

GEORGE B. WILLIAMS of the Township of Northampton, county of Berkshire and State of Massachusetts, makes and sells broad cloths at two dollars and one half, to three dollars per yard; blankets at three to three dollars and one half each; narrow cloths at one dollar and one third, to one dollar and one half per yard; total of goods in a year 4931 yards of broad cloth, 7368 yards narrow cloth and 413 blankets. Total value 24,511 dollars and 45 cents.

The said George Williams employs and moves by water one carding machine and 120 spindles; and by hand four hundred and ten spindles in the woollen manufacture.

ANOTHER FORM OF A MANUFACTURER'S STATEMENT.

PHILIP J. HAIN, No. 55, Washington-street, Winchester, Frederick county, Virginia, makes and sells wool hats at 90 to 110 cents each, furum, castor or common fur hats at 4 to 5 dollars each, and fine hats at 6 to 6 and one half dollars each; total quantity of goods in one year, 4930 wool hats, 1103 furum, castor or common fur hats, and 308 fine fur hats. Total value 10,653 dollars.

NATIONAL DEFENSE

A PROGRAM OF STUDIES

BY EDWARD MEAD EARLE

IN A recent article which dealt with studies of national defense as an obligation of scholarship,¹ I raised the following questions: Are military affairs a legitimate and, indeed, a vital concern of the political and social scientist? If so, what can he contribute in point of view, in method, and in content which cannot be or ordinarily is not contributed by the professional army or navy officer? There remains a third question: What topics, in particular, might profitably engage the attention of the scholar not only in the near future but over a longer period of study and research? Over a long period of time it will be desirable and even necessary to undertake basic research in military problems and in war as a fundamental social phenomenon. For the present it is the part of wisdom to concentrate attention upon the immediate military problems, the military potential, and the military policy of the United States, keeping in mind, however, their relationship to world-wide conditions.

The following specific topics are suggested, without reference to relative immediacy and importance and without contention that the list is more than an illustration of possibilities once the field as a whole is given the attention which it deserves.

The Role of the Military Services in a Democracy

There is no adequate history of the military policy of the United States similar to the as yet uncompleted work of Harold and Margaret Sprout on the Navy (*The Rise of American Naval Power*, 1939, and *Toward a New Order of Sea Power*, 1940). This would seem to be the proper time to initiate such a study, which should be something more than history, valuable as history itself would be. It would require an analysis of the theories or assumptions upon which American armies heretofore have been recruited and trained, in time of peace and in time of war, and an examination of the adequacy of those theories to present conditions. It would take due account of the rôle which maintenance of a professional army (including, in the case of England, a mercenary army), as contrasted with a militia and citizen soldiery, has played in British and American constitutional history and in the development of republican government in the United States. It would recount our previous experiences with conscription (as in the Civil War, both North and South, and in the Land Grant colleges) and with Selective Service in 1917-1918. It would discuss the theoretical question of the obligation of military service in organized society.

¹ "National Defense and Political Science," in *The Political Science Quarterly*, LV (December 1940), 481-95.

Such a study would, likewise, require an appraisal of the experience of others. Most pertinent is the theory and practice of universal military service in France, particularly in the Third French Republic, where the institution of conscription was intimately associated with the ideas of the Revolution and the system of liberalism and democracy which the Revolution implied. "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" all had their application to the French military system. In Germany, on the other hand, there was an altogether different conception of the rôle of the army; and, aside from theoretical considerations, the army was in fact a bulwark of political conservatism and reaction—until the Third Reich, when an entirely different order of things supervened. In Great Britain the practice was still different and, incidentally, more in accord with our own ideals and our practices, except that in the recruitment of the officer class there was a marked favoritism for certain social groups which had consequences of its own, good, bad, and indifferent. During the past two years the experiences of England with compulsory service have been rich with suggestions for the United States. There have also been important changes in the Swiss military system which warrant our attention. And it cannot be too strongly emphasized that we need, and need very soon, an intensive study of the processes by which Nazi Germany has produced its powerful military machine. In any such studies, there should constantly be kept to the fore not so much questions of tactics but problems of morale, physical training, education (military, vocational, and other), collaboration of military and civilian authority, the relations between the several branches of the service, and finally the return of the soldier to civilian life, including the question of service in an organized reserve. There is a great fund of interest and human affection invested in our New Army. Its success or failure will involve the utmost we can give in way of intelligent consideration of problems of morale and of the place which the Army is to play in promoting greater national unity as well as in our efforts to acquire an effective defense.

Closely associated with these questions are others: Is the maintenance of a national army and a greatly enlarged professional navy consistent with the continuance of a liberal democracy? What has been the extent to which the military establishments of other powers (Russia, Japan, Germany, France, Britain) have been able to prejudice larger questions of national policy, both foreign and domestic? What effect will rearmament have upon health, the standard of living, freedom of thought and discussion, and the national psychology? Experience abroad seems to indicate there will be diversified answers to inquiries of this sort. Although the experience of others is important for an understanding of our own problems, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the road which we are to take will of necessity be charted with primary reference to American conditions. There is a task here not merely for the historian but for the political scientist, the economist, and the psychologist as well.

The Military Potential of the United States

There have been many discussions, particularly at the Geneva disarmament conferences, of the meaning of "military potential" or "war" potential. Taken as a whole, they have been less than satisfactory—however useful as a point of departure—because of the dominance of political as distinct from scholarly motives. There has, however, been little study of the manifold factors which enter into the military power of the United States. We have had surveys of our national resources and of industrial capacity in relation to the demands of national defense, but the military potential demands more than these: it involves consideration of geographical position in the light of the new technologies of war and, especially, civil and military transportation; man power (including, in addition to mere numbers, education, intelligence, mechanical ability, loyalty, organization, adaptability, health, occupational skills, and the like); immigrant populations and the influence they may have upon the national military effort or upon industrial efficiency; vulnerability of war industries to attack or to transportation breakdowns by reason of concentration in the Northeast; the character of political and military leadership (including the organization of the high command); and the like. There is no absolute military potential; there is a relative military potential which is available at a given *time* and operates with reference to given situations. As was pointed out in the article referred to above, there must be kept to the fore the difference between the *potential* strength of a nation and its *existing* strength.

A study of the military potential of the United States would in and of itself be of enormous importance to the body of knowledge available to social scientists and to the responsible officers of the government. In addition, however, it would have relevance to the fundamental questions of national policy which we are going to have to face as a people. It is useless to have a diplomatic frontier which lies far beyond the boundaries of any military frontier we can hope to defend; in other words, we should not, as a rule, formulate policies to which in the last analysis we cannot give effect should they be challenged by armed force. This is not to say that we have been underestimating the ultimate military potentialities of the United States; on the contrary, it is probable that we have failed to appreciate the immediate striking power of the United States in defense of many of the policies which we have enunciated *vis-a-vis* Europe, Latin America, and the Far East. But however this may be, it is impossible to formulate, either for academic or for practical purposes, any clear-cut picture of the place of the United States in international politics unless we understand the weight and extent of our actual and potential military strength.

What is more, we need to know how the power we possess (particularly our economic power) can be used, in time of peace as well as in time of war, in the furtherance of national policy—so that we shall not increase the strength

of potential enemies or weaken ourselves or the powers whose interests most nearly coincide with those of the United States. The fact is that much against our hopes we have been drawn into a system of competitive power, and we have to measure, as far as possible, the factors of our strength and of our weaknesses as well as to speculate on the imponderables.

The military potential of the United States has not heretofore been the result of conscious and purposeful forces but has been an incidental development in a social and economic system which has been concerned with "welfare" rather than with "military" objectives. Whether the future will change this fundamental fact remains to be seen. We must at least understand, however, the fundamental relationships between guns and butter.

The Concept of Hemispheric Defense

At present, as a result of a long series of developments since the original enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States stands officially committed to the defense of the entire Western Hemisphere—not only against military invasion but against any attempt on the part of European or Asiatic powers to "extend their political system to any portion of either [American] continent" or to control the "destiny" of any Latin-American state "in any manner." It can hardly be doubted that the existence of this policy over the past century and a quarter has been a contributing factor in world stability. But it can be questioned whether the Monroe Doctrine has not been enforced more by moral sanctions and by the existence of a balance of power in the Atlantic and Pacific areas than by any effective military support which the United States has given it or is now prepared to give it in the event of a showdown. As the balance of power in the world is now upset and may, indeed, be destroyed for some time to come, and as moral forces seem to have less weight than heretofore in the world as now constituted, it may well be that the United States must reconcile itself to maintaining an establishment on land, at sea, and in the air capable of giving effect to the Monroe Doctrine (as supplemented by certain acts of Pan-American Conferences) by military force and, perhaps in addition, by military alliances. At the moment it seems as if the opinion of the American people, formulated with the help of such data as they now have at their disposal, is in accord with the official policy of maintaining the integrity of the Hemisphere by all necessary means.

But the wish is not necessarily father to the deed. As has been said above, we should not have a policy which is incapable of military implementation; we should not have a diplomatic frontier which does not approximate a defensible military frontier. Sooner or later we must face the question whether we can in fact, whatever our wish, maintain forces capable of resisting both armed invasion and ideological penetration of the twenty republics to the south of our own border. And if we could maintain such forces, what would be

the cost, social as well as financial, of so doing? Or is it conceivable that the political and military objectives of our Latin American policy might not be as well or better served by a narrower delimitation of our diplomatic and military frontiers? If the present policy is to be continued, how shall we construct for it a solid foundation in those elements of power which can resist the assaults of the totalitarian powers?

As military power now involves a vast complex of forces—economic, political, psychological, ideological, racial, religious, geographic, and the like—it is doubtful if an answer to any of these questions can be given in terms of strategic positions and weight of armaments alone. The writer of this article does not pretend to know the answers. But he does know that the problem of cooperation between the United States (and Canada) with the Latin American republics is a complicated and not a simple problem which will not be solved by political pronouncements, however well intended or however honored by past observance. He also knows that there are a good many centrifugal forces at work in Central and South America and that situations may well arise which will be made to order for the sinister methods and purposes of the totalitarian states. It will be universally agreed that it would be a serious threat to the security of the United States, as well as a tragedy of the first magnitude for Latin America itself, if our neighbor republics were to become the stakes of European diplomacy or were to be Balkanized by competitive trade and armament policies devised and fostered by outside influences. To prevent all of this is a task of the first magnitude. It is a problem in military strategy in the first instance. But it is also an economic problem. And it has emotional and psychological factors of far-reaching influence. It will require as much concentrated intelligence, sympathetically applied, as it can be given. It deserves all the effort we can spare. But it also requires cold-blooded, scholarly analysis and appraisal of all the facts in the case, with only such consideration to precedent as seems to be warranted by experience.

Out of such research might come one or more conclusions. It might be found that the concept of hemispheric solidarity has real substance, in which case hemispheric defense may be a less difficult task than appears on the surface. On the other hand, it might be concluded that hemispheric solidarity does not now exist but that effective measures must be taken to make it a reality in a measurable future. Or it might seem to be the part of wisdom to recommend serious consideration of an alternative policy which—to pick such an alternative policy at random—would limit our diplomatic and strategic commitments to an area in the Caribbean and South America which would assure the defense of the Canal Zone and the approaches to this Hemisphere from the west coast of Africa. But whatever the conclusions (which certainly should set forth at some length all the conceivable alternatives available to

us), there can be little doubt of the great utility, as well as the inherent scholarly interest, of a project of this kind. That it would cut across the boundaries of several academic disciplines goes without saying.

The Strategic Position of the United States in the Far East

An inquiry into our strategic position would not attempt to usurp the duties of the professional officer in appraising what is admittedly a complicated and delicate problem. It would rather concern itself with some of the fundamental data of which an understanding is essential to intelligent discussion and conclusions. It would seek to indicate the difference between those causes of conflict in the Pacific which are transitory and those which are likely to endure for some time to come. As in the case of the study of hemispheric defense, it would require a thorough-going, rational examination of the policies which we have heretofore pursued and, should we decide upon their continuance, would seek to determine whether they are capable of effective implementation, both economic and military. In the event that our historic policies require modification, in what respect?

Introspective rather than retrospective scholarship of this kind would seem to be particularly imperative in the case of the Far East because of the entirely new situation created by the formation of the Triple Axis. As Sir Robert Peel once said in another connection, "We walk, if not in danger, at least in darkness." Although there may be some question of the wisdom of isolating a geographical area for examination without reference to our military problem as a whole, it would seem to be justified in the case of the Pacific region as well as in the case of Latin America. And it would, of course, be hoped that the research conducted in Far Eastern affairs would not be hermetically sealed against appropriate reference to world conditions.

The crux of our Far Eastern problem is, of course, the military and imperialistic resurgence of Japan, accompanied by the rapid decline throughout Asia of the prestige and power of the West. To what extent does the Japanese program of a "New Order" menace vital interests of the United States? If we are determined to resist Japanese expansion, what are the means at our disposal? Is it possible for us to maintain, at a cost which we are willing to pay, a military and naval establishment capable of meeting her in her own sphere with reasonable chances of success? Should China and perhaps Russia be made actual if not nominal allies in such a program? To what extent would an economic blockade of Japan (supplemented, if necessary, by long-range naval activity) bring her to terms? What would be the effect upon our internal economy of economic sanctions against Japan? In the circumstances, should we reconsider the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which sets the Philippines free in 1946? If not, should we go further than the Act in reserving military, naval, and commercial aviation bases in the Islands?

Should we fortify Guam? Should we require the use of Singapore or should we consider even its virtual acquisition from Great Britain? What should be the political and military relationships between the United States and Australia and New Zealand in the event of a British defeat by Germany? What should we do, if anything, in the way of denunciation of the Washington Treaties insofar as they still restrict our freedom of action? Or should we continue to observe them because they have heretofore been a concrete expression of our hopes and aspirations?

What part do the Dutch and British East Indies occupy in our economy, particularly with reference to such essential commodities as rubber, tin, and quinine? How far could we locate and encourage other sources of supply (here there would be a tie-up with the hemispheric defense study) or depend upon synthetic substitutes? To what extent would Japanese occupation of these territories be prejudicial to our interests in times less critical than the present? Or would Japanese dependence upon the American market for disposal of East Indian products outweigh our dependence upon the Dutch colonial empire?

Quite aside from such economic and strategic considerations, can the United States stand by and witness the deterioration of international society which would be inherent in a tripartite plundering of the Far East by Germany, Italy, and Japan?

If it be objected that these questions are political rather than military, it must be pointed out that in the Far East (as in certain other regions like the Mediterranean) it is virtually impossible to isolate political factors from military factors. It was the basic premise of the Washington Conference, for example, that there could be no strategic settlement which was not inseparably tied with a political settlement and that there was no possibility of a political and economic realignment unless it were accompanied by compensatory measures of a military and naval character. It was because the Washington Treaties were at first believed to offer an all-round sense of security in the entire Pacific area that they were of genuine significance to international politics and had a marked influence for a time in easing political tension the world over.

Civilian Control of Military Policy

This is a subject to which Professors Lindsay Rogers, of Columbia, and Pendelton Herring, of Harvard, have given some attention. Professor Rogers has published two noteworthy articles in *Foreign Affairs*, and Professor Herring has recently brought out an extensive bibliography of the available materials.² It is understood, however, that neither of them proposes to carry

² *Civil-Military Relations: Bibliographical Notes on Administrative Problems of Civilian Mobilization* (Public Administration Service, Chicago, 1940).

his research much further at this time, except that Professor Herring is conducting a seminar on some phases of the subject at the Littauer School. There is still much to be done on this subject, however, which will require amplification at a later date.

Military Policy as a Problem of Legislation and Administration

The formulation and enactment of legislation dealing with military and naval affairs has heretofore been affected by the character of the American system of government and politics. It is not suggested that the system itself need necessarily be changed. But it is believed that a study of the processes by which legislation is framed and administered would throw a good deal of light on some of our problems of national defense. In the formulation of defense policies, the Executive, the armed forces, private groups, several committees of the House and Senate, and ultimately the Congress as a whole have special rôles to fill. The President's relations with his secretaries of War and of the Navy and with the commissioned officers of the services; the relations between the War and Navy departments, with special reference to the critical question of air power; the planning functions of the Army General Staff, the Office of Naval Operations, the Navy General Board, and other professional bodies; the process of framing estimates within the War and Navy departments; the attitude of the armed services toward civilian cooperation and advice; the relation of these services with Congress in general and with Congressional committees in particular; the activities of private pressure groups in relation to military legislation; the character of Congressional hearings and debates; the influence of sectional rivalries and special economic interests—factual studies of these factors (some of which admittedly would be difficult of documentation) would throw a flood-light upon some of the shortcomings which heretofore have marked our defense system. Such studies, also, would keep in mind the marked influence which war scares, on the one hand, and periods of public apathy, on the other, have had on the processes of legislation. In the political campaign of 1940 all sorts of charges were bandied about by representatives of both parties without cognizance of the patent fact that many of our difficulties are attributable not to individuals but to the system by which military appropriations are determined and are subsequently given effect.

The process of military preparedness begins with planning and legislation but ends with administration. The best planned armament program will fall short of its objectives unless it is intelligently carried into execution. It is an open secret that in the United States the administration of military affairs leaves something to be desired. Some of our shortcomings are well known: the lack of distinction of our secretaries of War and the Navy in the past, for example, and the inability of the President, in view of all the pressing

demands upon his time, to give adequate time to what has heretofore been regarded as a matter which somehow or other would take care of itself. There are other factors which require examination: the recruitment and education of officers; methods of promotion within the commissioned personnel; the organization of the War and Navy departments; the relations between the services, as well as between the several branches of each of the services. Studies of this character would have to be critical of the existing system but not hostile to it; they should be scholarly and not political in character.

Closely connected with all of this is the universally acknowledged necessity of more careful and more far-sighted planning of the national defense in all of its various aspects. Whether we require a Council of National Defense, with a permanent secretariat, or whether a different device would serve our purpose can only be decided after a thorough study has been made of the experiences of other countries—France and Great Britain and, above all, Nazi Germany. For whatever we may think of the Nazi system as a whole, it has demonstrated the importance to military success of a complete integration of national policies, as well as effective collaboration between all branches of the armed establishment.

Conclusion

The topics given above by no means constitute a syllabus of the subject as a whole. There are others which might be mentioned *en passant* and for each of which a detailed prospectus might easily be drafted:

- European Lessons for American Preparedness
- American Economic Power as a Weapon of Defense
- Social Implications of a Military Economy
- Technological Changes in Warfare and Their Influence on World Politics
- Changing Concepts of Peace and War
- Psychological and Emotional Weapons of War: the Crucial Problem of Morale

It is not deemed necessary in this article, however, to indicate more than the possibilities of the field as a whole. There is, indeed, more to be done than any research program could hope to do in several years, and the results of any single project will suggest new approaches and new subjects for investigation.

Perhaps one final question needs to be raised. Is it possible for the scholar to study war and preparedness for war and still maintain his scholarly objectivity? Admittedly, military affairs are closely bound up with powerful emotions, and it is not always easy to view them without patriotic or nationalistic bias. And even if one could, it might not be altogether desirable to do so. Heretofore scholars have largely abandoned the field to others. But igno-

ing a problem or running away from it is no approach to its solution. National defense has always been a powerful motive in American history. It is more so now than ever. If contemporary affairs are any indication of the future, it will continue to be so for some time to come. There is no danger that intelligence will be degraded to the mentality of an old-fashioned drill sergeant just because it concerns itself with military affairs. In fact, militarism occurs only when civilian influence is superseded by the military to such an extent that the latter takes command of national policy. One of the surest ways to avoid the militarization of our world is, within the United States at least, to maintain a considerable body of civilian interest and competence in what is one of the basic problems of all government and, therefore, of self-government: the common defense. In creating and sustaining civilian interest in military affairs the scholar has a special place of responsibility. In discharging an obligation to the nation he can, at the same time, make a valuable contribution to the several branches of the social sciences which, whether they will or no, have found that rearmament has been crowding into their purview with increasing insistence for almost three decades. Surely it is no reflection upon scientific inquiry if, in addition to being worth while of and for itself, it serve the cause of the nation and of democracy in this great human crisis and help to guard against the recurrence of similar crises.

THE ENGLISH SOLDIER IN THE CAMPAIGN OF AGINCOURT

BY WILFRED BRENTON KERR

III. *The Battle of Agincourt*¹

TOWARD morning the rain ceased, and the English, awaking and looking about, found before them a triangle of land among three villages, Maisongelles to the south, Tramecourt to the northeast, Agincourt to the northwest, each set in a small thick wood.² Through the middle of this triangle ran the road to Calais, and between Agincourt and Tramecourt, a distance of three-quarters of a mile, lay the French army blocking the passage. The field between English and French was open, devoid of hedges, thickets, valleys, ravines, or other obstacles, and had been chosen by the French themselves. For our purpose the country was like a table; rarely is a battlefield so simple and easy to describe.³

At the same time on this morning of October 25, 1415, the French were astir. They had foregone any notion of surrounding the English as contrary to fair play and had made their plans for a stand-up fight.⁴ They were soon taking their places in order of battle in the usual three sections. Foremost was a vanguard of five thousand men of arms, all or almost all knights, nobles and gentlemen who expected only a bit of military exercise and wanted for themselves whatever little glory was to be had. They formed a line three deep and packed themselves closely, each man having about two feet of room. The length was the three-quarters of a mile mentioned above, less sufficient room for cavalry and crossbowmen on each end.⁵ With the van were the principal commanders, the constable Charles d'Albret and the Dukes of Orleans

¹ This article is the third part of a study of the life and work of the English soldier in the campaign of 1415. The first two parts, dealing with the siege of Harfleur and the march to Agincourt, were published in this JOURNAL, IV (Spring 1940), 8-29.

² Thomae de Elmham, *Vita & Gesta Henrici Quinti, Anglorum Regis*, ed. by T. Hearne (Oxford, 1727), p. 59, says that Henry sent some noble knights to view the prospective battleground at dawn. This may be, but he is more likely to have gone himself.

³ *Croniques par Waurin*, ed. by W. Hardy (Rolls series, London, 1868), II, 210; J. H. Wylie, *The Reign of Henry the Fifth* (Cambridge, 1914-29), II, 131-32.

⁴ Wylie, *op. cit.*, II, 140-41.

⁵ *Chronique du Religieux de Saint Denys*, ed. by M. L. Bellaguet (Paris, 1844), V, 561, makes the French van 5,000 and says that those in the third rank could hardly use their swords for the press. This indicates three ranks of less than 1,700 men to a rank. Two feet each to these makes less than 3,400 feet or about 1,100 yards. 200 yards for the cavalry (100 on each side) makes 1,300 yards or about the necessary three-quarters of a mile. The calculations are, of course, only rough. The crossbowmen were mostly behind the cavalry. "Elmhami Liber Metricus de Henrico Quinto," *Memorials of Henry V, King of England*, ed. by C. A. Cole (Rolls series, London, 1858), p. 120, makes the French van three times the "Anglica rura," but the former source is a better

and Bourbon. Behind it at an unstated interval came the main and rear, so close together that the English chronicler speaks of them as one.⁶ About eighteen or twenty thousand in number, they were all on horses to the surprise of the English; behind them were the servants, the whole appearing an "innumerable multitude" to their opponents. The commanders of the main were the Dukes of Bar and Alençon, but it appears that they left their posts to join the fray in front. On each flank of the van the French placed bodies of mounted men, two or three hundred strong. They found room behind these horsemen and the van for detachments of crossbowmen and worked in a few stone-throwers and a field-gun or two between the van and the main. The high command intended to send the flank squadrons of cavalry against the English archers and override them. The crossbowmen and stone-throwers might get a little practise on the English men of arms while the French lances, with their great superiority of numbers, made short work of the combat. The plan was sound and could not have failed of success had it been executed as it was conceived.⁷ By the English accounts and one good French story, many of the French treated the coming encounter as a joke; but certainly others took it seriously, forgave injuries, and embraced each other. The confidence of the French has drawn the unanimous scorn of historians, but the circumstances actually appeared to justify their assurance—no one laying a bet at the time would have placed his money on the English.⁸


Meanwhile the English, a mile away, watched the French ordering themselves, the cavalry forming on each side of the front line and the line itself

authority for the French. *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre, Seigneur de Saint Rémy*, ed. by F. Morand (Société de l'Histoire de France, Paris, 1876), I, 255, says that some of the front rank had cut the shafts of their lances short to get a better push.

⁶ *Henrici Quinti, Angliae Regis Gesta*, ed. by Benjamin Williams (London, 1850), pp. 49, 55, mentions only "anterior acies" and "bellum posterius," and again "bellum equestre posterius," not "postremum." But in "Elmhams Liber Metricus," p. 120, the same author acknowledges "hinc equitum turmis acies sunt posteriores."

⁷ The dispositions of the French from *Henrici Quinti*, p. 49; *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 246-49; and "Elmhams Liber Metricus," p. 120. That the French had some stone-throwers appears from Titus Livius, *Vita Henrici Quinti Regis Angliae*, ed. by T. Hearne (Oxford, 1716), p. 17, and from *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 247. That they had at least one gun from Joseph Hunter, *Agincourt, A Contribution towards an Authentic List of the Commanders of the English Host in King Henry the Fifth's Expedition to France in the Third Year of His Reign* (London, 1850), p. 36, which records the death of an archer from it. As *Henrici Quinti* and "Elmhams Liber Metricus" are silent, however, the amount and effect of this artillery must have been negligible. The number of cavalry is much in dispute: *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 255, has 80 on each side; "Chronique de Ruisseauville," *Archives Historiques et Littéraires du Nord de la France et du Midi de la Belgique*, IV (Valenciennes, 1834), 140, says there were only a few; a mean between *Henrici Quinti*, p. 49, and "Elmhams Liber Metricus," p. 120, indicates between 200 and 300.

⁸ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 49; "Elmhams Liber Metricus," p. 119; "Chronique de Ruisseauville," p. 144; *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 249. Most of the crossbowmen were left with the main division; there was no room for them in front and no use for them until the English archers were out of the way.



THE BATTLE OF AGINCOURT

From C. L. Kingsford, *Henry V* (New York, 1901).

like a forest of lances with masses of shining helmets. The chaplain chronicler thought the French thirty to one of the English but was in no good mood for statistics.⁹ Certainly Henry's men knew that they were greatly outnumbered. They were soaked by the rain and little refreshed by their sleep or the breakfast which cannot have been ample after a week of short rations, and many of the archers were hatless and barefoot for the march had wrought havoc with clothing and boots.¹⁰ They can have been in no gay mood, but, spared by national habit from lively forebodings, they were ready to do their best. Henry, fresh from three masses, appeared in harness and surcoat emblazoned with the arms of England and France, a fine bassinet and a golden crown on his head. He was riding a little gray horse without spurs to be the readier for action.¹¹ He asked what time of day it was. "Prime," was the response. "Now is good time," he said, "for all of England prayeth for us. Therefore be of good cheer and let us go to our day's work."¹² He ordered the men out of the village, omitting the usual trumpet calls in the interest of better hearing, and presently drew them up in front of the wood of Maisoncelles in a field of young green wheat, remarking, "Keep all together and be of good cheer."¹³ The sick, the baggage, and the chaplains remained for the time in Maisoncelles with the pages, most of whom were Henry's, and the horses. Henry told off ten lances and twenty archers, who might have thought this a bit of luck but apparently did not, to guard the assortment in the village and asked the Duke of York to take command of them. The Duke refused the sinecure for the honor of leading the van, and Henry was compelled to choose a gentleman whose name is not given.¹⁴

The men of arms now took their places in line in their three sections separated by spaces: the van under the Duke on the right, the rear under Lord Camoys on the left, and the main body in the center with Henry. About his station floated five banners, his own and those of the Trinity, the Virgin, St. George, and St. Edward in token of his claim for divine aid. At intervals

⁹ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 49.

¹⁰ *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 254, a celebrated description echoed by *Croniques par Waurin*, II, 212, and *La Chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet*, ed. by L. Douët-d'Arcq (Paris, 1859), III, 106. "Chronique de Ruisseauville," p. 139, notes that most of the archers had no armor and had rolled their hose down.

¹¹ *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 244, for Henry's appearance. Titus Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 16, and Elmham, *op. cit.*, p. 61, agree but give him a white horse and others on lead.

¹² *The Brut*; or, *The Chronicles of England*, ed. by F. W. D. Brie (London, 1906-08), pp. 378-79; "The Siege of Harflet and Battle of Agincourt" (two versions: one in Elmham, *op. cit.*, pp. 359-75; the second, attributed to Lydgate, in N. H. Nicolas, *The History of the Battle of Agincourt and of the Expedition of King Henry the Fifth into France* [London, 1827], pp. 249-62). I have inserted "day's work" in place of the original "journey" to give the modern meaning of this old French term.

¹³ *The Brut*, pp. 378-79.

¹⁴ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 50; *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 245; Titus Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 16; "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 120.

in the line appeared the banners of the captains, conspicuous among whom were the Dukes of Gloucester and York and the Earls of March, Oxford, and Kent. Like Henry, the captains had on their surcoats in spite of the slight handicap for fighting. He could not afford to form his men in depth as did the French; he was obliged to put them in one formation as long as that of his opponents. He arranged the men of arms three deep like the French and in places four, but he gave each more room, three feet at the least. For the archers he had a slightly unusual plan. He expected the French to begin the battle with a grand cavalry charge against his bowmen. Accordingly, while leaving most of them in their normal position on the flanks, he placed detachments in the spaces between the sections of lances in order to bring an inside flank fire on the charging horsemen. It would not do to let these archers stay in the line for the clash with the French men of arms, but Henry must have hoped for time enough after the cavalry charge to send them back to the flanks and to close the ranks of his lances. In accord with this plan, the archers, marshaled by Thomas Erpingham, took their places at the sides and in the line, four and five deep, and planted their stakes in front of them. Some of them had pieces of armor, purchased or picked up, but most had not. They had rolled their hose beneath their knees for freer action, and they stood with bows and arrows ready and their striking weapons at their belts.¹⁵ A few French scouts rode up, took a look, and went away;¹⁶ but the French line did not move.

The delay of the battle was actually of Henry's own contrivance. In the previous evening he had sent heralds to the French to ask for a parley; now the French deputies arrived and the parley took place between the lines. By one account the French offered him a passage to Calais and the *status quo* in Guienne and Picardy if he would surrender Harfleur and his claim to the throne of France. The English made a counter-offer of Harfleur and the claim in exchange for certain small increases of territory, the hand of Princess Katharine for Henry, and a cash dowry. By another account, which accords better with the market conditions for such a transaction, Henry offered Harfleur, all the forts in Picardy except Calais, and an indemnity of one hundred thousand crowns for a passage. In neither case does the story-teller profess

¹⁵ Titus Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 17, says that at most there were four ranks of lances. There would have been not less than three to match the French; the four would have been about the standards. 900 men of arms, three to four deep, a yard to each, would occupy about 260 yards; the less than 5000 archers, allowing for casualties on the march, four or five deep, would occupy about 1100 yards. The total of 1360 yards is about the three-quarters of a mile necessary. The calculations cannot be exact, but they yield a rough equality with the French line. It is usually said that the archers were in wedges. This comes from the word "cuneus" in *Henrici Quinti*, p. 50, but "cuneus" means only "detachment" as in *ibid.*, pp. 44, 46, 129.

¹⁶ T. Walsingham, *The St. Alban's Chronicle, 1406-20*, ed. by V. H. Galbraith (Oxford, 1937), p. 94.

more than hearsay for his source; certainly no agreement was reached. In a short time the deputies returned to their lines.¹⁷

Henry then called a council of the leading captains, and they all agreed that they must bring on a battle or perish of starvation. At this moment three Frenchmen rode up. Chief of them was the Lord of Helly, who, once a prisoner in England, had broken his parole and escaped. Now he said he wanted a duel to clear his good name. Henry could not waste time on trifles; he charged the visitor with his misdeed and predicted that he would be either a captive again or a corpse by the end of the day. Turning to more serious business, he asked the three when the French would attack. Their answer was, when they saw fit. Henry bade them be gone and declared that his army would be at their heels.¹⁸ First he addressed his men, recalling the famous English victories over the French;¹⁹ he had a special word for the archers whose freedom from armor might tempt them to trust in their legs and the grand principle of safety first.

"Sirs and fellows, yonder army think to block our way and they will not come unto us. Let every man prove himself a good man this day and forward banner in the best time of the year; for as I am true king and knight, for me this day England shall never pay ransom. First many a man shall forfeit his life for here rather I will be done to death." He turned to the lances, "And therefore, gentlemen, for the love of sweet Jesus, help maintain England's right this day"; and to the archers, "Also, archers, to you I pray, no foot that ye flee away, else be we all beaten in this field; and think, be Englishmen that never would flee at no battle, for against one of us though there be ten, think Christ will help us in our right." Last he prayed, "But I would no blood were spilt (Christ help me so now in this case) except of those that are the cause of this sinful deed. When thou sittest in judgment, there hold me excused before thy face, as thou art God omnipotent. But pass we now

¹⁷ *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 251-52; "Chronique de Ruisseauville," p. 139. The latter account, which is entirely credible, vouches for the dispatch of heralds the previous evening. There has been much controversy about this parley. *Chronique du Religieux de Saint Denys*, V, 555, assigns it to the evening of the 24th and gives terms much like those in "Chronique de Ruisseauville," Henry offering to make reparations for the damage done and to restore his conquests. "Chronique de Pierre de Févin," *Collections des Memoires Relatifs à l'Histoire de la France*, ed. by Michaud and Poujoulat, 3rd ser., vol. I (Paris, 1857), p. 588, assigns it to the morning of the 25th. The only allusion to it in the English accounts may be that in "Siege of Harflet," in Elmham, *op. cit.*, p. 368, which says that Helly, "a true knight," came to Henry and besought him to yield and save himself and his army. This misunderstands both Helly's purpose and character but contains a hint of the parley.

¹⁸ Titus Livius, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19. This affair is mentioned in "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 188, but is misplaced, and in "Siege of Harflet," in Elmham, *op. cit.*, p. 368, but is misinterpreted. "Chronique de Pierre de Févin," p. 588, also has it.

¹⁹ "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 121. There may be some question as to how Henry addressed a line of men three-quarters of a mile long; probably he rode along it and repeated the speech four or five times.

all in fear, duke, earl and bachelor. Of all our sins he make us free, gentle Jesus born of Mary; and as for us thou didst die on Good Friday as thy will was, so bring us to bliss on high and grant us there to have a place. Do and bete on fast."²⁰ The tense phrases, the appeal to national prestige, the prayer in case of the worst, all so pregnant of zero hour, helped to rouse every soldierly instinct.

Henry had told the priests, the heralds, and the officer in charge of the baggage to wait in Maisonneelles for the end of the fight, but bands of local French were gathering about the village and eyeing the baggage greedily. The officer reported their presence to the king, and Henry sent for him, his charges, and associates to come and stand in rear of the line. The priests, pages, heralds, and some of the drivers obeyed; and the first betook themselves to their prayers and service-books on Henry's behalf. A few drivers of the royal baggage were slow, however, and the ten lances and twenty archers, sharing the Duke of York's opinion, had gone off to help their comrades in the battle. Hence it was easy for a group of plunderers to pounce on the baggage and carry off a considerable booty, over two hundred pounds cash and most of the horses.²¹

Henry was too busy to notice the absence of his treasure carts at the time. He sent the old knight Thomas Erpingham to make a final arrangement of the archers for he could now see from the limited number of the French cavalry that he need not fear a grand charge by several thousands of the enemy. He might as well send the interior detachments of archers back to their normal stations on the flanks; it was necessary to do this in any case if the English were to make the attack. Erpingham conducted the detachments to the main bodies of their comrades and drew all the archers a little to the front, and the men of arms closed line. As final steps Erpingham rode along the line with two attendants, delivering final instructions to the archers and putting in another word of exhortation on the king's behalf for a vigorous combat, and threw up a warder from his hand as a sign that all was ready.²² He then returned to his place beside Henry who was by this time on foot behind his banner. Henry made the sign of the cross and called for an advance in the name of Jesus, the Virgin, and St. George.²³ The English knelt, took morsels of earth in their mouths for a sort of communion (as Erpingham had doubtless suggested), and then rose and gave a great cheer to hearten themselves. With this they marched forward, some shouting continually and all

²⁰ This speech, of which I have given a free rendering, is given in *Chronicles of London*, ed. by C. L. Kingsford (Oxford, 1905), pp. 119-20, and in Nicolas, *op. cit.*, pp. 234-35.

²¹ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 50; *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 257; "Chronique de Ruisseauville," pp. 140-41; Wylie, *op. cit.*, II, 170-71. The second of these is the only one to account for the absence of the guard.

²² *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 253.

²³ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 50; "Elmhani Liber Metricus," p. 121; *The Brut*, pp. 578-79.

repeating the cheer twice. They halted at least once to dress the line and to rest, a mile being a long distance for a man of arms and the earth sticky. The archers naturally outpaced their heavier comrades and began shooting at the French as soon as they were within any sort of range.²⁴

The French of course observed this advance which must have taken fifteen to twenty minutes. The constable Charles d'Albret ordered the flank squadrons of cavalry to charge the archers when these seemed near enough, perhaps two hundred yards or more away. Here for the first time things went wrong; only half or fewer of the men assigned to the job had made their appearance. Those present obeyed the order but could make no great speed over the softish ground. The archers had time to plant their stakes and to deliver rapid fire on the assailants while the men of arms must have halted. Some of the French horses went down before the arrows; most of them, as the story goes, took fright, turned about, and ran off with their riders. In this way the charge on the side of Tramecourt came to grief; but on that of Agincourt, three Frenchmen, including Guillaume de Saveuses, actually reached the stakes and forced a way through them as the wet soil afforded little hold. Their horses floundered with the effort, however, and the archers soon pulled the men off and killed them. A few horsemen at each end of the line got between the archers and the woods of Tramecourt and Agincourt, but the archers sniped at them and brought down one or two, the rest disappearing from our accounts and presumably from the field. Thus the charge of the cavalry had failed.²⁵

It is hard to believe that horses and riders alike were as untrained as the story suggests. Since it was possible to reach the stakes with an effort like Guillaume's, one suspects that the horses were less at fault than the riders. These may have thought that they need not trouble themselves much in view of the great superiority of their side. In the flight or retirement they suffered more loss from the arrows. Some of the horses now really went out of control and ran along in front of the French van. The men of arms opened their ranks to let their luckless cavalry through, but they managed to reform line pretty well and spread out over the vacant flank space, filling it entirely after the disappearance of the crossbowmen. The mud had played its part in the battle in slowing the cavalry but was the same for the men on foot of both sides.²⁶

²⁴ "Chronique de Ruisseauville," p. 139; *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 253-54. The former says that the battle began at 10 a. m. Titus Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 19, says that the English advanced in the usual order of sections, van first, main next, and rear last; this is quite incredible, and no other source assumes anything but an advance in line; Titus Livius may have misunderstood Gloucester.

²⁵ *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 255; *Henrici Quinti*, p. 52; "Chronique de Ruisseauville," p. 140; *Chronique de Religieux de Saint Denys*, V, 561.

²⁶ *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 256, and all the French accounts lay much of the French defeat to the gaps in the van caused by the fleeing cavalry, but *Henrici Quinti*,



ARCHERS PROTECTED BY STAKES

From a contemporary monogram reproduced in Georg Liche, Der Soldat in der deutschen Vergangenheit (Leipzig, 1899).

The English line moved forward again until its flanks, like those of the French, touched the woods of Agincourt and Tramecourt and the space between the lines was about one hundred yards. The archers halted, and the men of arms began to advance by themselves. This, if any, was the time for the French crossbowmen. They discharged a volley but were too quick about it. Most of the bolts fell between the lines, and the others injured only a very few of the English. The stone-throwers and field-guns also fired and killed one English archer.²⁷ But the archers concentrated on the crossbowmen and quickly put them out of action, the survivors retiring. Then they delivered their warmest barrage on the French line while the men of arms continued forward shouting to each other to do their best.²⁸

p. 53, has the same van moving forward shortly "plena fronte" which indicates that the gaps, if any, were of little importance. So also "Histoire d'Artus III, Duc de Bretagne et Comte de Richemont," *Collections des Memoires Relatifs à l'Histoire de la France*, ed. by Michaud and Poujoulat, 3rd ser., vol. I (Paris, 1857), p. 188.

²⁷ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 52; Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 36. The archer slain by the gun was Roger Hunt in the retinue of James Harington.

²⁸ The movements of the English line are not described in any of our sources and must be inferred from stray phrases. The line must have halted when the cavalry commenced to charge; and a cavalry charge needs 200 yards or more. *Henrici Quinti*, p. 53, says that at the clash both flanks merged into the woods on either side of the armies. The English line must have come forward from its position in receipt of the cavalry charge when there had been room for a few horsemen to run about between the archers and the woods. For the last position of the line we must rely on (1) the reports of the barrage as hot and heavy, which means having a range of 200 yards or more, and (2) the short shooting of the crossbowmen, whose effective range was from 40 to 60 yards. The archers would not have ventured closer in the interest of their personal safety and of the effective use of their weapons. That the men of arms

The French had been preparing themselves for the shock. The constable Charles d'Albret, the marshal Boucicault, and the princes exhorted them also to do their best; trumpets and clarions seconded the effort. Before the storm of arrows the men who had shields raised them; the others bent their heads to avoid being struck on the face. Some were injured, especially on the flanks, but the majority were unhurt. They made the sign of the cross, bade farewell to each other, and, when the English line was only twenty paces away, slowly moved forward shouting "Montjoie."²⁹ For the first half-minute they kept a good line;³⁰ had they maintained it, attacking English archers and men of arms simultaneously, they would have won the battle. Instead they became excited and began a pell-mell rush toward the three principal standards of the English. They struck the English line in three wedges;³¹ lances mingled and at first the French had the advantage, pushing back the line a spear's length while Henry's dismayed clerics redoubled their prayers. But the English gathered against the wedges, pushed in their turn, and recovered the lost ground. The set-to became furious as the other French of the van pressed up to their comrades, but the fighting remained pretty well confined to the area of the three principal banners and especially the King's. Eighteen French gentlemen had sworn to knock Henry's crown off his head or die in the attempt. One got near enough to strike a fleuron off the crown with his sword, but all were soon slain and the crown remained.³² At one time Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, received a sword wound and was thrown prostrate. He was in imminent peril, but Henry himself bestrode his brother and saved him.³³ The outermost and hindmost Frenchmen began to fear that they would miss their share of the fray and pushed toward the points of combat. Here a little discretion was needed. They could easily have poured around the ends or through the gaps which must have appeared in the English line by this time and come at their enemies from the rear. Or they could have taken over the fighting in relays and soon have tired the English out. But neither of these did they do; instead they jammed themselves together. The live, pushing forward, fell over the dead in front; others were killed over them so that presently there grew three heaps of dead and prostrate to the height of a man. Some of the English jumped on the heaps and wielded

moved to the shock alone is indicated by "cum accessum prope mutuum utrimque fecissent armati" (*Henrici Quinti*, p. 53). The English shouts to each other are mentioned in *Chronique de Religieux de Saint Denys*, V, 561.

²⁹ *Chronique de Religieux de Saint Denys*, V, 561; *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*. I. 254-55; *Henrici Quinti*, p. 53.

³⁰ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 53.

³¹ "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 121.

³² *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 250; "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 121.

³³ Titus Livius, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20; *Henrici Quinti*, p. 59; "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 121. Titus Livius speaks of only two French "horns" attacking the English line, but Gloucester's memory doubtless led to a slip here.

swords and axes on whatever heads and throats they could see. Thus far the English were holding their own, but nothing decisive had yet been done. The heaps need not have contained more than forty or fifty men each, and the French could well spare that many. It was now the turn of the archers.³⁴

They had stopped while the men of arms went forward to the clash. They now poured volleys into the sides of the French van until their arrows were exhausted. Then, no doubt acting on order although no authority says so, they threw down their bows, took axes and swords or picked up staves and ends of lances lying around, and rushed to the aid of their men of arms. By this time the French van was in disorder, most of it about the three points of combat, the rest in groups. The archers got into the gaps and assailed their armed opponents. Some even wrested away the axes with which they proceeded to fell the owners. The French, their attention concentrated in front, were taken aback by this onslaught and did not defend themselves properly.³⁵ "Slothful, amateurish, timid, unmanly" were the adjectives of the chaplain chronicler; they "defended themselves poorly," said the experienced Le Fèvre; and the informants of Walsingham had the same tale to tell.³⁶ The procedure was not without its risk, however, and most of the English casualties seem to have occurred among the archers in this struggle. But in the main it was successful, and the French men of arms fell by the hundred. Some escaped from the *mêlée*; others tried to surrender and offered themselves to Englishman after Englishman in vain.³⁷ The English were in frenzy, thinking only of destroying active opponents and deaf to others. Their men of arms took advantage of the pressure exerted by the archers, worked forward into the French van, and put it out of action. With success, the English grew calmer; they took prisoners by the hundred and were so busy at it that some of the French got away with the help of their valets. Presently Henry gathered his men for an attack on the main French body.

The French van had shown courage if little discretion; with but two ex-

³⁴ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 55.

³⁵ The charge of the archers appears in most of the documents: *Henrici Quinti*, pp. 53-54; *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 256; *Chronique de Religieux de Saint Denys*, V, 563; "Chronique de Pierre de Fénelin," p. 588. It is omitted from "Chronique de Ruisseauville" and slurred over in Titus Livius, *op. cit.*, and Elmham, *op. cit.*, perhaps because Gloucester did not see much of the battle.

³⁶ *Henrici Quinti*, pp. 53-54; *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 256. Walsingham, *op. cit.*, p. 96, says, "When the French saw so many prostrate whom they had thought insuperable, they were struck with fear, stood immobile and senseless while our men took the axes from their hands and cut them down like cattle with them." Walsingham had not much idea of the battle, into which he imports descriptions and quotations from the classics, but he has a few genuine details. When Le Fèvre condemned the defense, he was speaking about the main division of the French army but was really thinking of the van, as the main was not engaged.

³⁷ The phrase "je me rends" in "Siege of Harflet," in Elmham, *op. cit.*, p. 373, may, of course, well report what the soldiers heard.

ceptions the main and rear were to show neither. It seems incredible that during the two or three hours ascribed to the battle, twenty thousand Frenchmen should stand and watch their comrades of the van being slaughtered or captured.³⁸ An attack on the rear of the English archers would have drawn them off at any time and enabled the van to recover. Even the few hundred horsemen who had run away in the first few minutes could now have redeemed their reputation and saved the day by such an obvious effort. Strange as it seems, the great body of the French had no notion of doing anything except, indeed, of removing their artillery. Instead, when the van had met its fate and the English approached the others, most of them simply turned and fled.

Two of the French leaders had a better idea for the occasion. Anthoine, Duke of Brabant, a younger brother of the Duke of Burgundy, reached the field late, rushed into the fight, and met his fate. The Admiral of France, Clignet de Brabant, rallied a considerable number of men in the rear and prepared to attack the English. The latter observed the movement and raised a clamor of alarm.³⁹ Henry let his nerves get the better of him and proclaimed orders to the sound of a trumpet that each man must kill his prisoner or prisoners except the dukes and a few other notables lest they join with Clignet's force and reverse the fortune of the day. Both French and English protested loudly against the order, and the English refused it. They naturally did not want to lose the ransoms, but we need not deny them a repugnance on humanitarian grounds. Henry then told an officer and a band of archers to do the job. They led out some of the first captives before the French and made a start at it but were not at all zealous; the other soldiers may have put on a little show of killing to please Henry as William Wolf, mentioned below, seems to have done. They had a good precedent for slackness; Henry and his staff, with a fine eye to profit, were carefully saving their own prisoners from the consequences of the order.⁴⁰

In the meantime Henry sent other archers against Clignet's force and shortly led a detachment of men of arms to their support. At the first arrows the French abandoned the field in panic, only a few on foot remaining to be dealt with by the English men of arms. Henry cancelled his order about the

³⁸ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 55; *Chronique de Religieux de Saint Denys*, V, 561; and Titus Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 19, all agree on two or three hours. "Chronique de Ruisseauville," p. 140, has half an hour which is rather tempting, the suddenness explaining the dismay of the French main and rear, but it must be rejected in view of the other figures.

³⁹ "Elmhami Liber Metricus," p. 122.

⁴⁰ For a description of this massacre and the controversy about it, see *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 258; *The Chronicle of John Hardyng*, ed. by H. Ellis (London, 1812); "Elmhami Liber Metricus," pp. 122-23; "Siege of Harflet," in Elmham, *op. cit.*, p. 375, and in Nicolas, *op. cit.*, p. 262; and *Chronique de Religieux de Saint Denys*, V, 569. The recall of the order is implied in the last named source, V, 565; the saving of the royal prisoners, in *Henrici Quinti*, p. 56.



ENGLISH ARCHERS AT AGINCOURT

From a drawing by Henry Ford in C. R. L. Fletcher and Rudyard Kipling, A History of England (Garden City, 1934).

prisoners. The English captured the French baggage and found carts and wagons filled with arrows, bows, lances, and, most important, food; they promptly enjoyed their first real meal of a week.⁴¹ Now it was safe to resurrect the prisoners. Many soldiers and the few tradesmen and servants sold their men to Henry and the nobles. One of the actors in the stage-massacre,

⁴¹ *Henrici Quinti*, p. 56. Titus Livius, *op. cit.*, p. 20, has another story, that Henry sent heralds to Clignet and threatened to kill the noble prisoners unless he withdrew. Henry may have sent the herald and dispatched the van of archers after him to make the strongest impression on the French.

William Wolf, esquire of the Earl of Arundel, was in a difficulty about his important prisoner, the Seneschal of France, and waited until the arrival at Calais before he confessed and delivered his charge to the king. After their meal the English went back over the field and resumed the sorting out of the heaps of men with some pity for the slain. Henry detailed five hundred men to do the work systematically. They and the others took surcoats and armor from the prostrate figures and separated the dead from the living. Of the living, those likely to survive were taken up and given some care. The Count of Richemont was drawn out from under two or three corpses, recognized and brought to Henry. Gilbert de Lannoy, with ten or twelve others, was removed to a house for shelter; the house was later set on fire and he barely managed to escape. He attributed the fire to a deliberate intention to burn the captives but no doubt mistook the motive, some soldier probably thinking that all inside were corpses which ought to be disposed of.⁴² We may suppose that the other seriously wounded were removed to the villages and left.

The living whose cases seemed hopeless, French and English alike, were put to death. The armor and other property were gathered into heaps and taken to Maisoncelles. While the English were thus occupied, the country people assisted them unasked. They searched the hedges for fugitives, and, when they came on servants or pages unprotected by men of arms, they killed them mercilessly for the plunder. Next came the question of burial. The English gathered the bodies of their own men into a barn, placed in it the booty that could not be carried off, and burned everything.⁴³ The French corpses that could not be identified were put into three great trenches by direction of the ecclesiastical authorities of the locality, and there they remain near the wood of Tramecourt to this day. The French had lost twenty-four hundred killed, knights and upwards in rank, and perhaps a few commoners. The English had lost only a handful, including the Dukes of York and Oxford and the young Earl of Suffolk; they accepted it generally that the total was about twenty killed. The truth is impossible to ascertain, but the figure is likely to be less than one hundred.⁴⁴

That evening Henry entertained his noble captives at dinner and discussed with them the fortune of the day. He described it as a visitation on the part of God, the Virgin, and St. George for the sins of the French, their pride and riotous lives, their violation of women, and their robbery of the country people and the churches. The English on the other hand had deserved success; they had violated no women, robbed no men or churches, even burnt no cot-

⁴² Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 25; "Chronique de Ruisseauville," p. 142; "Histoire d'Artus III," p. 188; Wylie, *op. cit.*, II, 172, quotes Lannoy's *Oeuvres*, pp. 50, 187, for the latter's experiences.

⁴³ "Chronique de Ruisseauville" pp. 142, 144; *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 260.

⁴⁴ Wylie, *op. cit.*, II, 183-89, 217-29; Nicolas, *op. cit.*, appendix LXXVII.

tages according to Henry's declaration, though this last is hard to believe.⁴⁵ In this form Henry's theory does not commend itself to modern minds, inclined to stress Henry's wanton aggressions and the natural resistance of the French. But it has a grain of truth in that the English had displayed a better self-restraint and a better heed of their leaders' orders than had the French, virtues which bring solid military advantages. They were in a situation which brought out their best qualities. The imminence and obviousness of the danger had remedied the lack of imagination so normal to Englishmen and given their intelligence full play. They had shown the individual virtues of strength, skill, and discernment of opportunities with the mass virtues of cohesion and cooperation. They had committed no mistake and had acted as veterans. The part of the archers is especially notable; indeed, they had won the battle, but in the capacity of personal combatants rather than of masters of a craft according to the popular impression. The French on the other hand were in a situation which allowed free play to their worst qualities, their pride and confidence in their individual abilities. Having such an overwhelming superiority, they had not taken their enemy seriously and had hardly bothered to make preparations. They had not assigned enough cavalry to ride down the archers and had not brought up anything like the numbers assigned. The men of arms of the van had gotten in each other's way and spoiled their part of the fight. The leaders had exposed themselves to death or capture in the van and had thereby dissolved the organization. But the worst fault lay with the main and rear. Even without leaders they should have made the obvious attack on the English archers assailing the van; but supinely they watched their comrades and leaders go down before the English, then took to flight themselves. Cowardice and lack of wit are no normal attributes of the French, and in this case they sprang from an unpreparedness which in turn derived from overconfidence. This was the root of the French defeat. Had they had a quarter of their actual numbers, they would have made a much better showing. The battle of Agincourt was in fact no true test of the relative merits of English and French soldiery; it rather exhibited the English at their best and the French at their worst.

That night the army lodged in Maisoncelles again in the rain. Next morning they searched the field once more for men yet alive, and those whom they found they made captives or put to death according to the degree of vitality. At last they made ready to march, and in the afternoon they departed, Henry stopping for a final look at the field. The prisoners marched between the van and the main, and progress was made without incident, though the men sorely missed their horses. Three days later, October 29, the army reached the area

⁴⁵ "Chronique de Ruisseauville," p. 142. *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 261, has a speech somewhat like this but assigns it to a conversation between the King and Orleans on the march to Calais.

of Calais. Here they obtained a little food at extortionate rates, and here they disposed of most of their prisoners. Henry, lodging in comfort in the castle of Guines, learned that his men were in difficulties and tried to procure boats to take them across the channel, but it was not possible to reassemble the fleet of August. He allowed two shillings passage money for each man and each horse, letting them make their own arrangements. In this manner the soldiers found their way by groups to Dover, Sandwich, Southampton, Portsmouth, and Hull and dispersed to their homes in an informal demobilization. Their pay went on until the king had landed in England on November 16 so that they had a little bonus.⁴⁶

The bands which returned were in most cases far from identical with those which had gaily set out in August. Richard de Kighley had led from Lancashire one company of five men of arms and eighteen archers and another of fifty archers. Of the first, one man of arms had died of sickness, two had returned sick, Richard and four archers had been killed in the battle, and two men of arms and fourteen archers arrived home in safety. Of the second, six died of illness at the siege, ten returned sick, eight remained in garrison, seven were taken prisoners on October 24, and nineteen came through the battle without a scratch. The first company had had rather hard luck in the battle; the second rather good. It may be presumed that their experiences must have been fairly typical. When the channel was crossed, hardships were forgotten, casualties became a memory, and the men could look back on a wonderful ten weeks. They had taken a city, made a long march, fought a great battle, and had extraordinary success. They had seen something of France and of a civilization different from their own and more luxurious. They had had all the ups and downs of a soldier's life—short rations one minute and plenty the next, rain one day and sun the day after, the fields one night and a house the following, with every hour bringing something fresh, agreeable or not. They had felt the depth of gloom and the joy of deliverance. Glory had been gained and at least something more tangible for everyone while the canny had lined their pockets well. Life for a short space had been full and varied. Wherefore the men were "greatly joyous" on their return, proud of their achievements and acquisitions;⁴⁷ no doubt through their lives they cherished the memory of this adventure into France in the autumn of 1415.

⁴⁶ *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 260-62; "Chronique de Pierre de Fémin," p. 588; Wylie, *op. cit.*, II, 248-52. *Chronique de Religieux de Saint Denys*, V, 569-71, gives Henry a final speech to his troops on leaving the field, but no English document mentions it.

⁴⁷ *Chronique de Jean le Fèvre*, I, 263.

MILITARY PUNISHMENTS IN THE WAR OF 1812

BY JOHN S. HARE

THE War of 1812, the first of military importance after the close of the Revolution, was fought almost entirely by men drawn from the pursuits of peace time activities after hostilities became imminent. There were but few towns or cities, and the great part of the population was essentially rural. Most of the people lived on the frontier or what had been the frontier only a short time before, but they were frontiersmen in a limited sense of that term. They were abler with the ax than the rifle.

The occupants of the region back from the coastal plain were restless, unstable, and migratory in their tendencies. Here were to be found men of ability and worth, men who would develop into leaders as the area changed; but here also were the economic misfit, the ne'er-do-well, and the man who had left his former home only a few jumps ahead of the sheriff. Communication was difficult and each small community to a considerable degree was self-sufficient. The constant movement of population prevented the formation of strong commercial or social ties, and as a result there was a general lack of cohesiveness and of community of interest. Self-interest and egoism operated in this back country to make men resentful of direction or supervision and disinclined to submit to the control of others.

The protection of property, honor, and life lay largely with the individual. Gentlemen settled their differences with the pistol, the rifle, or the hunting knife under the dueling code. Those lower in the social scale were less formal; assassinations were not infrequent, and personal fights were common. Since few restraints existed as a result of either law or public opinion, these encounters were almost indescribably brutal. The vanquished sometimes had an eye gouged out or a nose or ear bitten off. Not infrequently the face or chest of a fallen foe was crushed in by the hob-nailed boot of the victor, and in some communities emasculation of a prostrate and helpless antagonist was not condemned by local sentiment.

If the individual was cruel and brutal in his passion, he but exemplified the spirit of his age. In a place and time of little money fines could not easily be collected; many communities did not possess jails, and those that did, found confinement an ineffective deterrent to lawlessness. Simon Kenton, as Justice of the Peace in western Ohio, sentenced minor offenders to be whipped with hickory switches. Obnoxious individuals were sometimes given a coat of tar and feathers and carried from the community astride a rail. The pillory, the stocks, and the whipping post were in general use or had only recently been abandoned. Cropping and branding were common, and there was always

a large audience to enjoy and applaud the execution of a malefactor by the hangman. Jails were veritable pest houses and sinks of iniquity. The insane were exposed, starved, frozen, and beaten, and the public had not yet awakened to the need for a change. Debtors died in prison and sailors were whipped to death at sea while popular opinion was indifferent. The sports of the people reflected this attitude of indifference to suffering; a dog match or a cock fight was easily arranged and enjoyed, and many a festive group applauded the victor in the gentle sport of gander pulling. Large quantities of whiskey were consumed by men alone or in groups. Standards of morality were not high; "woods colts" were numerous, and the regulations of the United States Army authorized the issue of rations to one "washerwoman" for every seventeen soldiers.

At the beginning of the war, the Regular Army was small, and the monetary inducements offered to recruits were not such as to draw into the ranks of the service many above the lowest social stratum. When the war opened and the number of men in service was increased by recruiting and by the mustering of the state militia into federal service, the Regular Army force was hopelessly unequal in number and in quality to the task of leavening the mass of new recruits and of infusing it with an *esprit de corps*. Generally, Regular and militia regiments served in the same contingents and maintained their original organizations intact. Militia regiments were under the command of officers elected by their subordinates without particular regard for their military qualifications. These officers were retained after their units were transferred to federal control, which meant that in the new organization inexperienced officers were faced with the herculean task of establishing and maintaining discipline among men to whom the very idea of restraint was repellant, and of doing this in the shortest possible time. To accomplish this any practice of rewards would have been hopelessly inadequate. Only a system of pains and penalties could get the necessary results, and the great deterrent of fear was relied upon.

The pressures brought to bear upon the recruit may be described loosely as extra-legal, quasi-legal, and legal. By extra-legal is meant the force of public opinion as represented by the approval or disapproval of the recruit's immediate associates in the ranks. This was manifested by the spirit of comradeship or the absence of it, by verbal criticism, by rude jokes, and not infrequently by physical violence. At Piqua, Ohio, in September 1812 a soldier who did not wish to march to the relief of Fort Wayne was, for his lack of courage and patriotism, hoisted on a rail by his comrades, carried to the Big Miami River, and unceremoniously thrown in.¹

The most important work of transforming the citizen into a soldier was done by the non-commissioned officers. Corporals and sergeants in immediate contact

¹ Robert B. McAfee, *History of the Late War in the Western Country* (Lexington, 1816; new ed., Bowling Green, 1919), p. 139.

with small groups of from four to eight men worked over this raw material until it took on military semblance. In the Army, then as now, efficient non-commissioned officers were essential to company and regimental discipline. The dearth of good experienced sergeants and corporals made the task of breaking in the new levies more difficult. They drilled the awkward squads, trained the recruit in the manual of arms, supervised his work as he policed the camp or labored to construct fortifications, and by strong language and the occasional use of their fists taught the recruit to adapt himself to Army life. It was the "non-com" who assigned the private to his daily task and many soldiers spent long hours wielding pick and shovel or swinging the ax because of sullenness, carelessness, or petty insubordination. If the recruit was carelessly dressed on parade or inattentive during company drill, he might be assigned to "kitchen police" duty and required to peel potatoes, carry water, or cut wood for the company cook. The duties were light but confining and drew upon the culprit the ridicule of his companions. It was a question whether a task might be assigned by a "non-com" or only by a commissioned officer as a penalty for the infraction of rules, but a soldier was dull indeed to whom there was not an evident relation between the non-commissioned officer's disfavor and the allotment of particularly disagreeable fatigue duty. Favoritism was undoubtedly common, but above the "non-coms" were the company officers, who were interested in the highest efficiency of their organizations and inclined to check the worst abuses resulting from poor judgment or bad temper. Not infrequently ill feeling developed between the petty officer and the private in the ranks, but the company officers were ready and willing to support their subordinates in all reasonable measures. The man in the ranks soon learned that he was caught in the machine, that resistance was hopeless, and that acquiescence and conformity represented the easiest routes to a happy Army life.

Occasionally the private soldier, more sullen or intractable than the average, resorted to violence and fought with a corporal or a sergeant; this usually resulted in bringing down upon the culprit the disapproval of his superior officer and might lead to charges of mutinous conduct and a hearing before a court martial. In such instances, whatever the provocation, the private was almost certain to be severely penalized, though there were exceptions to this rule.² Samuel Woods, for striking and maltreating a sergeant and attempting to bite his throat and gouge out his eye, was sentenced by a court-martial to sixty days' solitary confinement although a private and a lieutenant testified that the sergeant had knocked the prisoner down, striking him three times with a shovel. The lieutenant testified, "I believe he obeyed all orders received from the sergeant cheerfully enough." At this same sitting the court gave

² *Statutes at Large of the United States* (Boston and Washington, 1853-), II, 361. Death was the penalty for the disobedience of the lawful order of a superior and for striking or offering violence to a superior officer.

James Harris a like penalty for mutiny.³ At Fort Hawkins in March 1814 John Stockland, for disobedience of orders, was given a penalty of six months at hard labor with stoppage of his whiskey ration despite testimony as to his previous good character in service.⁴ Rhubin Aldridge, for behaving with contempt toward an officer, was sentenced to stand on a stump for one hour a day for six days.⁵ Moses Williams, for being absent from his post and for threatening to kick the corporal who ordered him back, was sentenced to hard labor for one month. He was, furthermore, to be confined in the black hole, and his liquor was to be stopped during his confinement.⁶

In contrast to the above, however, may be cited the cases of Thomas Russell, Phillip Johnson, and Henry Foot who were charged with striking, kicking, and otherwise beating Captain Joe Drew when he was officer of the day. The evidence showed that Captain Drew was probably intoxicated and had lost his head, ordered the soldiers to their rooms, and passionately attacked them. All three men were acquitted.⁷

The power of both non-commissioned and commissioned officers to inflict unauthorized penalties of a serious nature was generally held in check. Lieutenant Hoffman ordered that Private Dennis Baker be paddled. Before this the lieutenant had struck the private with a stick. Baker threatened Hoffman's life, and a court-martial resulted. The court, considering the unauthorized punishment of Baker by Hoffman, acquitted Baker.⁸

Sometimes extra-legal persecution and mistreatment by the superior officer led the recruit to desert. Upon apprehension punishment followed, though it is clear from the relatively mild penalty inflicted in such instances that the mitigating circumstances were taken into consideration. Private Hodderfield was tried at Charleston Harbor, October 14, 1813, for desertion. Hodderfield adduced that his superior, Lieutenant Bee, had struck him with a sword while they were drilling and that on another occasion the lieutenant had tied him astride a fence with a rail swinging from each foot. Hodderfield was sentenced to hard labor for one month with the stoppage of his liquor ration during this period and deprived of his pay for eight months—a rather light penalty for the grave crime of desertion.

At the same sitting of the court a similar sentence was given to Private Hunt. Hunt had deserted because he had been struck with a stick by his captain and on another occasion, by the captain's orders, had been tied to a tree for a whole day. The evidence given showed that upon this captain's personal

³ War Department, Office of the Judge Advocate General, records of general courts martial, Y-120 (hereafter cited as G. C. M.).

⁴ G. C. M., Y-47.

⁵ G. C. M., Y-115: Camp Hope, Georgia, September 26-27, 1813.

⁶ G. C. M., C-22: Charleston, May 8, 1813.

⁷ G. C. M., I-20.

⁸ G. C. M., Y-18: Chillicothe, Ohio, June 27, 1814.



PUNISHMENTS IN THE FRENCH ARMY, ABOUT 1715

From a drawing by JOB in *Henri Bouchot, L'Épopée du Costume Militaire Française (Paris, 1898)*.

order another private had spent an hour and a half tied to a tree with his arms extended.⁹ It is impossible to determine from the evidence whether such instances represent well meant but injudicious actions of an inexperienced commander or merely the expressions of a nature essentially cruel and brutal. It is evident that the captain exceeded his authority in the penalty he imposed.

Extremely severe punishments for law violations were the rule of the age, here and abroad, and this was particularly true of naval and military service. In time of peace captains of merchant vessels were permitted under the law to whip members of their crew to the point of death. Evidently little protection was afforded to the soldier in service by the eighth amendment to the Federal Constitution. Though this amendment forbids cruel and unusual punishments, many penalties now regarded as inhumane were then not unusual and the term cruel was not capable of practical definition.¹⁰

⁹ G. C. M., H-32: Charleston Harbor, October 14, 1813.

¹⁰ The author found no evidence of the use of the strappado in the American service although it had been used at one time in the British service. In its severest form it consisted of fastening a man's hands behind his back and suspending him by a rope

In April 1812, evidently in anticipation of war and with the desire to make military service less unattractive, it was enacted by Congress that for a period of two years "no non-commissioned officer, musician or private belonging to . . . militia . . . ordered into actual service . . . shall be subject to corporal punishment by whipping" ¹¹ This seems to have been the only legal restriction then in effect upon the penalties that might be imposed by courts martial. An examination of the War Department records for this period shows that the ingenuity of the courts was equal to the problem of devising substitutes for the lash, a favorite instrument of punishment both before and after the two year period of restriction.

Penalties most commonly imposed for minor infractions of discipline involved loss of privilege or some form of degradation or humiliation. In one instance, for sleeping at his post, a private was sentenced to stand stripped for one hour. Before the punishment was carried out the time was reduced to five minutes. ¹² In a late spring month this would not involve very serious discomfort. In camp at Chillicothe, Ohio, a man found guilty of counterfeiting was sentenced to appear on parade from eight to ten o'clock three mornings in succession with a ladle, some lead, a pair of molds—apparently for molding counterfeit money—and a specimen of his work before him. His hands and face were blackened, and his coat was turned inside out. About his neck was hung a placard with the label, "Counterfeit money for sale." ¹³ A soldier who stole a duck had the dead duck hung about his neck and was paraded before his regiment all day wearing a placard, "I stole from a fellow citizen." ¹⁴

Benjamin Seigley, convicted of desertion, was sentenced to wear a paper cap labeled "Deserter"; his coat was to be turned with the lining outside, and he was to have a pair of large wooden spurs strapped to his heels. He was then to be mounted upon a wooden horse in front of the parade for thirty minutes on three successive mornings. In addition, his pay was to be stopped for four months. ¹⁵ John Goodson, found guilty of sleeping on his post, was sentenced to stand for two hours on a stump wearing a placard with the legend, "For sleeping on my post." ¹⁶ Corporal Nathan Nickerson was reduced to the

to the thong about his wrist. Inconceivably severe as mere suspension was when long continued, it was at times made even more brutal by lifting the victim a few feet and letting him drop with the inevitable result of broken bones and shoulder dislocation.

¹¹ *Statutes at Large*, II, 707. This act, approved April 10, 1812, automatically expired at the end of two years. By an act approved August 5, 1861, flogging was again prohibited, and this law is still in effect (*ibid.*, XII, 317).

¹² "Selections from the Gano Papers," *Quarterly Publication of the Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio*, XV (January-June 1920), 65.

¹³ Duncan McArthur papers (MSS. in the Library of Congress), March 24, 1814.

¹⁴ Worthington (Ohio) *Freeman's Chronicle*, October 31, 1812.

¹⁵ G. C. M., Y-18: Chillicothe, Ohio, June 1814.

¹⁶ G. C. M., Y-115.

ranks for the crime of desertion. His eyebrows were shaved, his face blackened, and he was given thirty days at hard labor.¹⁷

Commissioned officers as well as the men in the ranks were subjected to penalties which may be regarded as mental or moral. Lieutenant Hopson was cashiered for unofficerlike conduct and for encouraging immorality and insubordination among his soldiers.¹⁸ Captain Fordice was deprived of his sword and suspended from command for forty-eight hours for leaving his post and suffering some of the guard to do the same.¹⁹ At Plattsburg, New York, in 1813 Lieutenant B. P. Barrett was cashiered for cowardice and for deserting his post in the presence of the enemy when an attack was expected. His sword was broken over his head before the division, and his name was ordered published as a coward in the newspapers of the vicinity and of his home state.²⁰

In instances where the humiliation in itself was not regarded as adequate to the offense some minor (or major) privilege dear to the soldier in the monotony of Army life, was withdrawn. Almost any offense might result in stoppage of the whisky ration, and deprivation of pay for one or more months was also a common penalty. The withdrawal of these privileges frequently accompanied the inflicting of other penalties in the same sentence.

At the Regular Army posts it was customary to provide a dungeon of brick or wood, usually dark, unheated, damp, and without adequate ventilation. This, in the parlance of the Army, was known as the "black hole." William Jackson, for sleeping on guard duty, was sentenced to thirty night's solitary confinement in the "black hole" and was deprived of his liquor rations and one-half of his pay for this period.²¹ Confinement in the "black hole" was commonly assigned along with other penalties. In the field, where confinement was not feasible, it was customary to sentence the culprit to wear ball and chain. When ball and chain were assigned as a penalty it nearly always meant that a twenty-four pound shot (sometimes a six pound ball) was attached to the prisoner's right ankle by a short chain. Waking and sleeping he had his burden with him, sometimes for a period as long as five years. If the prisoner was not careful the leg iron might break the skin with consequent infection and attendant suffering. Yet the ball and chain were by no means as severe in effect as the bilboes, then commonly used in marine service.²²

¹⁷ G. C. M., AA-4.

¹⁸ G. C. M., AA-6. In the Regular Army today officers in service may not communicate in any way with an officer who has been cashiered. This means permanent ostracism from his former professional and social associates.

¹⁹ "Selections from the Gano Papers," *loc. cit.*

²⁰ G. C. M., D-24.

²¹ G. C. M., R-19.

²² The bilbo was composed of a long bar of iron with sliding shackles and a lock at the end. It confined the legs of a prisoner in such a way as to make walking almost impossible. The author found no evidence of its use in the Army.

Another form of punishment which circumscribed the victim's liberty, at least for the time, was the requirement that he stand upon a barrel or stump. Like many others this ordeal was not unendurable for a brief time, but for long periods it constituted a fatiguing experience. James McCurdy, for sleeping on sentinel duty, was sentenced to stand on a stump for one day.²³ Daniel Wilkinson, for the same offense, was sentenced to stand on a stump six feet high from sunrise to sunset with an hour off for each meal.²⁴

Andrew Clifford and William Martin, for stealing whisky from a contractor's house, were sentenced to solitary confinement for thirty days, to hard labor with ball and chain for nine months, and were deprived of four-fifths of their pay and of their liquor ration during the period of confinement.²⁵ From the severe nature of the penalties imposed in this and many similar instances it may be inferred that stealing whisky was regarded as a particularly heinous offense.

Two other penalties frequently given were "picketting" and "riding the wooden horse." Both had long been used as military punishments and when assigned for long periods may be regarded as extremely severe.²⁶ A man sentenced to be picketted was compelled to support his weight or most of it by his bare foot placed upon a wooden stake. In the past this had been a part of the punishment involved when a culprit was tied up by his thumbs or wrists with the opportunity to relieve the strain by resting a foot or a toe upon a sharp pointed stake. No instance was found of a man sentenced during the War of 1812 to be suspended by his thumbs. This is of interest because the penalty was commonly used later during the Civil War. The wooden horse was a board or rail supported on edge at such height above the ground that a man placed astride it could not reach the ground with his feet. The discomfort became excruciating with the passage of time. This was particularly true if the victim's hands were tied behind his back and a weight, such as a musket, was tied to each leg. Death has been known to result from injudicious use of this penalty.

At Buffalo, Edmund Fuller was picketted five minutes on three successive mornings for neglect of duty and for drunkenness.²⁷ At Lower Sandusky, Ohio, in August 1814 William Harris and John Grimm, for deserting the army in the vicinity of Urbana, were sentenced to be picketted for five minutes on two days, "*provided in the opinion of the Surgeon he is able to endure it for that length of time.*" If they were unable to endure the ordeal they were to be relieved at the discretion of the surgeon.²⁸ At Charleston in 1813 William

²³ G. C. M., AA-6.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ G. C. M., R-19.

²⁶ Charles M. Clode, *The Administration of Justice under Military and Martial Law* (London, 1874), contains some information on this subject.

²⁷ G. C. M., Y-19: June 1814.

²⁸ G. C. M., Y-51. Italics are the author's.



THE WOODEN HORSE AS USED IN FRANCE. ABOUT 1715

From a drawing by J.B. in *Henri Brachet, L'Époque du Costume Militaire Française* (Paris, 1868).

Brown, for drunkenness and mutinous conduct, was sentenced to one month of hard labor, to be confined at night during that period, and to be picketted for ten minutes.²⁹ John Adams, for sleeping at his post, was to be picketted for five minutes on seven successive days and to have half of his head shaved.³⁰ For desertion, John Yeann was sentenced to be picketted five minutes for three mornings in succession upon a picket one-half inch in diameter and to have half his pay stopped for six months.³¹

Sometimes a larger picket was used, but the time of the penalty was increased. James Jones, for sleeping on duty, was required to stand barefoot on a picket two inches square morning and evening of one day, fifteen minutes each time,

²⁹ G. C. M., C-22.

³⁰ G. C. M., Y-12.

³¹ Duncan McArthur papers, March 2, 1812. A similar sentence was given at Camp Covington, Georgia, to Robert Walker and Greene Newlan (G. C. M., AA-4).

with the privilege of suspending himself by the arm from some place fixed for the purpose.³² Jonathan Willis was given the same penalty for drunkenness and violent language to a superior officer.³³ That the punishment should be a little more severe, Joseph Snyder was sentenced to wear a gag during his allotted time on a picket.

David White, for desertion, was sentenced to ride a wooden horse for five minutes in front of his regiment.³⁴ Solomon Coker, for neglect of duty in allowing prisoners to escape near Raleigh, North Carolina, was sentenced to ride a wooden horse three days in succession, two hours each day, with a musket tied to each foot.³⁵ Thomas Welch and a private named Preston, who had deserted, were recaptured and sentenced to hard labor with ball and chain for one month. One-half of their monthly pay was stopped until the expenses incurred as a result of their act were defrayed. Their whisky ration was stopped for one month, and during this period they were to ride the wooden horse for one hour morning and evening every day. Ichabod Lords, for sleeping on his post, was sentenced to ride the wooden horse twice daily, one hour each time, for two months.³⁶

Sentences requiring the prisoner to walk his post for a given period with a twenty-four pound shot in his knapsack or with a knapsack of sixty pounds' weight were common. Gordon Allen, for leaving his post without being relieved, was sentenced to walk past the sentinel with a twenty-four pound shot in his knapsack for thirty nights, to endure solitary confinement during the day, and to be deprived of pay and whisky.³⁷

Imprisonment was frequently imposed as a penalty, though this did not necessarily mean solitary confinement. Imprisonment at hard labor was sometimes given for the more serious crimes, in some cases for long periods. Gideon Ellis, Bowden Eldridge, and Russel Harrington, three deserters, were sentenced to hard labor with ball and chain, for ten years, to be confined in the guard house, to wear fatigue clothing, and to be deprived of all their liquor ration and four-fifths of their pay during the period of the sentence. The same court, for a like offense, gave Benjamin Stocker a similar sentence, but for the shorter period of two years; Christopher Hawkins, for his second desertion, was given a like penalty of seven years. Evidently, mitigating circumstances not recorded brought the shorter sentences to Stocker and Hawkins.³⁸ For disorderly conduct, Joseph Harvey was sentenced to hard labor for six months.³⁹

³² G. C. M., Y-105: December 1814.

³³ G. C. M., AA-6.

³⁴ G. C. M., AA-4.

³⁵ G. C. M., D-14.

³⁶ G. C. M., A-22.

³⁷ G. C. M., R-19.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

John Collins, for advising a private to desert, for planning to do the same himself, and for striking a fellow soldier with an ax, was sentenced to six months' hard labor with ball and chain and was deprived of his whisky ration for the duration of the sentence.⁴⁰

In that age both cropping and branding were not infrequently imposed as punishments for crimes by civil courts. The barbarous practice of cutting off a part of the culprit's ear was intended to give due notice to those with whom he might come in contact during the remainder of his life that he had been found delinquent and was henceforth a person suspect. The same end was achieved by branding an initial on the cheek or on the forehead. Sometimes the hot iron was applied to the hip instead of the face—a practice which was less serious in its later social effects. In other cases the initial was tattooed into the skin. If the purpose was to create merely a temporary embarrassment, it might be stamped on with India ink. Sometimes the branding was done to prevent desertion and reenlistment. Both branding and cropping were generally employed along with other penalties.

Alpheus Avery, for desertion, had both ears cropped and was sentenced to hard labor with ball and chain in some fort for the remainder of his enlistment period.⁴¹ Henry Delap and Henry Hoffman, for desertion, each had one-half of his head shaved, both ears cropped, and the letter "D" branded on the cheek.⁴² At Plattsburg, New York, in July 1814 Joe Brown was "branded to prevent reenlistment." For stealing clothing, Thomas Mount was branded with the word "Thief" on the right hip.⁴³

No direct evidence was found of "bucking," which consists of tying the feet together, tying the hands together, and requiring the victim to seat himself on the ground with his arms around his knees. A stick was then thrust through below his knees and above his arms, effectively pinning him in a bowed and huddled up position. The culprit was commonly gagged at the same time. (This punishment was used frequently in the period of the Civil War.) It is recorded that three prisoners were sentenced to be tied down with a gag in their mouths for one hour,⁴⁴ but it is not clear whether they were "bucked" or "spread eagled."⁴⁵

As an example of the unusual in penalties may be cited the case of Daniel Moses, who, for a minor offense, was tied to a sentry box and compelled to drink a quart of salt water. This may have acted as an emetic or a cathartic,

⁴⁰ G. C. M., Y-47.

⁴¹ G. C. M., D-22.

⁴² G. C. M., Y-19.

⁴³ G. C. M., Y-120.

⁴⁴ G. C. M., Y-111. Bucking and gagging and spread eagling were both in use in the Army as extra-legal or quasi-legal punishments as late as the Spanish-American War.

⁴⁵ As late as 1898 a man was "spread eagled" for forty-eight consecutive hours.

but it seems probable that the prisoner's greatest discomfort was a raging thirst.

When a detachment was located near water it was possible to sentence the culprit to be ducked. This meant that, with hands and feet securely tied and a weight attached to the latter, the victim would be lowered into deep water by a rope. After an interval a pull on the rope would bring him up for air. The severity of the punishment lay in the length of time he spent beneath the surface, or in the brevity of the period in which he was supposed to get his breath. At its best the procedure was little more than a joke; at its worst it was barbarous in the extreme. One private, for sleeping on his post, was "to be well ducked and receive five cobs." William Cotter, for being absent without leave, was sentenced to be ducked once and to receive ten cobs. The same court sentenced Harry Stephenson, for a like offense, to be ducked three times and to receive twenty-five cobs.⁴⁶

For a long time and in many places whipping has been regarded as the ideal punishment. From the switch which curbs childhood's errors to death under the knout in Czarist Russia seems a far cry, but the two punishments belong in the same class. A simple instrument, easily procured, the lash in its many forms has been universally used. In its ordinary form it consisted of a leather thong or piece of rope, generally the former; in its more complex form it became known as the "cat" (cat-o'-nine-tails)—a broad flat piece of leather with its end slit into separate thongs, or a handle or broad light board to which were attached leather thongs or pieces of rope, the latter sometimes weighted at the ends with wire or lead to make punishment more severe.

Prior to the law of April 10, 1812, and after its expiration two years later, the only restriction upon the use of the lash was that not more than fifty blows could be imposed in any one sentence.⁴⁷ During the two year period of its prohibition, the custom of cobbing (paddling with a board or strap) was generally in use. Lashing cut and bruised the flesh; cobbing, as a rule, only bruised it. Cobbing in its worst forms fell but little short of the cat or the lash in its effects.

Prior to the war, at the Washington Cantonment, Robert Smith, John Green, and Joseph Hast, charged with desertion, were sentenced to receive "fifty lashes on the bare back with wired cats, at five different times, ten lashes on each day and to have the expenses occasioned by their desertion, stopped from their pay." For insolence to an officer Jesse Harrington received the same penalty.⁴⁸ After

⁴⁶ G. C. M., X-120. In connection with this punishment may be cited the treatment of Dr. Mudd at Dry Tortugas and the "water cure" reported as used by American soldiers during the Philippine Insurrection.

⁴⁷ *Statutes at Large*, I, 709. The law of March 2, 1799, had specified "not beyond twelve lashes on the bare back with a cat for any one offense."

⁴⁸ These are cited as examples of the penalties imposed in the Regular Army and prior to the law of April 10, 1812. While the law protected the militia only, no instance



A FLOGGING DURING THE MEXICAN WAR

From a contemporary sketch by Samuel E. Chamberlain, 1st U. S. Dragoons, in the collection of Mrs. T. P. Buxton. The trooper on the extreme left has been gagged as well as "bucked" with his companions.



USE OF LEG IRONS IN THE NAVY ABOUT THE TIME OF THE WAR OF 1812

From J. G. Heck, Iconographic Encyclopaedia (New York).

the above law went into effect, the lash fell into disuse even in the Regular Army organizations. No instance was found of the use of the lash between April 1812 and April 1814, though during this period cobbing was very commonly imposed as a penalty. At St. George in June 1813 William Bennett was given fifty cobs for being absent without leave, and Thomas Havler was sentenced to receive fifty cobs for four days for insubordination.⁴⁹ In September 1814 Milroy Johnson was sentenced to receive one hundred cobs and James Jackson to receive one hundred and fifty.⁵⁰ From the greater number of blows assigned for simple offenses it may be implied that cobbing was regarded as less severe than whipping with the lash or the "cat."

Desertion was a crime common in every division of the Army. It became worse late in the war as a result of war weariness or homesickness. Bounty jumping or desertion for the purpose of reenlisting to claim the monetary reward constituted one of the most serious problems faced by military authorities. In their efforts to stamp out the practice the courts martial became more severe and the death sentence was meted out without hesitation. A court martial at Chillicothe, Ohio, on July 1 and 2, 1814, sentenced eight men to be shot to death, all but one for desertion.⁵¹ The following is a summary of executions during the war years:

	1812	1813	1814	1815
Sentenced to death	4	43	160	53
Reprieved	1	11	14	29
Executed	3	32	146	24

The rapid rise in the use of this extreme punishment in 1814 is indicative of the importance of the problem of desertion since most executions were for that crime. The number reprieved is also significant. Whereas in 1812 and 1813 one-fourth of those sentenced were saved by the intervention of higher authority, of those sentenced in 1814 only one in ten failed to pay the extreme penalty for his crime. That the number of reprieves in 1815 reached more than one-half was undoubtedly due to the fact that the war was over and little purpose would be served by severity. The evidence seems to show that in all 260 men were sentenced to death and 205 actually executed during the four war years.⁵²

With certain exceptions the death sentence in the Army was carried into execution by shooting. The brigade, regiment, or battalion was drawn up to form three sides of a hollow square with the firing squad and prisoner in the otherwise open fourth side. The prisoner, blindfolded, sometimes faced the

was discovered of the use of the lash in the following two year period with the exception of an article in the Franklinton (Ohio) *Freeman's Chronicle*, April 1, 1814. As this paper was anti-war and anti-administration, its value as a source may be questioned.

⁴⁹ G. C. M., D-22.

⁵⁰ G. C. M., H-168.

⁵¹ G. C. M., Y-18.

⁵² War Department, Office of the Judge Advocate General, register of general courts martial, *passim*; Duncan McArthur papers.

firing squad erect and sometimes was seated on his coffin beside the open grave. At five paces few of the firing squad would miss, and death was instantaneous. No direct evidence was found of the well established tradition that one musket was loaded with a blank cartridge so that each member of the firing squad might always cherish the hope that he himself was not responsible for the death of a fellow man.

Occasionally when a reprieve had been granted the fact was not made known to the condemned man until all formalities of a regular execution had been complied with up to the command to fire. This command was withheld, and the reprieve was then read.⁵³ The revulsion of feeling must have been extreme. Delay in notifying the prisoner of his reprieve was apparently designed to bring home to him the seriousness of his offense.

Among the prisoners found after Perry defeated the British on Lake Erie were some deserters from the American service. They were denied the privilege of death by shooting—a soldier's death—and were sentenced to be hanged.⁵⁴

In the century and a quarter since the War of 1812 the soldier's lot has improved in many respects. To-day he has better clothing, food, arms, and equipment, but in no way is this change evidenced more than in the more humane treatment of violators of Army Regulations. "Cruel and unusual punishments of every kind, including flogging, branding, marking, or tattooing on the body, are prohibited. . . . Courts-martial will not impose any punishment not sanctioned by the customs of the service, such as carrying a loaded knapsack, wearing of irons, shaving the head, placarding, pillory, stocks, and tying up by the thumbs. . . . Solitary confinement, a bread-and-water diet, loss of good-conduct time, and the placing of a prisoner in irons will not be imposed as punishment by a court-martial."⁵⁵

The tendency away from severity and brutality in Army penalties has kept pace with public sentiment and with the similar change in penalties imposed by state courts. It came from within the service and has not been imposed from without. Congress from time to time has abolished outmoded punishments, but it has largely been because they were no longer necessary. In our civilian population of today, unlike that of the time of the War of 1812, the individual has been conditioned to cooperate. In both rural and urban life he is in closer association with his neighbors than was his pioneer prototype, and nearly always he is a product of our public school system. The recruit of today has initiative and resourcefulness in a high degree, but the violent reaction to control, so characteristic of the frontier, is gone. In the Army he is a better soldier, and in private life he is a better citizen.

⁵³ *Aurora* (New York) *General Advertiser*, August 29, 1813; *Worthington* (Ohio) *Freeman's Chronicle*, June 16, 1813; *Zanesville* (Ohio) *Express*, September 15, 1813.

⁵⁴ G. C. M., Y-20.

⁵⁵ *A Manual for Courts-Martial, U. S. Army* (Washington, 1927), p. 92.

PROFESSIONAL NEWS

Librarian's Report

The Acting Librarian, Mr. Robert Runser, has submitted a detailed report on the library of the INSTITUTE. Although it is too long to reproduce in full, the following summary should be of interest to the membership.

During the last year the library has grown from 367 to 1,612 accessionable items (on October 1), exclusive of ephemera and vertical file material. In addition to the original collection of the late Colonel Charles E. T. Lull which formed the nucleus of the library, outstanding gifts have been made by Mr. Wickliffe P. Draper; Colonel Arthur L. Conger; Miss Virginia Summerlin in memory of her father, Captain George Thomas Summerlin, Jr., and Mr. Frederick P. Todd. For the most part the library consists of standard military works forming a basic collection of primary and secondary sources; but there are some collectors' items, especially rare works on military costume, and some valuable periodical files such as the *Journal of the Military Service Institute*, the *United Service Magazine*, and the *Revue d'Histoire*. The library now receives thirty-three periodical publications on an exchange basis.

The classification of the library has presented many peculiar problems because of its high degree of specialization. The classification system worked out by Mr. Todd (Professional Documents Nos. 1 and 3) is being used; Mr. Runser states that it is proving to be very practicable, although numerous changes in detail and terminology have been suggested by experience. About half of the volumes have been listed in what will eventually be a comprehensive dictionary catalog. The progress of classifying and cataloging the collection is seriously hampered, of course, by the fact that all such work is being done on a volunteer basis by persons who have other regular employment. Nevertheless, real progress has been made during the past few months, and the resulting organization of the library has greatly facilitated the meeting of the growing number of demands being made upon it.

Among the latter, one of the most frequent requests made is for bibliographical assistance. Plans for a comprehensive bibliography of warfare have been formulated, and initial steps have been taken toward its compilation. Although several thousand titles have been listed, this project cannot possibly

be completed in the near future. To meet a more immediate need, there is being compiled also a selective annotated guide to military literature and its relative elements. In this project it is hoped that the services of many of the members of the INSTITUTE may be used. Members who are authorities in a given field are to be asked to submit, with an analytical and critical summary, a list of the outstanding and basic books which they believe to be necessary to the understanding of their subject. Several specialized topics have already been covered, and within a short time requests for additional volunteers will be sent out. Not only will the INSTITUTE benefit itself and its members in fulfilling this task, but in so doing it will have performed a service of great value to librarians and scholars generally.

* * *

The war abroad and the defense measures of this country have caused widespread changes in the occupations and duties of many members. It is impossible to list the Reserve Officers who have been called to active service or the Regulars who have been promoted, but the following are noted because of the close relationship of their new assignments to the work of the INSTITUTE:

Major Charles Winslow Elliott, U. S. A., Retired, has been ordered to active duty in the Historical Section of the Army War College which is compiling for publication the records of American participation in the World War.

Lieutenant Harvey S. Ford, Field Artillery Reserve, has been ordered to active duty in Washington and appointed Assistant Editor of *The Field Artillery Journal*.

Dr. Charles P. Stacey, formerly a member of the faculty of Princeton University and a Major in the Canadian Reserve, is on active duty with the Historical Section attached to the Canadian Military Headquarters in London. The Historical Section is recording Canada's war effort over-seas.

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The title page and index for Volume IV of the JOURNAL will be distributed with the Spring issue.

Contributors to This Issue

Dr. Edward Mead Earle is Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton where he conducts a seminar in American Military Policy. He has at various times been a lecturer at the Army War College, the Army Industrial College, and the United States Military Academy.

Dr. Wilfred Brenton Kerr, whose first article on Agincourt appeared in the Spring issue, is Associate Professor of History at the University of Buffalo.

Dr. John S. Hare is Instructor of History at Ohio State University.

Dr. Hugh Jameson is Associate Professor in the Department of Social Science at Northern Illinois State Teachers College.

Dr. Ruhl J. Bartlett is Professor of History at Tufts College.

THE MILITARY LIBRARY

The Roman Art of War under the Republic, by F. E. Adcock. (*Martin Classical Lectures*. Volume VIII [Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1940. Pp. 140. \$2.00.])

The five lectures, delivered at Oberlin College in 1939 by one of the leading British historians of Rome, deal in turn with "The Men," "The Sea," "The Land," "Foreign Policy and General Strategy," and "Generalship." The author judiciously stresses the Federation as one of the chief pillars of Rome's military strength. He does not overemphasize Rome's military achievement and never strains his sources for more information than they should be made to yield.

The manner in which the legion actually fought is a highly controversial subject because our information is contained in a difficult passage in Polybius and a much darker one in Livy. Adcock does a good job of this subject, but some difficulties remain. If the maniples of the first two lines had six men in file and those of the last line three men in file, then each maniple would have had a front of twenty men in line. If the Roman legionary stood in the center of a two yard square as seems probable, each maniple would have a line forty yards long. The intervals between the maniples would also be forty yards (accepting the *quincunx* pattern as Adcock does), which would give a line of eight hundred yards for ten maniples. One gets the impression that Adcock thinks of this as the entire legion, but to include the equal number of troops from the Allies one would have to reckon the front of the legion as sixteen hundred yards. This would make a front of thirty-two hundred yards, almost two miles, for a consular army and seems much too long. This distance may be reduced one-half if the maniple is reckoned as a body of men twelve in file and ten in line. The *triarii*, or third line, accordingly would have six in file and ten in line.

Adcock's description of the cooperation and articulation of these three lines in battle is excellent. One might add that, in addition to the highly fatiguing "rear guard" action which the *hastati* in the front line had to fight, when the legion met the phalanx these men had to carry on this retreat and at the same

time keep hacking off the long spears of the enemy before they could hack the men who were carrying them.

The lecture on generalship is especially good. Adcock regards Caesar as the only leader of genius produced by the Romans in this period and rightly disputes the notion that Scipio was "greater than Napoleon." His insight into the whole area of combat operations is seen in the remark that "Agrippa is the last great Roman soldier of the Republic and not the least" because Agrippa appreciated the value of amphibious warfare just as Pompey had before him. On this subject one might also add that Adcock might have pointed to the possibilities of the legionary organization for promoting the exercise of generalship during the course of the battle. At Cynocephalae, before the cohort had been introduced, a tribune pulled out his maniples when it was clear they could not become engaged and threw them in on the opposite wing where they were needed. The possibilities for such display of generalship on the part of the consuls and military tribunes might have received greater stress.

The book has short notes for each chapter and an index.

THOMAS A. BRADY

University of Missouri

The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A Study of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905, by Arthur J. Marder. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1940. Pp. 580. \$5.00.)

In naval policy, and its close inter-relation with foreign policy, university scholars have recently found a relatively unworked field and have skillfully exploited it in such volumes as *The Rise of American Naval Power* (1939) by Harold and Margaret Sprout of Princeton, *A Navy Second to None* (1940) by George T. Davis of Yale, and the present volume by Arthur J. Marder of the Bureau of International Research at Harvard. Noteworthy in Mr. Marder's book, as in the others, is the diligent combing, not only of printed records, magazines, and newspapers, but of manuscript material available in government archives and elsewhere. The result, in the present instance, is a book of the highest value to students of British naval and national policy in the period covered.

In these years, 1880-1905, the British Navy was transformed from the complacent, "spit-and-polish," sail-rigged, far-scattered fleet of Victorian days to Lord Fisher's squadrons of dreadnoughts and battle cruisers, already concentrated against a more dangerous enemy than it had faced for a century. It was a period of perennial war scares—the "invasion bogey" of the 1880's, the navy scare of '93, the Fashoda crisis of '98, the invasion fears of 1900, and the increasing German naval challenge to mention only some of the more important. But at the same time it was a period of wars that did not come off, a period in which the British Navy, with its constant changes of strategic disposition

and shifts of building policy, remained sufficient to protect British interests without resort to the "last argument of kings." For this very reason the book may not prove very popular reading; even to specialists it may seem that at times overzealous study is devoted to newspaper panics and diplomatic tempests that never got far beyond the teapot. Whether or not this be a valid criticism, the book brings to the political side of naval history a welcome application of sound scholarship. Often, too, as in its study of British preoccupations in the Far East and the Mediterranean, it throws light on British naval problems today.

ALLAN WESTCOTT

United States Naval Academy

The Official History of the Great War: Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1918 [Volume III], by Brigadier-General Sir J. E. Edmonds. (London and New York: The Macmillan Company. 1939. Pp. 385. \$4.00.)

Previous volumes in the British official history series have been reviewed in this JOURNAL (III, 183-85). This volume covers the period between May and August 1918, from the close of the German offensive on the Lys to the beginning of the Franco-British offensive of August 8. It describes the three German diversion offensives against the French: the Aisne battle (May 27-June 6), the battle of the Matz (June 9-14), the fourth battle of Champagne (July 15-18), and the second battle of the Marne (July 18-August 2). The effect of these battles in preventing the threatening "Hagen" offensives from falling on the Hazebrouck-Ypres front is revealed.

British divisions played a relatively small rôle in these operations. Five tired divisions of the IX Corps which survived the destruction of the Fifth British Army were placed in the "quiet zone" of the Chemin-des-Dames just before the German attack. Under General A. H. Gordon, they fought throughout the operation or until destroyed. Four British divisions, the XXII Corps, took part in the French counter strokes of July. The employment of these nine divisions with the French gave the British an opportunity to study the French methods of defensive fighting at first hand.

Little effort was apparently made by the French High Command to evaluate the changing methods of German attack, despite the fact that one department of the 3rd Bureau of the staff (Operations) was charged with examining enemy defensive and offensive tactics. This department did not issue a study on the German methods at Riga (September 1917) until February 1918. No important publication was issued on the German attack methods of 1918 until Foch's memorandum of June 16, 1918. The British were equally slow in adapting themselves to the changes in German methods of assault. No study was issued

by G. H. Q. until May 1918 when pamphlet S. S. 210, *The Division in Defence* was published.

Just before the German assault in the West in May 1940 the reviewer read and re-read the chapter on the French preparations for the Chemin-des-Dames attack in 1918, and, as the story of General Duchêne's insufficient preparations was revealed, there came over my mind a painful fear that similar mental and physical inertia might lead to even greater disasters if the "impregnable Maginot line" were seriously assaulted by the Germans. General Duchêne's observation in reply to General Gordon's complaint as to the disposition of troops and reserves has become classic: "*J'ai dit.*"

The mastery of the German system of the break-through was acquired slowly and painfully in 1918. Finally, against General Gouraud's army, the Germans met crushing defeat. It makes curious reading in 1940 to find the official historian saying (pp. viii-ix) about the Allied counter offensives of this period that, though they took on the character of open warfare, "neither aeroplanes nor tanks achieved any results of importance; in fact, had little influence on the decision; aeroplanes are dependent on favorable weather and tanks move but 'by leave of the ground.'" These observations were doubtless true of June and July 1918, but they may have provided dangerous indoctrination for the students of warfare who may have read them before the campaigns of 1940.

Perhaps this volume and the one on 1917 more recently published will be the last in the British official history series. If so, it must be counted one of the crowning ironies of the present war that the immensity of the last struggle prevented the completion of the official account of it in time for the complete survey of all its military lessons. It would appear that the historical sections of all general staffs must be established on a basis which will permit the speedier evaluation of past military lessons.

As in all previous volumes, the quality of this excellent series is maintained. The maps provided by Major A. F. Becke are helpful and clear, the index is complete, and nine pages of addendum and corrigenda to earlier volumes are included.

H. A. DEWEERD
Denison University

The 25th Army Brigade, R. G. A., on the Western Front in 1918, by C. S. B. Buckland. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1940. Pp. 110. 7s.6d.)

This short history of the 25th Army Brigade of the Royal Garrison Artillery was written by the well known authority on the diplomacy of the Napoleonic era in a period of enforced inactivity after the armistice. Possessing the background of a trained historian, Mr. Buckland subsequently revised and documented his early effort. The result is something more than a mere chronology

of the moves of the brigade and the targets fired upon. Unusually informative footnotes demonstrate a wide acquaintance with the most important French and English publications on heavy ordnance. The period covered includes the operations of the 25th Army Brigade on the Hazebrouck front from April to June 1918, on the Kemmel front from July to September, during the advance to the Lys River in September and October, and in the movement to the Scheldt in October and November.

Though at first only an adjutant (finally a captain), Mr. Buckland apparently worked up a true artilleryman's feeling for the cumbersome guns and howitzers he served. The brigade contained only super-heavy 6-inch to 15-inch guns and howitzers. He felt that the only esthetic spectacle of the last war was the magnificent measured roll and counter roll of the 8-inch British howitzers after each discharge. He frequently expresses an opinion on the failure of the British command to utilize their super-heavy artillery to its maximum advantage and shows that they seriously underestimated the mobile qualities of some of the less heavy 6-inch guns. Two excellent maps on a scale 1/100,000 illustrate the terrain and battery locations. There is a general and a subject index.

H. A. DEWEERD

Denison University

General Washington's Spies on Long Island and in New York, by Morton Pennypacker. (Brooklyn: Long Island Historical Society. 1939. Pp. 302. \$3.50.)

Until the publication of this volume devoted to the history of military intelligence during the American Revolution, little has been known concerning the identity of Washington's spies, their duties, and their methods of obtaining and transmitting information useful to colonial general headquarters. The author has done much to answer these and similar questions. He has proved, for example, that the famous agent "Culper Junior" was Robert Townsend of Oyster Bay (pp. 232-33), he has reproduced a section of the code prepared by Major Tallmadge for the use of Washington's spies (pp. 218-19), and he has written an excellent section on codes and camouflage (pp. 209-17).

In addition to these specific contributions, Mr. Pennypacker has also made general observations of much interest to the student of military intelligence. It is said that the capture and execution of Nathan Hale was the determining factor which led Washington to establish a Secret Service Bureau. Abraham Woodhull and Robert Townsend early became key agents. The chapter "Secret Service Secrets" discusses the use of codes, the numerals used to refer to individuals, the difficulties of transmitting information, and the use of an ink or stain commonly employed by Revolutionary spies.

This stain was invented by James Jay, brother of John Jay who first recommended it to Washington. It came into general use even though it was necessary to apply a developer before hidden writing could be brought out. The formula for this secret ink apparently has never been rediscovered and, despite intensive research by Mr. Pennypacker and others, continues to remain a mystery.

Based upon careful investigation of the Washington papers, as well as upon documents written by the spies themselves, the volume must take its place as a substantial contribution to the history of military intelligence in the United States. It is well written and reprints much correspondence verbatim. Perhaps the student would have been aided had the location of many of the quoted documents been given, and perhaps more interpretation in certain chapters would have enhanced the interest, but these criticisms do not detract from the essential value of an important work.

PHILIP D. JORDAN
Miami University

John White Geary, Soldier-Statesman, 1819-1873, by Harry Marlin Tinkcom.
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1940. Pp. 155. \$1.75.)

This life of John White Geary, Lieutenant Colonel of the 2nd Pennsylvania Infantry during the Mexican War, San Francisco postmaster, governor of Kansas and Pennsylvania, and Colonel of the 28th Pennsylvania Infantry and Brevet Major General of Volunteers during the Civil War, is the first volume in a new *Pennsylvania Lives* series. The editors plan to continue with biographies of other distinguished individuals who have made Pennsylvania history.

The military historian will find about fifty pages devoted to Geary's actual service in the field, the bulk of this material pertaining to the Mexican War. The author quotes liberally from Geary's diary kept during 1847, but there is little here which sheds additional light upon the strategy of that conflict. One wonders if the data contained in the diary could not have been woven into the story rather than so obviously inserted. Certainly the narrative suffers from too much quotation.

Commanding the 28th Pennsylvania, Geary saw action at Cedar Mountain, Chancellorsville, Wauhatchie, Lookout Mountain, and Peach Tree Creek. A summary of these engagements and a brief analysis of Geary's conduct are included.

Attractively printed, the volume adequately delineates a local character who played his rôle upon the national stage. The style is somewhat marred by the use of the editorial "we." There are no footnotes or other citations to sources, although a bibliography is appended.

PHILIP D. JORDAN
Miami University

OTHER RECENT BOOKS

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

Why War? by Nicholas Murray Butler. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940. Pp. 323. \$2.50.) A series of essays on peace and war.

ART AND PHILOSOPHY OF WARFARE

Defense of America, by William Allen White. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940. Pp. 205. \$1.00.) A plea for American aid to Britain as the best means of defending the United States.

Conscription and America, by Edward A. Fitzpatrick. (Milwaukee: Richard Publishing Company, 1940. Pp. 150. \$1.50.) A careful study of the system of conscription used in 1917 and a plea for civilian management of its local aspects.

The Battle Shield of the Republic, by Major Malcolm Wheeler-Nicholson. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940. Pp. 212. \$1.50.) A candid examination of American defense progress by an Army officer.

Why Europe Fights, by Walter Millis. (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1940. Pp. 272. \$2.50.) The background of the present conflict written by the author of *The Martial Spirit* and *The Road to War, 1914-1917*.

Airpower, by Major Alford J. Williams. (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc. 1940. Pp. 431. \$3.50.)

Uruzheinoe del v pervuiu imperialisticheskuiu voinu [Armaments for the First Imperialistic War], by V. G. Fedorov. (Moscow: Akademii RKKA imeni Dzerzhinskogo, 1939. Pp. 132. R. 8.) An account of the production of armament, 1914-1918.

MILITARY SCIENCE

Heerführer des Weltkrieges, issued by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wehrpolitik und Wehrwissenschaften. (Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1939. Pp. 295. Rm. 8.50.)

Appreciations of ten military commanders: the younger Moltke, Joffre, Falkenhayn, Conrad, Alexeiev, Enver, Cadorna, Haig, Foch, and Hindenburg-Ludendorff. *Ocherki mirovoi voyny 1914-1918 gg.* [Sketches of the World War 1914-1918], by E. Boltin and I. U. Veber. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1940. Pp. 146. 3R.25k.) An analysis of the evolution of military art, especially the use of reserves.

The Technique of Modern Arms, by Colonel Hollis L. Miller. (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1940. Pp. 417. \$2.50.) A guide to modern warfare and to a military career by an American officer.

Takticheskiĭ spravochnik po germanskoi armii [Tactical Vade-mecum on the German Army], by I. M. Tokarev. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1940. Pp. 79. 1R.50k.) A guide-book on the present German army.

Voprosy protivobatareinoi bor'by [Questions of Counter-Artillery Strategy], by I. U. M. Sheideman. (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1940. Pp. 55.) A discussion of methods of artillery fire for the neutralization and destruction of the batteries of the enemy with emphasis on the need of competent reconnaissance service.

Sluzhenie sopriazhennogo nabliudeniia [Service of Concomitant Observation], by I. A. Popov. (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1940. Pp. 140. 1R.75k.) Stresses the need of accurate information for effective artillery fire.

Strategicheskoe razvertyvanie. Tom. I. Pervaiia imperialisticheskaiia voina 1914-1918 gg. [Strategic Deployment. Volume I. First Imperialist War, 1914-1918], by V. A. Melikov. (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 2nd ed., 1939. Pp. 527. 11R.) An outline and analysis of the plans for strategic deployment used during the World War.

A l'Ecoute devant Verdun: Récit du Capitaine Henri Morin, edited by Pierre Andrieu. (Paris: Denoël, 1938. Fr. 21.) A personal account of the listening service of the French Second Army.

The Army Way: A Thousand Pointers for New Soldiers Collected from Officers and Men

of the U. S. Army, by Philip Wylie and William Muir. (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc. 1940. Pp. 96. 50c.) A handbook of useful information for the new recruit.

NAVAL SCIENCE

Ships and the Sea, by Lieutenant-Commander E. C. Talbot-Booth. (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Co., Ltd. 1940. Pp. 1105. 8s.6d.) A comprehensive handbook of convenient desk size forming a miniature encyclopedia of material on ships and shipping.

German Subs in Yankee Waters: First World War, by Henry J. James. (New York: Gotham House, 1940. Pp. 208. \$3.00.) An account of U-boat warfare during the World War.

AUXILIARY SCIENCES

Fighting Planes of the World, edited by Lieutenant-Commander E. C. Talbot-Booth and compiled by Eric Sargent. (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Co., Ltd. 2nd ed., 1940. Pp. 624. 8s.6d.) A review of the world's air forces with details and illustrations of the principal machines used by each country.

Aircraft of the World: A Recognition Book, edited by Lieutenant-Commander E. C. Talbot-Booth with drawings by Eric Sargent. (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Co., Ltd. 2nd ed., 1940. Pp. 1094. 8s.6d.) Contains silhouettes of civil and military planes and colored plates showing the markings of all countries.

Aircraft of the British Empire, by Leonard Bridgman. (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Co., Ltd. 5th ed., 1940. Pp. 137.) Photographs and sketches of sixty-three types of planes with statistical data on each.

Osnovy obshchei taktiki voenno-vozdukhnykh sil [Fundamentals of General Tactics of the Air Force], by B. Teplinskii. (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1940. Pp. 203.) A presentation of air tactics of the Soviet army.

Vozdushnaia striel'ba [Airplane Fire], by S. S. Rukavishnikov. (Moscow: Voenizdat. 2nd ed., 1940. Pp. 442. R.5.) A manual for the air corps.

Vozdushnaia radio-navigatsiia [Air Radio-Navigation], by E. P. Titov and N. A. Nosov. (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1940. Pp. 263. R.3.) A text book.

WEAPONS AND ORDNANCE

Evoliutsiia strelkovogo oruzhiia [Evolution of Firearms], by V. Fedorov. (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1939. Pp. 314. 7R.50k.) A history of the development of firearms.

A History of the Colt Revolver and of the Other Arms Made by Colt's Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing Company from 1836 to 1940, by Charles T. Haven and Frank A. Belden. (New York: William Morrow & Co. 1940. Pp. 711. \$10.00.) The definitive history of these weapons; complete, detailed, and admirably illustrated.

ESTABLISHMENTS

British Empire

A Short History of the British Army, by Eric William Sheppard. (London: Constable. 1940. Pp. 410. 10s.)

United States

The Army of the United States: Its Components; Its Arms, Services, and Bureaus; Its Military and Non-military Activities, prepared by the War Department for the Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the Senate. (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1940. Pp. 200. \$1.00.) A well illustrated account prepared by G-2.

The 101st Field Artillery, A. E. F., 1917-1919, by Russell Gordon Carter. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1940. Pp. 306. \$3.00.) An historical account of the 1st Massachusetts Field Artillery containing a record of every action of the regiment during the World War but lacking most of the heroics and self-praise that generally mar regimental histories. A series of colored maps show in great detail the gun positions occupied.

OPERATIONS AND BIOGRAPHY

- The Era of the American Revolution: Studies Inscribed to Everts B. Greene*, edited by Richard B. Morris. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1940. Pp. 415. \$3.75.) To be reviewed.
- The Cockpit of the Revolution: The War for Independence in New Jersey*, by Leonard Lundin. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1940. Pp. 463. \$3.75.) A well documented account forming part of *The Princeton History of New Jersey*.
- The Civil War Career of Thomas A. Scott*, by Samuel Richey Kamm. (Wheaton, Illinois: privately printed. 1940. Pp. 264. \$2.50.) A doctoral dissertation about the vice-president of the Baltimore, Wilmington, and Pennsylvania Railroad who became Assistant Secretary of War under Lincoln.
- I Rode with Stonewall*, by Henry Kyd Douglas. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1940. Pp. 321. \$3.00.) Memoirs of the youngest member of Jackson's staff.

World War

- Ein Armeeführer Erlebt den Weltkrieg: Persönliche Aufzeichnungen*, by Generaloberst Karl von Einem, edited by Julius Alter. (Leipzig: Hase und Kohler. 1938. Pp. 480. Rm. 9.80.) The personal diary kept by General von Einem, of interest chiefly for its gossip and side-lights.
- Meine Tätigkeit im Weltkriege, 1914-1918*, by General Fritz von Lossberg. (Berlin: Mittler und Sohn. 1939. Pp. 368. Rm. 12.) The memoirs of an expert on defensive warfare.
- La Bataille de Charleroi, Août 1914*, by Georges Gay. (Paris: Payot. 1937. Pp. 392. Fr. 36.) A full account written by a professor at Charleroi College; it is written with local knowledge and illustrated with contemporary photographs.
- La Guerre en Argonne*, by General J. Rouquerol. (Paris: Payot. 1937. Pp. 198. Fr. 20.) An account of the fighting in 1914-1915 dealing with the problems and difficulties of fighting on a heavily wooded terrain. American activities in the Argonne in 1918 are not covered.
- Alashkertskaya i Khamadanskaya operatsii* [The Alashkert and Hamadan Operations], by N. G. Korsun. (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1940. Pp. 199. 4R.50k.) Based on archival materials and personal reminiscences, this volume is instructive as an example of defensive and offensive mountain warfare.

1919-1940

- Na Yudenicha: Razгром beloi armii pod Petrogradom 1919 g.* [After Yudenich: The Defeat of the White Army before Petrograd in 1919], by S. Khesin. (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1939. Pp. 80. 50k.)
- Razгром Yudenicha v 1919 godu* [Defeat of Yudenich in 1919], by G. N. Karaev. (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1940. Pp. 235. 4R.50k.) An enlarged edition of a previously published work, *Bor'ba za krasnyi Petrograd* [A Struggle for Red Petrograd], stressing peculiarities of tactical actions on the Petrograd front.
- They Wanted War*, by Otto D. Tolischus. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock. 1940. Pp. 340. \$4.00.) A series of the most important dispatches of the well known former Berlin correspondent of the *New York Times*, giving an excellent portrait of Germany's leaders, war preparations, and civil life, together with early accounts of the Polish campaign.
- I Saw It Happen in Norway*, by Carl J. Hambro. (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company. 1940. Pp. 219. \$2.50.) An eye-witness account of the Nazi invasion and conquest of Norway.
- Chronology of Failure: The Last Days of the French Republic*, by Hamilton Fish Armstrong. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1940. Pp. 202. \$1.50.) A day by day analytical account of the collapse of France by the editor of *Foreign Affairs*.
- I saw France Fall. Will She Rise Again?* by René de Chambrun. (New York: William Morrow and Company. 1940. Pp. 216. \$2.50.) An account of the military operations preceding the collapse of France by a French officer who served in the Maginot line and as liaison officer with the B. E. F.

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

HISTORIOGRAPHY

- "The Civil War Restudied," by J. G. Randall, in *The Journal of Southern History*, November 1940 (VI, 439-57). Suggestions for the reexamination of the history of the Civil War epoch.

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

- "Civil Liberties in War Time," by Carl Brent Swisher, in *The Political Science Quarterly*, September 1940 (LV, 321-47). A review of restrictions on civil liberties during the World War with suggestions as to their current significance.
- "The Cabinet Minister and Administration: Asquith, Lloyd George, Curzon," by T. MacGregor Dawson, in *The Political Science Quarterly*, September 1940 (LV, 348-78). A survey of the methods and administrations of British war time premiers.
- "Clergymen-at-Arms," by J. M. Scammell, in *Army Quarterly*, January 1940 (XXXIX, 325-32). Historical examples of the attitude of the church and clergy toward war.

ART AND PHILOSOPHY OF WARFARE

- "Total War and Blitzkrieg," by Lieutenant-Colonel H. de Watteville, in *Army Quarterly*, April 1940 (XL, 17-31).
- "Blitzkrieg is Not Infallible," by Brigadier General Henry J. Reilly, in *The Living Age*, October 1940 (CCCLIX, 137-40). A suggestion for stopping the method of advance employed by the Germans in Poland, Belgium, Holland, and France.
- "The Two Blockades," by Archibald Hurd, in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, September 1940 (CXXVIII, 251-55). A comparison of the naval blockade of 1914-1918 with that of 1940.
- "Economic War: With Hitler and with Napoleon," by Montgomery Belgium, in *The Quarterly Review*, April 1940 (CCLXXIV, 233-47). A comparative study of the present economic struggle and that waged by Britain against Napoleon.
- "U. S. Foreign Policy: 'Short of War,'" in *Fortune*, December 1940 (XXII, 51-54 ff.). An analysis of the United State's present world position with the recommendation that we continue to help Great Britain.
- "Imports of the Confederate Government from Europe and Mexico," by William Diamond, in *The Journal of Southern History*, November 1940 (VI, 470-503). Detailed review of a phase of the Confederate procurement problem.
- "The Industrial War Potential of the United States of America," by Fritz Sternberg, in *Army Quarterly*, January 1940 (XXXIX, 224-34). An article by the author of the widely read *Germany and a Lightning War* published in 1938.
- "Of Arms and Automobiles," in *Fortune*, December 1940 (XXII, 57-60 ff.). The uncertainties of an armed peace and the perplexities of an all-out war which confront the auto companies.
- "Air Power and Future History," by John Philips Cranwell, in *Harpers Magazine*, December 1940 (CLXXXII, 67-71).
- "War and Peace Economics of Aviation," by Kurt Lachmann, in *Social Research*, November 1940 (VII, 468-79).
- "The Man Selected for Service," by Brigadier General Lewis B. Hershey, in *Infantry Journal*, November-December 1940 (XLVII, 530-35). Some of the personnel problems to be faced under selective service.
- "Nazi Infiltration in Ibero-America," by Fernando de los Rios, in *Social Research*, November 1940 (VII, 389-409). A study of German economic and morale warfare.
- "Italy and the Triple Alliance: Military Conventions before 1914," by J. E. Tyler, in *Army Quarterly*, April 1940 (XL, 130-34).

MILITARY SCIENCE

- "Les Fronts Fortifiés: Ligne Siegfried et Ligne Maginot," by Henry Bidou, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, November 1, 1939 (LIV, 5-14).

- "Infantry in Modern War," by Victor Wallace Germain, in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, September 1940 (CXXVIII, 244-50). A British estimate of the power of infantry in blitzkrieg.
- "Infantry Support for Machine Guns," by Major G. Harrison, in *Army Quarterly*, January 1940 (XXXIX, 298-302).
- "Engineers in Combat," by Donald B. Adams, in *The Military Engineer*, November-December 1940 (XXXII, 429-35). Survey of the work of combat engineers from 1917 to the present.
- "Awards for Military Gallantry," by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Arnold Wilson, in *The Quarterly Review*, January 1940 (CCLXXIV, 18-26). A brief survey of British military awards from the time of Drake to the present.

AUXILIARY SCIENCES

- "Has the Tank Again Made Frontal Attack Possible," by Lieutenant D. M. L. Gordon-Watson, in *Army Quarterly*, October 1939 (XXXIX, 154-61). Considerations of the future of tank warfare based on the results of the Battle of Cambrai, November 1917.
- "Transportation: The Fifth 'G'?" by Captain Warren S. Everett, in *Infantry Journal*, November-December 1940 (XLVII, 560-66).
- "A Motorized Reconnaissance Unit in the Polish Campaign: Mława, Przasnysz Ciechanow," in *Army Quarterly*, April 1940 (XL, 103-108). An article based on an account which appeared in the *Militär Wochenblatt* of December 15, 1939.
- "Air Defence in the Field," by Lieutenant-Colonel G. L. Appleton, in *Army Quarterly*, January 1940 (XXXIX, 278-87).
- "The Air Battle for Britain," by F. A. de V. Robertson, in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, October 1940 (CXXVIII, 322-29). Factors and prospects in the struggle of the R. A. F. against the *Luftwaffe*.
- "Small Pox in the American War of Independence," by Hugh Thursfield, in *Annals of Medical History*, July 1940 (3rd ser., II, 312-18). Brief study of effects of small pox on the British and American armies.

WEAPONS AND ORDNANCE

- "The Early Evolution of Firearms," in *The Gun Report*, November 1940. Condensations of Sir Samuel Meyrick's history of arms and armor (1824); this first instalment covers 1377-1415.
- "Brigadier General John Jacob and His Rifle," by Charles Boulkes, in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Winter 1940 (XIX, 193-97).
- "The German Solothurn," by L. E. Olson, in *The American Rifleman*, November 1940, pp. 27-29. Brief analysis of the German light machine gun, Model 1934.

ESTABLISHMENTS

British Empire

- "From Oxford to the Army," by R. J. M. Goold-Adams, in *The Quarterly Review*, July 1940 (CCLXXV, 28-46). An inside account of the Officer Cadet Training Units in an English university.
- "The Royal Air Force in the Second Three Months of the War," by Air Commodore P. F. M. Fellowes, in *Army Quarterly*, April 1940 (XL, 81-89).
- "Canada at War," in *Fortune*, November 1940 (XXII, 51-57 ff.). A description of Canada's enormously expanded industry.
- "Australia's New Army," by Donald Cowie, in *Army Quarterly*, October 1939 (XXXIX, 56-67). An account of recent changes in the organization of Australian military forces.
- "Marching from Old Bengal," by Lieutenant-Colonel P. R. Butler, in *Army Quarterly*, October 1939 and January 1940 (XXXIX, 137-48, 308-17). The normal routine of soldiering in India in the latter part of the eighteenth century.

France

"Une Histoire de l'Armée Française," by André Bellessort, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, September 1, 1939 (LIII, 170-93).

Germany

"The German Army and the War," by Herbert Rosinski, in *Army Quarterly*, January 1940 (XXXIX, 247-53). The condition of the German army at the outbreak of the present war.

United States

"National Defense: The Sinews," in *Fortune*, October 1940 (XXII, 52-58 ff.). How the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense is mobilizing industry for defense and its great weakness, lack of power.

"Defense Economy of the United States: An Inventory of Raw Materials," by J. C. de Wilde and George Monson, in *Foreign Policy Reports*, November 15, 1940 (XVI, 201-12). A detailed and competent estimate of American potentials in raw materials.

"The Emergency National Defense Organization," by Joseph P. Harris, in *Public Administration Review*, Autumn 1940 (1, 1-24). A study of the functions of civil agencies participating in the current defense program.

"The United States Army," by Frank C. Hanighen, in *Harpers Magazine*, December 1940 (CLXXXII, 1-13). A brief summary of its strength and weakness.

"The Armored Force and Its Development," by Lieutenant Colonel Percy G. Black, in *The Cavalry Journal*, November-December 1940 (XLIX, 484-88). Brief general review of the background and mission of the Armored Division.

"Fleet Base," in *Fortune*, December 1940 (XXII, 61-67 ff.). Depicts the dangers of the United States' present lack of major fleet operating bases.

"Early History of the Washington Artillery of New Orleans," by Powell A. Casey, in *The Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, April 1940 (XXIII, 471-84).

OPERATIONS AND BIOGRAPHY

"An Amphibious Campaign: North Holland, 1799," by Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred H. Burne, in *Army Quarterly*, October 1939 (XXXIX, 103-23). An account of the British invasion against the French army of occupation under General Brune.

"Bookseller in Arms," by Major Charles Winslow Elliott, in *Infantry Journal*, November-December 1940 (XLVII, 580-91). A brief sketch of Henry Knox.

"Gunner in Luzon: Part VII," by Brigadier General E. D. Scott, in *The Field Artillery Journal*, November-December 1940 (XXX, 478-84). The conclusion of his memoirs of the Philippine Insurrection.

World War

"Field Artillery Firing Centers," in *The Field Artillery Journal*, November-December 1940 (XXX, 447-55). Continuing the extracts from the memoirs of Major General William J. Snow.

"The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Armies," by Colonel Sir Thomas Cuninghame, in *Army Quarterly*, October 1939 (XXXIX, 124-36).

"La Revolution Allemande et la Guerre," by Albert Rivaud, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, November 15, 1939 (LIV, 137-56).

1919-1940

"Sur la Guerre," by General Henri Gouraud, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, May 1940 (LVII, 247-58). Comments on the war by a distinguished French soldier just prior to the French collapse.

"The Second German War, 1939: The First Three Months," by Lieutenant-Colonel H. de Wateville, in *Army Quarterly*, January 1940 (XXXIX, 235-46).

"La Lutte Millénaire des Polonais et des Allemands," by Henri Bidou, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, October 1, 1939 (LIII, 481-91).

- "La Campagne des Allemands en Pologne," by General Niessel, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, December 1, 1939 (LIV, 309-24).
- "The Rape of Poland," in *Army Quarterly*, January 1940 (XXXIX, 214-23). An article based on German statements in the neutral press and German *communiqués* and press notices.
- "Les Champs de Bataille: Hollande et Belgique," by Henri Bidou, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, June 1940 (LVII, 448-58).
- "The Retreat to Dunkirk," in *The Field Artillery Journal*, November-December 1940 (XXX, 437-45). A digest of British accounts, published and unpublished, with emphasis on field artillery experience.
- "Czestochowa—Le Martyre de la Cité Sainté," by Maurice Lewandowski, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, October 15, 1939 (LIII, 613-23).
- "Breakthrough M-1940," by Major Wendell G. Johnson, in *Infantry Journal*, November-December 1940 (XLVII, 539-45). An analysis of the German offensive of June 1940.
- "Silhouettes de Guerre: Le Général Gamelin," by "Fidus," in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, October 1, 1939 (LIII, 492-96).
- "Silhouettes de Guerre: Le Général Georges," by Général de Castelnau, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, October 15, 1939 (LIII, 609-12).
- "Silhouettes de Guerre: Le Général Héring," by A. Lichtenberger, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, November 15, 1939 (LIV, 166-70).
- "Silhouettes de Guerre: Le Général Sikorski," by Maurice Lewandowski, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, December 1, 1939 (LIV, 403-10).

CUSTOMS AND ANTIQUITIES

- "Some Military Customs and Survivals," by Major T. J. Edwards, in *Army Quarterly*, January and April 1940 (XXXIX, 341-53; XL, 153-62).

NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

INDUSTRIAL SURVEY, 1811

The broadside reproduced as the frontispiece (p. 198) is of interest because of the present activities under comparable circumstances of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense. The mobilization of industry in time of emergency appears to be no new thing. This copy of the broadside was forwarded to the Secretary of War by the Purveyor of Public Supplies and is to be found among the records of the War Department in The National Archives.¹ The covering letter explains Tench Coxe's reasons for issuing it:

Philadelphia, December 11th 1811

Sir,

A number of considerations arising out of the present situation of the United States have occasioned me to believe, that however capable our manufacturers are to furnish the supplies of the army various attentions on the part of the public offices will be useful and may be necessary.

As there is no board, effective association or office either of the United States, or of any member of the Union for the promotion of manufactures, nor any office of inspection or revenue to bring their local situations or aggregate values or amounts into the necessary view, and as such boards, offices & associations produce, in a very considerable degree in Europe, those effects, I have considered it probable that an effort like that which I have now the honor to submit to your examination, might prove a useful opening of the business. It may produce good consequences as far [as] it may affect our present or approaching wants for the ensuing calendar year; & it may have many useful tendencies, in respect to the general & permanent promotion of a manufacturing system, compatible with the rights & interests of agriculture, navigation & foreign commerce.

I have caused 200 copies of the printed paper to be prepared, and I have taken the liberty to place them in a train of convenient & respectful tender to the gentlemen of the two houses of Congress, hoping & trusting that they will be so good as to communicate them to three, four or five suitable persons of intelligence & public spirit, in their respective districts, & states. No measure more free from expence & promising more effect, at present occurs, and I hope, if there should appear in it any thing excusable in form or substance, it will be excused on the score of sincere good intention.

I have the honor to be, Sir, your respectful h. Serv^t

Tench Coxe
Purveyor of P. S.

W^m Eustis Esqr., Secy. of War.

¹ Secretary of War Letters Received File, VI-C-66.

NEW LIGHT ON CONFEDERATE PRISONS

Early in 1865 the Northwestern Branch of the United States Sanitary Commission planned a Great Sanitary and Soldier's Home Fair which was to be opened at Chicago on May 30 by President Lincoln. The Reverend William H. Ryder was appointed agent for the Committee on Arms, Trophies, and Curiosities and was requested to visit Richmond, City Point, and other places where western soldiers might be in camp or in hospital in order to report upon conditions and to gather materials for exhibit at the Fair. Ryder left Chicago on April 9, six days after the occupation of Richmond by Federal troops, and arrived in that city on April 14. He requested permission from the Provost Marshal to gather Confederate bonds and money and "papers of no value to the U. S. but of interest as relics of the rebellion [and] Relics from the battle of no historic or Commercial value."¹

Amid the confusion that reigned in Richmond on April 14 and the days that immediately followed, Ryder had no difficulty in helping himself to Confederate documents of various kinds. Among other things, he picked up two spindles of records of Richmond prisons. One spindle contained one hundred and fifteen permits to visit prisoners confined at Libby Prison, and the other contained the day by day reports of the officer in charge of the Confederate prisons in Richmond. These reports have been rediscovered among the Ryder manuscripts at Tufts College. The reports extend from March 22, 1862, to December 16, 1863. Reports for the months of July and August and for September 13, 14, and 21, 1862, and for June 24 and 25, 1863, are missing. Otherwise they are complete for the dates mentioned.

The reports show the number of prisoners of war, citizen prisoners (Northerners), Confederates, deserters from the Federals, and Negroes that were in prison each day, as well as the number of prisoners received and the number removed from the list each day and under each class. For the number removed from the list an explanation is given showing the number that escaped, that died, that were paroled, that were sent North under a flag of truce, that were transferred, that were released for various reasons, or that were shot by prison guards. Although various kinds of statistics could be compiled from these records, in view of the controversy that has raged in the past over the comparative death rates in Northern and Southern prisons probably the greatest general interest centers about that subject. The following table shows the number of prisoners at the beginning of each month and the number received and the number of deaths during the month.

¹ His letter of request was countersigned by the Provost Marshal with instructions to the District Provost Marshal that the "spirit of the request should be granted." The *Richmond Whig*, April 15, 1865, mentioned the fact that Ryder was in the city gathering materials for the Sanitary Fair. For a description of the conditions in Richmond relative to Confederate records see the *New York Times*, May 19, 1865.

	Prisoners	Received	Deaths
March 22, 1862	570	77	5
April 1862	671	260	5
May 1862	772	700	3
June 1862	710	2,964	46
September 1862	3,097	4,132	50
October 1862	857	2,328	6
November 1862	504	819	0
December 1862	353	1,483	33
January 1863	1,443	3,738	48
February 1863	1,205	401	15
March 1863	432	1,501	11
April 1863	445	2,161	15
May 1863	448	8,358	3
June 1863	440	5,797	1
July 1863	4,920	5,179	14
August 1863	4,436	1,734	1
September 1863	4,204	3,114	36
October 1863	7,913	6,826	143
November 1863	12,196	2,063	384
December 1863	10,514	1,597	181

The total number of prisoners held at Richmond during the twenty months covered by the reports was 55,802, and the total deaths amounted to 1,001. The percentage of deaths is therefore much smaller than the figure usually given as the mortality rate in Southern prisons.² Obviously these data must be used with discretion for no positive conclusion could be reached unless the records were complete until the end of the war and unless data could be found to establish the mortality rate among those prisoners who were transferred to other prisons. It is interesting, however, to make some comparisons. It was officially reported that out of seven thousand Southern prisoners at Fort Delaware three hundred died during the month prior to October 8, 1863.³ During the same period the mortality rate in the Richmond prisons was less than one-fourth as great. This comparison, however, like the one above, is subject to considerable interpretation. Although the prison reports show the number of prisoners sent to hospitals, they do not show the number of soldiers who may have been sent to hospitals upon their arrival in Richmond without having been listed among the prisoners. The probability that such a situation existed may account for the apparent difference in mortality rates at Richmond and at Fort Delaware. At best these reports provide additional evidence con-

² The best students of the subject have estimated about 15 per cent mortality in Southern prisons and 12 percent mortality in Northern prisons (Edward Channing, *A History of the United States* [New York, 1905-25], VI, 439; James F. Rhodes, *A History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850* [New York, 1893-1906], V, 509; William Best Hesseltine, *Civil War Prisons: A Study in War Psychology* [Columbus, 1930], p. 256).

³ *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, 1881-1901), ser. II, vol. VI, p. 309.

cerning Richmond prisons but in no sense conclusive evidence concerning the whole subject of prison mortality.

During the twenty months covered by these reports, sixty-nine prisoners escaped and two were shot by prison guards. These figures seem rather small considering the number of prisoners held and the fact that the guards were reported to be "as green as grass" and without knowing enough to shoulder arms. The "Yankee deserters" were apparently given some choice as to their disposition for on August 26, 1863, it was reported that twenty-four of them "changed their minds" and decided to be sent North as prisoners of war. A few prisoners of war asked not to be exchanged.

RUHL J. BARTLETT

A NOTE ON THE MINUTE-MEN

In his excellent study, *The First Year of the American Revolution*,¹ Allen French reviews the brief services and complete collapse of the Massachusetts minute-men in some detail and stresses the fact that the establishment, which was only partially organized at the outset, disintegrated and disappeared a few weeks after Lexington. He notes particularly that Massachusetts made no attempt to revive the minute-men and ignored the recommendation of the Continental Congress, July 18, 1775, which urged all of the colonies to form a part of their militia into minute companies. Beyond the mention of some action in Maryland, New Hampshire, and Connecticut, Mr. French does not state what action was taken in other colonies, though he suggests that some of them may have conformed.² In view of his conjecture and the important place occupied by the minute-men in American tradition, it might be of interest to note how the Congressional resolutions fared elsewhere. The record, though fragmentary as to details, is clear enough in the main to permit the reconstruction of the brief history of the minute-men in the middle colonies.

The resolutions, passed by Congress on July 18, 1775, recommended the organization of the entire adult male population of each colony as a militia force, subject to the control of the revolutionary government.³ Congress suggested that, after the regular militia establishment was formed, one-fourth part thereof be organized into minute companies which would receive additional training and be available for instant service. The Pennsylvania Committee of Safety had already recommended a similar scheme to the Associators on June 30.⁴ Mary-

¹ Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1934.

² This is not intended as a criticism since such inquiry was outside the scope of his study.

³ *Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789* (Washington, 1904-37), II, 189.

⁴ *Colonial Records [of Pennsylvania]: Minutes of the Provincial Council* (Philadelphia, 1852-53), X, 280; *Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801* (Harrisburg, 1896-1908), VIII, 487.

land followed on July 26.⁵ The Provincial Congress of New Jersey acted on August 16,⁶ and the revolutionary Congress of New York responded August 22.⁷ The Regulations of the various governments differed in such details as the number of men to a company and the method of enlistment, but aside from these the scheme was much the same everywhere.

After the regular militia was formed, one-fourth of the total number was to be separately organized into minute companies. These companies were to receive about twice as much training as the regular militia, except in New Jersey where no additional training was specified, and were to receive pay for the additional period. They were to be subject to call before the regular militia and could be marched into neighboring colonies if necessary. Moreover, when called into service they were to receive Continental pay and rations and be furnished with camp equipment, though the regulations were silent as to how or by whom such necessities were to be provided.

The actual organization, however, fell far short of the paper plans. In Pennsylvania the record shows the formation of minute-men only in York County.⁸ If other regiments were organized there is no record of them either in the proceedings of other county committees or in the records of the provincial government. No formal resolutions abolishing the minute-men were ever passed, and there is no reference to them in the militia law of August 19, 1775. What happened to the York County regiment we do not know. As for the rest of the colony, the only possible conclusion is that no organization developed.⁹

In Maryland some companies were organized. On January 15, 1776, three companies of minute-men were ordered to march to Northampton County, Virginia, for eight weeks' service.¹⁰ Two of them arrived at their destination and served for a time, but they were largely without military necessities when they started and found no supplies awaiting them in Virginia.¹¹ Even before these companies were called, the convention moved to abolish the organization. On January 1 that body resolved to raise a permanent force of 1,444 men to be taken into the pay of the province, and the minute-men were deemed to be no longer necessary.¹² On January 4 it was definitely decided that no more minute

⁵ *Proceedings of the Conventions of the Province of Maryland . . . in 1774, 1775, and 1776* (Baltimore, 1836), pp. 12-13.

⁶ *Minutes of the Provincial Congress and the Council of Safety of the State of New Jersey, 1774-1776* (Trenton, 1879), p. 179.

⁷ *Journals of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, etc. of the State of New York* (Albany, 1842), I, 114-22.

⁸ *Pennsylvania Archives* (1st ser., Philadelphia, 1852-56), IV, 640.

⁹ This is a reasonable deduction since all militia activities in Pennsylvania were on a voluntary basis and there was no directing head to the organizations until late in 1775.

¹⁰ *Proceedings of the Conventions of the Province of Maryland*, p. 107.

¹¹ *Archives of Maryland* (Baltimore, 1883-), XI, 173, 193.

¹² *Proceedings of the Conventions of the Province of Maryland*, p. 66.

companies should be enrolled and that none should be continued beyond the first of March.¹³

The Provincial Congress of New Jersey, February 24, 1776, appointed a committee "to prepare an ordinance for regulating the former minute department."¹⁴ From the committee's report we learn that the minute companies were in no condition to answer the purpose for which they were established, owing in part to the large number of enlistments into the Continental Army and in part to the lack of equipment and the inability of the Congress to supply it. The committee recommended the incorporation of the remnant into the regular militia, and their report was adopted.¹⁵

Some minute companies were formed in New York and there are occasional references to their being called for guard duty,¹⁶ but we do not know how many answered the calls. Where the record does chronicle their services, they appear to have been short and uneventful and accompanied by many appeals for equipment, pay, and subsistence.¹⁷ On May 25, 1776, the Provincial Congress appointed a committee "to take into consideration the state of the militia and report thereon with all speed."¹⁸ The report, June 5, strongly recommended the abolition of the minute-men. The committee considered the distinction between minute-men and common militia as being "ill-timed and unfortunate by not being well adapted to the state of things in this colony." In their opinion the whole scheme violated the sacred right of every militiaman to elect the officers under whom he would serve and was productive of great confusion.¹⁹ The report was adopted by a vote of twenty-nine to sixteen, and the minute-men ceased to exist even on paper.²⁰

From this brief record it is apparent that the minute-men of the middle colonies were a negligible, almost non-existent, factor in the War of Independence. The organization never reached a functioning state, and long before the campaign of 1776 carried the war into the middle colonies it had been abolished.²¹ There is no record of minute-men during the campaign of 1776, and no state government made any attempt to revive the establishment in any subsequent year of the war.

HUGH JAMESON

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

¹⁴ *Minutes of the Provincial Congress . . . of New Jersey*, p. 325.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 436.

¹⁶ *Journals of the Provincial Congress . . . of New York*, I, 261.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, I, 320, II, 125; *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*: [Volume XV:] *New York State Archives*: [Volume I:] *New York in the Revolution* (Albany, 1887), p. 72.

¹⁸ *Journal of the Provincial Congress . . . of New York*, I, 72.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 478.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 479.

²¹ The first call for any considerable body of militia from the middle colonies was issued by Congress on June 3, 1776.

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